Autonomising Conflict: Conflict Transportation in Online Activity among Kurdish and Turkish Diasporas in Denmark

Abstract

Within diasporas and conflict studies, little research has so far looked at the content and dynamics of online conflict transportation. Addressing this gap, this study investigates how the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is reflected in the online mobilisation of Kurdish and Turkish diasporas in Denmark. Through an online ethnography of associations on Facebook, the study finds that while conflict transportation occurs in online spaces, it is shaped and influenced by the country of residence, transnational networks and other diasporic communities and actors. This suggests a plurality of consciousness rather than the duality of ‘homeland’-‘host-country’ attachments often attributed to diasporas.

Introduction

In 2018, the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen was damaged when men of Kurdish origin threw Molotov cocktails at the building. The event occurred shortly after the Turkish government initiated its military operation called Olive Branch in north-eastern Syria, which increased diaspora activity across Europe (Schøtt, 2021). While direct clashes between Turkish and Kurdish communities in Denmark are rare, reported tensions and public debates suggest that conflict dynamics in and around Turkey still influence relationships among the communities. As such, looking at how conflict dynamics transport and manifest in diasporic settings is of great interest. In this context, this study uses online ethnography to investigate the online dimensions of conflict transportation and asks how the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is reflected in online diasporic mobilisation among Turkish and Kurdish organisations in Denmark. Looking at conflict transportation in online spaces opens up new avenues for understanding the complex ways in which diasporas engage with conflicts in their countries of origin and residence alike. The links between diasporic online activity and conflict have been the focus of some research, for instance through the concepts of cyber warfare or participation in ‘homeland’ conflicts from afar (Chernobrov, 2022; Osman, 2017; Turner, 2008), but few studies have investigated diaspora mobilisation and the transportation of conflict in online spaces.

The Turkish-Kurdish conflict is an interesting case as mobilisation in diasporas has been significant, and the conflict takes distinct transnational forms (Baser, 2017, p. 675). In addition, Denmark is an interesting case as little research exists on Kurdish and Turkish communities in the country even though they are among the largest ethnic minority groups there (Danmarks Statistik, 2021); however, their numbers are still comparatively small in Denmark as compared to other European countries. Smaller diaspora communities have so far received little attention (see Schøtt, 2021, for an important exception), necessitating research on precisely such smaller communities for comparative purposes (Emanuelsson et al., 2015, p. 143).

Around 30 million Kurds live in areas spanning Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq, making them one of the largest groups of ‘stateless’ people in the world (CFR, 2019). The so-called Kurdish Question refers to the Kurdish struggle in the region for an independent state of their own. The Turkish-Kurdish conflict cannot be understood as separated from this transnational struggle, but the Kurds in Turkey, in particular, have faced oppression from their ‘home’ state (Candar, 2013, p. 63). In 1974, the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) was founded by Abdullah Öcalan (Baser, 2016, p. 56). A significant actor in the conflict in the region, the PKK has been involved in a military conflict with the Turkish state since 1983 and has been listed as a terror organisation in the EU since 2004. The conflict is deeply intertwined with the war in Syria due to the military involvement of both the Turkish state and the Syrian-Kurdish factions of Partiya Yekîitiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD), and its military arm, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Unit, YPG), opposing ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in the north-eastern parts of Syria, which also caused a significant increase in diasporic mobilisation for the conflict (Schøtt, 2019, p. 98). The establishment of a Kurdish transitional administration in the northern parts of Syria called Rojava in 2012 also led to a proliferation of diasporic mobilisation; Rojava, and in particular the cantons of Afrin and Kobane, continue to be important for diasporic activity (Baser, 2016; Schøtt, 2021).

The issue of how conflict is reflected in online spaces will be investigated through the theories of conflict transportation and autonomisation. Within diaspora studies, the transportation of conflicts to countries of residence has gained increasing attention in the past decade (Baser, 2016; Féron, 2017; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). Especially after the 9/11 attacks, research on and interest in the links between diasporas and conflict has proliferated (Féron & Lefort, 2019). Initially, the literature highlighted the capacities of diasporas to import or participate in ‘homeland’ conflicts (Demmers, 2002; Koinova, 2011; Shain & Barth, 2003). Subsequent strands of research emphasised the peace-making capabilities of diasporas and the positive roles they can play—and have played—in conflicts (Baser, 2017; Baser & Swain, 2008; Smith & Stares, 2007). Apart from stressing diasporas’ involvement in their countries of origin, be it through perpetuation of conflict or peacebuilding, little attention has been paid to the content of the transported conflicts. What happens to conflict dynamics when they reappear in a completely new setting? Often, studies assume a rather linear transportation of conflict dynamics to the countries of settlement and neglect the potential effects of transportation on conflict (Féron, 2020). What makes the absence of studies on conflict transportation even more striking is that the effects of the new country of residence on diaspora mobilisation has been amply researched. These studies have rightly highlighted the role played by political and discursive opportunity structures, and the nature, positionality and size of diasporic communities on diasporic mobilisation (Karagöz, 2017; Khayati & Dahlstedt, 2014; Toivanen, 2019). If the country of residence affects the patterns of mobilisation, how does it affect the content of the conflicts that appear in diasporic communities when conflict is ongoing in the ‘homeland’?

