Trapped between religion and ethnicity: identity politics against the Baloch in Iran and Pakistan

ABSTRACT

This article delves into the intricate connection between societal identity markers and the politico-socio-economic conditions of the Baloch people in Pakistan and Iran. It explores the structural conditions of identity that contribute to oppressive dichotomies in centre–periphery relations, ultimately fuelling internal conflicts. Balochistan, historically marginalized and overlooked, endured a complex geopolitical history as it shifted between empires, notably the Persian and British Empires. In the nineteenth century, agreements between the Persian and British Empires outlined the modern-day borders, fragmenting the Baloch nation into regions now administered by Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The aftermath of this partition led to permanent societal tension, impacting the internal security of these states. The article highlights the struggle of the divided Baloch people for equal politico-socio-economic rights, emphasizing the states’ challenges in legitimizing their authority. The Baloch, residing in divided borders, express their grievances against Iran and Pakistan, each grappling with identity-based conflicts rooted in sectarianism (Iran) and ethnicity (Pakistan). The narrative explores the complex relationship between the Baloch people and the respective states, shedding light on diverse perspectives regarding marginalization and discrimination.

KEYWORDS:

• Baloch
• Iran
• Pakistan
• identity
• ethnicity
• sectarian militancy

Introduction

To explore the historical background of Baloch, historians have largely relied on studying the cultural and linguistic connections between the Baloch and other ethnic groups in the region as the primary means to trace their origins. There is little documentary evidence to define the Baloch identity, but relatively thorough investigation into Baloch history and language was conducted by Dames in 1904, who had identified Kerman (located in present-day Iran) as a plausible point of origin for the Baloch (M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015, p. 2). The Baloch were pastoralist or semi nomads and had routine migrations along established routes between focal grazing areas (Breseeg, 2004; Dashti, 2012; Wirsing, 2008). They had been moving in the south and eastern fringes of the Iranian Plateau for almost 3000 years. The settlement process to a permanent territory of the Baloch started in the 12th century on an area stretching through Persia, Afghanistan and India. In a span of centuries, and in the process of migration and settlement the Baloch incorporated many smaller groups (Breseeg, 2004; Dashti, 2012; Wirsing, 2008) yet they kept their distinctive tribal associations (Breseeg, 2004, p. 22) and they still feel pride to associate themselves with their tribal kin. The assemblage of smaller groups was to safeguard themselves against their powerful neighbours, Persia, Afghanistan, and the sub-continent of India. A significant turning point in Baloch history took place during the 14th century when Mir Chakar Khan Rind established the first tribal confederacy among the Baloch tribes, aiming to unite them under a loosely structured administrative system (Breseeg, 2004, p. 139). This confederacy extended from Kirman in the west to Afghanistan in the northeast, and from Sindh and Punjab in the southeast to the Arabian Sea in the south. Chakar Khan’s efforts towards Baloch unification marked a notable and meaningful initiative. It was in 1666 when the first Kalat confederacy was established and surpassed Chakar Khan’s confederation in terms of size and coherence (M. Ahmed, 2013, p. 99). During the eighteenth century the 6th Khan of Kalat, Mir Naseer Khan consolidated most of the land wherein Baloch tribes were settled into an arrangement of feudal state with its stretch from southeastern Afghanistan, Makran (Pakistan), Kharan to Murdar Peak in Quetta (Pakistan), and all the way to Bandar Abbas (Iran), including Dera Ghazi Khan on the edge of Punjab (Pakistan) (Ahmad, 1992, p. 76; Breseeg, 2004, p. 150). Under Mir Naseer Khan rule the confederacy grew stronger, with a regular army of around 25,000 personnel, a bureaucratic system, and two legislative councils known as the House of Lords and the House of Commons (M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015, p. 3).

It was in the mid-nineteenth century the British paid some attention to this land – Kalat Confederacy – due to its strategic location, which served as a line of defence between the Russian and British Empires. It provided access to British forces into Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan and asserted their influence in the region (Dunne, 2006:19; Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), 2006, p. 13; S. Khan, 2021, p. 7; Siddiqi, 2012b, p. 158). “At that time Kalat was a very small and uninfluential state. The Khans, therefore, gradually engaged the assistance of the chiefs of their kindred tribes in the neighborhood by giving them fiefs in Kalat. In certain specified cases and numbers, for the aid of the Khan” (P. Ahmed et al., 2015, p. 62). A secured route for British commercial and military convoys was carved out through the confederacy after multiple treaties with local rulers both through political dialogue and forceful military actions (Breseeg, 2004, p. 159; Marri, 2014, p. 17); but the people living in Kalat Confederacy – an area under the jurisdiction of Mir Nasir Khan II – rejected the agreements. The locals retaliated against this arrangement and attacked British troops. To counter these attacks, the British Army with modern technology and far more powerful than the locals took strong military action against the indigenous tribes. The military advent ended up in trifurcation of the region (FPC, 2006, p. 13). Each part was given away to three states: Persia, Afghanistan, and British India (Dashti, 2017, p. 3; A. Khan, 2009, p. 1073; S. Khan, 2021, pp. 38–40; Siddiqi, 2012b, p. 158). Under the trifurcation arrangement, 25% of the Confederacy went to the Persian territory through the Goldsmith Line¹ in 1871 (FPC, 2006, p. 13; S. Khan, 2021, p. 40). The demarcation of Durand Line² between Afghanistan and British India resulted in the division of the northern part of the confederacy (S. Khan, 2021:40; Qassem, 2007, p. 66). The arrangement under the trifurcation further strengthened and confined the groups into their own boundaries instead of assimilating with other groups. Heraclides sees it as “retribalization instead of detribalization” (Heraclides, 1991, p. 7).

Present day Balochistan is a legacy of the trifurcation and international recognition of the drawn contours on this region divided into three states: Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Baloch population scattered in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

In the course of history, the Baloch developed into an independent linguistic and cultural community with the largest concentration found in Pakistan, followed by Iran, Afghanistan, Oman, Bahrain, and Turkmenistan (Breseeg, 2004, p. 64; Dashti, 2017, pp. 1–3; Samad, 2014, p. 306; Taheri, 2012, p. 7). The strong affinity within the ethnic group refused to recognize new boundaries that had divided families and tribes across the borders. Strong societies like Baloch who live in weak states like Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have kept their separate identity intact with a strong social network within the boundaries. Artificially created borders not only divided but also compelled incoherent assemblage of disparate and mutually resentful groups to live together – an ideal recipe for a continued feud (Esman, 2004, p. 69). Nationalism, originating from European philosophy two centuries ago, has successfully reshaped the global political map by establishing nation-states across the entire land surface, excluding Antarctica. However, the integration of ethnic or cultural minorities within these states remains imperfect, leading to significant challenges and frequent failures in the process of national integration – a critical issue in the contemporary world (Birch, 1989, p. 3).

