Remarks on the concept of critique in Habermasian thought

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of critique in Habermasian thought. Given that the concept of critique is a central theoretical category in the work of the Frankfurt School, it comes as a surprise that little in the way of a systematic account which sheds light on the multifaceted meanings of the concept of critique in Habermas's oeuvre can be found in the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the various meanings that Habermas attributes to the concept of critique in 10 key thematic areas of his writings: (1) the public sphere, (2) knowledge, (3) language, (4) morality, (5) ethics, (6) evolution, (7) legitimation, (8) democracy, (9) religion, and (10) modernity. On the basis of a detailed analysis of Habermas's multifaceted concerns with the nature and function of critique, the study seeks to demonstrate that the concept of critique can be considered not only as a constitutive element but also as a normative cornerstone of Habermasian thought. The paper draws to a close by reflecting on some of the limitations of Habermas's conception of critique, arguing that in order to be truly critical in the Habermasian sense we need to turn the subject of critique into an object of critique.

Keywords:

• communication
• critical capacity
• critical theory
• critique
• emancipation
• Habermas
• language
• rationality
• validity

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank Vivienne Boon, Gail Carter, Anthony Gorman, Naomi Head, and Stephanie Lawler for making many useful suggestions.

Notes

See, for example, Bohman (1986), Eidam, Hermenau and Stederoth (1998), Garz (2000), Karácsony (2001), Müller-Doohm (2000), Nuyen (1993), Sintomer (2005), and Wagner and Zipprian (1991).

On Habermas's theory of the public sphere, see, for example, Habermas (1989 [1962], 1992/1999, 1995). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Calhoun (1992/1999), Crossley and Roberts (2004), Forester (1985), Gardiner (2004), Goode (2005), Holub (1991/2003 [1991]), Kelly (2004), Kögler (2005), Martin (2005), Negt and Kluge (1993 [1972]), Rochlitz (2002), Sintomer (2005), and Voirol (2003).

On Habermas's theory of knowledge, see, for example, Habermas (1987 [1968]-a, 1988 [1963]-a, 1988 [1967/1970]-a, 2001b). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Alford (1985), Apel (1977), Bailey (1994), Giri (2004), Honneth (1991 [1986]), and Pickering (1997).

On Habermas's theory of language and communication, see, for example, Habermas (1970, 1984 [1976]-a, 1985 [1984], 1987 [1981]-a, 1987 [1981]-b, 1987 [1985]-b, 1988 [1967/1970]-b, 1990 [1983]-a, 1998 [1976, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1996], 2000b, 2001 [1984]-a, 2001a). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Apel (1976), Cooke (1994), Giddens (1987), Haferkamp (1985), Honneth and Joas (1991 [1986]), Lafont (1999 [1993]), Markus (1986), May (1996), McCarthy (1973), Schnädelbach (1990 [1982]), Schöttler (1997), Susen (2009a), Thompson (1983), Wagner and Zipprian (1991), and Wellmer (1977 [1976]).

On Habermas's theory of morality, see, for example, Habermas (1990 [1983]-c, 1993 [1990], 2004c). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Abdel-Nour (2004), Böhler (1990 [1982]), Ferrara (1996), Finlayson (2000), Ilting (1990 [1982]), Milley (2002), Morgan (2002), Olsaretti (2003), Schweppenhäuser (1989), Whitton (1992), Young (1997a), and Zurn (1996).

On Habermas's theory of ethics and law, see, for example, Habermas (1990 [1983]-b, 1993 [1990], 1993 [1991], 1996 [1992]-a, 1998a). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Apel (1996), Benhabib (1990), Benhabib and Dallmayr (1990), Finlayson (2000), Gamwell (1997), Gilabert (2005), Hutchings (2005), Nielsen (1995), Rosenfeld and Arato (1998), and Thompson (2000).

On Habermas's theory of evolution, see, for example, Habermas (1979, 1984 [1976]-a). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Antonio (1989), Kirkpatrick (2003), McCarthy (1981), and Whitton (1992).

On Habermas's theory of legitimation, see, for example, Habermas (1988 [1973]). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Berndt (1989), Bjola (2005), Gaon (2004), and Pietrzyk-Reeves (2004).

On Habermas's theory of democracy, see, for example, Habermas (1996 [1992]-b, 2001c, 2005). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Brookfield (2005), Cooke (2000), Eriksen and Weigård (2003), Ferrara (2001), Festenstein (2004), Goode (2005), Ingram (2005), Kelly (2004), O'Neill (2000), Oquendo (2002), Rosenfeld and Arato (1998), Sintomer (1999), and Young (1997b).

On Habermas's theory of religion, see, for example, Habermas (2001b, 2002 [1981, 1991, 1997], 2004b, 2004c), and Habermas and Ratzinger (2005). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Arens (1989), Browning and Schüssler Fiorenza (1992), Meyer (2004), Nault (2004), Rehg (2004), and Trautsch (2004).

