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ABSTRACT
This paper describes the affinities between Socinian and Unitarian materialism. Based on different philosophical traditions, the Socinian Christoph Stegmann and the Unitarian Joseph Priestley developed a strong “system of materialism” which fit very well with Christian doctrines and the Bible. The conviction that the whole man is material and therefore mortal became the common basis for these radical thinkers. Stegmann formulated within the Aristotelian tradition a “non-reductive” materialism in which matter, not form, became the fundamental principle of all living things. Priestley, on the other hand, created his “absolute” materialism by developing a new understanding of the concept of matter according to the philosophical rules of Isaac Newton. The paper will discuss the affinities and differences between these two different concepts of materialism. The idea of a thinking matter, most prominently formulated by John Locke, will serve as a link between them.
Notes on contributor
Sascha Salatowsky received his PhD in 2004, after studying literature and philosophy at the Free University of Berlin. His thesis dealt with the reception of Aristotle's De anima in Catholic and Protestant Universities in the Early Modern Period. From 2009 to 2011 he conducted a research project on the Philosophy of the Socinians at the University of Marburg. Since 2011, he has been working at the Gotha Research Library.
Notes
1 Cf. Lange, History of Materialism, 2 vols.
2 Augustine, Confessiones, XII, 6,6 (PL 32, 828): “cogitabam quiddam inter formam et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe prope nihil.” See ibid., XII, 3,3.
3 Collegium Conimbrincense, Commentarii in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, I, l. I. c. IX, q. II, art. II, 154.
4 Stegmann was the younger brother of the well-known Socinian Joachim Stegmann (1595–1633), who was briefly the rector of the school at Racov. He does not seem to have been active in any academic school or university. Nevertheless, he was able to participate in the intellectual discourse of the time as a private scholar. Along with Ernst Soner (1572–1612), a crypto-Socinian in Altdorf, Stegmann is the only Socinian who operated exclusively as a philosopher. From 1626 to 1636, he was a Lutheran (sic!) pastor in Löcknitz (a small town near Stettin in Brandenburg), subsequently Propst and Superintendent of the Lutheran Church St. Marien in Angermünde. He spread his Socinian ideas only in the inner circle of this movement. For more biographical details, see Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 41f.
5 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata. I quote from the only copy that is available in the Leibniz Archive in Hanover. No other manuscript tradition is known. It would be another story to describe in detail how this copy found its way into the Leibniz Archive. Leibniz studied this treatise thoroughly and, in 1708 – that is, shortly before the publication of his Theodicy – composed a response to it. This response was first published by Nicholas Jolley in 1975, regrettably without Stegmann’s text.
6 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, 1r. For a detailed description of Stegmann’s concepts of matter and soul, see Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 310–27, 419–27.
7 Wilbur, History of Unitarianism, vol. II, 294. It should be noted that Priestley described the development of his personal belief in his Memoirs. He started by being an “Arminian,” then became an “Arian,” and finally – in around 1767, soon after his settlement at Leeds – “what is called a Socinian” (Memoirs, 15, 30, 69). In a footnote, Priestley called the last label “very improperly, when rejecting, as unauthorized by the Christian doctrine, the adoration of ‘the man Christ Jesus,’ for which Socinus contended even to the persecution of his more consistent Unitarian brethren” (ibid.). For a comprehensive biography of Priestley, see Schofield, Enlightenment of Priestley; Schofield, Enlightened Priestley.
8 Priestley, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (2nd ed., 1782), quoted from The Theological and Miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley, Vol. III, 197–383, here: sect. VI, 252. All further quotations are from this edition.
9 Ibid., Introd., 220.
10 Thiel, “Hißmann und der Materialismus,” 28: “Für einen von diesen beiden Positionen [sc. Identitätstheorie und eliminativer Materialismus] zu unterscheidenden nicht-reduktiven Materialismus dagegen hängen geistige Phänomene zwar von der Materie ab, sind aber nicht vollständig auf diesen reduzierbar und haben damit eine gewisse Eigenständigkeit.” On the different forms of early modern materialism, see Wunderlich, “Varieties.”
11 Priestley, Disquisitions, Pref., 201.
12 Cf. Priestley, Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind (1775, 2nd ed., 1790), quoted from The Theological and Miscellaneous works of Joseph Priestley, Vol. III, 167–96, here: Essay I, 181f.
13 For recent studies on materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see, especially, Schofield, Mechanism and Materialism; Yolton, Thinking Matter; Yolton, Locke and French Materialism; Thomson, Bodies of Thought. In all these studies, the Aristotelian tradition is totally absent.
14 Priestley, Disquisitions, Introd., 220. Italics are from the text. In the second chapter, I will examine these three doctrines of matter in detail.