The Baloch people – the subject of this article – best illustrate how partition of their region divided and scattered them across three different and internationally recognized states, resulting in continued frustration and antagonistic relationships with the controlling governments of these regions. A commonality within three states for the Baloch is that in all cases they live far below the socio-economic conditions of the respective majority groups. “Socio-economic disparities between regions are a manifestation of factors which are predominantly structural in nature and embedded within the social, economic, cultural, historical, political, and environmental milieu of the area and form an inherent part of the society” (Huda et al. 2011, p. 38). The disparity has created constant conflict and morphed into identity-based political factionalism with the exception of the identity markers. In a society, the identity markers define their space and draw confinement boundaries wherein they interact within the group only. Guelke (2012) relates this confinement as a reason that engenders deeply divided societies and restricts the assimilation and cohesion. The Baloch of either side believe that the state controlled by the majority ethnic group adopts discriminatory policies against them both in Iran and Pakistan, and this is due to their identity. Interestingly the same ethnic group with similar complaints against their state register them with different identity markers: sectarian and ethnic.

This article examines how identity markers are exploited by the state centre in Iran and Pakistan and have led to the plight of the Baloch in these two countries. The emphasis in the article is to investigate the role of state towards its minority as Asim says, when a state associates national identity with a specific sect or ethnic group like in Iran and Pakistan, this association can trigger the minority groups to raise their demands (Asim, 2023, p. 14). Nevertheless, the qualitative components of inequality cannot be measured using statistical data on social and economic conditions. Reports with absolute numbers, percentages, ratios, and indicators may highlight the figurative details but cannot portray or express the open and covert discrimination and marginalization in a society with the people who are in any way different from the majority. This article will bring forth an analysis by evaluating the available literature and reports.

The following section constructs a scaffolding to flesh out the theoretical reasoning of the rife between the central government and the peripheral area.

Theoretical framework

In any society, the absence of equal opportunities for all always creates a competitive environment between haves and have nots. The latter group often associates its deprivation with its identity, which further obstructs its assimilation with the rest of society. Confinement within group boundaries not only weakens society but also impacts its social contract with state. Whenever a group feels marginalized and discriminated against; identity becomes a powerful and potent political tool to raise its voice and mobilize. Identity-based politics is an act wherein the people rationally pursue their interests, “yet those interests are constrained by the identity context in which they operate” (McCauley, 2014, p. 802). Guelke identifies common sources of division in societies around the world, which are: class, caste, religion, language, race, ethnicity, and clan. He further adds binary divisions like settler versus native; immigrant versus indigenous population; pastoralist versus native; peasant versus landowner; urban versus rural; and centre versus periphery (Guelke, 2012, p. 14). While analyzing other potential sources of division in society, Guelke ascribes ethnic cleavages more prone to political conflict (Guelke, 2012, p. 20). Ethnic identity is not an acquired attribute, rather it is an inherited ascription based on common culture (social values, language, norms, and rituals), faith, religion, and racial features (Esman, 2004, p. 28; Smith 1979, p. 22; Tambiah, 1989, p. 335). The group assemblage on the basis of distinct identity – ethnicity – makes it identifiable among others and significantly more powerful than any other bondage within the society to which Guelke (2012, p. 20) refers as ethnonationalism. Whether real or perceived, targeted discrimination ignites the flame of nationalist fervour (Mayall, 1990, p. 70). The discrimination may not be on ethnic lines; however, a marginalized group can translate it into an ethnic/religious claim, which is very powerful and also a gelling factor (Esman, 2004, p. 36; Horowitz, 1985, p. 97).

The societies which are divided on the basis of ethnoreligious identity not only challenge the legitimacy of state but also create a conducive environment for violence. On the one hand, the state is neglectful towards segments of its society, as in the case of the Baloch in Iran and Pakistan. On the other hand, the neglected segment resorts to physical violence to demonstrate their vengeance and resentment against the discriminatory policies.

The question that follows these observations is why and how the Baloch community has been oppressed on the basis of its distinct ethnic and religious identity. In this juncture the concept of structural violence offers a vantage point to unpack the Baloch case. According to Johan Galtung (1969) structural violence is force applied upon people based on pre-existing social arrangements that prevent the realization of the full human potential and the satisfaction of basic development needs. Unlike direct physical violence, structural violence is silent, it does not show: it is essentially static. Galtung further explains that, in a static society, personal violence is obvious and can be registered but structural violence is imbued in the system as the air around us. It allows inequality to persist and has an institutional bias against a certain group. The set of all such systems of interaction, for a given set of actors, can then be referred to as a structure. And in a structure an actor may have consistently low rank in comparison with another actor – “the violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung, 1969, pp. 170–175). The analysis draws on the notion of systematic structural violence in the state institutional apparatus that remains the invisible frame within a state structure. The disenfranchised group of people in reaction may resort to visible violence resisting marginalization (Esman, 2004, p. 19; Horowitz, 1985, p. 135; Rubenstein, 2017, p. 31).

Given the Baloch issue on both sides and the weaker state capacities in Iran and Pakistan, another way to look at the issue is the failings of a state to deal with its citizens. Researchers can use Iran and Pakistan case studies when examining the causes and effects of weak statism. The authors have, therefore, examined the issue both by Galtung’s prism of structural violence and weak statism due to state’s fragility in order to pinpoint the causes of politics against Baloch by their respective states. One or both of these causes may exist. It is a state’s responsibility to provide equal opportunities and fair distribution of public goods to all its people. Lack of access to equality and fairness could lead to frustration, grievance and probably aggression by the deprived communities. Due to its own inability to maintain social cohesion, a fragile state creates space for disgruntled groups within its borders who can potentially challenge the state’s authority (Kress, 2012, p. 865). A state which fails to treat its people in equitable manner and cannot provide security and basic civic necessities is vulnerable to both “intra” and “inter” state conflicts (Wolff, 2011, p. 955). These observations allow us to expand our inquiry and question the mechanisms, processes, and institutions (formal and informal) that prevent people from satisfying their needs and constrict their rightful options of fair share.

