Security Force Assistance to The Gambia Following the 2017 Political Transition: A Recipe for Further Fragmentation?

ABSTRACT

This research explores the role of security force assistance (SFA) in the context of political transition, through the case of The Gambia. It shows how political and military leaders have preferred ad-hoc and shorter-term SFA programmes over wider security reform efforts. The Gambia has welcomed a range of new security partnerships through foreign security advisors and small scale SFA programmes provided by states, international organizations, and NGOs. These have not converged in a clear strategy and the uncoordinated efforts risks perpetuating long-standing problems. The case demonstrates the ways SFA can lead to fragmentation and (re)focus armed forces on presidential protection.

KEYWORDS:

• Security sector reform
• armed forces
• military
• ECOWAS
• ECOMIG
• development

Introduction

In January 2017, The Gambia saw its first-ever political transition by election when Adama Barrow was inaugurated as president. However, this was not a standard inauguration, rather it took place in neighbouring Senegal because the previous president, Yahya Jammeh, refused to accept the election results. It was only following extensive domestic and international pressure and ultimately a military intervention of 7000 troops led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that Jammeh finally stepped down (Williams 2017). Thus ended Jammeh’s twenty-two-year authoritarian rule and ushered in what Barrow has promised to be a new democratic era for the country.

Barrow inherited a state that was bankrupt, underdeveloped, and isolated from the West. He quickly reversed some of Jammeh’s most controversial policies and asked the international community to assist with building ‘The New Gambia’, which would adhere to international norms regarding human rights and civil liberties. The international community responded to Barrow’s call and has since pledged over a billion (US) dollars in support (Camara 2018). While the list of areas within The Gambia that need attention is expansive, Barrow has continually noted that the security sector is a top priority. This stated priority relates to the central role the forces played in the violent and repressive previous regime. Barrow’s National Development Plan (NDP) calls for a ‘robust security sector reform process’ … so that ‘our armed and uniformed services can play a meaningful and positive role in national development’ (Government of The Gambia, National Development Plan 2017, 4). The narrative around security for development remains rather abstract but nonetheless has attracted a wide range of new security donors to The Gambia. Some of the new security providers likely also have self-interests as improving socio-economic conditions and the capabilities of the security services is seen as a potential way to curb the high rate of migration from the country to Europe.¹ For this combination of reasons, the democratic transition of 2017 has led to a wider range of security partnerships than any other time in the country’s history.

This research explores the role of security force assistance (SFA) in the context of political transition through the case of The Gambia. There is a general consensus among the Gambian government, donors, and even the forces themselves that the state security agencies in The Gambia are not well-suited for the new democratic context. Yet, while efforts to reform or build capacities of the forces is often a technical process, the decisions behind how and when to do so are highly political (Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2018; Matisek and Reno 2019; Reno 2018). This article will highlight how Barrow has tried to encourage new security partnerships while also staving off donor pressure to enact significant security reforms.

At a conceptual level, the article differentiates between security sector reform (SSR) processes and security force assistance (SFA) programmes and demonstrates variations between the two in the case of The Gambia. While there is no single definition of SSR (Jackson 2018, 1), the often-cited Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) handbook on SSR explains that the process aims to assist countries to meet security and justice challenges in a ‘manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance’ (OECD 2005, 20). Especially in fragile states, it is often part of a wider state-building exercise supported by international donors following conflict or significant political transition (Jackson 2011). Yet, decades of SSR efforts across multiple countries have yielded mixed results. Among the various challenges to SSR programmes are that they are often overly ambitious, aiming to restructure complex institutions and ‘transform the mindsets, behaviour and security culture of the recipient country’ (Sedra 2018, 53). The international shift to counter-terrorism following 11 September 2001, has led to a downplaying of some of the more ‘liberal peace’ aspects of SSR and instead places more emphasis on traditional security issues. Scholars have argued that this ‘second generation’ SSR (Jackson 2018) risks ‘militarizing’ the process by prioritizing the training of military forces over issues of ‘good governance’ (Albrecht and Stepputat 2015; Abrahamsen 2016, 282; Sedra 2018, 55). This raises the concern that SFA programmes are often preferred over wider, long-term SSR efforts. SFA can be defined as a set of activities of an external actor equipping and training an armed unit with a stated aim to strengthen the recipients’ operational capacity and professionalism (Rolandsen, Dwyer, and Reno 2021). Both SSR and SFA aim to transform elements of a state’s security apparatus, but generally SSR also includes a more ‘whole of government’ approach (Albrecht and Stepputat 2015). This involves emphasis on the justice sector and attempts to improve the accountability and oversight of the security organisations by civilian authorities. SFA is typically more narrowly focused on the security sector and their capabilities and can occur within or without wider SSR efforts.

