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ABSTRACT
This article offers an introduction to the question of God’s omnipresence as debated within the late medieval scholastic tradition as seen through the lens of Francis of Meyronnes. In Meyronnes’s commentary on distinction 37 of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, he attempts to categorize the various ways one might prove God’s existence in all things through a four-fold classification. In following his classifications, we are able to look back at some of the historical ways earlier scholastics have attempted to prove God’s omnipresence and follow some of the changes in those approaches as the tradition has developed. Likewise, Meyronnes’s fourth and final classification will point us toward the future. His fourth way—interesting and puzzling in and of itself—offers early hints of future debates about God’s omnipresence and his relationship to place that will emerge in the late 14th century and then again in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries.
Notes
1 See especially the works of Grant, Much Ado about Nothing; Sylla, “Imaginary Space”. Other important studies include Grant, “Medieval and Seventeenth-Century Conceptions”; Aertsen and Speer, Raum und Raumvorstellungen in Mittelalter; Sylla, Transmission of New Physics; Sylla, “Space and Spirit”; Cross, The Physics of Duns Scotus.
2 Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation”, 323, who depends on Roth, Franz von Mayronnes.
3 Roth, Franz von Mayronnes, 33. See Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation”, 324.
4 Lambertini, “Francis of Meyronnes”, 256.
5 Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation”, 324
6 See Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries”, 237.
7 See Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries”, 237.
8 See Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation and Transcendentals”, 324.
9 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, 65; Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation”, 324.
10 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Nam dicunt aliqui quod, sicut Deus est intensive infinitus, ita extensive, non quod habeat partem extra partem, sed quod potest coexistere infinitis locis”.
11 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libros distinctae, I, d. 37, c. 1: “Sciendum igitur est, quod Deus, incommutabiliter semper in se existens, praesentialiter, potentialiter, essentialiter est in omni natura sive essentia sine sui definitione, et in omni loco sine circumscriptione, et in omni tempore sine mutabilitate”.
12 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libros distinctae, I, d. 37, c. 1: “Beatus Gregorius Super Canticis Canticorum inquit: Licet Deus communi modo omnibus rebus insit praesentia, potentia, substantia”.
13 Fuerst, An Historical Study, 18; Glossa Ordinaria, Cant, 5:17 (PL 113, 1157). The fact that the text in the Gloss cannot be found in Gregory’s commentary on Cantus Canticorum is noted by the 17th-century Augustinian Frederico Niccolo Gavardi, who says that the quote can instead be found in Gregory’s 8th homily on Ezekiel (see Frederico Niccolo Gavardi, Theologia ex antiquata, Tractatus 11, Quaestio 1, Articulus 5, t. 1, 587: “non tamen illum citat in Comment. Cant. Sed alio loco, nam si vidissent Homil. 8 super Ezech., invenissent quod quaerebant”).
14 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libros distinctae, I, d. 37, c. 1: “et in omni loco sine circumscriptione”.
15 Fuerst, An Historical Study, 204 (emphasis mine).
16 For example, Alexander of Hales’s treatment of the issue is contained within a larger treatment of the “the immensity of the divine essence”. In these discussions, the “incirumscriptibility” of the divine essence figures prominently. Hales’s concern to remove any limitation or finitude in God is visible in his direct response to the question: Is the divine essence everywhere? He writes: “For if his presence were not everywhere, it would follow that he would be constrained and finite in his own being / Nisi enim esset ista praesentia, sequeretur quod esset coarctatio et finitatio in suo esse” (Alexander Halensis, Summa Halensis, I, t. 2, q. 3, tit. 2, c. 2).
17 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Potest ergo dici, quod licet Deus habeat infinitatem intensivam, non tamen habet infinitatem vel magnitudinem extensivam, quam imaginantur praedictae rationes, ideo non concludunt”.
18 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Secunda via aliquorum est via causalitatis. Nam oportet agens esse praesens patienti et approximatum, sed Deus agit ubique, ergo etc.”.
19 Aristotle, Physics, VII, c. 2. See Aquinas, Scriptum, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1; Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 68; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, a. 1.
20 Iohannes Capreolus, In libros Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, 498b: “Deus est in omnibus creaturis, non sicut pars essentiae vel accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei, in quod agit”.
21 Fuerst, An Historical Study, 204 (emphasis mine).
22 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Sed ista ratio non demonstrate, quia forte hoc est creditum, scilicet quod Deus immediate in actione agentis naturalis agat, immo aliquibus non videtur”.
23 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Non oportet agens praesens esse localiter patienti” (emphasis mine). Traces of arguments against this kind of necessity can already been seen long before Meyronnes, for example in the Dominican Peter of Tarantasia’s principal argument of the same question. Tarantasia ultimately rejects these arguments in favor of the Thomistic position, but his arguments provide good evidence that these objections and concerns are well-known, even before the era of Scotus, in which they will become quite prominent. See Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, args. 1-5, 301.
