Is the capability approach a sufficient challenge to distributive accounts of global justice?

Abstract

I begin by discussing forms of cosmopolitanism that motivate challenges to distributive accounts of global justice. I then use Sen's version of the capabilities approach to show how distributive accounts fall short, why an overarching theory of justice is not needed, and that democracy understood as the exercise of public reasoning can do the work of identifying and addressing injustices. That said in favor of Sen, I argue that his account fails to attend to the kinds of injustices emerging from relationships of power and the institutions and structures in which these relationships are embedded. To show this, I outline features of a feminist relational approach, which I then apply to Canada's attempt to address historic harms through the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While I agree with Sen that we do not need a theory of global justice that is universal, ideal, impartial, or abstracted from context, I aim to broaden the scope of justice beyond both distributive accounts and Sen's version of the capabilities approach.

Keywords:

• global justice
• distributive justice
• Amartya Sen
• care ethics
• relational theory
• Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Acknowledgements

A very early version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association meetings at the Université de MontréalIn, June 2010, for the Panel, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Global Justice’, organized by Ryoa Chung. Because it allowed me to return to and develop my critical analysis of global justice, I welcomed the invitation to participate in the Workshop, ‘Critical Approaches to Global Justice’ organized by Monique Deveaux and Kathryn Walker and held in Toronto in October 2012. I could not have developed my critique without the positive and engaging interactions with participants at the Workshop and especially not without Monique's and Kathryn's useful feedback.

Notes

For a fuller discussion of arguments for and against supplying a list, consult Nussbaum (2003), Robeyns (2005), Sen (2004), and Crocker (2008).

Examples of work on relational theory include Brennan (1999), Campbell (2003, 2008), Downie and Llewellyn (2012), Koggel (1998, 2002), Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000), and Nedelsky (1993).

For a fuller discussion of individualism in liberal theory, consult Chapter 2 of Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Koggel 1998).

While no one disputes the importance of current institutional structures for enhancing women's agency and well-being, I argue that Sen relies too exclusively on these in ways that exclude discussion of what may be needed to advance the provision of care in families and communities as is shown in the following quotation:

empirical work in recent years has brought out very clearly how the relative respect and regard for women's well-being is strongly influenced by such variables as women's ability to earn an independent income, to find employment outside the home, to have ownership rights and to have literacy and be educated participants in decisions within and outside the family. (1999, 191)

Also consult similar themes in Agency and Embodiment (Maynell, Campbell, and Sherwin, 2009).