The line between these two forms of assistance aimed at armed forces can be blurry and overlapping. In countries that take part in both, preferably SFA programmes would feed into wider reform strategies. For instance, an SSR strategy would identify weaknesses in a state security force, and an international partner would provide training to the forces to meet those needs, which would then contribute to the broader reform agenda. Yet, this ideal sequencing is often not followed, and the process can be delinked due to a range of reasons, including political priorities and politics in and between donor countries. In the case of The Gambia the SSR process, which is envisioned to include restructuring, resizing, and systematic retraining, has been consistently delayed due to political sensitivities and an overall lack of political will at the highest levels in The Gambia. However, shorter-term and ad hoc SFA programmes have not been treated with the same level of concern and have grown, despite a lack of a wider strategy as to how they align with longer-term reform efforts. While it is not always possible to draw a definitive line between SSR and SFA, the latter will be examined as the ongoing, mostly short-term training to the security services by international partners. In contrast, SSR is understood as the process of restructuring the Gambian security forces to be an ‘apolitical, accountable, transparent and responsive sector in line with international best practices’ (Government of The Gambia, Security Sector Reform Strategy 2020, vi).

By tracing both the wider reform delays and the ongoing SFA programmes in The Gambia, the article argues that the security training programmes can be at odds with reform goals and undermine the process. The research shows that political and military leaders often view these two types of assistance in different ways. The latter half of the article will narrow the attention on the ongoing SFA programmes and demonstrates the perils of uncoordinated security assistance from a wide range of providers, which is especially problematic in a post-transition environment in which structures and processes are not yet in place to manage such engagements. A wide range of SFA providers with unclear entry points to the Gambian security forces has created tensions and divisions within an already fragmented security environment. It has also threatened the fragile political environment by furthering strains between the forces and elected civilian leadership. The complications that come with multiple providers and multiple entry points is a challenge that extends far beyond The Gambia and has become a significant but understudied feature of SFA programmes, especially in fragile states (Rolandsen, Dwyer, and Reno 2021; Seabra 2021).

At an empirical level, this study is the first available research to look in-depth at security partnerships in The Gambia post-political transition. It focuses on a critical period in The Gambia’s history as it is the first democratic transition, and leaders have promised a new start for the country. It is also one in which the armed forces are central to the democratic transition, yet what role they will play is still unclear. This research contributes to calls for the need to document and assess the place of international engagement in shaping the security sector in new democratic contexts (Croissant and Kuehn 2017, 7–8).

Methodology and article outline

The structure of this study provides a broad understanding of the security situation within The Gambia post-political transition and then focuses more specifically on various international engagements involving the forces. The article first details the fragile situation faced by The Gambia and President Barrow in order to highlight why reform of the security services is needed while at the same time feared by the president. The second half of the article will focus more specifically on international engagements within the security sector post-political transition. It will first examine the wider SSR process, which has been stalled, before turning to SFA efforts. The research includes a focus on both the Gambian National Police and the Gambian Armed Forces, with a heavier emphasis on the latter.

Research for this article involved a systematic review of the three main Gambian news sources (The Standard, The Point, and Forayaa) between December 2016 and October 2019. As news from The Gambia rarely makes international press coverage, the local media provided an important source for documenting issues related to the security forces, including activities related to security force assistance.

