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ABSTRACT
My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel’s relation to Spinoza’s account of teleology by discussing Spinoza and Hegel’s stance to two straightforward objections against teleological views of reality: the anthropomorphism objection and the backward causation objection. I show that both argue against a teleological account that would be committed to the anthropomorphism objection by raising the same argument: such a divine intelligence would lack what it desires to realize. I then argue that their dealing with the backward causation objection differs. Whereas Spinoza finds the backward causation objection against natural purposiveness to be valid, Hegel uses this objection to build his own case: natural purposiveness obtains to a different aspect of reality than effective causality. In contrast, Spinoza defends the backward causation objection because he believes there is only one fundamental principle that reality is subject to. Not only has the issue of Spinoza and Hegel’s relationship on teleology been neglected, I also argue that such a discussion can prove illuminating with respect to Hegel’s stance to monism, as, in contrast to Spinoza, Hegel must assume that there are different fundamental principles governing reality and not merely one.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Camilla Angeli, Lilja Walliser and Anton Kabeshkin for comments on the first draft.
Notes
1 For Hegel endorsing a monistic view of reality, see e.g. Beiser, Hegel, 80–109; Beiser, “Introduction: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics,” 15ff. See also e.g. Horstmann, Wahrheit aus dem Begriff, 12ff.; Horstmann, Die Grenzen der Vernunft, 165ff. Also Horstmann and Emundts, G. W. F. Hegel. Eine Einführung, 35. Against such a monist view on Hegel, see e.g. Kreines, Reason in the World.
2 In the Appendix to the first book of his Ethics, Spinoza is actually advancing three main objections. However, as the last one is about our judgement of nature in normative terms, which is itself a result of an anthropomorphistic view of nature, I treat this last one as a consequence of the first objection, and not as a self-standing argument.
3 Even though I think that, for Hegel, the different aspect thesis holds for all parts of reality, I limit my discussion to the structures of nature because Spinoza is also referring to nature when discussing conceptions of purposiveness. Thus, for the sake of the argument, by reality I mean nature in this paper.
4 I am sympathetic to Kreines’ pluralist approach, and I do think that my analysis supports such approach; however, I do not engage with this approach here, as my main concern is the comparison of Spinoza and Hegel dealing with the two objections against teleology mentioned above.
5 The thesis that, for Hegel, reality has different aspects, which in turn yield different types of explanations, is not in fact denied by researchers whom I take to hold the common view (see note 1); however, I think there is still a worry these researchers do not address. This is the worry that the thesis of different aspects of reality which yield different explanations is relativized or even undermined once it is understood under the umbrella of an organic paradigm. Thanks to the anonymous referee for making this point explicit.
6 Hegel advances two main critiques of Spinoza: (i) Hegel charges Spinoza with being committed to acosmism, a critique Maimon and Jacobi put forward as well; (ii) Hegel draws on a critique on Spinoza’s special version of monism, the substance monism. Cf. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 21:101/87, 11:376ff./472ff. Compare also to Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III, 163/167. On a discussion on Spinoza and acosmism, see e.g. Melamed, “Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite,” 77–92. Melamed, “Omnis determinatio est negation,” 177ff. On a discussion on Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s substance monism, see e.g. Beiser, Hegel, 90ff.; Emundts, “Die Lehre vom Wesen. Die Wirklichkeit,” 416–21.
7 For arguments on Spinoza allowing for a genuine account of human purposiveness, see e.g. Curley, “On Bennett’s Spinoza: The Issue of Teleology”; Della Rocca, “Spinoza’s Metaphysical Psychology”; 252ff.; Garrett, “Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism.”
8 Garrett and Schmid argue for a genuine teleological account of nature in Spinoza with respect to Spinoza’s doctrine of the conatus. See Garrett, “Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism,” 330; Schmid, Finalursachen in der frühen Neuzeit, 229–99, esp. 298.
9 As already indicated, Spinoza does not use the kind of terminology Hegel does, but I think his critique of divine purposiveness is, in substance, a critique of what Hegel would call external purposiveness.
10 As I mentioned earlier, at least in Spinoza, this claim is controversial. For arguments on Spinoza refusing even purposiveness of this kind, see e.g. Bennett, A Study of Spinza’s “Ethics”, 215ff.; Bennett, “Spinoza and Teleology: A Reply to Curley,” 53–7.
