The Logic of the History of Ideas – Then and Now

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Notes

¹ M. Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

² In the Logic I contrasted beliefs with pro‐attitudes, not desires, because I wanted to allow that the pro‐attitude that motivated an action might be a belief or need rather than a desire. I still think that this broader concept of a pro‐attitude is more philosophically appropriate. Yet, in this essay I generally use the term desire because it is more common and because it is the term Lamb uses in his paper.

³ See most recently M. Bevir and R. Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and M. Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁴ J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 13.

⁵ In his most recent work, Searle explicitly avoids this confusion in a way that might seem to address Emmerich's criticism. However, it seems to me that Searle still neglects contestation and contingency in more fundamental ways that I describe in the following paragraph. See J. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁶ For details of my views, see M. Bevir, New Labour: A Critique (London: Routledge, 2005).

⁷ For example, Modern Political Science: Anglo‐American Exchanges since 1880, edited by R. Adcock, M. Bevir and S. Stimson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁸ M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock Publishers, 1970), xxii.

⁹ Q. Skinner, ‘A Reply to Critics’, in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, edited by J. Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 275.

¹⁰ Q. Skinner, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4–5.