ABSTRACT
In view of the gap between policy and practice in Security Sector Reform (SSR) interventions, this article examines external actors' field-level practices with a focus on national ownership principles in the context of the SSR process in Mali from 2015 to 2016. It proceeds from the assumption that perceptions of institutional demands crucially impact the way organisations decide on appropriate actions. The findings show that, under conditions of a perceived absence of national commitment to SSR, external actors navigate conflicting demands by practicing avoidance, manipulation, and compromise-seeking. The article concludes with recommendations on strengthening external actors' adherence to ownership principles.
Acknowledgements
The empirical research in Mali in 2015 and 2016 was supported by the SFB 700 ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’ at Freie Universität Berlin, with funds provided by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The terms local, domestic, national or country ownership are not used consistently in international policy frameworks. This article works with the unspecified term of ownership, though in national SSR processes, the focus is usually on political actors at the national level – especially at the outset of the process, when the parameters of the reform at hand are negotiated. For more information on the terminological debate, see Brown (Citation2017).
2 Four research trips where undertaken to Bamako to conduct in-depth interviews and background discussions with staff members of external actors providing support and national actors involved in the SSR process. Interviews were also conducted in Brussels and Geneva, as well as by phone (New York). In total, ca. 100 interviews were conducted, with several respondents being interviewed recurrently.
3 Note that the external actors under research are not exposed to one homogenous environment, as they require legitimacy in their host country and in their home constituencies.
4 EUCAP Sahel officer, 17 Jul 2015, Bamako; representative of EU Delegation, 31 Jul 2015, Bamako; MINUSMA officer, 14 Nov 2015, Bamako; MINUSMA officer, 29 Jan 2016, Bamako; DCAF consultant, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako; DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
5 Two representatives of Malian NGO, 27 Jul 2015, Bamako; representative of Malian NGO, 28 Jul 2015, Bamako; Malian police officer/EMP, 18 Nov 2016, Accra; officer of Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 Jul 2015, Bamako.
6 DPKO officer, 30 Sep 2016, phone call; MINUSMA officer, 23 Jul 2015, Bamako; MINUSMA officer, 22 Jan 2016, Bamako.
7 Two MINUSMA officers, 29 Jan 2016 (various similar statements from different respondents throughout the research period).
8 Two MINUSMA officers, 29 Jan 2016, Bamako.
9 MINUSMA officer, 10 Nov 2016, Bamako; two MINUSMA officers, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
10 MINUSMA officer, 13 Nov 2016, Bamako.
11 While it could be argued that the alignment of MINUSMA’s mandate to the Peace Agreement was an overall instance of adherence, several respondents emphasised that the Peace Agreement was drawn up under strong external influence and did not necessarily reflect national priorities, especially regarding its SSR-DDR provisions. Ref. interviews with two representatives of Malian NGO, 27 Jul 2015, Bamako; representative of Malian NGO, 28 Jul 2015, Bamako; Malian police officer/EMP, 18 Nov 2016, Accra.
12 MINUSMA officer, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako.
13 MINUSMA officer, 13 Nov 2016, Bamako.
14 MINUSMA officer, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako; two MINUSMA officers, 15 Nov 2015, Bamako, MINUSMA officer, 14 Nov 2015, Bamako.
15 Two MINUSMA officers, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
16 Two MINUSMA officers, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
17 Two MINUSMA officers, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
18 MINUSMA officer, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako.
19 UNPOL officer, 01 Feb 2016, Bamako.
20 MINUSMA officer, 13 Nov 2016, Bamako.
21 Two MINUSMA officers, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
22 MINUSMA officer, 29 Jan 2016, Bamako.
23 MINUSMA officer, 23 Jul 2015, Bamako.
24 Field notes, Atelier Technique d’echanges et de reflexion sur la reforme du secteur de la securite (RSS) au Mali, 23 Jul 2015, CICB Bamako; field notes, Projet Relance Economique et Gouvernance des Affaires Locales – Tombouctou, Mopti, Ségou, Workshop, 28 Jan 2016, Hotel Salam/Bamako.
25 Representative of EU Delegation, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako.
26 EUCAP Sahel officer, 31 Jan 2016, Bamako.
27 Two EU officers, 07 Dec 2016, Brussels.
28 EUCAP Sahel officer, 24 Jan 2016, Bamako.
29 EUCAP Sahel officer, 19 Jan 2016, Bamako.
30 EUCAP Sahel officer, 24 Jan 2016, Bamako.
31 EUCAP Sahel officer, 14 Nov 2015, Bamako.
32 EU officer, 07 Dec 2016, Brussels.
33 EUCAP Sahel officer, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako.
34 Representative of EU Delegation, 02 Feb 2016, Bamako.
35 EUCAP Sahel officer, 31 Jan 2016, Bamako.
36 EUCAP Sahel officer, 24 Jan 2016, Bamako.
37 EUCAP Sahel officer, 31 Jan 2016, Bamako; representative of EU Delegation, 09 Nov 2016, Bamako.
38 EUCAP Sahel officer, 14 Nov 2016, Bamako.
39 Two EU officers, 07 Dec 2016, Brussels.
40 EUCAP Sahel officer, 14 Nov 2015, Bamako.
41 EUCAP Sahel officer, 31 Jan 2016, Bamako.
42 Two DCAF officers, 27 Jul 2015, Bamako.
43 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
44 DCAF consultant, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako.
45 DCAF officer, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako.
46 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
47 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
48 DCAF consultant, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako; DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
49 DCAF consultant, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako.
50 EUCAP Sahel officer, 17 Jul 2015, Bamako.
51 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
52 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
53 DCAF officer, 24 Nov 2016, Geneva.
54 DCAF officer, 20 Jan 2016, Bamako.
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Karoline Eickhoff
Karoline Eickhoff is Associate Researcher in the programme for Conflict Transformation Research at the Berghof Foundation. She holds a doctoral degree in political science from Freie Universität Berlin.