11 Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, II, app. 78–9.
12 Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, II, app. 80.
13 Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, II, 1p22/23/25.
14 Cf. Della Rocca, Spinoza, 84ff.
15 Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, II, app. 78.
16 There is a long tradition in accusing teleological conceptions of reality to be anthropomorphistic starting with the ancient Greeks until today. Therefore, Jonas sees the refusal of purposiveness in nature as part of the fight against anthropomorphism in general; see Jonas, Das Prinzip Leben, 66.
17 Cf. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:154/651. Compare also to Hegel, Enz II, § 360.
18 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:156/653. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
19 Hegel, Enz II, § 245Z.
20 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:169/666.
21 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:166/553.
22 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:169/666. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
23 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:163/660.
24 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:169/666. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
25 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:169/667. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
26 Thanks to the anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
27 Cf. Kreines, Reason in the World.
28 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:184/681.
29 Ibid.
30 A discussion of this claim exceeds the scope of this paper. On Hegel’s arguments on the meaning and reality of internal purposiveness, see e.g. Kreines, “The Logic of Life,” 344–77; Kreines, Reason in the World, 77ff.
31 I am drawing on Schmid’s reading of Spinoza here. In contrast to the common view that there is no natural teleology in Spinoza, Schmid argues for a specific version of natural teleology in Spinoza which Schmid calls a “naturalized constitutive teleology.” According to this kind of teleology, a thing strives to possess everything that is good for its self-preservation. This particular behavior is an expression of the particular being or the essence of this thing. However, as Schmid stresses, this kind of teleology does not have any explanatory relevance for Spinoza. Cf. Schmid, Finalursachen in der frühen Neuzeit, 229–99, esp. 289.
32 Gebhardt, Spinoza Opera, II, app. 87.
33 Ibid.
34 Of course, the streets could be wet due to another cause that took place before, but this objection does not affect the general claim that a cause has to be prior to the effect.
35 Compare to the considerations of Kreines, Reason in the World, 91.
36 Traditionally, this kind of causality is called efficient causality. In the following, I am going to use this expression.
37 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:160/657. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
38 Ibid.
39 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:184/681. One might object that Hegel makes this claim, rather, with respect to the organism’s relation to mechanism, and there is indeed a further development of the concept of causality in the Science of Logic, culminating in the chapter on mechanism. However, I do not believe that Hegel gave up the claims on efficient causality put forward here. Also, in mechanism, the object, i.e. the particular content, remains external to the particular mechanic causality to which it is subject to; cf. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:133ff. Thus, he draws parallel cases between efficient causality and internal purposiveness and mechanism and internal purposiveness.
40 Note that Hegel also holds that teleological relations are explanatory prior to relations, according to efficient causality. I cannot discuss this further claim in this paper. For further reading on this claim, see, e.g. Emundts, Erfahren und Erkennen, 348ff.
41 Cf. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:160/657.
42 Hegel thinks this is characteristic for purposes according to the conception of external purposiveness as well as according to the one of internal purposiveness.
43 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:160/657. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
44 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:184ff/681ff.
45 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:189/685f. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
46 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:189/686.
47 Cf. John Burbidge, “Objektivität,” 239.
48 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 11:397f/493f.
49 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:160/657.
50 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 12:161/658.
51 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 11:399/495. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
52 Hegel explains the action of a painter painting a picture with respect to efficient causality in a similar way. The cause of the painting is supposed to be a propulsive force which is communicated to the object, subject to that force; it is the same quantum of movement that functioned as cause that is communicated to the corresponding object. That does neither mean that Hegel claims that this is the only efficient cause of the painting nor that there are no other causes, like purposive ones, relevant to that painting. Cf. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 11:399f./495.
53 Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, 11:400/496. Translation: Hegel, Science of Logic.
54 For a further discussion of the concept of causality within the context of Hegel’s Science of Logic, see e.g. Emundts, “Die Lehre vom Wesen. Die Wirklichkeit,” 387–456, esp. 436–50.
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Karen Koch
Karen Koch is currently a PhD student and research assistant (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin) at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her work is focused on teleology in Kant and Hegel.