The French New Right: multiculturalism of the right and the recognition/exclusionism syndrome

Abstract

This article studies a seeming paradox – the adoption of multi-culturalist strategies and arguments by the neo-fascist European New Right. Why would neo-fascists adopt such a theoretical framework, and why has multiculturalism failed in Europe? In this article, I argue that the European New Right employs a multiculturalism framework, which I define as a recognition/exclusionist one, in order to create a new discourse of ‘legitimate exclusionism’ of non-authentic European immigrants. In short, multiculturalism, by celebrating differences between ethnic and cultural groups, inherently admits that there exist such differences between individuals. This allows neo-fascists to distinguish between themselves and ‘others’, immigrants not sharing their cultural heritage, and to claim the need for protecting such a cultural heritage through exclusion of others. As this article attempts to claim, immigrants will not benefit from multiculturalism, but the right of the radical integralist in its different versions.

Keywords:

• multiculturalism
• nationalism
• exclusionism
• radical right regionalism
• Europe

Notes

Neo fascist movements arose in Europe following the Second World War. Like earlier fascist movements neo-fascism opposed liberal individualism and attacked Marxist and other left-wing ideologies. They have been indulged in racist and xenophobic scapegoating, while in general terms, they have promoted populist right-wing economic programs. Differently from old style fascists, neo fascists showed no interest in imperialist conquest of territories, and made efforts to portray themselves as democratic and mainstream. They usually placed more blame for their countries misfortunes on immigration rather than on Jews and leftists.

The reason for that is that most studies on the New Right focused on its meta-political strategy and its neo-fascist ideological roots. Although the association of proto-fascist ideas with cultural diversity and ethno-pluralism has been done, no comparative works have pinpointed the different, but interconnected links between the Benoist theory of differentialism and the radical multiculturalism (see Griffin 1998; see also Eatwell 1992; Griffin 1993; Spektorowski 2000; Taguieff 1994). Another solid work is by Duranton Crabol (1988) and Bar-On (2001). Regarding the differences between the new intellectual right and other right-wing movements (see Ignazi 1993). The New Right has developed all around Europe. In Germany, the Thule Seminar (whose name is peculiarly reminiscent of the Thule Society which had strong links with the early Nazi party) led by Pierre Krebs and Armin Mohler, contributed to the rehabilitation of the German Conservative Revolution's blend of nationalism and socialism. In Italy, the New Right was associated with Pino Rauti, one of the ideological leaders of the Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale. Pino Rauti and Marcho Tarchi synthesized anti-imperialism with a type of European ‘third way’ fascism. In Belgium, Robert Steukers, the editor of Vouloir, and in England Michael Walker and the journal Scorpion (an ex-member of the British National Front and a party organizer for central London), combined the stress for the preservation of Europe's distinctive ‘ethnies’ together with a total critique of American imperialism and liberal and socialist materialist ideology.

As nationalism turns into nativism, it becomes a kind of pluralism (see Michaels 1995, 69).

Some theories suggest that this new type of reactionary tribalism that animates the theoretical convergence between ‘radical right and cultural left’ represents a postmodern reaction against liberal multicultural ideology (see Antonio 2000).

As remarked by Benhabib (1995, 6) ‘agreements in societies living with value pluralism are to be sought for not at the level of substantive beliefs, but at the level of procedures, processes and practices for attaining and revising beliefs’ (see also Kymlicka 1998).

The question of ‘cultural recognition’ of immigrants or sons of immigrants was particularly highlighted over the demands of Islamic schoolgirls in France to don veils in public schools This was a local contest concerning the propriety of displaying cultural distinctions in public which became a larger, theoretical issue focusing on the principle of tolerance in liberal society.

Another critique is provided by Grillo (1998, 212), ‘Multiculturalism … by seeking to legitimize heterogeneity, it has created a space for separatist and fundamentalist movements which seek to impose uniformity and homogeneity on all their adherents’.

Hollinger (1995) distinguishes between pluralist multiculturalism where groups are permanent, and cosmopolitan multiculturalism, which involves shifting group boundaries, multiple affiliations, and hybrid identities and is based on individual rights.

Since the idea of assimilation relies upon individual autonomy, what follows thus, is that in order to protect cultural communities, the idea of individual autonomy has to be seriously damaged. Iris Young stresses the non-viability of impartiality. The frameworks for conflict resolution are systematically skewed when they operate within the idiom of one of the parties to the conflict, she claims (Young 1998, 6–7).