15 Cf. Wissowatius, Religio rationalis; Priestley, Disquisitions, Pref., 209:
And, for my own part, I am satisfied that it is only by purging away the whole of this corrupt leaven, that we can recover the pristine simplicity and purity of our most excellent and truly rational, though much absurd, religion.
16 For a comprehensive description of the Socinian concept of God and Jesus Christ, see Fock, Der Socinianismus, 414–651; Dixon, Nice and Hot Disputes, examines in his study the controversies about the Trinity in Europe, with a special focus on both the Socinians and Unitarians. For a particular view on England, see Mortimer, Reason and Religion, 147–76; Lim, Mystery Unveiled.
17 Mortimer, Reason and Religion, 149.
18 Crell, De uno Deo Patre libri duo. I quote from the English Translation The Two Books of John Crellius Francus, Touching one God the Father, A4r.
19 Boethius, Liber de persona, c. III (PL 64, 1343): “Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est, atque in his rationalibus, substantiaque omnis natura est, nec in universalibus, sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est definitio: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia.” The debates on this topic in the early modern period were very intricate. In an earlier study, I examined the dispute on the concept of person between the Reformed Bartholomew Keckermann (1572–1609) and the Socinian Adam Goslav (c. 1577–c. 1642). See Salatowsky, “De Persona.”
20 Crell, One God the Father, book II, sect. I, chap. IV, 256.
21 Ibid., concl., 302.
22 Ibid., book II, sect. II, chap. I, 268.
23 Ibid., book II, sect. I, chap. IV, 260.
24 Ibid., book II, sect. II, chap. VII, 283.
25 Ibid., 284.
26 Crell, De Deo & ejus attributis, c. IV, 12b: “Amplius, quomodo materia appetit illam intellectionem? Num forte ipsa quoque cupit intelligere?” I would like to stress that Crell formulated the thinking-matter hypothesis on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy. The link between the Aristotelian tradition and the early Enlightenment is much stronger than usually thought.
27 Cf. ibid., c. IV, 10a. I will come back to this issue in the next section.
28 Ibid., c. XV, 37a: “Posterior definitio constitui potest hujusmodi, ut Deum dicamus esse Spiritum aeternum.” Crell refers here to John 4:24, in which God is called a “spirit.”
29 Ibid., 37a: “Spiritum cum nominamus, substantiam intelligimus ab omni crassitie, qualem in corporibus oculorum arbitrio subjectis cernimus, alienam.”
30 Cf. ibid., 37b: “Itaque perinde est, ac si dictum fuisset, Deus est spiritus, seu spiritualis substantia. Ex his autem intelligitur, membra humani corporis, quae in sac. literis adscribuntur, uti & partes queadem aliarum animantium, quales sunt alae, non nisi improprie Deo tribui.”
31 Cf. ibid., c. XV, 37b: “Itaque carnalem atque umbratilem ejus cultum, qui certo aliquando loco fuerat ab ipsomet Dei alligatus, jam porro ex ipsius consilio cessare, spiritualem autem ei succedere debere. Quapropter spiritus seu animi religione ac pietate, Deum propitiandum esse meminerimus.”
32 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, I, c. II, 8v. According to Stegmann, matter forms together with form the essential part of the quiddity of a thing. In other words, it is the principium individuationis of a thing.
33 Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, I, c. II, 9r: “Etiam Deum, Angelos, accidentia, entia rationis, summatim omnia Entia materia & forma constare.”
34 Cf. Völkel, De vera religione, l. II, c. IV, 6. For a comprehensive description of this doctrine, see Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 292–5.
35 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, I, c. II, 12v–13r:
Illa autem materia est prima (ut obiter & tribus verbis etiam hac super re, quanquan heterogena in Metaphysicis mentem nostram explicemus), quae est irresolubilis in aliam superiorem materiam, qualis est materia sive massa illa rudis, ex qua initio Deus omnia condidit. De qua Moses Gen. 1. v. 1. 2. Terra autem erat dissoluta (sive informis) et inanis et tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi (id est super aquas illas profundas, quibus terra tegebatur) & spiritus Domini ferebat super aquas. Terra haec et aqua ex quibus sublunaria omnia facta sunt μὴ ϕαινόμενα vocantur. Hebr. 11. v. 3. ob tenebras densissimas quibus obruebantur, et prae quibus antequam lux crearetur videri non poterant. De hujus vero terrae et aquae, ut & spiritus aquae incubantis, creatione, nec Moses, nec aliae sacrae literae quidquam docent, unde multi sunt, qui Deo illa ab aeterno coextitisse suspicentur, ut ita quando Deus 2. Machab. 7. v. 28 legitur coelum, terram et omne in iis, hominem ipsum ex nihilo creasse, non intelligendum sit nihil negativum, sed privativum, seu informis et rudis illa materia de qua ante Gen. 1. v. 1. 2. et Hebr. 11. v. 3. audivimus, quod et inde liquet quod 2. Mach. 7. tum de homine tum de aliis etiam dicatur illa ex nihilo esse facta, cum tamen constet hominem & alia plurima ex terra creata esse. Atque ita in dicto loco dicitur Deum omnia ex informi materia creasse.
