Turkish Nationalism and the Cyprus Question: Change, Continuity and Implications for Engagement with Northern Cyprus

ABSTRACT

This article examines the change and continuity in the Turkish policy toward Cyprus since the de facto partition of the island in 1974. The exploration of the relationship between Turkish nationalism and foreign policy toward Cyprus suggests that the language of Turkish nationalism regarding the Cyprus question has been far from monotonous. It is shown that the period coinciding with the coming of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in 2002 in particular was a critical juncture which opened up the discursive space for the re-articulation of the ‘Cyprus problem’, legitimising efforts in relation to reunification. Yet the partial nature of the discursive shift and the absence of a complete paradigmatic change—explained here with reference to structural and historical features of the Cyprus problem as well as the contingent nature of the European Union (EU) membership prospects—has meant the return of the well-entrenched narratives on the conflict and national identity. Also revealing the ways in which Turkish Cypriots have responded to such changes in policy and rhetoric from Ankara, the paper aims to complement existing accounts of trans-border nationalism in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Notes

1 The National Vision Movement is a political movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan, who was the leader of the National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi-MNP), National Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi-MSP) and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), and the Prime Minister of the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition between July 1996 and June 1997. Its objective is to replace Turkey's underdeveloped status compared to the West with economic and spiritual development. The reference point of spiritual development is Islam (Çakır, 2002; Yavuz, 2002).

2 Denktaş never strayed from this line of thought. Derviş Eroğlu who served as the ‘President’ of the ‘TRNC’ from 2010 until 2015 when he was replaced by Mustafa Akıncı, also follows the same line of thought, claiming that he is a ‘Turk from Kayseri’ in his visits to Turkey (Turktime, 2010). In Turkish politics, Alparslan Türkeş, the founder of the far-right MHP is perhaps the striking example regarding the issue. Born in Cyprus as Hüseyin Feyzullah, Türkeş refrained from saying that he was a Cypriot, instead identifying himself as ‘from Kayseri’ and a descendant of Afşar Turks (see Bora & Gültekingil, 2002, pp. 116–117). What all three leaders share in common seems to be an attempt to emphasise their Turkishness as opposed to a hyphenated version of belonging that is often seen in nationalist imaginary as a deviation.

3 In May 1983 Denktaş broke off all intercommunal talks, and in November he proclaimed the ‘TRNC’. Whist Turkey announced immediately that it recognised the broke-away republic, the UN Security Council condemned the move and repeated its demand, first made in 1974, that all foreign troops be withdrawn. The subsequent UN efforts to resume talks in 1984 and 1985 were unsuccessful, and in May 1985 a constitution for the ‘TRNC’ was approved in a referendum.

4 Turkish Resistance Movement (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı or the TMT), was a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary group set up to avert possible Greek Cypriot attacks and to eliminate the ‘traitors’ within the Turkish community. As An describes:

in its first proclamation, on November 2, 1957, TMT gave the first command to the Turkish-Cypriots concerning total obedience to the orders of the organisation and announced the following: in this struggle there may be—though we do not wish to believe such a thing—traitors. In such a case their extermination will beunavoidable. (Cited in Yennaris, 2003, p. 125)

5 For a more detailed analysis of such developments and the reactions triggered by them from the successive Turkish governments, see Uzer (2010).

6 On 11 November 2002, the then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive plan towards settling the diplomatic dispute to allow the EU accession of a reunified Cyprus. Following extensive negotiations, the fifth version of the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ was submitted to simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004, the results of which are well-known: 65% of Turkish-Cypriot voters accepted the Plan while 76% of Greek-Cypriot voters casted ‘no’.

7 This is an intriguing finding of significant comparative value for research beyond Cyprus in further discerning the implications of kinship for nation-building processes in conflict and post-conflict settings and will be addressed at length in a different study.