Conflict transportation suggests that conflicts in the country of origin can still frame and influence diasporas in the country of residence (Féron, 2017, p. 363). Conflict transportation occurs when conflict dynamics in a conflict area are transferred to the country of residence, manifesting physically in violence or socially and discursively through symbols, segregation, group identities or rhetoric (Baser, 2016, p. 41). This process has also been referred to as conflict import (Baser, 2016; Pirkkalainen & Abdile, 2009) and de-territorialisation (Demmers, 2002). But rather than looking at conflict transportation as a singular activity that ‘copies’ the conflict into a new context, it can instead be understood as a dynamic process that occurs at multiple times and in different ways, sometimes even activated by actors other than the diaspora groups (Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Moliner (2018), for instance, shows how conflict is reinvented or transformed among Sikh and Muslim diasporas in Britain. Reflecting the complexity of these processes, conflict autonomisation suggests that transported conflicts undergo a deep transformation influenced by the transport itself, the country of residence, the nature of diasporic groups and the means through which they mobilise (Féron, 2017).

Autonomisation manifests in various areas of mobilisation: (1) borders (group boundaries) can be moved or restructured; (2) symbols, narratives and themes might differ; (3) objectives and actors might vary; (4) patterns of mobilisation might change; and (5) triggers and issues can be different. Autonomisation also involves looking at the spatial and temporal dimensions of diaspora mobilisation. Baser (2014), for instance, argues that Turkish diaspora mobilisation for ‘homeland’ issues in Sweden developed as a reaction to the mobilisation of Kurdish diasporas in the country, signifying the importance of spatial and temporal dimensions in understanding conflict transportation and autonomisation. Where previous research on diasporas and conflict has indeed focused on the ways diasporas create, carry or import conflict, or how diasporas can influence conflict in the ‘homeland’, diasporas and conflict can be understood as co-creating each other (Féron & Lefort, 2019). This explains how the timing of mobilisation in diasporas does not always concur with events in the conflict areas, or how conflict narratives are altered in the diasporic settings. Looking at the timings and triggers of mobilisation is therefore central to understanding conflict autonomisation.

While highlighting the complexity of diasporic behaviour and interaction, the studies mentioned above still engage with somewhat rigid ideas of diasporas as an analytical category. Few studies address at which point mobilisation stops being diasporic or autonomise ‘out of’ the diasporas. Additionally, the ‘new context’ in which conflict transportation takes place is rarely conceptualised beyond geographical space and as such leave out ideas of what transportation of conflict is in other contexts such as the online space. Indeed, Mahmod (2019) suggests that online mobilisation contests the ‘duality of consciousness’ often attributed to diasporas and challenges the ‘homeland’-host country binary frequently used to understand diaspora mobilisation. As such, the contribution of this study is twofold; first, it investigates smaller diaspora communities which have so far received little attention, and second, it adds new perspectives on theories of conflict transportation by applying them to online mobilisation practices.

The following section presents methodology and data collection. Subsequently, I outline Kurdish and Turkish diasporas in Denmark and proceed to present and discuss the findings in three parts. First, I present the mechanisms of conflict transportation in online spaces specifically through triggers of mobilisation, discourses and symbols. Second, I discuss processes of conflict autonomisation, arguing how they are visible in the way conflict discourses are constructed, through the actors involved, and in the complex ties to other movements and conflicts. Third, I discuss what the empirical findings can tell us about reflections of conflict in online spaces and conclude with suggestions for further research.

Methods

I conducted online ethnography on Facebook, following the activity of five associations that were active on Facebook, mobilising in Danish, and in relation to ‘homeland’ politics in the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Facebook was chosen as the main ‘site’ of research given its rich diversity in material and due to its wide use: it is a social networking site used by roughly 3.6 million people in Denmark out of a population of nearly six million (Kepios, 2022). As a data collection site, it is useful as it provides a platform for sharing pictures, videos and long text messages, it can host online meetings, and it is often where information about offline events such as demonstrations are posted or organised through the ‘event’ feature on the site. It also provides the possibility for engaging with activities after the fact: time stamps, posts and threads remain in place on Facebook, making it possible to trace the activity of groups in the past as they happened in ‘past real-time’. This, for instance, is useful when looking at mobilisation patterns and timings of mobilisation and comparing them to events that happened in the country of origin.

The first part of the ethnographic research involved ‘navigating the site’ (Hart, 2017, p. 4)—getting a sense of the actors, associations and activity on Facebook involving Kurdish and Turkish diaspora communities. Importantly, this process is not linear, but, rather, an iterative process concurrent with other modes of data collection later in the research (ibid.). Whereas self-proclaimed Kurdish sites mobilising in Danish were plentiful, the self-proclaimed Turkish sites in Danish mobilising for ‘homeland’ politics were strikingly absent. Indeed, I found only two Turkish associations which posted regularly in Danish.¹ This does not mean that there were no Turkish organisations on Facebook. Turkish associations operating in Denmark on Facebook were plentiful and often branches of transnational organisations such as Diyanet, Millî Görüş and Union of International Democrats. In addition, there were associations such as The Secular Turks in Denmark, the Danish-Turkish Academic Union, and a number of Alevi associations. The mere absence of Danish-language material in relation to ‘homeland’ politics on the Facebook sites is both a limitation and a discovery. The landscape of Turkish organisations online seemed characterised by an overwhelming number of Turkish-language pages and focused on religious and integration related issues rather than ‘homeland’ politics. Interestingly, this seems to mirror an earlier study on the political transnational mobilisation of Turkish organisations in Denmark, in which Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, p. 22) found that Turkish organisations were less mobilised with regard to ‘homeland’ politics as compared to Germany, for instance.

