Prud and Butmir Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Intra-ethnic Competition from the Perspective of Game Theory

Abstract

Local political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been unable not only to use existing political institutions but also to reform them. It triggered two informal attempts to create an agreement on the institutional reform undertaken in the years 2008–2009. The paper focuses on comparison of both processes, following the main assumption that decision-making processes in multi-ethnic environment depends not on inter-ethnic, but intra-ethnic competition. This argument was supported by Georg Tsebelis’ nested game theory, which explains the phenomenon by introducing the concept of two arenas and multiple games while one variable, monopoly of intra-ethnic representation, is considered crucial to limit the outbidding chain. Consequently, it was concluded that the Prud negotiations with exactly one actor from each group were supposed to be more successful than the much more diverse Butmir talks.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this article was presented at the Third Joint PhD Symposium on South East Europe (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL). For insightful comments on earlier version of this paper, the author thanks the symposium participants, Soeren Keil, and the two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. The terms Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and BiH will be used interchangeably.

2. Among recent proposals are: the municipalization model designed by a coalition of Bosnian NGOs K143 with the help of the DPC (K143, 2014) and the complex model proposed by the ICG.

3. The choice of these two attempts was based on the similarity of circumstances and actors, but it does not mean that these have been exclusively the only efforts devoted to the constitutional reform undertaken in Bosnia since 1995. Except for the April Package, it was also: ethnically exclusive declarations from 2007—the Fojnica Declaration (Fojnička deklaracija) and the Kreševo Declaration (Kreševska deklaracija); also the Mostar Declaration (Mostarska deklaracija)—an agreement on the police reform concluded by the six largest parties; and finally, the Sarajevo Agreement (Sarajevski dogovor) reached in 2002 by six political parties under the auspices of the High Representative and successfully implemented even though its provisions have been partly ignored (Stanisławski & Szpala, 2009, pp. 162–163; Krysieniel, 2012, pp. 330–331).

4. There are three characteristics of this type of politics: one principal issue axis—the ethnic conflict axis; competition within ethnic groups which creates strong incentives for parties to be diligent in asserting ethnic demands while outbidding is a constant possibility; boundaries of party support stop at the boundaries of ethnic groups (Horowitz, 2000, p. 346).

5. An ethnic party does not aspire to a universalistic platform; rather, its purpose is to secure political, economic and cultural benefits for an ethnic group. It typically has a low level of ideological coherence and programmatic commitment, is characterized by clientelism, must attract a majority of its support from a specific ethnic group as well as be organized to make demands on behalf of the group (McCulloch, 2013, p. 115).

6. According to the definition, only interaction between parties competing for support among voters identified with the same ethnic group (Zuber, 2012, pp. 5–6).

7. Application of game theory is always risky, and there are a lot of problems from which this approach suffers: unavoidable simplification and a set of rigorous assumptions difficult to apply in real-life situations seem to be among the most important. On the other hand, these simplifications, assumptions like rationality of actors (Shepsle, 2010, p. 17; Tsebelis, 1990b, p. 32) or acceptance of fixed elements approximate real situations and, as all forms of social science modeling, introduce rigor and precision to the analysis (Gates & Humes, 1997, pp. 5–6).

8. Power-sharing elites are also described as engaged in a second type of nested game that comprises an intra and an interethnic arena—the ability of leaders to gain and maintain power is dependent upon both of them (Belloni & Deane, 2005, p. 221).

9. Tsebelis was not the only one who came up with the idea of two arenas. In international relations, similar logic stands behind Robert Putnam's model of a two-level game in which the politics of international negotiations comprises two levels: national and international (Putnam, 1988).

10. There are two prisoners (A and B) and each of them is offered a bargain, they can either betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime or cooperate with the other by remaining silent. If A and B betray each other (mutual intransigence), each of them serves two years in prison, if A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa) and if A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve one year in prison (mutual cooperation).

11. Both Prud and Butmir Processes were negotiations behind closed doors, but the public was informed about the talks—thus the information variable should not be ignored. However, it is impossible to differentiate in which case its strength was higher and to what extent defined outcomes of both processes. Consequently, the information variable is assumed to be equal in both processes and the monopoly of representation variable is accepted as crucial for the understanding of both cases.

12. It was six parties which had created the parliamentary majority and two parties from the opposition (SDP and SNSD) while SBiH as the only one did not sign the agreement (Pejanović, 2012, pp. 170–173).

13. As it was mentioned above, there was one significant constitutional change undertaken in 2002, devoted to the implementation of power-sharing structures at cantonal and entity levels, supported only by SDP, SBiH and NHI and finally imposed by the HR (Marković, 2012, pp. 406–407).

14. In short, for the Serbs, too many responsibilities were transferred to the central level; for the Bosniaks, the integrity of the state was threatened; according to the Croats, reforms gave them nothing (Popov-Momčinović, 2012, p. 270).