Balochistan: a historical overview

Balochistan is an underdeveloped region wherein people are struggling for their socio-politico-economic rights (Hamid et al., 2019, p. 133; Sial & Basit, 2012, pp. 10–11). Both in Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch attribute their low quality-of-life to their identity markers oscillating between ethnicity in Pakistan and sectarianism in Iran. The formidable task for any researcher is always collection of data, which in the case of Balochistan of both sides is more challenging due to lack of reliable sources. The institutional presence in the Pakistani side of Balochistan is minimal and that is also understaffed and under-resourced. Access to the Iranian side of Balochistan’s data is another daunting task because of sensitivity of the topic and stringent censorship laws in Iran (Manghebati, 2015, p. 13). In the next sections, despite all limitations and available data, the authors have tried to analyze the living conditions of Baloch on both sides.

Baloch in Pakistan

Present day Balochistan in Pakistan or Eastern Balochistan (hereafter EB) comprises an area that Pakistan has inherited as a result of decolonization of the British India in 1947, and subsequent accession of the Kalat Agency and its three peripheral states – Kharan, Makran, and Lasbela in 1948. EB is Pakistan’s largest province in terms of area and covers 347,190 square kilometres, or 43.6% of the country’s total land (Dashti, 2017; Feyyaz, 2013:115; GOB,³ 2021:220;3; Noraiee, 2020:72; S. Khan, 2021:5). The demarcated boundaries of today’s EB are marked with British–Afghan wars⁴ and the colonial political designs (S. Khan, 2021, p. 5). According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS),⁵ Balochistan is the largest yet sparsely populated province in Pakistan. Based on the latest census in 2017 the population of the province is around 12 million (12,344,408), which is almost 6% of the total population of Pakistan (207,774,000) that includes two dominant ethnic groups – Pashtun and Baloch. The average population density in Pakistan is 260.88 persons per square kilometre, whereas it is merely 35.53 persons per square kilometre in Balochistan (PBS, 2021; S. Khan, 2021, p. 6). With Quetta its capital city, EB is Pakistan’s most diverse province with a population mix. Almost 45% Baloch (excluding Brahvis), mainly clustered in the south of EB, closely followed by the second largest group – Pashtun, who make up almost 32% of the total. Pashtun are settled in Quetta and its periphery in the north, the adjoining areas of KP. In addition to Baloch and Pashtun, Brahvis, Sindhis, Punjabi, Hazara, Makrani people of African descent, and many other smaller nations are currently residing in EB, making it most diverse region. There is a noticeable non-Muslim population: Hindu (0.49%), Christians (0.40%), Qadiani (0.15%), and Scheduled Castes (0.10%) (A. Khan, 2009, p. 1071; Feyyaz, 2013, p. 115; PBS, 2017, p. 5; S. Khan, 2021, Z. A. Khan, 2012, p. 10). The Baloch society has a tribal structure with major tribes to be Marri, Bugti, Brauhi, Jamaldini, Rakhshani, Bizenjo, Boleidai, Bangulzai, Umrani, Jamali, Qaisarani, and Khetran, among others (Breseeg, 2004, p. 60).

Situating the conflict in Balochistan is not possible unless its historical background is studied. During the British rule, the entire Balochistan within British Indian territorial boundaries was an outsourced territory administered by a small group of elites who were uninterested in developing the region despite the fact that it contained vast amounts of hydrocarbons, minerals, and other natural resources. The British took control of the region after two Afghan Wars and signing different treaties, as have been mentioned in preceding paragraphs. It was Sir Robert Grove Sandeman – a British Army Officer who was later deputed as political agent to look after the administrative affairs of Balochistan excluding the Kalat Agency and its peripheral princely states. His major task was to safeguard British interests in this farthest territory of British India. Sandeman introduced a new administrative model –Shahi Jirga⁶ (Grand Council), after dismantling a centuries-old local traditional administrative and judicial system of Jirga.⁷ Sandeman’s “reformatory” Shahi Jirga was a shrewd colonial mechanism of indirect rule through a few carefully selected tribal leaders –Nawabs and Sardars (S. Khan, 2021, p. 41; Kupecz, 2012, p. 99; Mirza, 2013, p. 22; Noraiee, 2020, p. 73). In exchange for their allegiance to the British Crown, the Sardars were granted vast administrative powers over their tribes and were conferred titles and rewards like Khilyat (royal gowns), Bakhshish (prizes both in cash and kind), and a special place in Darbar (royal court) (Grare, 2006, p. 6; Marri, 2014, p. 49). These nobles were also allowed to establish private militias and armed tribal bands to suppress any uprising against the British administration or British convoys. After 1947, the same “selected” tribal leaders took over the administrative affairs of the periphery as they were deeply entrenched in the system. “State building was a matter of low priority during the period of colonial rule in Quetta’s hinterland compared with strategic, military and political concerns. This imbalance continued in the post-colonial period” (Gazdar et al., 2010, p. 1). The leadership in the centre also relied on them for their administrative convenience and continued with colonial legacy of indirect rule.

Since independence in 1947 and the subsequent accession of the Kalat Agency and its three peripheral states, there is a constant complaint against the central government of Pakistan, which is largely categorized and identified as ethnic conflict. Disenfranchisement and alienation between EB and the federal government are the root cause of recurring political crises. It is a weakness of the state and its institutions that no genuine effort has been made until recently to engage and integrate the disgruntled and aggrieved party (M. Ahmed, 2020, p. 1). It is therefore not surprising if EB has yet to emerge as a prominent feature on a mainstream political canvass, which was given the status of a province in 1972 after the cessation of Bangladesh. From 1947 to 1972, the largest province in terms of area remain unattended and administered in the same colonial style. Neither the central government nor the local chieftains were interested in its development; rather they were more concerned in protecting their interests and securing a larger share in the government’s political and economic banks (S. Khan, 2021, pp. 51–52; Mazhar et al., 2012, p. 113). The successive governments in Pakistan, instead of strengthening the state institutions and reaching out the farthest region and people, relied on local political elite. The symbiotic relationship between the federal and provincial political for its administrative convenience is the major issue that has failed to resolve the genuine issues of people living in Balochistan regardless of their ethnic background. Pakistan as a state has failed not just to offer political goods to its people, but also to properly manage internal affairs, resulting in a bitter and frequently violent climate. Balochistan’s citizens are not only frustrated, but they are also enraged when basic requirements are not met (Javaid, 2010, p. 117). The ineffectiveness of state and consecutive governments with minimum opportunities to accommodate diverse ethnic communities makes EB a perfect recipe for conflict and competition. Political unwillingness combined with access to limited resources has become a major contentious issue in multiethnic political entity like EB, which suffices the requirement of a violent conflict (Demmers, 2012, p. 6; Esman, 2004, p. 30; S. Khan, 2021, p. 107).

