Autonomy Impaired: Centralisation, Authoritarianism and the Failing Iraqi State

Abstract

Regional autonomy is guaranteed in the constitution of Iraq, yet between 2006 and 2014 the Shiite prime minister at the time, Nouri al-Maliki, did his utmost to limit the power of both Kurds and Sunnis. Maliki worked to further centralise governance and amassed greater controls and power—from militarily to legislative—for his party. Instead of strengthening and securing Iraq, Maliki's actions have led to a rise in both Kurdish and Sunni nationalisms, which has resulted in civil war and the effective failure of the Iraqi state. This article analyses how Maliki's actions enabled the rise of the Islamic State, and have changed the dynamics of Iraq. It proposes that, in light of these changes, the best way forward for the effective running of the country is the implementation of federalism across Iraq.

ORCID

Dylan O'Driscoll http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5938-3809

Notes

1. Although referred to as the Islamic State in this article, this term only came into being after a caliphate was declared on 29 June 2014 and they were formerly known, and are often still referred to, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. They are also often referred to as Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym for their name.

2. The Kurdish leadership postponed the referendum and stated that they would give Iraq and the new government ‘one last chance’ to prove that Iraq can succeed and that the central government will fulfill its previous promises.

3. This includes the period when Maliki acted as a de facto prime minister between the 2014 election results on 19 May and the formation of the new government under Haider al-Abadi on 08 September 2014.

4. The works prior to 1993 examined purely the consociational element.

5. Their only reference to consociational theory post 1985 is to highlight that according to O'Leary consociation and federalism are two sides of the same coin. They completely ignore the major developments to the theory that have happened over the past 30 years, particularly that of liberal consociational theory.

6. For a detailed analysis of the use of sequential proportionality rules, particularly in Iraq, in the allocation of cabinet portfolios (see: O'Driscoll, 2014a, 2014b).

7. This can slow down negotiations through sub negotiations at the regional level. It can also lead to the call for higher demands, as the party feels a greater pressure to demonstrate their worth to their region.

8. In an interview conducted by the author in Kirkuk, Iraq, the spokesperson for the Asayesh (Kurdish secret police), Lieutenant Colonel Azad, alluded to Iranian, Turkish, as well as Qatarian interference in the politics of Iraq.

9. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law by the 31st December 2007. Article 58 calls for the normalisation of the disputed territories of Iraq, followed by a census and then a referendum on the future constitutional status (in Kirkuk's case whether it would join the KRG or not).

10. Additionally, in a lecture, ISIS, the state of Kurdistan and the State of Kurdistan, given by Brendan O'Leary (London, 30 March 2015) O'Leary stated that the prior to IS' success in Iraq the Kurdish prime minister asked him if he would advise the Sunni governors of Nineveh and Anbar in creating a region.

11. The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their borders changed by the previous regime and now involve disputes over the borders. They involve Kirkuk, Diyala, Nineveh, Salahaddin and the KRG.