24 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Tum quia quanto agens est fortius: tanto agit in magis distans”. Again, this is a common argument visible much earlier in the principal arguments of thinkers like Tarantasia and Aquinas. See Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, 301: “Nobilior est agens qui potest operari ubi est et ubi non est, sive in absentia et in praesentia, ut in coelo et in inferioribus, quam qui in praesentia tantum”. See also Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 8, a. 1, obj. 3.
25 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v: “Tum est quia videmus agentia secundaria agere, ubi non sunt praesentia, sicut sol in visceribus terrae”.
26 See Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 37, q. 1. For a few representative examples of later uses, see Iohannes Bassolis, In quatuor Sententiarum Libros, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, 196va; Iohannes Bassolis, In quatuor Sententiarum Libros, II, d. 9, q. 2, f. 57va; William de Ockham, Ordinatio, I, d. 37, q. 1; Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114v.
27 For more on John of Bassol, see Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary”, 78–9, 99, 112.
28 Iohannes Bassolis, In quatuor Sententiarum Libros, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, f. 196va: “De primo quia non habeo rationes adduco auctoritates”.
29 Responding to the Thomistic argument from the Aristotelian dictum, he writes: “Primo sic quanto agens est virtuosius tanto potest agere in aliquid magis distans, sicut patet ad sensum, sed Deus est agens potissimum et virtuosum, ergo etc., ergo ex sua actione non potest argui praesentia eius realis cum eo in quod vel quod agit, sed potest agere in quodcumque distans et quantumcumque distans” (Iohannes Bassolis, In quatuor Sententiarum Libros, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3, 196va).
30 Iohannes Bassolis, In quatuor Sententiarum Libros, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 196vb: “Dico igitur quod sola fide tenendum et ex dictis sanctorum non ex omnipotentia vel actione Dei circa creaturam quod Deus est ubique praesens per suam immensitatem vel essentiam immensam”.
31 For an insightful and thorough account of de Novo Castro’s life and the surrounding scholarly debate, see Idziak, “The Disputed Biography of Andreas de Novo Castro”.
32 Andreas de Novo Castro, Primum Scriptum Sententiarum, I, d. 8, f. 54vb: “Deus secundum deitatem non est proprie mutabilis localiter. Probatur quia est ubique nec potest esse locus sine eo, igitur est immobilis localiter, hoc deducit Magister 37 distinctione primi, sed hoc numquam potest probari in lumine naturali”. Note that this admission does not come where we would expect it, in distinction 37, but in distinction 8; but the admission was found by tracking references to key passages from Aristotle’s Physics, VII, which De Novo Castro identifies as inconclusive rather than demonstrative.
33 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114vb: “quia si non esset ubique videtur quod posset moveri de loco ad locum transferendo se de una parte mundi ad aliam, et sic esset localiter mutatus”.
34 See Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, 301: “Si Deus est in una re et non in alia, aut ergo potest esse in illa, aut non potest, si potest, ergo est mobilis, si non potest, ergo impotens”.
35 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114vb: “Deus nusquam esset proprie, sed transferibiliter esset ubi esset”.
36 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 114vb: “Nam respectus locati ad locum est ubi, et illum non habet Deus”.
37 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, ff. 114vb-115ra: “Sed locus habet respectum ad locatum praesentialitatis”.
38 There are examples, preceding Meyronnes, of this shift away from thinking of “place” as a physical container to something more abstract and non-physical. See, for examples, William Duba’s discussion of Peter Auriol’s notion of “place” discussed under a “metaphysical consideration” and Nicholas Bonet’s discussion of “mathematical place” as distinguished from “natural place” (Duba, “Mathematical and Metaphysical Space”).
39 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115ra: “Diceretur ergo Deus de loco ad locum transferri per novum respectum praesentialitatis in hoc loco ad Deum quo prius non erat, et ab illo denominaretur Deus esse in aliquo in quo prius non erat, sicut dictum est superius de creatione nova quae est in creatura, et sine aliquo novo in Deo”.
40 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115ra: “Ubi dicit unus doctor quod omnis creatura habet necessariam praesentialitatem ad Deum sicut coexistentiam durationis”. Such a comparison between space and time in this context is noteworthy as it finds echoes in the likes of Henry More in his own 17th-century attempts to explain how God is identifiable with “infinite space” by analogy to the necessity of “eternal duration”. More writes: “Now there is the same reason for Time (by Time I mean Duration) as for Space … Wherefore I say that those unavoidable imaginations of the necessity of an Infinite Space, as they call it, and Eternal duration, are no proofs of Self-existent Matter, but rather obscure subindications of the necessary Existence of God” (Henry More, Appendix to an antidote against Atheism, 163–4). See also Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 217. For more on More, see the contribution by Jacques Joseph in this volume, “God, space, and the spirit of nature: the inner structure of More’s panentheism”.
41 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115ra: “Ubi dicit unus doctor quod omnis creatura habet necessariam praesentialitatem ad Deum sicut coexistentiam durationis”.
42 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115ra: “Sed quia necessitas istius respectus non est nota, ideo confirmatur quadruplicter”.