The conflict between the state and the periphery has witnessed two major insurgencies, occurring from 1973 to 1977 and from 2006 onwards, as well as three localized uprisings in 1948, 1958, and 1963. These were guerrilla movements that were ultimately suppressed by the Pakistan army. The first insurgency was triggered by the army’s attempt to overthrow the Khan of Kalat on charges of treason. The second insurgency emerged following the imposition of One Unit,⁸ led by the deposed Khan’s brother. Pakistan used state force and the army was ordered to crush the uprising, which resulted in violence across the province. The third phase started when, in 1963, Sher Mohammad Marri organized a new guerrilla movement in response to the military garrisons in the province. The conflict ended with a ceasefire in 1969 after the dissolution of the One Unit Scheme. All these three localized uprisings were short lived and took place in a limited area. But the major insurgency occurred between 1973 and 1977, when the government of Pakistan not only imposed emergency rule and ousted the civilian government of Balochistan but used airstrikes attacking the militants, including civilians. The army, with the help of the Iranian government, quelled the uprising. The current phase of insurgency, which has continued in the form of a low-intensity armed conflict since, in 2006, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a prominent Baloch sardar, was killed in an ambush between the militants and the Pakistan army. This led to widespread protests and riots across Baloch-dominated areas, with significant displacement and allegations of human rights abuses. The killing of Bugti further fuelled Baloch nationalist sentiment and mobilization. Protests in response to the killings of Baloch leaders or other significant issues have continued, indicating a growing urbanization of Baloch protest movements. The basic reason for the continued violence and agitation is the uneven modernization (Gazdar et al., 2010, pp. 3–4). EB, in comparison to the progress and development in other provinces, is far behind. According to a Natural Disaster Consortium (NDC) report issued in 2019, out of the total population of Pakistan almost 39% are multi-dimensionally poor.⁹ However, EB provides the majority of that 39%, as 71% of its residents, regardless of their ethnic background, are multi-dimensionally poor (IPC, 2019:5). The state’s indifference towards its periphery, institutional marginalization, and the role of the political elite have added to the weak centre–periphery relationship (M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015; S. Khan, 2021, p. 98; Sial & Basit 2010, p. 13, 279). The political elite is one of the influential groups which controls the power within a state and designs the state paradigm that’s suits their vested interests. In political science, this influence is referred to as elite capture, which exerts its control over decision-making processes, resources or institutions, often to the detriment of broader societal interests. In such scenarios, the elite, by virtue of their position, manipulate or exploit systems for their own benefit, sidelining the interests and needs of the wider population. The key players of elite capture or entrepreneurs “capitalize on certain forms of identity by creating or politicking existing communal identities which they use as a political resource” (Barry, 2023, p. 48).

The elite capture in EB due to an artificially imposed leadership thrives on corruption. The unwillingness of the central government in reaching out to the people and relying on local lords further adds to the miseries of people of EB, be they Baloch, Brahvi, or Pashtun. The avoidable conditions, like inaccessibility to basic facilities (housing, health care, and education) make the EB a classical demonstration of Galtung’s structural violence theory. Besides the provision of civic amenities, no preventive measures are taken to protect the people from harsh weather and natural calamities like drought or flash flooding. Frequent drought spells, which persist for longer periods have adversely impacted the socio-economic condition of people living in EB. Subsistence living is the norm for the people of EB, who have the least government support and institutional safeguards. Lack of job opportunities further reduces their options for living.

One of the most contentious issues between the people of EB and central government is usurpation, dispossession, and expropriation of natural resources in EB such as natural gas, copper, uranium, gold, coal, silver, platinum, as well as potential oil reserves (Chandio & Mariya, 2013, p. 1048; Dashti, 2017, pp. 195–196; M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015, p. 275; S. Khan, 2021, p. 98; Sial &Basit, 2010, p. 19). Natural gas was discovered in EB in 1952 and was available to the rest of Pakistan both for industrial and domestic usage, but the centre failed to provide it to the people of EB, even for domestic use (S. Khan, 2021, p. 98). Gas was not only provided to the households in a large part of the country but industries in Faisalabad, Sialkot, Lahore, Gujranwala, and Karachi also benefitted from the cheap fuel (gas) from EB (Laif & Hamza, 2000, p. 60). Quetta was the first city in EB which was provided with gas in 1983 through a 370 kilometres transmission line (A. Khan, 2009, p. 1075:130). It was the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which pressurized the central government to provide fuel to the households in EB, fearing the extinction of forests, particularly Juniper forests¹⁰ (IUCN, 2000:95). The international pressure worked and the supply of gas was made possible through pipelines to a few districts in EB like Khuzdar, Ziarat, Lasbella, and Dera Bugti (Laif & Hamza, 2000, p. 60).

The second institutional discrimination against the people of EB, which cuts across domestic politics in Pakistan, is the domination of the Punjabi ethnic group on the state apparatus – share in central government’s political, civil, and military milieu (Hassan, 2019, p. 139; S. Khan, 2021, p. 100). Punjabi make up the dominant majority¹¹ in Pakistan, with 52.96% (PBS 2017) of the population, and has been accused of usurping the rights of smaller ethnic groups since 1947. Punjabi domination in Pakistan is not by design but the scanty population of EB inclusive of Baloch, Pashtun, Brahvi, and other smaller groups, which is a mere 5% (6,281,087) of the people (PBS, 2017), keeping its share marginal.

Punjabi’s control on the state apparatus owes to its population size and also due to British legacy. The British employed Punjabis more than the other communities due to its large population . Additionally, large agricultural tax collection from Punjab was another attraction that forced the British to invest more in Punjab than other areas, particularly if compared with EB – an arid, barren land with its sparse and scattered population that had very less to contribute to the British economy (S. Khan, 2021, p. 101). However, even after independence, the Pakistani government has not made any serious effort to develop the area and invest in infrastructure that can ameliorate the living conditions of people of EB.

Baloch have serious reservations about their already small population and allege that the state of Pakistan with the help of Pakistan Army is turning EB into a Baloch minority area by facilitating Pashtun to settle in Balochistan (S. Khan, 2021, p. 104). It is important to understand that EB is an ethnically divided territory, wherein Pashtuns are historically settled in the north; and Baloch and Brahvi migrated and settled in the south of EB. The Baloch during their early migration period settled not only in south EB but in adjoining areas of south Punjab and north-east Sindh. This adds to their feeble presence in EB.

Relating to Baloch allegation in relation to Pashtun settlement, it is argued that, during two Afghan wars: 1) when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s and 2) when the US led a NATO forces’ operation in 2001, forced many Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan. The Afghan refugees who migrated to Pakistan were from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, and other smaller groups including Turkmen and Baloch, however Pashtuns were the largest in number (Gazdar et al., 2010, p. 17). The migration from Afghanistan is a persistent phenomenon, which has continued even after NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The largest refugee settlement is in KP and erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which are now merged in KP. As per the United Nations Human Refugees Commission Report 2021, Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees for more than 40 years.