The research also involved over three dozen interviews with members of the police and army during two rounds of field research (February–March 2018 and November 2019). The interviewees ranged from the junior rank and file soldiers up to the most senior level of the hierarchy. The interviews focused on the military and police views of the security sector reform process, security force assistance, and general state of the services in the context of the political transition. Additional interviews were conducted with key domestic and international actors involved in the security sector of The Gambia. This included Members of Parliament who were part of the Standing Committee on Defense and Security due to their role in oversight of security-related matters in the country. It also included six interviews with individuals in key partner institutions working with the security forces in The Gambia, including several in diplomatic positions.

Finally, the research involved access to documents assessing the security forces, including the World Bank Public Expenditure Review, the SSR Assessment Report written by the Gambian Technical Working Group, the Gambian government’s SSR Strategy, and an independent review of the security reform project funded by the UN. These documents provided detailed information about the state of the security forces and also give insight into internal challenges facing security cooperation and reform efforts.

State fragility post-political transition

Political context

While the political transition of 2017 was ultimately seen as a victory for the power of democratic elections, the country remains in a fragile state since then. The Gambia’s economy relies on a limited number of sectors, including tourism, weather-dependent agriculture, and remittances, all of which are highly vulnerable to external factors (World Bank 2019). Jammeh’s departure from office only solidified the economic hardships when audits revealed that the former leader and his associates looted or misappropriated 975 million USD, including money from the state pension fund and foreign aid projects (Sharife and Anderson 2019). The level of theft of state funds is especially devastating given the state of underdevelopment in the country. The Gambia ranks in the bottom 15 countries worldwide in terms of human development according to the United Nations Human Development Index (2019). The difficult economic situation that the country was left in at the transition has made it reliant on foreign aid. This aid has come from a range of donors and in a variety of forms but some of the most significant in the everyday operation of the Gambian state has come from the European Union (EU). Between 2017 and 2019, the EU transferred 77 million euro in budgetary support to the government of The Gambia (Jeffang 2019). As will be elaborated, the EU has also been the most outspoken donor with regards to the need for reform of the security sector.

In addition to economic fragility, there are also factors more specific to the political transition which have threatened the stability of The Gambia. Jammeh’s rule, which was marred with brutality and secrecy, left many with unanswered questions about the fate of their loved ones. The National Assembly established a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) to document abuses under the past regime, which heard 392 witness testimonies between January 2019 and May 2021 (Darboe 2021). The vast majority of the testimonies were focused on abuses by the state security forces. A lack of trials in The Gambia for abuses related to the Jammeh-era have led many to question the role of the justice system and raise concerns that the accused perpetrators could continue to pose a security threat (Darboe 2019). A general sense of frustration with the state of affairs in The Gambia can be seen in the growing number of street protests. Several of these have been violently repressed by the police, only furthering calls for security reform (Dwyer 2021). Additionally, a perception of growing violent crime has left many feeling anxious about issues of security and safety in the country (Jaw 2019).

A final significant factor that contributes to the fragility in The Gambia is Barrow’s weakened domestic support. Barrow accomplished a historic feat in the 2016 elections, but his victory was narrow, with 43.3 per cent of the vote compared to Jammeh’s 39.3 per cent (Hultin et al. 2017, 328). Additionally, he has never had a significant political following. During the election period, the fragmented opposition decided to unite to increase their odds of ousting Jammeh. Barrow was selected to lead the coalition in part because he was not a party leader and therefore seen as a more neutral choice across the various opposition parties. Early in Barrow’s term, the coalition that helped bring him to power fractured, with some former coalition members openly speaking out against Barrow. Within a few years in office, he was already on his third vice president, signalling the turbulence within his administration. Tensions around Barrow’s presidency intensified at the three-year anniversary of his election when a movement formed calling for him to relinquish his position based on an informal coalition agreement that he would only serve a three-year term. This movement called the ‘Three Year Jotna’ (meaning Three Years is Up in Wolof), organized some of the largest protests the country has seen and demanded Barrow step down (Dwyer and Ceesay 2019). Barrow not only refused but formed his own party and has stated his intention to run in the next election, scheduled for December 2021.