Consequently, hard data was collected from three Kurdish and two Turkish organisations located in or around Copenhagen and mobilising on Facebook and in Danish. As already mentioned, however, several other pages have been visited and observed to gain an overview of the networks, associations and actors involved in online mobilisation. I chose to focus on these five organisations to get a qualitative in-depth view of what I found to be the most active sites posting on Facebook in Danish. The organisations were all established between 1998 and 2018 and had varying numbers of followers ranging from 700 to 2,300. The Seve Kurdish Women’s Association (SEVE) was established in 2015 and the Facebook page I followed for it has been active since 2020. It is supportive of the PKK, frequently mobilises in support of PKK’s leader Öcalan, and works on issues related to women’s rights more generally. The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Denmark (FEY-KURD) was established in 1998 and its current Facebook page has been active since 2019. FEY-KURD often organises activities with SEVE as well as the Rojava Alliance. Its activities are both political and cultural and include Newroz celebrations (Kurdish New Year and national day), demonstrations, and campaigns related to the Kurdish question; it is sympathetic to the PKK. It sends out numerous press releases, both on its Facebook page as well as in its (Danish) email newsletter. The third organisation on which data was collected is the Rojava Alliance, an umbrella organisation consisting not only of Kurdish organisations but independent actors and ‘left-wing sympathizers’ as well. It was established on Facebook in 2015 and has been active there since then. The Rojava Alliance, which takes its name from the self-declared Kurdish autonomous region Rojava in Syria, has ties to larger organisations in Europe such as the Kobane Reconstruction Board. It mobilises for anti-fascism, climate change and other global movements related to these issues. Finally, the Union of International Democrats Denmark (UIDDK) is the Danish branch of the Europe-wide organisation, the Union of International Democrats (formerly Union of European Turkish Democrats, UETD). It has been supportive of the Turkish government and has been active on Facebook since 2015. Additionally, I followed the UIDDK’s Youth page, which was set up in April 2018. While the data was collected from two Turkish sites only, they represent organisations with large European branches and are the organisations that have the largest following in my research. I have inserted Facebook links where available but two of the pages had been closed at the time of writing. SEVE created a new Facebook page shortly before I started my digital data collection in late 2019, and, in April 2021, resurfaced with a new Facebook page. The name is slightly different, but the logo remains the same. On Instagram, you can see that it continues to post under both names. FEY-KURD’s Facebook page disappeared in early 2021, but the organisation has been continuously active on Twitter and other online platforms since 2016, using the same name and logos.

Digital or online ethnography involves ‘dense and contextualized reports as [a] means of exploring culture in spaces mediated by technology’ (Nascimento et al., 2022, p. 493; see also Kozinets, 2020; Pink et al., 2016) and looks at ‘online practices and communications and involves human beings studying human beings’ (Cleland & MacLeod, 2022, p. 878). To ensure this in-depth immersion in the site, the data collection took place over two months in the spring of 2020 and the months of November and December 2020. During this time, I observed the activity of the groups on Facebook, made field notes of my observations, and took screenshots of Facebook pages, posts, pictures, events and videos. Importantly, this study approaches online ethnography in a qualitative manner. The focus was kept on one site and only a few organisations in order to get a ‘contextualized, richly descriptive’ (Hart, 2017, p. 2) account of their online activity. However, since ethnography entails ‘following the thing’ (Marcus, 1995), the data also includes observations and data collected across other sites when organisations shared links or pages on their profiles. This includes the Danish-Kurdish news site, Nudem.dk, links to the Danish parliament website, the websites of the organisations themselves, other transnational news sites, and the Twitter and Instagram pages of the organisations. While data collection was done over four months, it includes posts from early 2018 until late 2020. To limit the data collection, I looked only at the past three years of activity, starting from the time Turkey initiated its military involvement in Syria until late 2020. Starting at the time of the involvement in Syria was important because it enabled observations in online spaces at a time of escalation in Turkey and mobilisation in the European diasporas, as noted by Schøtt (2021). In addition, the time frame enabled me to collect both real time data as well as the archived activity of the organisations.

This research focuses on Danish-language sites both due to language barriers and because the use of Danish-language sites gives important insights into the relationship between the country of residence and conflict transportation processes precisely because it is directed at a Danish-speaking audience. In addition, the study refrains from using data from private chatrooms or fora, but looks specifically at the public mobilisation of ‘homeland’-oriented organisations in the online space. Consequently, what is explored is the ‘front stage’ of performing politics (Wodak, 2009) rather than the informal everyday practices also involved in political mobilisation. This is an important distinction as it situates the kind of knowledge available to this study. It does not engage with individual experiences or narratives of people engaged with online mobilisation, nor does it cover the everyday interactions of community members. Instead, it focuses on the meanings embedded in discourses and presentations in the online space, the more performative, formal aspects of mobilisation.