The UNHCR¹² (2021) statistical analysis explaining the Afghan refugees registered settlement in different areas of Pakistan is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Afghan refugees per province.

Location name	Source	Data date	Population
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	UNHCR	30 June 2022	671,075
Balochistan	UNHCR	30 June 2022	314,866
Punjab	UNHCR	30 June 2022	184,744
Sindh	UNHCR	30 June 2022	71,937
Islamabad	UNHCR	30 June 2022	38,888
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	UNHCR	30 June 2022	4,244

The Quetta–Kandahar Pashtun connection since the 1980s has become another point of contention after the influx of Afghan refugees (S. Khan, 2021, p. 106; Siddiqi, 2012b, pp. 160–161). Already scarce resources have burdened the limited opportunities. Afghan wars were not incidents, but they were two series of conflictual events, which had a phenomenal impact on overall Pakistani society and culture. Narcotics, guns, religious extremism, and millions of refugees changed the very fabric of Pakistani society, particularly in border adjoining areas including EB. The Pashtuns’ traditional hospitality welcomed Afghan Pashtun under centuries-old tribal values/rites – Pashtunwali¹³ and Nanawati¹⁴ in the northern part of EB other than KP and adjacent Pashtun dominated areas.

The government could have managed the migration with the least impact on locals but failed to do so and, therefore, restricted opportunities for the poor masses. The state is failing in provision of basic necessities and adding to grievances of the people who find refuge in agitation. The people of EB, including Baloch, are the worst affected in the mismanaged and poorly governed state of Pakistan. The lowest share in federal electoral constituency due to its scarce population is one of the major reasons that EB is far behind when it to comes to the federal (central) government’s priority, which continues to invest more in central Punjab. In the lower house – the national assembly, where representation is premised on population size, Punjab has 183 seats compared to EB’s 17 seats. On the contrary, in the upper house – senate, the representation is on parity basis and each federating unit has 14 seats (PBS, 2017). The meagre representation from EB in central legislature is from the entire EB, irrespective of ethnicity, which translates into their share in developmental funds, government schemes, share in military and civil bureaucracy. Less representation does not correspond with ethnic marginalization but scanty population of the entire EB. However, Baloch who register their complaints use ethnic voice as it is louder than any other. Are the Baloch facing the same situation in Iran? The next section will analyze the Baloch’s living condition on the other side of the border – Iran.

Baloch in Iran

Iranian Balochistan (hereafter WB) accorded as the birthplace of Baloch history, housing their ancient heroic ballads and popular poetry. It was from this region that their ancestors began their expansion and consolidation of power in eastern Balochistan, starting in the 13^th century. It is worth noting that WB not only holds the cradle of Baloch history but, according to renowned expert Selig Harrison, it is also recognized as the birthplace of Baloch nationalism (Breseeg, 2004, p. 167).

WB is divided into three administrative regions, the largest of which is known as the province of “Siestan wa Balochistan¹⁵” or “Siestan and Balochistan” with Zahedan as its capital (Taheri, 2012, p. 12). The Baloch in Iran make up about 3–4 million people, who mostly live in Siestan and Balochistan. Unlike EB, which covers 47% of the total area of Pakistan, WB covers 181,785 km² or 11% of the total area of Iran (Taheri, 2012, p. 12). WB is 1800 km away from Tehran in southeast Iran. Similar to EB, WB is a distant periphery and far away from the central government. Economically, like their EB brethren, Iranian Baloch depend on pastoral economy. Major Baloch tribes in Iran are Rigi, Yarahmadzai, Nauri, Gorgej, Ismailzai, Mir Balochzai, and Gamshadzai (Breseeg, 2004, p. 61). The Iranian government has been accused of implementing repressive policies in Siestan and Balochistan, which have led to human rights abuses and unrest in the region. Some of the grievances expressed by the Baloch include economic marginalization, cultural discrimination, limited political representation, and lack of access to basic services such as education and healthcare.

The Persian Empire’s encroachment towards WB began after losing its territory on the west coast of the Caspian, including Qarabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku, Georgia, and parts of Talish, as a result of conflicts with Russia and the signing of the Turkmanchai Treaty (1826) and Gulistan Treaty (1813). The vulnerability of the region due to petty chiefs constant feuds made it an easy prey to Persian expansionist designs. Subsequent expeditions led to the subjugation of significant areas in WB under Persian rule, until Chabahar also fell under Persian control, putting an end to any remaining Arab authority in the region (Breseeg, 2004, pp. 168–171). Complete Persian control of WB in 1928 took place during the first Pahlavi era after certain arrangements with the British Empire. The province was called Balochistan but was later changed to Siestan and Balochistan. The previous section on historical overview contains the details of trifurcation and distribution of Balochistan. The British were wary of Soviet influence and Persian intrusion into its most precious possession – India and therefore they “created an isolated safety perimeter around India that turned Balochistan [all three parts] into an uninhabited desert''. Balochistan in its entirety never thrived but remains entrapped in religious and ethnic conflicts (Manghebati, 2015, pp. 22–27). Prior to British entry into the Baloch land’s political canvass, the locals were kept under subjugation of Baloch leaders. In WB, it was the combination of tribal chiefs and (Sunni) clerics who were in absolute control of their people (Taheri, 2012, pp. 10). After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the politically suppressed Baloch came under Shia-Sunni sectarian rife. Both Persian Monarchy and the leaders after the Islamic Revolution made strict arrangements to prevent the people in WB from forming any organisation or activity with the help of external support from Baloch living across the border, mainly in Pakistan (Manghebati, 2015, pp. 22–27). Iran, with the declared Shi’ite Islamic political system and with religious sect as a major element in social orientation, the definition of the minority is based on a Shi’ite perspective (Hosseini, 2023, pp. v-vi). It is therefore Siestan and Balochistan, individuals whose religious beliefs which differ from the majority within the governing system, who face systematic discrimination and suppression.

The British wanted a centralized system and sought help from locals to establish their writ in peripheral areas. In EB they formed a mutated controlling body from Jirga to Shahi Jirga comprising selected notables. The British Agent in EB introduced administrative reforms under the Sandeman Model. On the same pattern in WB, the monarchy preferred to select a small number of members who could control and administer the periphery through clerics and tribal chiefs.