36 Cf. ibid., 13v: “Vides ex his, ut materiam ad piper et cuminum prope damnari a Philosophis, ita formam prope in coelum collocari ab iisdem, & inter divinas censeri.”
37 Cf. ibid., 14r:
Verumsi omnes Entis species consideraverimus, eorumque formas inquisiverimus, nullam ex omnibus inveniemus, quae non sit accidens. Quidquid enim non per se subsistit, sed alij ut subjecto inhaeret illud est accidens. Nulla forma sive interna sive externa per se subsistit, sed materiae suae ut subjecto inhaeret, hinc materia ὑποδοχὴ formae dicitur a Philosophis. E[ergo].
38 The doctrine of mortalism is one of the main characteristics of the Socinian philosophy and theology. Cf. Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 366–412. For the historical background in the early modern period, see Burns, Christian Mortalism; Ball, The Soul Sleepers.
39 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, I, c. II, 14v–15r.
40 For a discussion of this topic in the Aristotelian philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Salatowsky, De anima, 246–57, 330–6.
41 Cf. Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, 15r–15v.
42 Ibid., 15v: “atque ita plane nihil aliud futura sit resuscitatio mortuorum, quam novorum & qua animam & qua corpus hominum creatio.”
43 Cf. ibid., 17v:
Verumtamen illis quae de spiritu hominis diximus adijci velimus, nonnullos ex censu eruditissimorum spiritum hominis ab anima ejusdem distinguere, et hanc quidem accidens mecum fateri, illum vero substantiam dicere, animamque formam hominis, spiritum autem materiae partem constituere, illam itidem cum accidens sit, destructo subjecto sive corpore perire, et in nihilum abire, hunc post mortem superesse.
44 Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, 16r: “Accidens enim est anima, subtracto ergo corpore tanquam subjecto non amplius existit.”
45 Cf. Salatowsky, De anima.
46 Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, 18r.
47 Cf. ibid., 9v.
48 Ibid., 9v: “Scriptura autem nobis talem ubique describit Deum, non quod sit ἄυλος et ἄμορϕος, sed qui materiam & formam habeat.”
49 Cf. Tertullian, “Adversus Praxeam,” c. VII (PL 2, 162): “Quis enim negabit Deum corpum esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.”
50 Stegmann, Metaphysica repurgata, c. VII, 48r: “Pergis: Deus est Spiritus, Spiritus autem carnem et ossa non habt. Respondeo. Recte est omnis Spiritus substantialis & corporeum licet carnem et ossa non habeant.”
51 It is not the right place to describe all aspects of Stegmann’s radical revaluation of the concept of God, for example his re-definition of the ubiquity and eternity of God. Cf. Salatowsky, “God in time and space”.
52 Jolley, Locke, 55.
53 See ibid., 55–79.
54 Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects, 67f.
55 Locke, Essay, IV 10, § 18, 628.
56 Cf. ibid., 628f, and II 26, § 2, 325.
57 Ibid., IV 10, § 10, 623.
58 Ibid., II 23, § 27, 310.
59 Ibid., II 23, § 28, 312.
60 For a discussion of this topic of Locke’s philosophy, see, inter alia, Yolton, Thinking Matter; Jolley, Locke, 80–98; Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects, 67–83; Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 335–8.
61 Locke probably purchased Crell’s book in 1685 in Amsterdam. Cf. Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism,” 151. It cannot completely be ruled out that Locke also knew Stegmann’s manuscript, even if this is highly unlikely. Yolton, Thinking Matter, xi, assumes that Ralph Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) “may have supplied Locke with his formulation of the possibility of thinking matter.” For a short description of Cudworth’s position see ibid., 4–13; Thomson, Bodies of Thought, 77f. I do not want to deny this assumption. However, I emphasise that my reference connects the discussion of thinking matter with Socinianism and Aristotelianism.
62 Locke, Essay, II 23, § 32, 314.
63 Ibid., IV III, § 6, 540f.
64 This result may be unsatisfying, but it fits exactly with Locke’s agnostic position. There is an ongoing debate as to what Locke really thought. Henry asserts “that Locke never affirms that matter can think” (“Omnipotence and Thinking Matter,” 359); more balanced is the description of Jolley, Locke, 88f.: “Although (in some sense) it is possible for matter to think by a divine act of superaddition, Locke is careful to observe that matter cannot produce thought.”