Online ethnography involves critical reflection on the public versus private nature of the data used in the study (Cohen et al., 2017, p. 147). Rosenberg (2010, p. 24) notes that public spaces are spaces that can be accessed freely by anyone on the internet, while spaces are private if they are ‘perceived as private by the participants’, and as such highlights the need to ethically reflect on the ‘intentions’ of the sites, posts and material. Through the focus on organisations and their posts rather than on individuals, the aforementioned ‘front-stage’ of performing politics, the study uses only information that can be seen as intended for and perceived as public, rather than taking place in a perceived private sphere. In the analysis, I have refrained from using visual images and directly cite only textual data for ethical reasons: to avoid copyright issues and the sharing of personal data. Several videos and posts contain images of people in demonstrations and events up to four years ago, from whom consent would be difficult to obtain. The analysis describes pictures, videos and posts, all of which have been either captured in screenshots or were part of my field notes.

Kurdish and Turkish Diasporas in Denmark

In Denmark, like in other European countries, the largest waves of Kurdish and Turkish immigrants came through work programmes in the 1960s and 1970s and subsequent family reunifications. Political refugees increased in the 1990s during conflict escalations between the PKK and the Turkish government; more recently, the war in Syria has caused an increase in Syrian Kurds as well in Denmark. Over 60.000 people living in Denmark today have Turkey registered as their country of origin (Danmarks Statistik, 2021). Estimates suggest that around 30,000–40,000 Kurds live in Denmark, but this is not a precise figure because migrants are registered according to nationality (Serinci, 2011). It is also not clear how large a percentage of the Kurdish community in Denmark originated from Turkey as compared to Iran, Iraq and Syria. Distinct Kurdish organisations did not emerge until the 1980s, when the arrival of political refugees prompted the beginning of mobilisation around a Kurdish identity in Denmark (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001, p. 14; Schøtt, 2019, p. 93).

The Kurdish and Turkish diaspora communities in Denmark are heterogenous and comprised of different ethnicities and identities that intersect and overlap. Among the Turkish immigrants and their descendants living in Denmark are Kurds, Alevis, Sunnis, Circassians, Lazi and Assyrians. This mix is further complicated by political divisions and cleavages of both a secular and religious nature (Jørgensen, 2010, p. 166). Schøtt distinguishes four main groupings characterising the politically mobilised Kurdish diasporas in Denmark—the Öcalan supporters, the Kurdistan movement, the independents, and the Syrian Kurds (2019, p. 98)—but comprehensive studies on the political mobilisation of Turkish diasporas in Denmark are thus far non-existent.

Divisions within the Turkish and Kurdish communities gained public attention in 2019 when the media reported on a ‘culture of snitching’ and surveillance, fuelling distrust and suspicion among members of the communities (Birk, 2019). Turkish involvement in the war in Syria has had an effect on the relationship between the Kurdish and Turkish communities as well, not least since political mobilisation among the Kurdish diaspora proliferated since the outbreak of the war (Schøtt, 2019, p. 14), but with relatively few instances of direct violence. Previous studies have shown how perceived differences in public and political support between Kurdish and Turkish diasporas in Denmark have been the cause of critique from both the Turkish government and Turkish organisations in the past (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Turkey and Turkish politics are often negatively portrayed in public debates, which might explain why Turkish organisations seem more mobilised towards religious and community-building matters in Denmark (ibid.). Jørgensen (2010) shows that Kurdish organisations have fewer interlocking ties with other organisations in Denmark as compared to Turkish organisations, while Kurdish organisations in Denmark seem to have strong transnational ties. Many campaigns are coordinated internationally in which demonstrations are organised simultaneously across different European countries (Schøtt, 2019, p. 101). While the above draws on existing studies on Turkish and Kurdish communities in Denmark, no research has so far investigated the online dimensions of their diasporic activities. It is to precisely these dimensions that this study now turns, starting with the nature of conflict transportation in the online space.