Security sector context

Before addressing issues of reform and assistance to the armed forces, it is important to understand the state of the armed forces at the time of transition. President Jammeh came into power through a coup in 1994, and during his 22 years in office, he devoted significant attention and resources to the armed forces. During his rule, the security services expanded by nine times the size as when he first came to power. This expansion was not in response to external threats but rather was designed for regime protection. Yet, Jammeh was also wary of the forces and feared they could imitate his own previous actions and oust him in a coup. In response, he created parallel structures, informal units, and blurred chains of command, which would warn of disloyalty or plots within the ranks. This led to a highly fragmented force, which was often suspicious and in competition with other elements of the organization (Dwyer 2017). In addition to focusing on threats from within the forces, the security services also violently abused civilians deemed to be a threat to Jammeh. These widespread human rights violations were increasingly recognized internationally, and in response, donors such as the EU suspended aid during Jammeh’s rule (Hussain 2014).

When Barrow came to office, he inherited a military that was developed around loyalty to Jammeh and served primarily for regime protection – against opposition, which Barrow was part of. Barrow requested The World Bank to conduct a Public Expenditure Review (PER) of the armed forces, which was completed in 2018. It revealed that the security services were much larger than most anticipated, with a total of 18,752 personnel, which accounts for nearly half of all public servants on the government payroll. This is roughly broken down evenly between the military, police, and special services (intelligence, prison employees, immigrations services, etc.). The spending on security as a percentage of national budget is considerably higher than in other West African states that also have low external threat levels (World Bank, The Gambia Public Expenditure Review, 2018). The World Bank and other donors such as the EU have consistently urged The Gambian government to downsize the forces to free up funds for other state services. Yet, so far the Barrow government has resisted, in large part due to the objections by the armed forces and fears of a dissatisfied security service, as elaborated on below.

In the context of limited domestic funding and an extensive list of shortfalls, international assistance is viewed as a vital way to meet the training needs of the security forces. Yet, it is unclear what purpose the security forces currently need to be fit for. This critique is also highlighted in the PER, which notes the ‘absence of coordinated strategic policies’ and a lack of a ‘national strategic vision or a security sector strategy’. As will be detailed below, the wide range of SFA projects is likely to exacerbate this issue.

Stalled security sector reform

While Borrow has publicly stated that reform of the security forces is a key priority, government rhetoric appears stronger than its actions. As detailed below, the beginning steps of a reform process have been initiated but so far very few changes have been enacted. In September 2017 a SSR assessment was launched with assistance and advisors from a large number of international partners, including the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and EU (Mutangadura 2020, 10). With funding from the UN an assessment of the security sector was carried out by a 27 member Technical Working Group (TWG) drawn from representatives of the security forces as well as members of government ministries and civil society organizations. Yet, this assessment was marred with problems including lack of office space, no remuneration for the members of the TWG, lack of cooperation from institutions, irregular attendance from members of the TWG, and lack of transportation to facilitate the community outreach (Government of The Gambia Security Sector Reform Assessment Report 2017). These issues suggest a lukewarm commitment to the process by the government.

While the SSR assessment was completed in 2017, it was not until April 2020 that The Gambian government developed an SSR Strategy. It follows classic SSR goals to ‘establish democratic, accountable and transparent security forces – characterized by good governance and rule of law’ (Wilén 2018, 65). The strategy, if enacted, will result in an extensive overhaul of the security sector. It lays out five strategic goals, which can be paraphrased as (1) addressing post-authoritarian legacies, (2) developing of a legal framework to enhance command and control of the security sector (3) developing civilian oversight bodies, (4) addressing challenges to vulnerable groups, and (5) specific reforms activities to security institutions (Mutangadura 2020, 11).² Within each of these strategic goals are dozens of proposed activities spread across various government institutions, including setting up multiple coordination committees and capacity building across all security services.

