The ethics of secret diplomacy: a contextual approach

Abstract

Under what conditions is secret diplomacy normatively appropriate? Drawing on pragmatic theories of political and ethical judgement, this paper argues that a three-dimensional contextual approach centred on actors' reasoning process offers an innovative and reliable analytical tool for bridging the ethical gap of secret diplomacy. Using the case of the US extraordinary rendition programme, the paper concludes that secret diplomacy is ethically unjustifiable when actors fail to invoke normatively relevant principles of justification, inappropriately apply them to the context of the case and when the actors' moral reasoning process suffers from deficient levels of critical reflection concerning the broader implications of secret engagements for diplomatic conduct.

Keywords:

• ethics
• secret diplomacy
• extraordinary rendition

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

Notes on contributor

Dr Corneliu Bjola is University Lecturer in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford. His research interests cover the role of diplomacy in shaping international change, ethical dimensions of diplomatic relations, and theories of innovation in international negotiations. His most recent (co-authored) publication is Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics (London: Routledge 2013). He is also the co-editor of the New Diplomacy book series from Routledge.

Notes

1. For example, if justications of secret diplomacy are anchored in taken-for-granted understandings about advancing peace talks, such as those between the USA and North Vietnam (Kissinger 1994, 684) in the early 1970s, one should also critically consider the extent to which Kissinger's secret diplomacy really helped put an end to the war as well as whether the context of the case really replicates the stategic environment during which the talks between the USA and North Vietnam occurred (e.g. the Cold War).

2. Due to space constraints, non-US justifications of the SDER programme cannot be included in this article. It is nevertheless important to note that it was the USA which approached and sought the collaboration of its allies and also the one to coordinate logistically the entire operation.

3. According to former US officials, the CIA had flown 100–150 suspected terrorists between 2001 and 2005, from one foreign country to another, including to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Pakistan. Each of those countries has been identified by the State Department as habitually using torture in its prisons (Jehl and Johnston 2005).

4. For example, Rice's claim that the US policy on enhaced interrogation was consistent with US obligations under the Convention Against Torture obscured the fact that ‘consistent with’ was not the same as being in compliance. The former invites administrative choice and discretion instead of a legal obligation (Fisher 2008, 1428).

5. Harsh interrogation methods were partially banned by the US Congress through the Detainee Treatment Act in December 2005 and more comprehensivley, through the intelligence funding bill in March 2008, the last being subsequently vetoed by President Bush (Associated Press 2008). This demonstrated greater awareness among US lawmakers about the negative impact of torture on the US standing in the world. However, both legislative acts were adopted at the end of the extra-rendition programme and largely as a result of the media exposure of SDER.