Transportation of ‘Homeland’ Conflict in the Online Space

Conflict transportation processes were visible in the online activity of the organisations under study, notably through the triggers of mobilisation and the use of ‘homeland’ discourses, groupings and symbols. Conflict transportation manifests at three different levels, namely discursive, social and physical (Féron, 2017). In the online space, conflict transportation of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict remained largely at the discursive level, but showed signs of physical transportation when posts referred to events or demonstrations offline. January 2018 saw the initiation of Operation Olive Branch, the Turkish military offensive in the Afrin district in northern Syria, and mobilisation in the diaspora online activity increased accordingly. Both of the UIDDK’s pages were more active during this period on issues related to ‘homeland’ issues than in the coming years, and it shared posts and images related to the operations of the Turkish state. This, for instance, included an online campaign of a series of pictures shared on its page in which the reasons for Operation Olive Branch were explained in Danish under the hashtag #olivengren (‘olive branch’ in Danish), and a public gathering to which ‘anyone who supports Turkey’s right to self-defense’ was invited. Similarly, the Rojava Alliance held demonstrations in collaboration with other Kurdish associations as a reaction to ‘Erdogan’s war in Afrin’ and posted about the involvement recurringly in the period between January and April 2018. As has been noted by Schøtt (2021), Afrin has been a significant source of mobilisation in the Kurdish diaspora in Denmark. This also figured on the sites, in demonstration titles (for instance, ‘Stop the Invasion in Efrîn—Freedom for Öcalan’, organised by the now discontinued Efrîn platform on 21 April 2018)² and through the use of hashtags such as #saveafrin and #worldafrinday. In a post by the Rojava Alliance, #worldafrinday was used to describe an incident at an Afrin solidarity demonstration in which ‘unidentified men showed the sign of the “grey wolves”’ and attacked the demonstrators with knives and other weapons, causing injuries, according to the post. On 24 February, the UIDDK warned its followers against a Copenhagen demonstration protesting civilian killings in Syria because the use of the hashtag #saveafrin made the event ‘very likely to turn into propaganda of PKK terror’.³

In addition, symbols and flags were important mobilisation tools and mechanisms of conflict transportation in the online space. This was visible in the pictures shared, the videos on the sites and the logos and names of the organisations. In a video posted by the UIDDK at the Olive Branch press release event before the Turkish embassy in Copenhagen in 2018, it is evident how Turkish flags crowd the group and almost cover the entire scene of the event. The same was visible in a video from a demonstration in response to the attack on the embassy that year. The importance of flags stands out in the text for the event in which UIDDK wrote, ‘[I]f you don’t have Turkish background, you are more than welcome to bring Dannebrog [the name of the Danish flag] and/or other countries’ flags to the event’. Similarly, SEVE and the Rojava Alliance often shared pictures from their demonstrations and events, in which flags had a significant presence, although in these demonstrations the flags represented a variety of actors and groupings involved in the conflict. Flags representing the PYD, YPG, Syrian Kurdistan and Kurdistan often dominated the pictures, but there were also flags depicting the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK flag, as well as that of the Kurdish Women’s Movement in Europe (TJK-E). Through the use of flags, symbols and page names, it was therefore also possible to see how groupings and adherence to specific conflict parties were transported in the online space. The UIDDK and its Youth page is part of a larger Europe-wide organisation supporting the Turkish governing party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) the Rojava Alliance takes its name from the Kurdish-led region in Syria, while support for Öcalan and the different Kurdish factions is shown through flags in demonstrations and the logos of the FEY-KURD and SEVE. What is interesting in the context of the symbolic showcasing through flags, for instance, is that in the pictures of the Kurdish demonstrations, the sheer diversity in adherences and actor representations is massive. While the Kurdish factions and groupings are far from politically unified, the Kurdish canvas of flags at demonstrations that was shared in the online space seemed like a practice of unity utilised in public displays of support and raising awareness.

Interestingly, Turkish mobilisation for homeland issues was also triggered by host country reactions to Turkish involvement in the conflict or by negative discourses surrounding Turkey than just by the conflict itself. In this post from 2018, the UIDDK writes:

‘Fake news’ has unfortunately become a part of everyday life; an increasing number of people’s opinions are formed on the basis of either misinterpretations or incorrect information. Misunderstandings and mistakes can always be made. An example is the post from Nikolaj Willumsen [Danish left-wing politician], where Kurds are being portrayed as running from the Afrin area, due to Turkish forces and Syrian opposition groups, among other things due to looting/pillaging. (UIDDK, 25 March 2018)⁴

The media is criticised again in another post from 23 January 2018, in which the UIDDK noted that ‘it is problematic, that western media in their news coverage and analyses, often twist the developments at the Turkish border with Syria, and Turkey’s motives in relation to the current military operation’. This was also visible on the UIDDK webpage where the organisation notes that it contributes to ‘provide the Danish public with factual information about Turkey and counter smear campaigns’.⁵ Consequently, mobilisation for the Turkish-Kurdish conflict by Turkish diasporas in online spaces was also seen when mobilisation in Kurdish diasporas proliferated or when the conflict was being brought up in public discourses. In contrast to this, Kurdish organisations mobilised on a more regular basis following events in the areas of conflict, posting information on developments and actors, as well as organising awareness-raising events, commemorative vigils and demonstrations also outside of periods of conflict escalation in the conflict areas. This shows how mobilisation can be achieved not just by conflict developments in the countries of origin, but also by the activity of other diasporas in the country of residence and the country of residence itself. Indeed, this speaks to Baser’s (2014) findings in Sweden showing that Turkish mobilisation was triggered by Kurdish mobilisation in Sweden rather than developments in Turkey alone.