43 William de Vaurouillon, Quattuor librorum Sententiarum Compendium, I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, f. 90v: “Tertio dicitur esse in loco praesentialiter: et isto modo tam corpora quam spiritus quam Deus sunt in loco, quia non dicit esse in loco hoc modo, nec circumscribi a locos nec esse hic non alibi, sed solum coexistentiam”. For more on Vaurouillon, see Zahnd, “Easy-Going Scholars Lecturing Secundum Alium?”, 274–90. Meyronnes’s general discussion (especially his arguments against the via causalitatis) is also heavily cited by Pelbartus de Themeswar (1430–1504) in his Aureum Rosarium Theologiae, “localis motus,” sect. 11, 140, though the position on the via coexistentiae does not seem explicitly discussed.
44 Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 219. See also Hoefer et al. “Absolute and Relational Space”, section 3.2.
45 Aristotle, Physics, IV (212a21-25); see Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 218: “He [Descartes] had adopted Aristotle’s definition of a body’s place as depending upon the immediately surrounding bodies”.
46 Hoefer et al., “Absolute and Relational Space and Motion”.
47 Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 218; e.g. Hoefer et al., “Absolute and Relational Space and Motion”, section 3.2: “the Earth does not move relative to its surroundings in the vortex”.
48 Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 219.
49 Newton’s idea, Sylla notes, is to “reject the Aristotelian categories” and begin thinking of an extended space that is at the same time devoid of body (Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 219).
50 Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 223.
51 Hoefer, Ugget, and Read note: “This is a view that attracts even fewer contemporary adherents, but there is something deeply peculiar about a non-material but physical entity, a worry that has influenced many philosophical opponents of absolute space” (Hoefer et al., “Absolute and Relational Space and Motion”).
52 Isaac Newton in Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 131–2, qtd. in Sylla, “Imaginary Space”, 219.
53 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115r: “Primo sic, si Deus crearet stellam caelo destructo, posset eam movere circulariter, sed non nisi acquireret aliquem respectum, sed non nisi respectum praesentialitatis ad ipsum, ergo etc.”.
54 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115r: “Quia si Deus totum universum destrueret, exceptis polis, eos posset coniungere. et sic perpendiculariter movere, sed non nisi per respectum praesentialitatis ad primum, ergo etc.”.
55 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115r: “Deus omnia simul potest movere, et non nisi per respectum aliquem. non ad se invicem. ergo ad Deum”.
56 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115r: “Omnia que moventur respectum habent ad aliquod immobile: sed illud non potest esse nisi Deus, ergo etc.”.
57 Meyronnes seems to hint that he knows he is asserting something difficult and mysterious. He states that, “once having explained the immobility of place, which is a more difficult passage from the whole of philosophy, the proposed will be apparent / Dico quod declarata loci immobilitate, quae est difficilior passus de tota philosophia, propositum apparet. Sed hoc dicetur in secundo” (Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus in librum Sententiarum, I, d. 37, q. 1, f. 115r).
58 For an introduction to Thomas Bradwardine, see Lahey, “Thomas Bradwardine”.
59 For more on John of Ripa, see Ruello, “Le project théologique de Jean de Ripa”.
60 Grant, Much ado about nothing, 120, suggests that Meyronnes in his commentary on the Physics denies an extracosmic void. That may be the case, but, as we’ve seen here, in his Sentences commentary, he is offering a description of God and its relationship to place that is similar to how others, like Ripa and Bradwardine, used the concept of an imaginary space to explain puzzling physical phenomena.
61 Grant, Much ado about nothing, section 2a, 23–127, esp. 125, which focuses on the paradoxes introduced by Ripa designed to raise doubts about the Aristotelian worldview.
62 Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, 177: “vacuum a corpore potest esse, vacuum vero a Deo nequaquam” (transl. Grant, Much ado about nothing, 141).
63 Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei, 179: “Est enim inextensibiliter et indimensionabiliter infinite extensus” (transl. Grant, Much ado about nothing, 143).
64 Grant, Much ado about nothing, 142.
65 Grant lists a number of authors following the Bradwardine position. “Of the authors who accepted the existence of an infinite, imaginary space and who have been considered here thus far, some, namely Bradwardine, Oresme, Suarez, Fonseca, and the Coimbra Jesuits conceived it as identical to God’s immensity and also capable of receiving bodies” (Grant, Much ado about nothing, 163). To see its connection to Newton, consider Grant’s statement: “To identify imaginary, infinite space with God’s immensity and also to assign dimensionality to that space would have implied that God himself was an actually extended, corporeal being. Although Benedict Spinoza, Isaac Newton, and others would do precisely this” (Grant, Much ado about nothing, 164).
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Jeffrey C. Witt
Jeffrey C. Witt is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Maryland. His research focuses on late medieval scholasticism and the Sentences commentary tradition. As the director of the Scholastic Commentaries and Texts Archive (S.C.T.A.; https://scta.info), his most recent work is focused on developing a digital corpus of the scholastic tradition. As part of that work, his critical edition of the Sentences commentary (Lectures 1–20) of Peter Gracilis appeared in 2023 (reviewed by the Medieval Academy of America).