Recognition theory and global poverty

Abstract

So far, recognition theory has focused its attention on modern capitalism and its formation in richer Western societies and has neglected issues of global poverty. A brief sketch of Axel Honneth's recognition theory precedes an examination of how the theory can contribute to a better understanding of global poverty, and justice in relation to poverty. I wish to highlight five ways in which recognition theory can enrich our inventory of theories dealing with global poverty and justice: It emphasizes the importance of giving victims of poverty due weight in theorizing about poverty. It provides a vocabulary to conceptualize the experiences of suffering by poverty in terms of misrecognition. It highlights the importance of legal recognition and of actually having certain rights in order to be respected. It bases its critique of poverty on a particular idea of justice and how it should unfold. Finally, recognition theory demands that the poor must be involved in decision-making processes and their agency has to be recognized, respected, and socially esteemed in order to overturn injustice.

Keywords:

• global poverty
• recognition theory
• Axel Honneth

Note on Contributors

Gottfried Schweiger works as a senior researcher at the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research (University of Salzburg) and is currently the principal investigator of a three-year research project ‘Social Justice and Child Poverty’ funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). He recently published on recognition theory, poverty, child well-being and the capability approach. More information about his work can be found at: www.uni-salzburg.at/zea/schweiger

Notes

1. I will focus my exploration in this paper on Honneth and will not engage with other versions of recognition theory such as that of Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth 2003).

2. It would be worth exploring if the concept of vulnerability can also cover institutions and maybe states. Especially in the context of global justice the inequality in power and resources between states and the vulnerability of poorer states toward international agreements or transnational companies has been discussed, for example by Pogge (2008). Goulet (1971) also uses the term vulnerability to describe the situation of poorer societies (chap. 2).

3. Recognition theory shares this ethical individualism with other normative theories such as the capability approach but it is crucial to note here that its ethical individualism is not bound to an ontological or methodological individualism (Robeyns 2005). Recognition as well as misrecognition is at its core an interpersonal process and the claims for recognition are always addressed toward other persons or institutions.

4. Deveaux is in particular concerned with Thomas Pogge's theory but views her criticism to apply to most standard theories of (global) justice. She concludes:

On this framing, the designated moral agents are specifically persons and entities not suffering from poverty but rather responsible for contributing to that poverty, or thought to be capable of alleviating it (or both). By contrast, the would-be recipients are construed as mere recipients of justice, rather than as potential agents of change. [ … ] In the absence of adequate attention to perspectives and needs of the putative recipients of poverty reduction efforts, a focus on agents’ duties and capabilities risks marginalizing the role of poor communities in devising and implementing solutions to chronic poverty and inequality. By failing to see the poor as actual or prospective agents of justice, such approaches risk ignoring the root political causes of, and best remedies for, entrenched poverty. (Deveaux 2013, 23–24)

5. Here it is worth noting that recognition theory shares some similarities with the theory of Avishai Margalit, who has argued that a decent society is one in which its members are not humiliated (Margalit 1996). Margalit has a narrower understanding of humiliation than recognition theory, but still points to the same direction, namely that it is of high moral importance that people are treated with respect by others and especially in contexts of unequal power.

6. Hereby I follow a suggestion of Deranty (2010), who has argued – with particular reference to the work of Emmanuel Renault – that recognition theory provides first and foremost a conceptual language to uncover and describe economic injustices and not an attempt to explain their causes.

7. It can be disputed if the capability approach is a full or partial theory of justice depending on what is needed to count as such. I view it at least in Nussbaum's version as a (partial) theory of justice situated within political liberalism. She writes herself on one occasion:

These ten capabilities are supposed to be general goals that can be further specified by the society in question, as it works on the account of fundamental entitlements it wishes to endorse [ … ]. But in some form all are part of a minimum account of social justice: a society that does not guarantee these to all its citizens, at some appropriate threshold level, falls short of being a fully just society, whatever its level of opulence. Moreover, the capabilities are held to be important for each and every person: each person is treated as an end, and none as a mere adjunct or means to the ends of others. And although in practical terms priorities may have to be set temporarily, the capabilities are understood as both mutually supportive and all of central relevance to social justice. Thus a society that neglects one of them to promote the others has shortchanged its citizens, and there is a failure of justice in the shortchanging [ … ]. (Nussbaum 2003, 40)

8. Honneth only seldom uses the concept of dialectics, but does so occasionally in the context of social progress and the development of morality and justice within capitalism. This is an interesting parallel to the description of development as a dialectical process by Goulet (1971, chap. 4).

9. This is certainly also of importance for the capabilities approach, and Nussbaum deals with such relational aspects explicitly. Still, I view this focus on the social embedding of the individual to be the main focus of recognition theory.

10. It would be an interesting venture to connect this concept of empowerment with the concept of freedom as non-domination, as is advocated by neo-republicans like Philipp Pettit (Lovett and Pettit 2009).