As already mentioned, Kurdish mobilisation for ‘homeland’ issues did not only occur at times when conflict escalated in the countries of origin. Rather, certain events and developments were continuously brought up and commemorated in the diasporas both through posts on Facebook, articles on the Danish-Kurdish news media and the organisation of offline demonstrations. This ‘reuse’ of symbols and events triggered mobilisation autonomous of what was currently happening in the areas of conflict, as events and developments were re-enacted in a diasporic setting after the fact. For instance, Kobane and Afrin were used continuously in mobilisation patterns. All three Kurdish organisations held yearly demonstrations in November under the hashtag #worldkobaneday, and both Kobane and Afrin were referred to in the online posts even outside of episodes of escalation. The data collection showed how Afrin became both a mobilisation event as well as a space for contention in the immediate aftermath of the Turkish military involvement in 2018. While the data did not cover online activity in 2014 during the fighting in Kobane, it did show how Kobane remained a symbol and still caused mobilisation in diasporic settings years after the events in the area that originally sparked mobilisation.

The above highlights the importance of the ‘temporal’ dimensions of diaspora mobilisation as the reuse of specific events and symbols activates diaspora groups, sometimes long after they have first taken place or been invoked in mobilisation. This means that the conflict dynamics can become detached from the ones in the countries of origin, sometimes involving an intensification of relationships or mobilisation in physical spaces that are independent of conflict developments in the conflict areas. This mobilisation can be seen as a process of autonomisation affecting the temporalities of conflict dynamics as they appear in the country of residence. The following section delves into autonomisation processes in more detail.

Autonomisation Processes in the Online Space

Beyond the temporal conflict autonomisation described above, autonomisation was visible through three factors: the discursive constructions of conflict in relation to the context of Denmark; the presence of outside actors; and the discursive ties to other social movements, conflicts and issues.

A significant way conflict autonomised in the online space was how mobilisation was discursively tied to and made relevant for Danish society and values. One example is the following quote from the Rojava Alliance in 2019, posted on a video from a demonstration it did in front of the Danish parliament:

The autonomous region in Rojava has succeeded with progress especially on women’s rights and basic democracy which is not even seen in the ‘overdeveloped’ parts of the world, and [they have done so] even in a region otherwise known for its patriarchal traditions and feudal societal structures. (Rojava Alliance, 25 October 2019)⁶

Here, mobilisation was encouraged through situating the Kurdish struggles as relevant for and surpassing Danish and Western societies (at least implicitly) in their capacity for women’s rights and democracy. On several occasions on the sites, the Kurdish region of Rojava was discursively situated as an ideal for Denmark and the West. These discursive moves are arguably so present precisely because of the focus on Danish-language mobilisation and as a way of justifying support for their cause in a Danish context. In addition, the FEY-KURD appealed to the Danish parliament in 2020, stating that ‘as a democratic state with rule of law, and as a member of NATO and EU, Denmark has a responsibility to fight oppression and killings of civilians’ (FEY-KURD, 5 June 2020). Again, Danish values were tied to the Kurdish struggles, invoking a sense of moral responsibility to justify and encourage Danish involvement in the conflict. Notably, the Turkish UIDDK defended the Turkish state participation in Syria, using similar strategies of appealing to Danish and Western societies and their right to self-defence. Additionally, online activity was made relevant for Danish values and society through being tied to the security of Europe in general. In a post from 2020, the FEY-KURD writes that ‘when we in the West experience fewer terrorist attacks from radical Islamists, it is not just the thorough work of the intelligence service. It is also a result of the Kurdish YPG/YPJ [The armed wing of the YPG] factions having weakened ISIS and the dark powers’ (FEY-KURD, 24 June 2020).

It is also interesting to look at how boundaries were created in the online space as a process of autonomisation. In the following post by the Turkish UIDDK from shortly after the initiation of the Turkish Operation Peace Springs in the north-eastern parts of Syria, rebuilding unity is used to justify the operation:

With this military operation south of the border of Eufrat, Turkey seeks to stop the attacks from the terror organization PYD/PKK. Additionally, the Turks, Arabs and Kurds lived together in this area before the PYD/PKK occupation. By expelling the Turks, Arabs and Kurds in opposition, the terror organization PYD/PKK has changed the demographic composition of the area. While a range of religious groups are being expelled, all tribes in opposition have suffered severe losses. With this operation, it is the intention of Turkey, to reestablish the demographic composition of the area and the security of the area. (UIDDK, 11 October 2019)⁷

The notion of ‘good and bad Kurds’ is put into play, and ‘bad’ Kurds (PYD/PKK) are blamed for dividing the population, while the ‘population’ is united across different identity lines regardless of their origin. Unity and coexistence are threatened by the PYD and PKK, which are discursively situated as deviants from an otherwise cohesive group. Similarly, the FEY-KURD created a discursive unification of ‘Kurds’ as one group regardless of origin and political differences. In a post from 2020, entitled ‘An Appeal to Kurds’ (in Danish), the FEY-KURD urged infighting parties in Syrian borderlands to unite and engage in dialogue (FEY-KURD, 28 June 2020). At the time, divisions within the Kurdish factions were brought up in the media as well as in a statement made by Danish politicians (in English) pleading with the Kurdish factions to unite. The FEY-KURD explained that the union of Kurds was important in its fight against Turkey, and that ‘a solidaric and cooperative Kurdistan will serve and be beneficial for the Kurdish people and the future of Kurdistan’. The concept of ‘strategic essentialism’ can be useful to understand these processes. Eliassi (2013, p. 30) uses the term ‘strategic essentialism’ to explain the diasporic strategies of homogenising groups to claim space in the countries of settlement. The strategic aspects of mobilisation can be of particular importance when looking at precisely this ‘front stage’ of performing politics which is central to this study. Following the logic of Eliassi’s strategic essentialism, positionality is important to consider not only between diasporic communities themselves but also between the country of residence and diasporic communities. Turkish and Kurdish diaspora organisations mobilise as minorities, and this might be a contributing factor to the flexibility and discursive practices of unity that influence the construction of group boundaries in the online mobilisation patterns. Indeed, Féron argues that autonomisation involves the reconstruction of group boundaries according to a local context (Féron, 2017). The discursive practices building unity in the context of the marginalised space in Denmark can thus be seen as precisely such a process and it highlights the importance of the country of residence in understanding mobilisation patterns.