While a grand plan has now been laid out in the SSR Strategy document, there has been very little action toward reform of the security services since Barrow has been in office. This inertia has frustrated donors and some Gambian stakeholders, with many attributing the delay to a lack of political will from Barrow. For example, a National Assembly member who is part of the Standing Committee on Defense and Security argued that

there has been a lot of foot dragging in the SSR process, it has been years now, the World Bank and IMF have done their assessments, there is plenty of information available, it all shows that the current state is not sustainable, but still the political will is lacking.³

Here he is referring to the political will at the level of the executive and top security officers. International donors have also lamented the delay in reforming the security sector. The most outspoken in the donor community is the EU Ambassador who has publicly decried on multiple occasions the lack of ‘tangible changes’ in the security sector (Manneh 2019). While admitting reform can be a lengthy process, he says crucial time is being wasted because ‘the MOD and the MOI are eating the national budget … things like education and health are then far behind’.⁴ For donors, the security reform process is about more than the security sector; it is an opportunity to free up funding for other areas of development.

This lack of political will, which has been alleged by an UN-funded evaluation of the SSR process (UNDP Gambia Country Office 2020, 20), donors and Gambian stakeholders, is due to Barrow’s weakened position since coming to office as explained above. His own political standing is tenuous, and he is likely to be uneasy about beginning measures that have proven unpopular within the security services. The armed forces generally see SSR as synonymous with reducing the size of the armed forces. In an interview with the Chief of Defense Staff just mentioning the term ‘SSR’ led to a curt response of ‘I know you want to ask about the downsizing … or right-sizing … or whatever it is they are calling it now’.⁵ He went on the explain that he was not in favour of it and does not think it is necessary, a view that has been shared publicly by senior members of the security services and is supported by those farther down the chain of command. ⁶ While the issues the SSR aims to address are extensive, downsizing has received the most attention, both within the armed forces themselves as well as in the media. Beyond concerns about resizing, others worry about how a restructuring could shift power dynamics out of their favour. Still others likely have concerns about ways in which the vetting of a reform process may reassess individual ranks or, worse, uncover links to abuses that could lead to trials. For many in the security services, especially those in senior positions, sticking with the status quo is a more desirable option than the uncertainty that would come with restructuring.

Despite international pressure to enact reforms, it appears Barrow views angering the armed forces as a higher risk than upsetting donors. He does not want to lose the support of the security services, especially its influential senior ranks when he is running for re-election in 2021. In addition to Barrow’s worry that a dissatisfied armed forces could hurt his chances in an election, he may also fear that a disgruntled military could lead a military intervention against him. The 1994 coup was triggered by a sense of anger in the ranks that the president was marginalizing them (Saine 1996). Jammeh also fended off several coup attempts, most notably in 1994, 2000, 2006, and 2014. In the first months of Barrow’s presidency, he also dealt with an alleged coup plot (Al Jazeera 2019. 28 May 2019).

Finally, some of the weaknesses in the security sector, as pointed out in the SSR assessment, may be of less immediate concern to Barrow because he has outside forces to conduct many of the day to day security aspects. The ‘hard approach’ that ECOWAS took through military intervention to enforce the 2016 election results (Moe and Geis 2020, 161) has extended beyond the initial crisis. As of early 2021, 1000 ECOWAS troops remain in country at the request of Barrow, under the mission titled ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia – ECOMIG (The Africa–EU Partnership).⁷ The primary tasks of the force include ‘patrolling services for the president and members of the government, as well as key locations such as the international airport and the waterway terminals’ (The Africa–EU Partnership). These are tasks that would traditionally be done by the Gambian armed forces. The ECOMIG presence allows Barrow to bypass his own security forces and receive protection from outside forces, paid for by foreign donors. Many view ECOMIG as representing the new government’s suspicion of the Gambian armed forces (Jaw 2019) and highlights the fragile state of affairs.