Although the Baloch remained under strict control and were not allowed to form any organisation , the Baloch never stopped being politically active. The noticeable political activism surfaced in 1960s when a group of young students from the middle class mobilized under the banner of the Baloch Liberation Front (1964–1979) and demanded for their rights during the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Dashti, 2017, p. 77; Taheri, 2012, p. 10). Except for a few skirmishes, the Shah’s Administration developed good ties with Baloch tribal chiefs (Taheri, 2012, p. 14). It was after the Islamic revolution in 1979 that the entire Iranian political structure transformed from the monarchic to theocratic style. “Since 1979, the Iranian political system has been led by theocratic leadership following a unique version of Shia Islam (also called the Iranian version of Twelver-Shia Islam), which was introduced by Imam Khumeni” (Asim, 2023, p. 21). After the revolution although the tribal chiefs lost their charisma and influence over their people, clerics gained ascendance, a route that empowers them both spiritually and politically. The powerful clerics have intensified the religious sensitivity in Iran (Dashti, 2017, p. 89; Manghebati, 2015, p. 40; Taheri, 2012, p. 142). However, Barry (2023, p. 50) criticizes these clerics and is of the view that Sunni clerics or “sectarian entrepreneurs come from within the ruling system.'' Unlike EB, where the central government avoids engaging directly in the province and outsourcing its responsibilities to provincial political elite, in WB the central government’s emphasis has remained on centralized control and Persianization of national identity (Akbarzadeh et al., 2019, p. 3). Analysts like Taheri (2012), Dashti (2017), and Boladai (2006) criticize the Iranian government who discriminate against Baloch on the basis of their sect. The majority in Iran belong to the Shia sect (89%) of Islam and Sunnis in Iran are estimated at 8–10% of the total population. In Iran, the Sunni community comprises several major ethno-linguistic minorities, primarily Kurdish, Baluch, Turkmen, and Lari (Barry, 2023, p. 46). Baloch belongs to Islamic Hanafi Sunni belief (Barry, 2023, p. 46; Manghebati, 2015, p. 23). The identity marker, which in the case of Iranian Baloch is the sectarian difference, is the major reason for the conflict between the government and the Baloch and the basis for discrimination (Dashti, 2017, p. 247).

The prominence given to Persian identity in the country’s constitution is systematically and effectively used as a barrier against Baloch students entering into higher education systems in order to exclude them from the job market. Because of the discrimination that Baloch face on several levels in Iran, they feel that they are living in an apartheid system and treated as third class citizens. (Boladai, 2006)

Iranian government is systematically suppressing the Baloch minority. Tara Sepehri Far, senior Iran researcher of Human Rights Watch (HRW) highlighted the discrimination and stated that the deployment of excessive and lethal force in cities like Zahedan is largely aimed at brutally crushing ethnic and religious minority groups (HRW, 2023). Responding to these allegations, the Iranian government put forward its narrative that Baloch are not discriminated but they cannot be recruited against certain portfolios because they do not meet the merit criterion. They are neither skilled nor competent to hold government assignments. This is not a fair explanation; the government of any state is responsible to provide equal opportunities to its citizens so that they can participate in state affairs at all levels. In this age of information technology, the Iranian government deliberately slows down or intermittently cuts off internet connection in regions like Zahedan – the capital city of Siestan and Balochistan with a substantial Baloch ethnic and religious (Sunni) minority population. This strategic restriction aims to hinder the dissemination of information regarding the Iranian government’s repressive actions against the Baloch minority group (HRW, 2023).

The Balochi language is also forbidden in public and not permitted to be used in schools as a medium of teaching. Baloch in WB perceive it as a systemic exclusion from the mainstream system and a genocidal activity (Boladai, 2006; Dashti, 2017, p. 248). This is not the case in EB, where every ethnic community is free to communicate in their native language in public and private. However, the medium of teaching is not in Balochi or any other native language. The authors argue that the medium of language is always an official/national language whereas the native is chosen as optional, if available or taught and learned at home. Even in India, Urdu or other languages are not the official medium of teaching. In countries like Canada, Australia, and the USA, the medium of teaching is English and other, but not all languages, are taught as an optional subject in schools.

A common complaint of Baloch on both sides of the border is demographic manipulation, which means that the governments on both sides are systematically reducing the size of Baloch population and turning them into a minority by allowing non-Baloch to settle in their “own homeland” (Boladai, 2006; Dashti, 2017, p. 104). The details about EB are discussed in preceding paragraphs but the situation in WB is somewhat different. In a bid to Persianize the country, Shia and Persian speaking people are encouraged to settle in WB.

In many parts of western Balochistan, the Baloch are rapidly losing their identity. The previously Baloch-dominated regions of Bandar Abbas, parts of Kerman and Sistan are the areas most affected by the assimilation efforts of the Persian-dominated Iranian state. The Baloch are now a minority in all these areas, including the capital city of Zahedan. (Boladai, 2006)

Analysts such as Boladai (2006) and Rehman (2014, p. 2) have made an interesting case out of intentional settlement of Shias or Persians to WB. They posit that it is the Iranian government’s deliberate tactical attempt to foster Islamic extremism in the WB so that people in Iran remain involved in religious fights and away from moderate religious, liberal, or democratic forces. According to them, this is an adopted methodology of the Iranian government to hinder democratic development in WB.

As per his report for NOREF, Rehman argues that the promotion of Sunni Islam prior to the Afghan war was meant to quell the growing communist and secular feelings among the local Baloch community (Rehman, 2014, p. 2), which now needs to be crushed to maintain the Shia domination.

A common feature in EB and WB is the military presence and permanent deputation of paramilitary forces. The Baloch in WB also resist military presence in their province Siestan wa Balochistan. To them it gives an impression of a war zone and militarisation of Baloch areas and one strong reason to intensify the armed resistance against the Islamic Republic’s military force (Boladai, 2006). Lack of development in WB has encouraged the Baloch community to support militant activism against the government (Boladai, 2006; Breseeg, 2004; Dashti, 2017; Taheri, 2012). Rehman (2014) and Boladai (2006) associate the inclusion of militancy in WB and clashes between the disgruntled Baloch and Iranian security and intelligence forces as a resistance against state’s discriminatory and exclusionary policies, cultural and religious repression.

