Notes
See, most notably, Buzan Citation(l991), Job Citation(l992), Wriggins Citation(l992), Ayoob Citation(l995), Holsti Citation(l996), Maoz Citation(l997), Lake & Morgan Citation(l997), Solingen Citation(l998), Kacowicz Citation(l998), Lemke Citation(2002) and Buzan & Weaver Citation(2003). For works sharing the regionalist theme but not dealing only with security, see Fawcett & Hurrel Citation(l995) and Holm & Sorensen Citation(l995). See also Katzenstein (Citationl996, Citation2005).
For an overview of this debate, see Miller (Citation2007, chapter 1).
The closest is Van Evera Citation(l995), who uses the term ‘the state-to-nation ratio’. I develop further the partly related concepts of the ‘state-to-nation balance’ and ‘congruence’ and use them, in conjunction with the effects of the great powers, to create a coherent account of variations in regional war and peace.
For the full continuum of the typology of the dependent variables (hot war, cold war, cold peace, and warm peace), see Miller (Citation2007, chapter 2).
The issue of the great powers is discussed at length in Miller (Citation2007, chapters 2, 5 and 6). The evolution of warm peace is also not addressed here (see Miller, Citation2007, chapter 2, 7, 8 and 9).
The Correlates of War Project suggests no less than 1,000 battle deaths from all sides as a part of the definition of war. See Small & Singer (Citationl982, pp. 38, 54); see also Vasquez (Citation1993, pp. 21–29). Yet a strict adherence to such a precise figure is unnecessary in a qualitative study such as this one. Accordingly, one might refer to the phenomenon I investigate here in the more loose terms of ‘armed conflict’, ‘hostilities’ or ‘organized violence’ in addition to hot war.
On institutionalization as a key to political development, see Huntington Citation(l968). See also Nettl Citation(l968), who developed the concept of ‘stateness’—the institutional centrality of the state; for a recent review of stateness, see Evans Citation(l997). The relations between stateness and regional conflict are developed by Ben-Dor Citation(l983).
See Gause (Citationl992, p. 457), and the references he cites therein.
See also the indicators in Rotberg Citation(2003), especially pp. 4–22.
On the definition of state and nation, see Akzin Citation(l964), Gellner (Citationl983, pp. 3–7), Connor (Citationl994, pp. 90–117), Smith (Citation2000, p. 3), and especially Barrington (Citation1997, pp. 712–716), who emphasizes ‘the belief in the right to territorial self-determination for the group’ as a central part of the definition of a ‘nation’, which is central for distinguishing nations from other collectivities. Although many groups hold common myths, values and symbols (including ethnic groups), nations are unified by a sense of purpose: controlling the territory that the members of the group believe to be theirs. As Gellner suggests, ‘nationalism’ is ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (l983, p. 1). Thus, nationalism is the active pursuit of control by a national group over the territory that it defines as its homeland. As a result, every nationalist movement involves the setting of territorial boundaries (Barrington, Citationl997, p. 714), and national conflicts must involve disputes over territory to be truly ‘national’. Key works on nationalism include Gellner Citation(l983), Anderson Citation(l991), Smith (Citationl986, Citation2000) and Hobsbawm Citation(l990) (these works are cited, for example, in Smith Citation(2000) and Suny (Citationl999–2000, p. 145). See also Breuilly Citation(l993).
In contrast to Van Evera Citation(l995), who focuses on ethnic nationalism, I accept that nationalism can be either ethnic or civic. Civic nationalism focuses on citizen identification with the nation-state at its current territorial boundaries as opposed to a loyalty based on subnational or trans-border ethnic ties, which may challenge the existing boundaries. In ethnic nationalism, based on lineage and common ancestry, the nation precedes the state (the ‘German model’), whereas in the civic version, the state precedes the nation (the ‘French model’). See Brubaker Citation(l992). On the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, see Smith Citation(l986) and Greenfeld Citation(l992). For a useful overview, see Kupchan (Citationl995, chapter 1.
For example, in region A there are ten states. Seven of them are multinational, and in eight of them there is at least one majority ethno-national group that also resides in other regional states. In region B there are also ten states, out of which six are multinational, whereas in only two of the regional states does a majority national group live that also inhabits other states in the region. The combined state-to-nation measure for region A is 7+8/10=15/10; the combined state-to-nation measure for region B is 6+2/10=8/10. Thus, the state-to-nation imbalance is much higher in region A than in region B.
On the effects of settlement patterns on the inclination, legitimacy and capacity of ethnic groups to secede, see Toft Citation(2002/3). See also Gurr (Citation2000, pp. 75–76).
On the exclusionary policies of dominant ethno-national groups in the political, military and economic domains, see Weiner (Citationl987, pp. 35–36, 40–41).