The political context is crucial in understanding why Barrow, despite donor and some domestic civilian pressure, has stalled on enacting any substantial reform measures. Barrow is focused on staying in power in an environment in which he faces growing opposition and a wide range of socio-economic challenges. He likely sees it as too politically risky to rock the boat with the armed forces. Furthermore, he is able to rely on foreign forces for many of the key security areas, including protection of the State House. While this arraignment is not a sustainable option, the fragile political environment places priority on short-term solutions over longer-term reform. As a result, four years after the transition the armed forces consist of largely the same size, structures and individuals that were in place under Jammeh.

Security force assistance to The Gambia

Assistance to ‘regular forces’ vs elite units

The Gambia government’s reluctance to instigate security reform is in sharp contrast to their approach to SFA programmes. As will be detailed below, Barrow has welcomed a wide range of SFA programmes from a variety of international actors, which are aimed at both capacity building and professional ‘norms transfers.’ At the political level, these programmes allow for the development of new international partnerships, a key part of Barrow’s wider strategy. Furthermore, Barrow and his security chiefs have used increased international engagement as a main selling point to the forces. In a series of ‘familiarization’ tours conducted by leaders in the services to meet with the troops after the political transition, they promised a wide range of new training schools, professional qualifications, degree programmes, and new infrastructure. In these speeches, they also noted that the new perks were dependent on international assistance (The Point, 2 August 2017b). Yet, as seen below, the chiefs oversold the potential outputs and the SFA programmes thus far have been much more modest.

The wide range of SFA partnerships seen in The Gambia post-political transition includes multilateral engagements (such as EU and ECOWAS), bilateral engagements (including but not limited to the UK, US, Italy, France, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Mauritania, and China) along with partnerships with NGOs. Most of the new security donors offer very short training programmes, usually lasting a few days up to a couple weeks. Some of the courses offered by foreign donors have focused on technical skills development. For example, the FBI provided a two-day course on exhumation while Spanish police have delivered a three-day course on lifting finger prints, Germany funded a two-week course on criminal intelligence analysis carried out by UNODC, and France provided a twelve-day course on crowd control (The Point, 9 May 2017a; The Standard, 24 October 2017a). Short courses specific to skills training for peace support operations have been provided to the Gambian military by Germany and the UK.

Other parts of the new training offered to the Gambian security forces do not primarily focus on capacity but rather on broader issues of professionalism. This type of assistance has generally come from Western partners with goals to help build an armed force that is aligned with international norms regarding human rights and ‘good governance’. These ‘transmission of norms’ courses differ from skills training in that they teach about broad concepts that extend beyond security forces (Watts et al. 2018). While funded largely by Western governments, the actual training sessions are often carried out by NGOs. A sample of such training includes a workshop on human rights law for the police carried out by the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, a two-day course on female genital mutilation delivered to members of the army by Action Aid International, and a three-day workshop for the police on freedom of expression carried out by the organization Article 19 (Foroyaa, 2 June 2017; The Standard, 9 February 2017b; Sey-Jawo 2018).

While the above examples of NGO engagement were donor-funded, Barrow’s attempts to open the security forces to new partners have also led to a strange mix of independent NGOs and even individuals offering to help the security forces. For example, the police have seen bulk donations by foreign NGOs and philanthropists of (used, non-uniform) shoes and mountain bikes meant for patrolling. The director of a development NGO that became involved in collecting and donating materials to the police explained that she felt this was in the organization’s realm of interest because ‘security is fundamental for development’ (The Point, 29 March 2017c).

These programmes have taken place before any SSR strategy was developed. One security advisor called them ‘a bunch of bits and pieces’ and a diplomatic source described the various efforts as ‘piecemeal’. While the norms transfer programmes in particular do not necessarily contradict the stated SSR goals, they do not amount to systematic or widespread retraining or reorientation of the forces. The problems of a lack of coordination and strategy for most of the SFA efforts will be discussed in more detail below. Yet, running parallel to the dispersed and short-term SFA programmes provided to the ‘regular’ armed forces is a more robust and focused effort to develop the capacity of select units.