Marginalization: an appraisal

The political canvass in the divided Balochistan except for that area in Afghanistan, is checkered with armed resistance, militancy, and violence. The Baloch armed resistance in southern parts of EB and in WB is not a new phenomenon and is taken as a struggle against the repressive policies of their respective governments. The Baloch complained against discrimination and marginalization, whereas the governments on both sides are convinced that, without external support, an armed resistance is not possible. In order to contextualize the Baloch question, it is essential to understand the political canvass of their respective governments. It is imperative to view the identity markers of both sides of Baloch not as religious or ethnic identities but as political actors. The groups instrumentalize identity markers to pursue desired political goals and objectives but, on the contrary, these identity markers are targeted by the state and its government considering them as the reasons for conflict between the state and these groups. The identity conflict both in Pakistan and Iran, if taken in socioeconomic context, would be more plausible. The Baloch of both sides are less advantageous as compared to other communities in both countries. This article explains the identity politics – political mobilization due to tangible attributes such as political discrimination, economic deprivation, and non-inclusive approach of the two governments. Zartman and Anstey (2012, p. 3) explain step by step progress of an identity-based conflict which escalates from social friction to contentious politics and from politics to violence.

Siddiqui is of the opinion that political mobilization within an ethnic group is not a function of emotions as emotions are not a cause but an effect. Rather, it is due to the feelings of domination and control of the majority over a minority, lack of true democracy, strong centralized form of government structure and exclusionary policies which transform into an anguish and agitation against the state’s forced nationalistic approach on minority groups already having exclusionary sentiments. The conflict between the Baloch in minority both in Iran and Pakistan and their respective governments with a dominant group with different identity is of similar nature. Siddiqi explains the reasons for an identity-based conflict and relates it to the “political system which serves to either attenuate or intensify feelings of ethnicity.'' He further argues that conflicts “do not arise automatically nor are they solely determined by the level of ethnic diversity within a society. Instead, ethnic conflict emerges as a result of political factors, gaining significance as a response to the actions and policies of the state” (Siddiqi, 2012a, p. 4). In the case of Baloch in EB and WB, it is the political system that intensifies the exclusionary feelings among Baloch and trap them either in ethnicity or sectarian identity. The unequal access to power and resources necessarily generates competition and conflict, particularly if the affected minority group has a comparison to make with a majority powerful, dominant and affluent group. Zartman and Anstey argue that (2012, p. 13) “ethnic or communal conflicts generally reflect a situation in which certain groups feel despised or excluded on account of their religion, ethnicity, or other identity. In short, identity translates into economic or symbolic deprivation.” Guelke also identified similar reasons for such a contentious situation in deeply divided societies. He further argues that these sub-identities serve as dividing factors. If the political system in which they reside lacks legitimacy, these divisions can potentially result in political conflicts or acts of violence (Guelke, 2012, p. 20).

The academic literature and international reports present the Baloch issue as a case of marginalization and discrimination with two different identity markers – ethnicity and sect. The Baloch in Iran, although complaining about less representation in mainstream politics and in administrative apparatus, do not demand for separation or secessionism (Boladai, 2006; Dashti, 2017; Rehman, 2014; Taheri, 2012). Barry is also of the view that “Sunni Iranian movement by and large does not advocate separatism” though by Sunni he is not referring to Baloch only (Barry, 2023, p. 48). They are after more autonomy and a larger share in the administrative and political mainstream (Dashti, 2017, p. 80). The point of contention between WB’s Baloch is religious sect. In predominantly Shia and Persian-speaking Iran, the Baloch with their scanty population and Sunni belief feel threatened. It is often alleged that there is an unwritten policy in Iran to not allow the construction of Sunni mosques other than in their own area, that is WB (Boladai, 2006; Breseeg, 2004; Dashti, 2017; Taheri, 2012).

Pakistan’s issues are largely due to poor governance, weak governmental institutions, incompetence, and corruption (M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015, p. 289). According to Wolff (2011, p. 955), a fragile state can be divided into four categories: weak, failing, failed, and collapsed states. A state that does not meet the bare minimum of territorial control, security, and fundamental civic necessities is subject to both intra- and inter-state conflicts. In comparison, Iran is internally an autocratic state where the freedom of expression and open criticism on state’s behaviour is dealt with sternly. There are two dominant but parallel identities in Iran: Shia and Persian. Being Persian is a proud and inherited identity that makes them superior among all in the cultural sphere of Iranian civilization.

Official sources speak of nine mosques in the Iranian capital, while Sunnis complain that they can only use the fully functioning Sunni mosque within the premises of the Embassy of Pakistan, and in other cases they can only do their religious services either in private locations or in prayer houses –which are not officially acknowledged as mosques and therefore sometimes shut down –or even demolished –by official administration.

(Hutter, 2023, p. 3)

On the contrary, in the EB, few of the disgruntled Baloch demand independence and blame the central government for their poor condition. They associate their marginalized status with ethnicity. According to them, the state of Pakistan is biased towards Baloch and restricts their development and progression due to their ethnicity, ignoring the colonial legacy and the role of their own Sardars. There is no role of religion in the Baloch community as a point of contention in Pakistan’s Balochistan. The tangency of geo-politics has instigated violence and support separatism in EB, whereas the same ethnic group is content in Afghanistan and apparently has no such complaint against the ruling government. Since people in Afghanistan irrespective of ethnic background live in similar “poor” conditions and therefore are well assimilated in society, they do not have a comparative analysis to make. It would have been an interesting situation if there was one comparison to make. Would it be sectarian or ethnic?

Another intriguing aspect while analyzing the dilapidated condition of EB and WB, is the demographic composition of the two areas. The territorial and demographic composition of EB is “divided into Pashtun (North) and Baloch (South) areas. Pashtuns are concentrated in northern Balochistan (formerly British Balochistan), and the Baloch ethnic group mainly resides in pockets in the south” (S. Khan, 2021, p. 18). In Iran, however, Baloch are concentrated in WB, though many have now migrated to other urban areas for employment purposes, yet WB is an exclusively Baloch area. The commonality between the Baloch groups of the two sides is the discriminatory policies by the majoritarian group, which in the case of WB is the Persian speaking Shia group and it is the Punjabi group in EB with no difference of religious sect. Intergroup rivalry is always tense and conflictual if different groups have different politico-socio-economic opportunities. The dominance of the majority group in state machinery due to its population size may not frame the situation as a classic case of ethnic conflict but it does not exonerate it from structurally isolating a group in minority from reaching its potential. The weak state administration can find many excuses, but a structural violence lens will always be used to analye the miseries of Baloch on either side.

Pakistani Baloch demand secession from the state of Pakistan and they strongly believe that the central government in Pakistan has been usurping their rights and dispossessing them from their resources (M. Ahmed & Baloch, 2015; Feyyaz, 2013; FPC, 2006; S. Khan, 2021; Marri, 2014; Siddiqi, 2012b). It is interesting to note that complaints of less opportunities and marginalization are put forward by people living in EB irrespective of ethnicity (Pashtun, Baloch, Brahvi, and settlers). The nature of complaints and grievances is by the Baloch of the two sides but is raised using different identity markers. It is very interesting that Baloch of both sides expressed through anguish through militant activities and in return face the state use of force to suppress the militancy. Thus, the vicious cycle of violence continues (Manghebati, 2015, p. 11). Use of force and suppression further directs the investigation of Baloch cases towards serious Human Rights (HR) issues both in EB and WB.

