Federalism, National Identity and Overcoming Frozen Conflicts: Moldova's Experience

Abstract

In the Republic of Moldova struggles for independence and over national identity in the late 1980s and the early 1990s resulted in two conflicts with the Gagauz minority and separatists in the region of Transnistria. In this paper we compare and contextualize the settlement processes and pay specific attention to Chisinau’s perceptions of the two conflicts. Our analysis highlights how Gagauz autonomy and Transnistrian separatism are situated in the complex relationship between geopolitics and domestic identity politics that reproduces cleavages among Moldova’s political stakeholders. This is a major obstacle to a coherent position of Chisinau and the implementation of autonomy arrangements in both cases.

Notes

1 See http://statistica.gov.md/newsview.php?l=ro&idc=168&id=6416 (these are provisional numbers and do not include the population of the Transnistrian region).

2 See http://www.presedinte.md/eng/constitution

3 ‘Unitățile administrativ-teritoriale din stînga Nistrului’, see http://www.moldova.md/ro/content/organizarea-administrativ-teritoriala

4 See http://www.mfa-pmr.org/ru/konstitutsia

5 With the exceptions of Gagauzia where the ethno-lingual boundaries roughly coincide with the borders of the autonomous territorial unit and the district (raion) Taraclia where ethnic Bulgarians constitute two thirds of the population (66.1%).

6 See https://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro=&idc=479

7 See http://www.constcourt.md/public/ccdoc/hotariri/ro-h1720189a20180a9e9.pdf

8 The Moldovan Principality extended from the Eastern Carpathians to the Nistru/Dniester River and from the fortress of Hotin (today Ukraine) in the north to the Black Sea Coast in the south. In 1812, the Russian Empire formally annexed Bessarabia, the Principality’s eastern region between the Prut and Dniester Rivers. In January 1859, the principalities of Moldova (the remaining part west of the Prut River) and Wallachia united and later became Romania. Bessarabia remained under Russian rule until 1918, when it united with Romania.

9 In this conception, links to Transnistria derive only from the shared history since 1940/1944 with the formation of the MSSR and from the Romanian-speaking population in Transnistria.

10 See http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=313124&lang=1 and http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=312813http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=312813

11 Moldova does not grant basing rights to Russian forces. Furthermore, the OSCE Istanbul Document from 1999 explicitly calls for the withdrawal of all Russian troops except those which are part of the peacekeeping force.

12 An English translation of the ‘Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia’ (henceforth: autonomy law) is available here: http://www.e-democracy.md/files/elections/law-special-legal-status-gagauzia-23-12-1994-en.pdf

13 However, it ensures participation in the executive branch: The Bashkan is member of the Moldovan cabinet and the head of the Gagauz Court of Appeal as well as other key ministers are members of the collegium of the respective institutions on the federal level (see Art. 14 and 20–24 of the autonomy law)

14 Changes in the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia require a three fifth majority in the Moldovan Parliament (Art. 27 of the autonomy law).

15 In this context the ‘loss of sovereignty’ paraphrases unification with Romania and integration with the European Union and nurtures sentiments against pan-Romanianist and pro-European political actors in Chisinau. Article 1 (4) of the autonomy law, however, already includes Gagauzia’s right to self-determination if Moldova was to lose its status as an independent state.

16 In 2015 the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) was mandated to perform the function of ‘good offices’ and establish a permanent dialog between Comrat and Chisinau.

17 Author’s interviews with a government official in Chisinau in July 2018 and a civil society representative in Comrat in March 2020.

18 We speak about ethnofederalism where the boundaries of federal or autonomous units coincide with the settlement areas of ethnically distinct groups (see Roeder, 2009).

19 The autonomy law stipulates that all settlements with a Gagauz population of 50% or more are automatically part of Gagauzia. Settlements where the Gagauz constitute less than 50% of the entire population can become part of Gagauzia by popular vote expressed in a referendum. Moreover, settlements also have the option to vote for leaving the autonomous region (Art. 5 of the autonomy law).

20 An unofficial translation of the Kiev Document can be found in Coppieters and Emerson (2002).

21 An unofficial translation of the Kozak Memorandum is made available by Professor Stefan Wolff: http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/Kozak-Memorandum.pdf

22 By a majoritarian system O'Leary (2001, endnote 5) means a federation in which ‘standard consociational devices to temper majority rule are not significantly applied’.

23 An unofficial translation of law No. 173/2005 is available on the OSCE website: https://www.osce.org/pc/16208?download=true

24 An unofficial translation of the so-called Yushchenko Plan is available on the website of the European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dmd20050621_07/dmd20050621_07en.pdf

25 These three baskets were: (1) socio-economic issues; (2) general legal issues and human rights; (3) comprehensive settlement including the future status of Transnistria.

26 Author’s interview with a representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in October 2019.

27 See the Berlin Protocol from 2016 (https://www.osce.org/moldova/244656), the Vienna Protocol from 2017 (https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/359196) and the Rome Protocol from 2018 (https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/382885).

28 See https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/425141?download=true

29 Vladimir Plahotniuc was until June 2019 the chairman of the Democratic Party which was part of the ruling coalition since 2014 and supplied the Prime Minister since 2016. Although Mr. Plahotniuc did not hold a political office, he is said to have established a situation of ‘state-capture’ over Moldova. He is an oligarch and owner of influential media outlets in Moldova.

30 See OSCE press release: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/435392

Additional information

Funding

As part of the GEM-STONES program, Johann Wolfschwenger received funding from the European Union's H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, Grant Agreement N° 722826.