Engaging Diasporas in Development and State-Building: The Role of the Kurdish Diaspora and Returnees in Rebuilding the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Abstract

Diasporas can play an important part in contemporary social processes, either via remittances, investment, skills transfer, diaspora philanthropy or political influence. Currently, many states establish diaspora ministries or sub-committees under existing institutions to connect with their diaspora and tap their resources for development in the homeland. This paper contributes to this literature on the diaspora-homeland nexus by focusing on the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora and returnees. The paper analyzes the intricacies of diaspora and returnee involvement in state-building in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by discussing their capabilities and expectations as well as the tensions between the diaspora and the homeland.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Güneş Murat Tezcür, Shivan Fazil, Dylan O'Driscoll, Sardar Aziz, Elly Harrowell and Hawre Hasan Hama for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback during the peer-review process.

ORCID

Bahar Başer http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8583-5909

Notes

1 I participated in this conference with over 600 participants. It created transnational a platform for Kurdish policy makers, diplomats, civil society organizations and the diaspora to discuss the future of Kurdistan and its place in the Middle East. See: http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=45538 (Last access 28 February 2018).

2 As one of my interviewees at the Congress put it, what happened to Kurdistan in the recent years was a ‘miracle’.

3 I thank Dr. Bayar Dosky for conducting the interviews in the KRI as part of this project.

4 Our sample included 9 female and 17 male interviewees. One of the reasons we found it hard to reach female interviewees was that in most cases men return and bring their families afterwards or they leave them in the host countries. Secondly, the research assistant was male and he found it hard to reach female interviewees in Kurdistan’s relatively conservative setting.

5 Two of these interviews were conducted face to face in London and three of them were conducted via skype with academics who are based in the KRI.

6 For more information on the KRG’s ‘success story’ and the recent economic and political crises see Soguk (2015) and Sumer and Joseph (2018).

7 http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/reports/349883 (Last access 28 March 2018).

8 The Anfal Campaigns refer to the Saddam Regimes genocidal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds between 1986 and 1989, killing almost 200,000 people. The Halabja chemical attack occurred on 16 March 1988 and killed more than 5000 Kurdish civilians.

9 Interview with the President of the Kurdish Institute, Kendal Nezan, November 2013, Paris, France.

10 http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&s=02010200&r=73&a=45562&s=010000 (Last access 28 March 2018).

11 http://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/10062017 (Last access 28 March 2018).

12 For more information on KRG’s diaspora engagement policies see Baser (2018).

13 Author’s interview with Dr. Sardar Aziz, June 2018.

14 Diaspora Kurds also have the right to vote or to be elected if they are Iraqi citizens and can provide the necessary documentation required to practice these rights.

15 http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/201020177 (Last access 28 March 2018).

16 The KRG has introduced various laws including the Investment Law (July 2006) which stated that foreign investors shall be treated as national and local investors. The law did not provide any exemptions to the diaspora therefore diaspora entrepreneurs were treated the same way as nationals or foreign investors, unless of course they have a special agreement with the KRG via personal initiatives and contacts. See the law: http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/print.aspx?l=12&smap=010000&p=293 (Last Access June 2018). Currently the KRG is introducing new tax systems for private sector therefore these laws might change in the short run. See: http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/economy/7543c01a-6b71-438f-91c6-b3fe6c205a28.

17 Interview with a returnee from Germany, Erbil, April 2016.

18 Although patriotic motivations played big role in convincing the diasporans to return, the political situation in the KRI as well as the economic crisis compelled many to re-return to their host countries. This shows that initial motivations might not be sustained after return and priorities might be reshuffled depending on the ever-evolving situation in the homeland.

19 Author’s interview with Gorran Representatives in Berlin, April 2013.

20 Interview with Kendal Nezan, Paris, November 2013.

21 Author’s interview, November 2012, Stockholm, Sweden.

22 Author’s interview with Newzad Hirori, November 2012, Stockholm, Sweden.

23 Author’s interview, October 2013, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

24 http://www.qandil.org/ (Last access 28 March 2018).

25 See: http://ikwro.org.uk/ (Last access 28 March 2018).

26 Author’s interview with Dr. Sardar Aziz, June 2018.

27 The interviews took place in London (December 2012), Paris (November 2013), In the Hague (September 2013), in Geneva (May 2016), in Germany (April 2016).

28 Author’s interview with Dr. Fuad Hussein, April 2013, Erbil, KRI.

29 http://kw.krg.org/en/diaspora (Last access 28 March 2018).

30 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013.

31 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013.

32 Author’s interview, Erbil, April 2013.

33 Author’s interview with a returnee from the UK, Erbil, April 2013.

34 See also: http://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/017FBFC47C78EE5341560187F4FBBDD3/Returning-Kurdish-diaspora-students-seek-KRG-s-attention.html (Last access 28 March 2018).

35 Interview with a returnee from the UK, Duhok, April 2016.

36 Author’s interview with a returnee from the UK, Erbil, April 2013.

37 Interview with a returnee from the USA, Erbil, May 2016.

38 Interview with a returnee from Canada, Duhok, April 2016.

39 Author’s interview with a returnee from the Netherlands, April 2013.

Additional information

Funding

This research for this article was funded by an ERC Project, “Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty” (2012–2014) [grant number: 284198] and Coventry University’s Research Funding Scheme (2014–2016).