A notable process of conflict autonomisation was visible in the presence of outside actors participating in mobilisation and activity. When related to the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, however, this was more prominent on Kurdish sites than on Turkish sites. The Rojava Alliance is run by Kurdish diaspora organisations as well as Danish actors and individuals sympathetic to the Kurdish struggles, but with no other ties to the conflict itself—as it says on the site, ‘left-wing activists and students inspired by the Rojava Revolution’.⁸ It was when mobilisation was tied to developments in Syria in particular that actors outside the core groups were involved, or when mobilisation was tied to other movements related to, for instance, climate change or women’s rights. It also resulted in mobilisation outside of and autonomous to the diaspora communities as, for instance, in a demonstration on 2 November 2019, organised autonomously of the diasporas, under the slogan, ‘No to the Massacres of Kurds, Turkey out of Northern Syria’. Danes with no prior ties to the conflict have gone to Syria to join the Kurdish forces, which in one case resulted in a solidarity demonstration organised by the Rojava Alliance, which was shared online. Evidently, this involvement of outside actors and autonomous mobilisation can be seen as a level of autonomisation that detaches itself from the diasporic communities while simultaneously morphing diasporic mobilisation with other movements and causes. When outside actors were visible on the UIDDK sites, it was in relation to issues such as Muslim rights in Denmark and the fight against Islamophobia rather than ‘homeland’ issues. This was the case, for instance, after the attack on mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019, when the UIDDK, in collaboration with 40 other associations, organised a demonstration under the hashtag #wordshaveconsequences.⁹

Online mobilisation also tied itself to other social movements and causes, both nationally and transnationally. For the Kurdish sites, these included organisations fighting for women’s rights, anti-fascism movements and climate change in Denmark and abroad. Sometimes, demonstrations were arranged by Kurdish organisations with the sole focus of women’s rights as SEVE did in November 2020, and often in collaboration with other non-diasporic organisations. As such, the Kurdish struggles were intimately tied to, and made relevant for, these movements, presenting Kurdish mobilisation as something much more than the result of conflict in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Instead, Kurdish mobilisation was made part and parcel of the fight against fascism, anti-democratic powers and patriarchy, while at the same time focusing on very local conflict developments in ‘Kurdistan’. Other conflicts affected triggers and framings of mobilisation as well. Most notable, perhaps, is the conflation of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict with the war in Syria, which was used recurringly as a framework for tying events together and creating unity of purpose across different conflict lines. In addition, other conflicts triggered mobilisation when they could be linked to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, for instance when violence broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh in the autumn of 2020. The Turkish UIDDK organised a solidarity demonstration for ‘their Azerbaijani brothers’ and advertised it online. In this sense, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is brought into the framework for mobilisation related to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and prompts activity in the diasporic communities, a tendency visible in other countries as well, during the same period (see Chernobrov, 2022). It exemplifies how developments in countries other than those directly related to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, or the country of residence, can trigger mobilisation. Other events figured in online activity as well, such as attacks on women’s rights in Poland in 2020, humanitarian crises in Yemen, and solidarity with Palestine. These ties to other movements and issues also created a somewhat chaotic mobilisation. In an online info-meeting of the Rojava Alliance in the autumn of 2020, the organisers realised they had planned two different demonstrations on the same day for two different purposes—one for women’s rights in general, the other focused on Rojava and the Kurdish struggles for independence. It made it difficult to mobilise enough volunteers to help with the preparations for both, while also signifying a fragmented mobilisation dependent on individual desires rather than on overall goals in the organisation (Rojava Alliance online meeting, 18 November 2020).

Discussion: Dynamic Mobilisation and Reconstructions of Conflict Narratives

The previous sections have given an account of the reflections of conflict dynamics in online spaces which reveal both transportation and autonomisation processes. While theoretically separated, these mechanisms are deeply intertwined and must be understood in relation to one another, as the online mobilisation patterns also show. Conflict transportation during specific conflict intensification periods in the conflict areas was visible, but the reuse of events after the fact is the result of transportation and autonomisation processes tangled up in each other. Commemorations of events, online campaigns and hashtags are used to reproduce patterns of mobilisation and might even create new patterns as other diasporic groups react to this reuse and mobilise in response. In addition, while activity could be triggered by events in the conflict area, it was at the same time discursively constructed around a narrative relevant for Danish and/or European societies or even other conflicts and movements.