Buzan (Citationl991, chapter 2) distinguishes between two types of multinational state: imperial and federal. In the federal state no single nation dominates (such as Switzerland, Canada and Belgium), whereas the imperial state uses coercion to impose the control of one nation over others (such as Austria-Hungary or the Soviet Union). As multinational states, both types of state are potentially vulnerable to nationalist pressures to secede. In the case of the imperial, its stability depends on the ability of the dominant nation to maintain its control as a strong state. The federal state constitutes, however, a middle category between deeply divided and well-integrated societies (Horowitz, Citationl994, p. 37). Although ethnic groups have strongly held political aspirations and interact as groups, several favorable conditions have moderated the effects of ethnic conflict, among them, the emergence of ethnic issues late in relation to other cleavages and to the development of parties, so that party politics is not a perfect reflection of ethnic conflict. Among these states are Switzerland, Canada and Belgium—all, significantly, federations. These are also called consociational (Switzerland and Belgium) or semiconsociational (Canada) democracies—a power-sharing arrangement among ethnic groups (Lijphart, Citationl977; Walzer, l997). In deeply divided societies, such as Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, the moderating conditions are absent. This issue is also discussed in Miller (chapter 8 and in the conclusions).
For a comprehensive list of seccessionist attempts, see Gurr Citation(2000). For a list of all secessionist and irredentist crises, l945–l988, see Carment & James (Citationl997, pp. 215–218).
For a useful index of the failed states and an updated and comprehensive ranking of 60 failed countries, see Foreign Policy (July–August 2008, pp. 64–68). See also the discussion and references in Miller (Citation2007, chapter 2).
On the demand for the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, see Miller (Citation2007, chapter 4).
On revisionist versus status quo states, see Wolfers (Citationl962, pp. 18–19, 96–97, 125–126), Schweller (Citationl994, Citationl996 (which includes citations to other works who make similar distinctions in note 31, pp. 98–99), Citationl998, pp. 22–24, 84–89). See also Kupchan Citation(1998) and Buzan (Citationl991, chapter 8). On aspiring revisionist regional powers in the post-Cold War era, see Job (Citationl997, p. 187).
The Middle Eastern cases are discussed at length in Miller (Citation2007, chapter 4).
On other types of relation in this triangle, see Brubaker Citation(l996).
Irredentist conflicts include those between: Iran and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab; Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province; Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden; Pakistan and India over Kashmir; Serbia with Croatia and Bosnia in the l990s; and the post-Soviet conflict between Armenia and Ajrabijan on Nagorno-Karabach. For a list of all irredentist (and also secessionist) crises, l945–l988, see Carment and James (Citationl997, pp. 215–218).
For a recent empirical study that shows a significant increase in dyadic conflict when two states share an ethnic group and an ethnic majority exists in at least one of the states, see Woodwell Citation(2004).
For a variety of examples, see Smith (Citation2000, pp. 67–68).
See Chazan Citation(l991), Saideman Citation(2001) and Woodwell (Citation2004, p. 201). For examples of states that preferred to support a secession of their ethnic kin rather than irredentism because of realpolitik considerations, see Horowitz (Citationl991, p. 15); but at least some of these cases can be explained based on the minority–minority pattern discussed later.
Although in some cases such a response might be motivated also by ideological conviction (or due to economic/political bribes and military assistance offered by the revisionist states), ethno-nationalist response is likely to have especially destabilizing effects on regional security because of the challenges it poses to the existing boundaries, as stipulated earlier.
In Lake's Citation(l997) terms, such effects constitute security externalities or trans-border ‘spillovers’.
For a useful overview of both irredentism and the secession challenge, see Mayall (Citationl990, pp. 57–63).
With respect to war, several empirical studies have shown evidence of such ‘contagion’ or ‘diffusion’ at an intra-regional, rather than inter-regional level. See Geller & Singer (Citation1998, pp. 106–108) for an overview.
On the connections between secession and irredentism, see Horowitz Citation(l992).
For an overview of recent works on diversionary wars, see Levy (Citationl998, pp. 152–158).
On the role of emotions in ethinc conflict, see Peterson Citation(2002).
For studies that show that ethnic/national claims are major sources of territorial conflicts, see Mandel Citation(l980), Luard (Citationl986, pp. 421–447, especially pp. 442–447), Holsti (Citationl991, especially pp. 140–142, 144–145, 214–216, 274–278, 280, 308), Carment Citation(l993), Carment & James Citation(l997), Huth (Citationl996, pp. 108–112, l999, pp. 53–57), White Citation(2000) and Woodwell Citation(2004).
Although German unification continued to pose a challenge to stability until l990, systemic factors outside the purview of the model—bipolarity and mutually assured destruction—stabilized the relations between the two parts of Europe during the Cold War. The expulsion of the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after l945, however, reduced German irredentism towards this region.
For an elaborate discussion of the effects of the type of great power engagement on regional war and peace, see Miller (Citation2007, chapters 2, 5 and 9).
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