A Multilevel Theory of Democratic Secession

Abstract

In this paper, the author sketches a relational approach that regards secession as the political upgrading of a self-governing territory within a multilevel constellation of polities. The author considers territorial integrity, democratic diversity and recognition requirements as general constraints on secession from democratic polities. These principles support substantive and procedural conditions that vary, however, for local, sub-state regional and international secessions. Exit of a member state from a union is the only context in which secession is a unilateral right and even then it is constrained by a duty to negotiate fair terms of separation.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers and Jean-Thomas Arrighi and Dejan Stjepanovic, the editors of this special issue, as well as Joseph Lacey and David Owen for very helpful written comments and the participants at workshops in Neuchatel, Stockholm, Hamburg and at the EUI in Florence for oral feedback on early drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. There is a second reason for distinguishing cases of democratic secession from those of postcolonial independence. Unlike the former, the latter involves a normatively well-supported primary right to self-determination that is also recognized in international law. There are mixed cases, such as the claim for independence of New Caledonia from France. In such contexts, the substantive and procedural principles proposed in this paper have to be modified by taking into account the special weight of indigenous self-determination rights.

2. Depending on how polities determine their citizenry, however, this does not exclude partial overlaps. In the international system, individuals retain their citizenship of origin when residing in the territory of another polity and increasing numbers are even dual citizens.

3. According to Philip Roeder, ‘new nation-states have mostly come from administrative upgrade of segment-states’ (Roeder 2007, p. 11). I extend this idea here to within-state secessions.

4. The notion of population or territorial transfers is generally used to refer to top-down arrangements that are neither initiated, nor desired by the population concerned, which is why I use the more neutral term of territorial realignment.

5. Cases in recent history are extremely rare. The annexation of Crimea by Russia does not qualify as it was carried out by military intervention. A plebiscite held ex post under such conditions cannot confer legitimacy to a forceful territorial transfer.

6. As I am interested here in territorial secession, I do not discuss state withdrawal from international organisations (IOs). Unlike IOs, the EU has a common citizenship and a territory in which it exercises rather comprehensive jurisdiction. Other regional unions, especially those in South America, are gradually evolving towards regional polities with a common citizenship.

7. The view that plurinational diversity is a favourable condition for liberal democracy was defended by Lord Acton in his rebuttal of John Stuart Mill’s nationality principle (Acton, 1907).

8. See also Keating (2013, p. 175), who similarly defines territorial autonomy as ‘a relational concept, so that all polities are self-governing but interdependent’.

9. This use of ‘reflective equilibrium’ differs somewhat from John Rawls’ conception (1971, pp.48–51), which goes back and forth between moral principles and intuitions, rather than democratic principles and practices.

10. The territorial expansion of the US federation was not a procedure of voluntary association, but of colonisation and eventual upgrading of territories into states. Puerto Rico might eventually become the 51st state, but this option emerges from its current non-self governing status that is not compatible with the US constitution.

11. I thank David Owen for pushing me to clarify this point.

12. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this question.

13. See Laponce’s (1987) argument on why minority languages need territorial powers to survive.

14. The absence of such integrating mechanisms in the Spanish case may have contributed to the escalation of Catalan autonomy claims towards secessionism.

15. By contrast, plebiscitarian secession theories must regard such instrumental reasons as legitimate.

16. A proposal to turn Toronto into a federal province has been on the political agenda since the 1970s. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposal_for_the_Province_of_Toronto

17. Pure procedural legitimacy would be similar to Rawls’ concept of pure procedural justice, which refers to situations ‘in which there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct of fair whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed’ (Rawls 1971, p. 86).

18. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 based on decisions by the political leaders of the two federated republics and ratified by the federal parliament was therefore illegitimate from a democratic perspective. This assessment is reinforced by evidence that at the time of separation a majority of citizens in both parts of the country would have voted against it (see the sources quoted in Roeder 2007, p. 25).

19. The general point is made by Goodin (2007). For a discussion of the franchise in the Scottish 2014 referendum see Ziegler, Shaw, and Bauböck (2014).

20. For a more extensive discussion see Stjepanovic and Tierny (2019). See also Arrighi (2019) for an empirical explanation of why secessionists in Scotland and Catalonia, in spite of their somewhat different approaches to franchise issues, have broadly accepted these normative requirements.

21. Reference Re Secession of Quebec Sup. Ct. of Canada 2 S.C.R. 217. 37 I.L.M. 1340 (1998)

22. See various contributions in Closa and Vintila (2015).