65 Stillingfleet, Discourse of Vindication, 241.
66 Locke, Essay, IV 3, § 6, 541.
67 Snobelen, “Socinianism,” 114.
68 See Socinus, “De statu primi hominis ante lapsum,” 274b. This work was published posthumously. For an interpretation of Socinus’ position, see Biagoni, “La ragione”; Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 366–71; Daugirdas, Sozinianismus, 94–113. It is another characteristic feature of the Socinians that they rejected the orthodox doctrine of original sin. Cf. Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 153–9.
69 Cf. Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, ch. I, 6f. On Locke’s mortalism, see Marshall, “Locke, Socinianism,” 158–61.
70 Locke, Essay, II 23, § 22, 307f. See ibid., § 19, 306; § 28, 311.
71 Yolton, Two Intellectual Worlds, 117.
72 Ibid., 119.
73 Locke, Essay, II 23, § 19, 306.
74 Ibid., 307.
75 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. XX, part IV, 368. See ibid., sec. VII, part II, 270.
76 Cf. Leibniz, “Letter to Friedrich Wilhelm Bierling,” October 1709, quoted from GP VII, 488–9: “Multa alia in Lockium animadverti possent, cum etiam immaterialem animae naturam per cuniculos subruat. Inclinavit ad Socinianos (quemadmodum et amicus ejus Clericus) quorum paupertina semper fuit de Deo et mente philosophia.” See Jolley, “Leibniz on Locke and Socinianism.”
77 Cf. Thiel, Early Modern Subject, 97–142.
78 Locke, Essay, II 27, § 9, 335.
79 Cf. Salatowsky, Philosophie der Sozinianer, 400–12.
80 Locke, Essay, II 27, § 15, 340.
81 Cf. Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. I, 221.
82 Ibid., Ded., 199.
83 Priestley, Memoirs, 203. This entry dates from around 1774.
84 Abbri, “Priestley,” 355: “Materialismo, necessitarismo e socinianesimo sono I tre pilastri sui quali si fonda un cristianesimo autentico, non corrotto che è capace di conciliare la ragione e la scrittura.”
85 Yolton, Thinking Matter, 109.
86 Cf. footnote 13.
87 Cf. Priestley, Disquisitions, pref., 202; sec. II, 231–3.
88 Priestley, “Introductory Essays,” XX.
89 Ibid.
90 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. II, 226. See also ibid., 230, in which Priestley speaks of the “odium which has hitherto lain upon matter.” Priestley does not accept the distinction “which made the Supreme mind [i.e. God] the author of all good, and matter the source of all evil” (ibid., intro., 219). This contrast has been the “real source of the greatest corruptions of true religion in all ages” (ibid.). Priestley followed here the opinion of the Socinians that Platonism was responsible for the corruption of Christianity.
91 Ibid., Intro., 219; sec. II., 229.
92 Cf. ibid., sec. I, 223f.
93 Ibid., sec. II, 227.
94 Ibid., sec. II, 231.
95 Yolton, Thinking Matter, 108.
96 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. I, 225. This idea of an immediate agency of the Deity goes back to Descartes’s theory of occasionalism, which was refined by Nicolas Malebranche and Lord Bolingbroke. See ibid., 264. Another famous proponent was Arnold Geulincx.
97 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. I, 224.
98 Cf. ibid., sec. II, 230.
99 Cf. footnote 75.
100 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. IV, 243.
101 Ibid., sec. IV, 247.
102 Similar to Stegmann, “metaphysician” becomes here a negative connotation. When Stegmann purged metaphysics from all scholastic trappings, he, like Priestley, was on the way to an anti-metaphysical, i.e. anti-speculative, philosophy.
103 Priestley, Disquisitions, sec. IV, 246.
104 Ibid., sec. VII, part I, 258. Priestley calls this position also “both absurd and modern” (ibid., intro., 219). In this context, Priestley describes in detail the position of the occasionalists (cf. footnote 93). He criticises also the position of Leibniz, who was
as sensible of the impossibility of all proper connection, or influence, between matter and spirit, as the Cartesians, but he explained the correspondence there is between them in quite another, though not a more satisfactory, manner; forming a system, which has obtained the name of the pre-established harmony (ibid., sec. VII, part II, 265).
105 Ibid., sec. VII, part I, 258.
106 Ibid., sec. VIII, 272.
107 Ibid., sec. VIII, 276. Like Stegmann, Priestley defends the mortality of man with a lot of quotations from the Bible denying every form of a separate soul; see ibid., sec. XIV, 306–15.
108 Ibid., sec. XII, 298.
109 Ibid., sec. XII, 301.
110 Cf. ibid, sec. XV, 316–23.