Capacity-building at the Headquarter Level: The Case of EU Civilian Peace Operations

Abstract

This article traces the institutional evolution of the Council Secretariat that plans and supports EU civilian peace operations. During the early days of the European Security and Defence Policy in the late 1990s competing political priorities of big EU member states and a dominance of military structures put civilian administrators at a significant disadvantage. Between 2003 and 2007, however, the rising number and complexity of civilian missions generated pressure for reform, which eventually led to the creation of a civilian headquarters. The historical analysis provides the basis for assessing the EU's current institutional capacities for civilian crisis management. While some administrative capacity deficits have been addressed, increased institutional formalization and further politically motivated reforms may increase tensions and hamper the accumulation of expertise.

Keywords:

• peace operations
• civilian crisis management
• EU
• institutional reform

Acknowledgements

This article is based on research in the project ‘Learning to Build the Rule of Law? The Evolution of Police and Judicial Reform in UN Peace Operations’. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. We are also grateful to the officials and experts who kindly agreed to be interviewed during our research in Brussels and Pristina. This article is current as of January 2010. Later developments are not reflected.

Notes

1. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy has been renamed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, due the historical orientation of this article, we mainly refer to the old acronym ‘ESDP’.

2. A collective defence treaty among a sub-set of EU member state that served as a foundation for the ESDP.

3. Interview with Council official, October 2008.

4. Interviews with Council officials, October 2008.

5. In 2008 its conceptual work on security sector reform would also fall hostage to bureaucratic turf wars.

6. The implications of the Lisbon Treaty are briefly returned to towards the end of this article.

7. By then Athisaari headed the NGO Crisis Management Initiative that had brokered a first ceasefire in Aceh.

8. Interview with Council official, October 2008.

9. After all, Prime Minister Blair had become thoroughly discredited in the region due to his staunch support for the Bush administration.

10. Interview with national expert, October 2009.

11. A national expert described the initiative as Germany's ‘baby’. Interview, October 2009.

12. Interview with national expert, October 2009.

13. Even though the EMM Georgia involved a high-stakes gamble with Russia.

14. Interview with national official, October 2008.

15. Which, in turn, has been inspired by the example of the OSCE and UN.

16. After all, member states who are responsible for these missions will not publicly admit failure. In contrast, related Commission programmes for institution-building and the promotion of the Rule of Law are at least subject to independent financial controls.

17. But one should also acknowledge that the CPCC tries to exercise a positive quality control function by conducting more systematic mission inspections and by promoting more consistent project planning.

18. Interview with member of EULEX Kosovo, May 2010.

19. Interviews with Council officials, October 2008.