On Habermas's theory of modernity, see, for example, Habermas (1987 [1981]-c, 1987 [1981]-j, 1987 [1981]-k, 1987 [1985]-a, 1992 [1988], 2002 [1981, 1991, 1997]). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Benhabib (1981), Bernstein (1985), Blanke (1991), Bowring (1996), Honneth (1995), Hudson (1993), Kellner (1989), and Passerin d'Entrèves and Benhabib (1996).

On Habermas's communication-theoretic view of social order, see, for example, Habermas (1987 [1981]-d, esp. 94 and 99–100; 1987 [1981]-f, esp. 274, 278, 280, 284–8, 293–6, and 308; 2001 [1984]-d, esp. 102; 2001a, esp. 10–1, 33, 35, 44, and 78). For a detailed analysis, see, for example, Susen (2007, 61–100).

Habermas repeatedly emphasises the central communication-theoretic idea that human beings, unlike animals, can be considered to be ‘subjects capable of speech and action’ (‘sprach- und handlungsfähige Subjekte’). See, for example, Habermas (1988 [1971], 9; 1987 [1981]-d, 86; 1987 [1981]-e, 108; 2001 [1984]-b, 9; 2001 [1984]-c, 44; 2001 [1984]-e, 118; 2000b, 343; 2001a, 16, 23–4, and 42; 2004a, 879).

See, for example, Habermas (1970, 1984 [1976]-a, 1985 [1984], 1987 [1981]-a, 1987 [1981]-b, 2001 [1984]-a).

On the intellectual tradition of the Frankfurt School, see, for example, Bottomore (2002), Held (1980), Schirmacher (2000), and Wiggershaus (1997 [1988]).

Habermas (1987 [1965/1968], 308) (italics in original).

Ibid.

Ibid. (italics in original).

Ibid., 310 (italics in original).

Ibid., 309 (italics in original).

Ibid. (italics in original).

Ibid., 310.

Ibid., 308 (italics added).

Habermas 2000a, 17 (my translation). See also Müller-Doohm 2000, 84.

An illustrative example of Habermas's discussion and elaboration of Kohlberg's theory of moral development can be found in Habermas (1990 [1983]-c, esp. 160–70).

On Habermas's conception of juridification (Verrechtlichung), see, for example, Habermas (1996 [1992]-a, esp. 172–4, 187–8, 191–3, 238, 240–2, 246, 357, 431–2, 440–1, and 482; 1987 [1981]-b, 317, 327, 356–73). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Bohman (1989, 393), Deflem (1994, 7–8), and Kelly (2004, 42).

On the Habermasian notion of ‘authorship’, see, for example, Habermas (1988 [1963]-b, 218, 244, and 246–52; 1987 [1968]-b, 155–7; 2001a, 26–8; 2004a, esp. 871–2, 874–81, 884–87, and 890). See also Cooke (1999, esp. 26–32 and 47–8) and Susen (2007, 31–6).

Habermas repeatedly stresses the idea that validity claims are always and necessarily criticisable. See, for example, Habermas (1987 [1981]-f, 287, 305, 308, and 333; 1987 [1981]-h, 125–6, 137, 139, and 149–50; 1982, 269; 2001a, 33, 79, and 82–3).

On Habermas's insistence on the self-critical spirit of the Enlightenment, see esp. Habermas (1987 [1981]-j, 1996 [1981], 1987 [1985]-a, 1992 [1988]). See also Hudson (1993), Ingram (2005), and Passerin d'Entrèves (1996).

See Habermas (1987 [1985]-b, 302): ‘The New Critique of Reason suppresses that almost 200-year-old counterdiscourse inherent in modernity itself […]. The latter discourse set out from Kantian philosophy as an unconscious expression of the modern age and pursued the goal of enlightening the Enlightenment about its own narrow-mindedness.’ (Italics added.)

On Habermas's distinction between system and lifeworld, see esp. Habermas (1987 [1981]-g, 1987 [1981]-i). See also, for instance, Bohman (1989), Hartmann (1985), and Susen (2007, 61–73).

See, for example, Habermas (1984 [1977], 1985 [1984]). See also, for example, Johnson (1991) and Raulet (1996).

On Habermas's notion of ‘the authority of the better argument’, see, for example, Habermas (2001 [1984]-d, esp. 94–9; 2001a, 13, 44, 45, and 79). In the secondary literature, see, for example, Apel (1990 [1985], 35, 41–2, and 50), Fultner (2001, xv), Pellizzoni (2001), Power (2000), Ray (2004, 317–8), Rochlitz (1996), Susen (2009a, 96–7), Susen (2009b, 111–2), and Whitton (1992, 307).