Resistance to instructed reversal of the learned predictiveness effect

Abstract

The learned predictiveness effect is a widely observed bias towards previously predictive cues in novel situations. Although the effect is generally attributed to an automatic attentional shift, it has recently been explained as the product of controlled inferences about the predictive value of cues. This view is supported by the susceptibility of learned predictiveness to instruction manipulation. However, recent research has shown conflicting results. Three experiments investigated the parameters of the instructed reversal effect in a human causal learning task, to determine the relative contribution of automatic and controlled attention processes. Experiment 1 showed that reversal instructions abolished, but did not reverse, the learned predictiveness effect, although length of initial training had no effect on the extent to which predictive cues subsequently captured attention. Experiment 2 explored whether particular causal scenarios lend themselves more readily to instructed reversal, but still failed to establish a significant reversal effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated a significant reversal effect when nonpredictive cues were explicitly and individually identified as the causes of outcomes. However, this effect was considerably weaker than the learned predictiveness effect when predictive cues were identified in the same way. Taken together, the results are inconsistent with a purely controlled account of learned predictiveness and provide support for dual-process theories of learning and attention.

Keywords:

• Learned predictiveness
• Instructed reversal
• Causal learning
• Automaticity
• Cognitive control
• Selective attention

This research formed the basis of an Honours dissertation by Hilary J. Don at the University of Sydney.