The Kirkuk Conundrum

Abstract

This paper examines the changing nature of the Kirkuk problem in Iraq and the implications for its long-term resolution. It is argued that different state-building policies have transformed the Kirkuk problem from an ethno-territorial conflict between Kurdish elites and Baghdad to power struggles between representatives of local governing bodies, political parties and regional actors. The more complex space that defines the contemporary Kirkuk problem in post-Saddam Iraq has also encouraged shifts in identity politics. The notion of being ‘Kirkuki first’ has become salient alongside Kurdish nationalism. These transformations demand a more nuanced policy that addresses the diverse socio-economic and political components of the Kirkuk problem, alongside the ethnicized nature of political identities in which the dispute is centered. Before any referendum can be implemented, certain requisites and confidence-building measures must be established to assure stability and create a minimal level of trust between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad.

Notes

Kirkuk was one of the sanjaqs of the Ottoman Empire and became an independent province in 1919. It was annexed to the Iraqi state in 1925 as part of Mosul province. Administrative units within Kirkuk also changed during the early state period, decreasing from eight districts (qaza) to four by 1947.

Oil was first produced from the Kirkuk fields in 1927 in Baba Gurgur (well K172) and Ain Zala. It was exported through the main, northern pipeline system (Banias and Tripoli in Syria and Lebanon) on the Mediterranean coast, to Turkey through the Iraqi–Turkish line to the Terminal Porto, Cihan and the Mediterranean, and to Basra southward through the strategic line at Haditha.

Interview with Arif Qorbani, independent researcher and former director of the Kirkuk city television station, 15 October 2006, Arbil.

Qaymiyya Arab nationalism refers to pan-Arab nationalism. It emphasizes the revival of the Arab nation, of which Iraq was a central part, and does not recognize the authenticity of non-Arab identities. It can be contrasted to wataniyya nationalism, or Iraqi patriotism, which focuses on an Iraqi identity based on linguistic and cultural ties between groups living in the same geographical area. Wataniyya nationalism recognizes the local identities of non-Arab groups and views the Kurds as partners in Iraq. It is important to note that wataniya nationalism has undergone changes in the states in which it has emerged (see Natali, 2005, pp. 35–36).

The manifestation of Kurdish nationalism, like other nationalisms, is not naturally ethnicized. Rather, it became ethnicized in relation to the changing nature of the political space in the countries in which Kurds reside. For instance, until the late imperial period the political space was largely defined by Islam and the socio-economic distinctions of the underdeveloped Kurdistan regions. Most Kurds identified as part of the majority Sunni Muslim millet, as well as according to their tribal and localist identities. The creation of the modern Middle East state systems, division of Kurdish communities across borders, and emergence of official state nationalisms based on ethnicized Arab, Turkish and Persian nationalism created a new type of political space that encouraged the ethnicization of Kurdish nationalism.

Interview with Nuri Talabany, member of the Kurdish National Assembly, 7 October 2007, Arbil. The Iraqi elite used the term ‘montequeya’ as an Ottoman province, not ‘iqlim Kurdistan’, which refers to a distinct vilayet or state. When Jelal Talabani presented the issue of Kirkuk as central to Kurdish autonomy at a March 1963 conference in Koysinjaq, the Iraqi leadership rejected it. Already engaged in unification negotiations with Cairo, Iraqi officials required Talabani to revise Kurdish demands to a weakened form of decentralization. Similarly, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), demanded Kirkuk as an integral part of a proposed autonomous region (delineated as the borders of the Hamrin mountains); however, his requests were ignored by Iraqi leaders.

Disputed territories include Sinjar, Tel Afar, Zammar, Sheikhan, east Mosul, Makhmur, Tuz Khurmatu, Kifri, Khanaqin and Mandali.

Interview with Mr Ahmad, General Directorate of Planning, Ministry of Finance, Kurdistan Regional Government, 27 November 2007, Arbil. Other Kurdish informants have made similar comments to me since 2005.

Interview with anonymous student resident of Kirkuk, 11 March 2008, Arbil. The PUK concentrates its land distributions in the area between Chamchamal, Kirkuk and Suleymaniya, whereas the KDP focuses on areas between Kirkuk and Arbil (Hawler).

In the first election Kurds, Christians and independents (five of whom were Kurds) aligned with each other. Ismail Hadidi and Irfan Kirkuki personally supported the Kurds, creating a pro-Kurdish bloc of 20 in the 30-member council and upsetting the balance of power. The distribution of seats was as follows: Iraq Turcoman Front (eight) (includes four Turcoman parties and has four members in the Iraqi Parliament and one in the KRG), Turcoman Islamic Coalition (one), Iraqi National Assembly (one), Iraqi Republican Assembly (one) and Kirkuk Brotherhood List (26). Tasin Kahhiya, a Turcoman Shi'a, became president of the Kirkuk provincial council. He was replaced by Rizgar Ali, a Kurd, after the December 2005 election.

Interview with Mohammed Towfiq, former PUK politburo member, 16 May 2008, Suleymaniya.

Interview with anonymous development consultant in Kirkuk, 23 May 2008, Arbil. Peace Winds and Qandil had small projects in Kirkuk.

Interviews with dozens of anonymous Kurdish Kirkukis, many of whom are students in the Kurdistan region, during different periods from September 2007 to May 2008, Arbil and Suleymaniya.