15. The talks were held in the EUFOR military base Butmir, located on the outskirts of Sarajevo. The frame was then obvious: like in 1995, it was again a military base and with heavy international presence. Consequently, the talks were framed as Dayton 2 which should have had a symbolical meaning (Alic, 2009).

16. The proximity of 2010 general elections (the time variable) seems to be a serious factor influencing the outcome of the Butmir talks that could undermine the main argument of this paper. Yet, elections only highlighted the competition between parties inside blocks—it was the representation variable that was the decisive factor—if there was no competition, the elections could not have this impact on the situation.

17. The so-called five objectives and two conditions set out by the PIC in February 2008 which need to be met by the BiH authorities prior to the closure of the OHR (2000).

18. Constitutional changes accepted in Prud should have been a basis for talks at the level of parliamentary commission consisting of representatives of all major political parties (Dnevni avaz, 2009).

19. SBiH and SDA shared a vision of a state without internal borders (without the entities), but that is where the consensus between them ends. SDA, as a party with heterogeneous ideological legacy, cherishes the heritage of the wartime struggle to defend the multi-ethnic Bosnian but remains pan-Bosniak and pro-Islam (ICG, 2010, p. 9). SBiH used to emphasize state building and Bosnian patriotism over specifically Bosniak or Islamic identity, but since 2006, the party has radicalized which included Silajdžić’s radical promises, among others to abolish the RS, which were not kept (Pejanović, 2012, p. 111).

20. The change in Tihić’s behavior was visible in the discussion on ownership of state property. It did not take place before the 5th SDA Congress—at that time, the international community agreed that the country's property should be divided between the state and two entities—in accordance with the Prud Agreement also signed by Tihić. But, under the pressure of the political climate, Bosniak electorate and partners from the coalition, he changed his position and agreed that the property should be owned by the state, and only what will not be needed at this level should be transferred to the entities (Slobodna Bosna, 2009).

21. Already in 2000, Silajdžić, in his Memorandum, talked about the necessity to revise the Dayton Agreement (OHR RTRS News Summary 2000; Silajdžić 1999–2000). Also in October 2008, as a Chairman of the BiH Presidency, he presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe a plan of comprehensive constitutional reform (Haris Silajdžić: Comprehensive reform of the Dayton, 2008).

22. Party with communist roots, calls itself Bosnia's biggest multiethnic party, but has mostly Bosniaks support and attracts traditional SDA and SBiH voters. With time, the party's multiethnic image has been destroyed—SDP has in effect become a Bosniak party (ICG, 2010, p. 9).

23. After the 2006 elections, SNSD has become the most powerful Serbian political party in BiH. Its leader, Milorad Dodik, emphasizes mainly RS, putting BiH at the second plan and isolating himself from the politics of SDS (Majstorović et al., 2010). The party called for the OHR's closure, demanded Bosnia to be reconfigured into a ‘union of federal states’ and used rhetoric shifting between claims for autonomy and independence (ICG, 2009, p. 2; Morrison, 2009, p. 17).

24. According to Tihić’s words, these four parts—regions—should be organized around four main towns: Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla, so Bosnia will not be a country of two entities, nor of three (Nismo dogovoril granice 2009), which should be understood as a significant change in Bosniak politics, which has always been based on the unification of the country. Dodik claimed that BiH will be a federation with three constitutional units based on ethnicity with RS in its old borders, while Čović was convinced that the third Croat entity will also cover part of RS's territory (Slobodna Bosna, 2009).

25. As a third power in the RS, the party agrees that the Serbian entity is the best solution at that moment, but it does not disqualify changes in the structure of BiH (Marković, 2012, p. 392). Frequently described as ‘daughter who dances with everyone' since it has cooperated with both SDS and SNSD (Najgore je prošlo, 2006).

26. Since 2006, the Croat electorate is divided into HDZ BiH and the breakaway HDZ-1990. HDZ had had a radical, nationalist agenda, promoting the creation of a separate Croat entity; however, since the 1999 democratic reforms in Croatia, it has changed his politics toward more moderate positions, but still concentrated on some form of territorial autonomy claiming that the Croats in BiH—as the smallest constitutional nation—are endangered (Morrison, 2009, p. 17; Marković, 2012, p. 391). What is interesting is that Čović presented Prud's conclusions to the other Croat parties which signed the Kreševo Declaration and discussed their initial support (Nezavisne novine 2009), this being the only block which tried to create an intra-ethnic consensus.

27. Created after the failure of the April Package when a group of HDZ's senior figures, led by Božo Ljubić and Martin Raguž, broke away on the basis of a personal disagreements (ICG, 2010, pp. 10–11). In effect, HDZ 1990 participated in the 2006 elections with radical, nationalistic program describing the position of the Croats in Bosnia as deprived of sovereignty (Pejanović, 2012, p. 112; Vričko, 2010).