Vegan parents and children: zero parental compromise

ABSTRACT

Marcus William Hunt argues that when co-parents disagree over whether to raise their child (or children) as a vegan, they should reach a compromise as a gift given by one parent to the other out of respect for his or her authority. Josh Millburn contends that Hunt’s proposal of parental compromise over veganism is unacceptable on the ground that it overlooks respect for animal rights, which bars compromising. However, he contemplates the possibility of parental compromise over ‘unusual eating,’ of animal-based foods obtained without the violation of animal rights. I argue for zero parental compromise, rejecting a rights-oriented approach, and propose a policy that an ethical vegan parent and a non-vegan co-parent should follow to determine how to raise their children.

KEYWORD:

• Veganism
• Children
• Parental Compromise
• Religion
• Rights

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Josh Milburn for taking the time to read an earlier draft of this paper and for making valuable suggestions that helped improve the final draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. To name a few, see for example, W. L. Craig (2001) The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, Jason Waller (2019) Cosmological Fine-Tuning Arguments: What (if Anything) Should We Infer from the Fine-Tuning of Our Universe for Life? And Alvin Plantinga (1979) The Nature Of Necessity.

2. See, for example, Kai Horsthemke’s recent book Animal Rights Education, for both a critique of Regan’s view and the development of an alternative rights perspective.

3. Here I want to consider an objection. That is, does that apply to all cases? Is eating the eggs of backyard chickens, for example, or picking up cockles at the beach steeped in violence or negative aesthetic values? Certainly it is not evident that it is. Thus, the Aesthetic Argument addresses the inherent ugliness of intensive factory farming and slaughterhouses. The Gustatory Argument addresses the reasons that we ought to avoid products such as the eggs of backyard chickens, which do not directly involve violence. Furthermore, there may be advanced a compelling argument against such products on the basis of environmental considerations, which I do not develop here. For arguments against animal products not derived directly from violent practices see Deckers (2016). Animal (de)liberation. London: Ubiquity Press. https://doi.org/10.5334/bay.

4. This might be regarded as a utilitarian argument. Although I am not a utilitarian (and I don’t think this line of argument is utilitarian in nature) I am not bothered by it. Even if it turned out to be, it would not undermine my aesthetic-based argument.