Abstract
Critical mobility studies increasingly focus on legal geographies of the public street. Extending such work, we explore how statutory and case laws construct everyday circulation as right or duty, and implications for social justice. Using Ohio as case study, we analyze the ways legislative statutes define streets, mobile bodies, and ‘right of way.’ We then review how judges weigh statutory rights (and rights-based claims) against a ‘duty of ordinary care’ when assigning liability for accidents. Assessing the distribution of legal rights and duties among transport modes and spaces illuminates power asymmetries on American streets, in statutory theory and judicial practice.
Notes
1. Extensive study could be made of the complex regulation of vehicular and other motion, a topic for future papers. And while certainly relevant to questions of disability, our focus is on urban circulation more broadly.
2. For example, Illinois, Michigan, and Indiana all define the street in terms of ‘purposes of vehicular travel’ (Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 605, 2012; Indiana Code, Title IX, 2012; Michigan Vehicle Code, 2012). These states also define the right-of-way as either ‘the privilege of the immediate use of a highway’ (Indiana and Michigan) or the ‘right to proceed’ (Illinois). And these states offer nearly identical rules for who has the right of way, who must yield, and municipal liability. These similarities extend to the largest US states of California (California Vehicle Code), New York (New York Vehicle and Traffic Code), and Texas (Texas Transportation Code) show similar definitions and standards.