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ABSTRACT
While academic debate on the political control of military forces tends to oppose the poles of ‘integration’ or ‘separation’, the French military tradition is most often described as a case of subordination to political authorities. I examine the indicators of the rebalance of power in favour of the military by adopting an inductive approach based on the observation of the institutionalization of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The focus on officers’ professional trajectories and collective resources, gives an alternative explanation of the adaptation of the military organizations to the security environment, that no longer only relies on usual realist and functionalist theories.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Grégory Daho is an Associate Professor of Political Science at University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne / European Centre for Sociology and Political Science (CESSP), he specialises in international security and armed interventions studies. His most recent publications (in French) include The Transformation of Military Forces: Investigating Civil-Military Relations in France, Paris: Editions MSH, 2016; “Making the Generals Talk: Feedback on Some Uses of Interview Techniques in the Military Field”, Interrogations, 22, 2016; “The Socialisation Between Foreign Policy Professional Groups. The Case of the Institutionalisation of the French Civil-Military Activities in the former Yugoslavia”, Cultures & Conflits, 98, 2015 and “The Erosion of Algerians Taboos: An Alternative Explanation for the Transformation of Military Organisations in France”, French Review of Political Science, 64-1, 2014.
Notes
1. “The main element in France's nuclear deterrence strategy is the Chief of State, myself,” President François Mitterrand, November 16, 1983 (Chantebout Citation1986, 29). Author's translation.
2. Following the attacks of January 2015 and for the first time since 1961, 10 000 soldiers were deployed on the French national territory under a state of emergency as part of Operation Sentinel, responsible for securing sensitive sites and especially to deter terrorist acts while reassuring the population.
3. Conscription, removed in 2010, was reinstated on March 2, 2017 in Sweden in reaction to the russian military oprerations in Eastern Europe.
4. Before appearing as a “military function”, CIMIC was successively designated as a directive, provisional (1995) and then permanent (1997), a concept (2002) and finally a doctrine (2005, 2012).
5. Doctrine interarmées [Joint Doctrine], 3.10.3(A) CIMIC, 17 July 2012, 19.
6. This “detour” by the CIMIC case may be explained by the fact that ethnographic observation of civil-military relations at the highest political level (at the Elysee, in restricted councils or in the office of the Minister of the Armed Forces) seems empirically impractical.
7. Thanks to records of different military organizations and in-depth interviews with thirty French officers with stakes in these opposing points of view, I have selected two sample groups. For the Special Forces officers who defend an extensive model view, the group includes thirteen members of the Civil Affairs (CA) unit of the Special Operations Command. For the Army officers who promote a restrictive view, the subgroup is composed of ten senior officers.
8. This metaphor refers to the defiance between political authorities and military officiers inherited from the attempted coups in 1958 et 1961 in Algiers.
9. The field is a “network or a configuration of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu Citation1992, 72–73).
10. In 1943, the US Army created with Great Britain the European Civil Affairs Regiment in charge of police forces and means of transport in France.
11. In 1961, there were 2 000 US Special Forces troops in Viet Nam. Their mission was to train local civil defense groups to counter the Vietminh, in order to minimize the implication of the US Army.
12. The interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 illustrate the political dimension of CA, characterized by the rapid withdrawal of troops and the implementation of an allied government.
13. Gulf War, Somalia, and Haiti.
14. CA action was deployed by the US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC).
15. Army reservists make up 97 percent of USACAPOC forces.
16. The CA force had been comprised of the 96th CA Battalion in Fort Bragg since 1945. In 2007 increased demand for CA elements led to the provisional activation of the 95th CA Brigade.
17. The Special Military School of Saint-Cyr is an institution of higher education founded in 1802 by Napoléon to prepare officers for careers in the Army and the Gendarmerie. The school is under the authority of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
18. The US strategy of “shaping” perpetuates a paradox: a short-term doctrine inherited from the Revolution in Military Affairs and based on technological superiority, and a long-term policy, focused on the transformation of rogue states which, conversely, implies a sustainable ground presence.
19. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 28 November 2005.
20. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006.
21. Concept d’emploi des forces terrestres en phase de stabilisation, 2005, Doctrine d’emploi des forces terrestres en phase de stabilisation, 2006.
22. Doctrine Interarmées de la Contre-insurrection, 2010.
23. “As you say we have re-invented the wheel … to a certain point, it's useless to translate the US manuals, we just have to learn from our experience … ” Interview, with a colonel of the French Army, Paris, 26 May 2008.
24. “CMA, now called CIMIC in the Anglo-Saxon terminology and adopted in the NATO context, are part and have always been part of French military culture. The possible contributions of CIMIC in stabilization may be found in our military history. To be convinced of this, it suffices to re-read the essay published in 1900 by Colonel Lyautey ’Du rôle colonial de l’armée‘: ’First, past experience shows that we seldom if ever succeed in destroying a band of pirates by force. Secondly, we must keep in mind that the pirate, if I can put it that way, is a plant which grows only in a particular soil, and that the safest method, is to make that soil refractory.’ By substituting the word “terrorist” for “pirate,” these points still remain curiously relevant”.
25. Colonel Durieux, commander of the French Battalion in 2008, preferred “freeing” rather than “winning” hearts and minds; press conference, Ministry of Defense, 11 March 2010. General Druart, commander of the Task Force La Fayette (2009–2010), criticized “an oppressive merchandising approach to the Afghan population” (Valeyre Citation2010, 57).
26. “Since the actual origin of the sedimentations has become unimportant, the tradition might invent quite a different origin without threatening what has been objectivated. In other words, legitimations can succeed each other, from time to time bestowing new meanings on the sedimented experiences of the collectivity in question. The past history of the society can be reinterpreted without necessarily upsetting the institutional order as a result.” (Berger and Luckmann Citation1966, 87).
27. CIMIC officers’ attributions commonly regarded as privileges (civilian dress, autonomy, mobility, relations with IOs and NGOs female staff …), are often described as factor of misunderstanding with the other military units.
28. Centre de Doctrine et d’Emploi des Forces (CDEF) [Center for Doctrine and Use of Armed Forces], Centre Interarmées du Concept, de Doctrine et d’Expérimentation (CICDE) [Joint Centre for Concept, Doctrine and Experimentation].
29. Michel Dobry recalls that the intentionality of the actors in the emergence of this consensus is limited: the consensus is not a compromise, but rather a “pragmatic rule from which it is expensive in the French political game to deviate too openly” (Dobry Citation1986, 48).
30. “On one hand, the weakening of civilian control is related to uncertainties of the strategic environment at the end of the Cold War and to the growing technical operations. On the other hand, the increased role of the military is explained by the fact that they have acquired extensive experience in political and military matters, while at the same time, civilian elites have lost the military experience” (Hamelin Citation2003, 435–436).
31. During the spring of 2006, retired American generals spoke about the failure of the intervention in Iraq appointing Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense. Paul Eaton (Citation2006), Greg Newbold (Citation2006), John Batiste (Citation2006).
32. SURCOUF (Citation2008).
33. “General Desportes has expressed an unwelcome and insufficiently reasoned personal opinion. […] It is irresponsible because it comes from someone who is active. It is ‘a mistake’” (Admiral Guillaud, Chief of Staff, Radio Europe 1, 2 July 2010). The penalty was confirmed by the Minister of Defense, accusing him of a “lack of discernment” (Radio RMC, 7 July 2010). During this episode, General Desportes had been recruited by the security services of the President (Le Canard Enchaîné: 5 January 2010; Guibert Citation2010).
34. Speech made by Emmanuel Macron at the Hôtel of Brienne, elysee.fr, published the 19 July 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-d-emmanuel-macron-a-l-hotel-de-brienne/