In this vein, Mahmod (2019) argues that online mobilisation of diasporas illuminates the limits to the concept of dual consciousness when discussing diasporic engagement with ‘homeland’ issues. Dual consciousness in diaspora studies refers to the notion that diasporic engagement is shaped by a consciousness towards the ‘homeland’ and the new country of residence. In line with Mahmoud’s argument, I suggest that online diasporic mobilisation is better understood as inhabiting a ‘plurality of consciousnesses’ that can be employed at different times and coexist, depending on the context. As the above shows, online mobilisation patterns are poorly illustrated by a linear ‘ping pong’ between two points directed by a concern with the ‘homeland’ and/or the country of residence. Rather, online mobilisation seemed to be influenced as well by other actors, conflicts, events and developments as well as triggered at different times than developments in the areas of conflict. Mobilisation for the Kurdish struggles, for instance, often (discursively and physically) morphed into larger social movements, even to the extent that other topics were the main focus of the demonstrations, riddled with outside actors, almost questioning their diasporic nature. The discursive constructions of conflict also seemed to be deeply intertwined with the Danish context and tied to Danish values, events and actors, as well as to broader frames of European security and transnational social movements. These processes can also be seen as strategies for claiming space in the context of the country of residence, both in relation to ‘homeland’-specific issues as well as issues related to life in Denmark such as Muslim rights and gender equality. In this sense, the online activity challenges the binary understandings of diaspora activities and questions the borders of their ‘diasporicness’. Instead, online mobilisation seems to move in and out of what can be called diasporic, within the frame of conflict but also at the same time focusing on other issues, involving other actors and linked to larger social movements and ideas.

The chaotic and dynamic patterns of online mobilisation exemplify its non-linear and messy nature as well as the challenges and obstacles to mobilisation that this nature can bring with it such as fragmentation, lack of unified strategies and reconstructions of conflict narratives to strengthen support in the country of residence. The analysis thus gives an impression of a diasporic mobilisation in constant flux and with everchanging dynamics, a sort of decentralised bottom-up online mobilisation as noted by Aghapouri (2020). As such, focusing on the online space seems to accentuate the need for complexity when understanding diaspora mobilisation in relation to conflict transportation and autonomisation.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate how offline mobilisation translates into online mobilisation, the data and analysis show that it is impossible to look at online mobilisation without inevitably looking at traces of offline mobilisation as they are shared in online spaces. It suggests a deep intertwinement of the two spaces of mobilisation although the tools and mechanisms used might differ significantly.

Conclusion

This contribution has investigated reflections of conflict in the online space by looking at the content of transported conflicts in Kurdish and Turkish online mobilisation related to ‘homeland’ conflict. Through shedding light on online dimensions of conflict transportation and autonomisation, this study makes an important contribution to theories on conflict transportation and highlights the context of the country of residence as well as the fluctuating nature of online mobilisation.

In fact, the findings portray the many nuances of diasporic activity, as the online space seems to be an arena of constant and dynamic change, morphing with other movements, conflicts and actors. It challenges the very concept of diaspora and asks: at what point, in this dynamic space, does something autonomise ‘out of’ the diaspora? As such, online spaces highlight the complexity of diasporic mobilisation, in particular that it is not always limited to, led or activated by diasporic communities. Through my findings I suggest that online mobilisation patterns represent a ‘plurality of consciousnesses’ that can help accentuate the multidirectional and, at times, chaotic nature of online diasporic mobilisation.

The study shows how processes of transportation and autonomisation can play out in the digital space and how this opens up exciting new avenues for research. The traces of offline mobilisation in the online space warrant further research on how offline and online dimensions of conflict transportation influence and shape one another. In addition, the limited research on online conflict transportation makes comparative studies of great interest as well as studies on how conflict transportation processes vary across countries of residence and how ‘homeland’ diaspora outreach policies influence online spaces.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This research was financially supported by the Academy of Finland project, ‘Diasporas and Transportation of Homeland Conflicts: Inter-group Dynamics and Host Country Responses’ [no. 324621, 2019-2023].

Notes on contributors

Cæcilie Svop Jensen

Cæcilie Svop Jensen is a doctoral student at the Tampere Peace Research Institute in Finland. Cæcilie’s research centers on diasporic spaces and processes of conflict transportation and everyday peace. Her PhD project explores these dynamics within Somali communities in Denmark and Finland. She is the co-editor of Diasporas and Conflict Transportation: Challenges and Creative Practices (with Élise Féron), TAPRI Book Series, 2021 and the author of ‘Conflict prevention, dialogue and resilience: Exploring links and strategies’ (with Élise Féron) in Learning from Resilience Strategies in Tanzania. An Outlook of International Development Challenges, Peter Lang, 2021.

Notes

1 Although not exclusively, these pages also posted in Turkish.

2 Efrîn is the Kurdish spelling and Afrin is closer to the Arabic spelling and more widely used in English media coverage.

3 UID Danmark (2018a).

4 UID Danmark (2018b).

5 UID Danmark (2023).

6 Rojava Alliancen (2019).

7 UID Danmark (2019a).

8 Rojava Alliancen (n.d.).

9 UID Danmark (2019b).