The Production of Recognized Space: Statebuilding Practices of Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria

Abstract

This article looks at the practices used by informal states to legitimize their goals in the international arena on the basis of developing the distinction of Michel de Certeau between strategies and tactics. It is suggested that even when de jure unrecognized, informal states are nevertheless embedded in the network of international politics. On the one hand, their search for legitimacy outside is characterized by making use of global discourse, particularly its norms and values of sovereignty and democracy. On the other hand, their quest for a proper place in the world of states is based not only on words, but also on deeds, implying that although unrecognized they find ways to escape isolation. The significance of this quest for external support is closely interlinked with the struggle for domestic legitimacy.

Keywords:

• de facto state
• legitimacy
• Northern Cyprus
• Transdniestria
• Michel de Certeau

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank for criticism, useful comments and suggestions John Heathershaw, Klaus Schlichte, Sertac Sonan, Thomas Wood, and an anonymous reviewer.

Notes

1. The roots of the Cyprus conflict are perceived differently by the two communities. For the Turkish Cypriots it all started with the idea of enosis, the aspiration of the Greek Cypriots to unify with Greece and the constitutional crisis of 1963. For the Greek Cypriots the present division is the result of the Turkish military intervention of 1974.

2. Around 50 per cent of the budget of Northern Cyprus is sponsored by Turkey; the TRNC uses a Turkish currency, New Turkish Lira; the head of the Central Bank is a citizen from Turkey. There might be some reasons to believe that the economic dependency on Turkish aid has been an intentional policy of the Turkish Cypriot elite (Sonan 2007). Regarding security issues, the police forces in Northern Cyprus are under direct control of the Turkish Army; this is explained by the idea that since no peace agreement has been achieved so far, the Turkish Army has the right to control the security forces in Northern Cyprus to provide protection according to the Treaty of Guarantee, which is part of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 (author's interview, Turkish Cypriot part of Nicosia, 27 October 2006).

3. Transdniestria's economic self-sufficiency is due to the industrial complex which it inherited from the Soviet Union, but also due to mostly illicit trade across the border with Ukraine. The most significant factor perhaps is the informal support from Russia. As one of the PMR deputies confessed ‘no gas from Russia, no PMR’ (author's interview, Tiraspol, 2 June 2006).

4. For the details of Russia's role in Transdniestria see, for example, ICG 2004.

5. Author's interview, Famagusta, 11 November 2005.

6. To be more precise there were six referendums held in the PMR: on the foundation of PMR within the USSR (1990); on the preservation of the USSR (1991); on independence from Moldova (1991); on the presence of the Russian 14th Army (1995); on the new constitution (1995); and again on the independence and eventual integration with Russia (2006). There was one more referendum carried out on the issue of private property on land in 2003, however because of the low turnout the results were not considered as valid (Infotag 2006).

7. According to the official data, the turnout in the referendum was 77 per cent (Oliva Press 2008).

8. This anecdote is based on the author's personal observation, Tiraspol, 2 June 2006.

9. Author's interview, Turkish Cypriot part of Nicosia, 20 October 2005.

10. Since the TRNC is recognized only by Turkey, flights to and from Northern Cyprus are generally possible only via Turkey.

11. Author's interview, Tiraspol, 11 June 2006.