As Dryzek (2002) notes, the irony in involving theories of radical and pluralist democracy is that they require the persistence of a dominant liberal capitalist order and its multiple oppressions (p. 169).

Interview by Evans, Tambakaki, and Burke (2001–2002, 11–12). Interestingly, Mouffe (2005) not only praises diversity, but sees a logical link between the ‘conflictual consensus’ and Schmitt's (1952) new global order based on the existence of several autonomous regional blocs.

In more sense than one, Parekh overemphasizes the guarding of cultural boundaries despite paying lip service to the crossing of boundaries (see Yack 2002).

GRECE was the logical alternative for young French nationalist militants, Alain de Benoist, Jacques Bruyas, and Jean Jacques Mourreau, with the collaboration of Claude Valla and Dominique Venner after the dissolution of the Jeune Nation movement in 1958, the disbanding of the OAS, and the defeat of one of the Rassemblement Européen de la Liberté in the 1967 legislative elections.

The journal's political program in 1963, ‘Qu'est-ce que le nationalisme?’ for example, defined ethnocentric nationalism as the political expression of the West Europe Action 5, cited in Taguieff (1994, 124).

Venner (1993, 15), ex-official of Jeune Nation and founder of Europe Action.

Laborde emphasizes the emergence in France of a liberal multicultural Left ready to adopt the American liberal discourse, outstanding liberal intellectuals such as Christian Jelen, Emannuelle Todd, Tzvetan Todorov, and Alain Finkeilkraut, associate multiculturalism with the Right (see Jelen 1997; see also Finkielkraut 1987; Todorov 1996). Some critical intellectuals like Roman (1995) claim that the French should cease to give an aura of universality to all their national particularities and … should dare to give legal recognition to differences.

For criticisms of Sartre and Jeanson, see Crouzet (1962–1963).

On the differences between the neo-liberal Club de l'Horleoge and the New Right, see de Benoist (1990). The discussion with Le Club de l'Horloge was continued in Éléments, no. 71 (de Lesquen 1991, 28–9) (see also de Benoist 1991).

de Benoist, ‘Sur le foulard islamique’. Alain de Benoist website: www.alaindebenoist.com/pdf

See Éléments, no. 33: 20 (de Benoist 1980).

Three interviews with de Benoist (Telos 1993–1994, 195).

Pierre Vial's address at the 14 National Colloquium of GRECE. Cited in Taguieff (1993–1994, 117).

Éléments, no. 33: 10 (Vial 1980).

Originally delivered as a lecture at GRECE's 24th National Congress, devoted to the topic ‘Nation and Empire’, Paris, March 24, 1991.

Evola (1986, 18–20) adapted from Gli uomini e le rovine [Man and the ruins] (Rome: Giovanni Volpe, 1972; 1st ed., 1953), cited in Roger Griffin (1995, 343).

Evola (1986, 18, 20), adapted from Gli uomini e le rovine [Man and the ruins] (Rome: Giovanni Volpe, 1972; 1st ed. 1953), cited in Griffin (1995, 343).

Most of Schmitt's writings about his Grossraum theory are in his Staat, Grossraum, and Nomos (Schmitt 1995).

Some theories on federalism argue that democracy and federalism are two concepts that refer to different values, organizing principles, languages, and intellectual traditions, which can be analyzed separately (see Requejo 2007). For the non liberal idea of integral federalism, see Piccone (1991, 7–45) (see also Poche 1991–1992, 71–82).

Three Interviews with de Benoist (Telos 1993–1994, 201).

Editorial, ‘L'Europe de 1992: Un mauvais conte de fees’, Éléments, no. 65 (1980, 3–4).

On civic integration, see Joppke (2007, 247).

A contrasting vision is provided by Andrew March who claims that there is no need for any criteria of strong citizenship beyond what is necessary to secure to equal rights of all (see March 2007, 235–52).

Laura Androche's definition of civic republicanism rejects the idea of ancestral obligation as the basis of political obligation, while endorsing Andrew Mason's notion of political obligation as sociopolitical or public practice (see Andronache 2006, 410; Ferry 2005, 231; see also Mason 1997, 427–47).

This is middle road between D. Miller's liberalism based on the historical national culture and L. Androche's republicanism as public practice.

Petit's (1997) instrumental republicanism, seeks to secure resilient individual freedom as non-domination.