The violation of HR includes a high rate of conviction and executions of the Baloch population in WB and in cases of missing persons in EB. Baloch make up merely 2% of the Iranian population, but their conviction and execution rate often touches 20% or more¹⁶ (Dashti, 2017, p. 99; Rehman, 2014, p. 3). In EB, the issue of missing persons is continuously highlighted by the HR watch, with serious reservations on the large number of missing persons who have been arrested by the law enforcement agencies and never prosecuted in a court of law. “Disappearances are a tool of terror that strikes not just individuals and families, but entire societies. This is why enforced disappearances are a crime under international law and, if committed as part of a systematic attack against a civilian population, they constitute a crime against humanity” (Amnesty International, 2021, p. 6). In Pakistan the issue of enforced disappearance is not specifically associated with Baloch, but Pashtun, Sindhi, Punjabi, and Baloch are the victim of forced disappearances by the security agencies. Massive protests have been reported in the capital city of Pakistan, accompanied by long marches from Quetta to Islamabad, aimed at raising awareness about the state’s unlawful abduction of Baloch people. A concerning trend has emerged where Baloch students are frequently abducted from universities in various parts of the country. Human rights activists and lawyers like Iman Mazari, Asad Ali Toor, Mubashir Zaidi, and Akhtar Mengal in Pakistan have not only voiced their opposition to this heinous crime but have also pursued legal action. However, the country’s most powerful military institution employs various tactics to hinder any legal proceedings that could potentially lead to the dispensation of justice (Baloch, 2021; Peoples Dispatch, 2022). This is a common practice by the state security agencies in Pakistan to suppress the activism against their unlawful repressive activities.

Use of force by the state agencies against its people reflects undemocratic norms and weak handling of state affairs. The successive governments in both countries have failed to integrate the minorities in the state apparatus, which further strengthens the majority’s position and consequently reduces the options for minority groups. The structure of both governments due to its weak statism and bad management has induced structural violence against the minorities.

Conclusion

This area since the eighteenth century has been among those regions, which are worst hit by proxy wars between great empires and powerful states. It is an area which has remained the pivot of power politics. It may be the international environment that influences the internal matters of states; however, economic deprivation, marginalization, and uneven development undoubtedly ignite the flame of nationalist fervour. The state must promote economic activity for a group’s survival to reduce anguish and nationalist sentiments. Failure to do so will foment anti-state hatred, which may be easily exploited by internal and external opportunists. Pakistan as a state is administratively weak in its internal matters and its institutions are not effectively reaching out to its peripheral areas. On the contrary, Iran is a centralized and autocratic state while dealing with its peripheral areas. It is this strong handling of internal matters that no secessionist movement is active in WB, wherea, in EB, specifically in the southeastern part, low-level warfare is a persistent phenomenon. Regardless of any explanation – colonial legacy, unfavourable topography, external intervention, geopolitics, or corrupt political elite – the discrimination against the minorities cannot be freed from structural violence.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

(1) It was named after Major General Fredrick Goldsmith who was appointed Chief Commissioner of the joint Perso–Baloch Boundary Commission.

(2) Another agreement between Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand representing British India was signed in 1893. The Durand Line is now the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan but is contested by many Pashtun tribes on both sides.

(3) Government of Balochistan.

(4) Two Afghan wars between Afghans and the British were fought in 1839 and 1878.

(5) https://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//population_census/Balochistan%20%20District%20wise.pdf

(6) Shahi Jirga consisted of “selected” notables by British Administrative Agents not necessarily very respectable in the local society. The selection was made on the basis of their loyalty to the British Court. Shahi Jirga was an indirect way of controlling/administering the locals through the selected consultative body to resolve issues at local level. Quetta city became the administered capital of the British Balochistan (Breseeg, 2004:160–161; GOB, 2021).

(7) Jirga is a tribal (informal) dispute settlement institution that is meant to dispense speedy justice to the local people. The decisions are made as per the prevalent local customary law, local (tribal and religious) rituals. It is a unit comprising of village elders (notables) who are elected on the basis of their moral credentials. Their decisions are binding on the people of the village/area.

(8) A distinctive administrative arrangement was implemented in West Pakistan, where all the federating units were merged into a single unit. Similarly, a second unit was established in East Pakistan, which is now known as Bangladesh.

(9) The United Nations scale for poverty measures “Multidimensional Poverty Index” which includes a broader concept of poverty and does not rely in income and wealth statistics only. It considers the deprivation and inaccessibility of the people in areas of basic health, education, and standard of living. It, therefore, analyzes the socio-economic dimension while measuring poverty in a society/region.

(10) It was to preserve juniper forests, which were on the verge of extinction due to the rampant deforestation of this slowest growing species (IUCN, 2000:229).

(11) Pakistan total population as per the latest census, held in 2017, is 207,684,626 and Punjab’s population is 109,989,655. Detailed results can be seen at https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/brief-census-2017

(12) https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/pak

(13) Pashtunwali: Pashtun is bound to follow a conventional tribal code of conduct, which strengthens its relationship with its tribe and society. The strong bonding with its tribe and people creates a protective ring against hostile elements or enemies. The pillars of Pashtunwali are: Panah (refuge), Melmastia (hospitality), and Badal (revenge). These basic tenets were misused in the Afghan Jihad against the Russian invasion with the collaboration of Saudi Arabia, America, and Pakistan military establishment in the 1980s and then once again in the war against terrorism in the wake of 9/11 (Ali, 2013; Khan, 2015:41; Sheikh et al., 2012:31; S. Khan, 2021:106).

(14) “Nanawatay – a Pashtun tribal tradition. Nanawatay, is a mandatory protection provided to a person, who asks for it, regardless even if the request is sought from the enemy” (S. Khan, 2021:106)

(15) This area was identified as Baluchistan almost 80 years ago, which was later changed by the then Persian rulers to “Baluchistan and Siestan. The same was again changed to its present-day name – Siestan and Baluchistan” (Rehman, 2014:2).

(16) As per a report prepared by the US Department of State, it is estimated that the total population of Iran is 85.0 million (midyear 2020 estimate). The report further states that “Iranian government estimates, Muslims constitute 99.4% of the population, of whom 90–95% are Shia, and 5–10% are Sunni, mostly Turkmen, Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds, living in the northeast, southwest, southeast, and northwest provinces, respectively.” (the U.S Department of State, 2020).