Economic Aid and Peace Implementation: The African Experience

Abstract

This paper examines the potential importance of externally-facilitated peace dividends and donor coordination in sustaining peace after the signing of an accord. We extend our previous research on US performance after civil wars to learn if adversary assumptions on peace dividends have additional positive impact when a wider sample of major Western European donors is included. Was the lack of US follow-through compensated for in whole or in part by the extension of development assistance allocations from European allies? We find that cases in which donors provide significant and sustained post-conflict aid are somewhat less likely to return to civil war than those who do not receive comparable assistance. Moreover, we find in such cases that donor coordination reinforced behaviour that encouraged the implementation process, providing an extra incentive for maintaining the peace agreement over the five-year threshold and beyond.

Keywords:

• donor coordination
• implementation
• incentives
• peace dividends
• post-conflict aid
• sustainability

This article is dedicated to the memory of Donald Rothchild, who passed away on 30 January 2007 in Davis, California.