How Humanitarian and Stabilization Actors Contribute (Unwittingly?) to Post-Conflict Justice

Abstract

The construction of victimhood after conflict is contentious and relies in part upon public recognition. This article argues that humanitarian and stabilization actors often provide this recognition and thereby contribute to the construction of post-conflict conceptions of victimhood. It analyses how key operational documents produced by humanitarian and stabilization actors in Iraq during the period of conflict with the Islamic State (2014–2017) constructed and recognized a particular profile of victim, and only certain perpetrators. This resulted in the exclusion and silencing of complex victims and contributed to the tolerance of violence directed against them. The article concludes with some reflections on the implications of these findings for practitioners.

Acknowledgements

The author is very grateful to the editors and anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and their many thoughtful insights and suggestions.

Notes

1 International law recognizes that individuals should only be held criminally liable and punished for acts for which they possess some personal culpability, see: ICRC, IHL Database Customary IHL, Rule 102.

2 These agreements include the Tikrit Peace Accords signed in March 2015; the Ninewa Peaceful Coexistence Pact signed in March 2016; the Anbar Citizen's Covenant signed in July 2016 and renewed in December 2018; the Heet Pact signed in November 2016; the Peaceful coexistence Principles Pact between Tribes of south-west Kirkuk signed in January 2017; the al-Sabaawi Agreement of Qayyarah (Mosul) signed in May 2017; the Yathrib Peaceful Coexistence Pact signed in February 2018; the Peaceful Coexistence Pact of Honour for Tribes in Al Ayadiyah signed in August 2018; the Covenant of Peaceful Coexistence and Support of the Rule of Law in Zummar region signed February 2020; the Tal Afar Covenant Agreement and General Principles to Support Stability and the Rule of Law in Tal Afar signed in August 2020; and the Mahalabiyah Covenant of Honour signed in October 2020.

3 These reforms began in 2005, when the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) introduced the ‘Humanitarian Reform Agenda’, seeking to enhance the coordination of humanitarian actors by introducing the ‘cluster approach’. The importance of the cluster approach was reinforced in 2010, when UN OCHA and the IASC adopted the ‘Transformative Agenda’ and re-emphasized the role of clusters in humanitarian response. See Gibbons et al. (2018).

4 The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum established and led by the Humanitarian Coordinator. Composition includes representatives from the UN, international NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to humanitarian action.

5 Since 2015, the consortium funding the FFS has included: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States.

6 In east Mosul, the lighter fighting tempo and restricted use of air power meant that most residents chose to stay, whereas the GoI advised civilians in the west to flee because of the intensity of the battle. As a result, of the nearly one million civilians who fled the city between October 2016 and June 2017, approximately 705,000 (nearly 80%) came from west Mosul.

7 This is not an exhaustive list of potential perpetrators. In particular, as noted in the preceding section, the PMF was also alleged to have committed an array of violence against civilians, especially against those perceived to have an affiliation to ISIL. However, given the complexities in addressing this issue, the role of the PMF is beyond the scope of this article.