The most significant training since the political transition has gone into the creation of a new Presidential Guards. While Barrow disbanded the State Guards, who had served to provide protection to Jammeh, he quickly recreated a similar unit, drawing from both the police and the army. The unit, which includes roughly 150 personnel, has received an initial three – to six-month training in ‘VIP protection’ from Senegal, with members of the unit sent on to advanced training in Mauritania, Turkey, Senegal, and Saudi Arabia (Panapress, 7 February 2018; Manneh 2019; Bojang 2020). Considerable attention has also gone into training of the intelligence services and the construction of a new centre for them. This effort is led by Saudi Arabia, but policymakers and other donors commented that this arrangement is particularly secretive.⁸

The heavy focus on select units closest to the president is remarkably similar to the approach Jammeh took to the security services. Additionally, most of these more substantial SFA partnerships are a continuation of relationships established under Jammeh. With the exception of Senegal, the countries training the Presidential Guards are not known for advocating human rights or democratic principles. While many of the new partner countries may be wary of providing substantial military training to troops with records of abuse, partners developed under Jammeh have demonstrated little concern for this.

Lack of coordination and fragmentation

The above is a sample of the broad range of security assistance taking place in The Gambia, the majority of which is new to the post-political transition period. It is not an exhaustive mapping of the SFA environment, as even government officials do not seem to be aware of all details. A key critique of the SFA programmes in The Gambia is that they are uncoordinated, both between providers as well as within the Gambian security sector.

The National Security Advisor confirmed the coordination challenges when he explained

some of the partners have different entry points, some can enter using NGOs, they can enter thru the police directly, some can do at the level of the ministry of justice, others will go to the national assembly and sit with them, discuss and start activity. (UNDP 2020, 19)

This wide range of entry points from SFA providers has led to tensions and competition between the various Gambian security actors. For example, some senior Gambian military leadership has felt left out of security partnership conversations, and there are claims that those in positions to coordinate SFA stand to personally benefit through the influence and personal connections they can build through such international partnerships. Several MPs on the Standing Committee on Defense and Security expressed frustration that these security agreements are decided with little legislative oversight and undermine attempts from the civilian legislators to add transparency to the security sector.⁹

The coordination problems extend to the donor community as well. While there are broader donor meetings, which include aspects of security assistance along with development assistance, only some countries/organizations send representatives. An SFA provider stated ‘we are not privy to the details of the government’s other [defense] agreements’, which he noted was somewhat understandable but made it difficult to know if efforts were being duplicated.¹⁰ These coordination issues are exacerbated by The Gambia hosting twelve different foreign security advisors, most from different countries and organizations, with views that are not necessarily aligned.¹¹

Despite donors acknowledging a lack of coordination and duplication of efforts, it has not deterred them from continuing to offer security assistance. This willingness of donors to overlook ineffective aspects of their programmes is not unique to The Gambia. Providing security force assistance is often viewed by donors as way to gain influence and shape security priorities (Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2018), and as such duplication of efforts is viewed as a side effect. In The Gambia, there is a range of donor interests that SFA can assist in prioritizing, such as the European Union’s interest in curbing illegal migration or the UK’s interest in supporting international peacekeeping deployments. Some donors also hinted at the desire to counter influence from other countries. For example, several Western donors commented on their unease with the lack of transparency around Chinese and Middle East assistance programmes.¹² Whereas Jammeh had shifted towards these non-Western partners (Hussain 2014) and blatantly showed his frustration with Western countries through actions such as leaving the Commonwealth (Hirsch 2013), some Western donors see the democratic transition as an opportunity to realign Gambian priorities with their own.

The wide range of security assistance programmes from multiple donors has not converged into a clear strategy. It has also introduced equipment that is not aligned with existing practices or needs, such as the case of donated mountain bikes for police patrolling. Similarly, following the training from Spanish police on finger print lifting and forensic science, the Chief Inspector thanked the contingent and noted that the Gambia police will put the skills to good use ‘if the necessary equipment is made available’. This suggests that the training provided was not supported by equipment used in the Gambian Police Force. This builds on a broader trends in which increasingly generic and technical SFA packages are often divorced from the reality of the recipient forces (Jowell 2018, 107).

That the forces are now attending training from NGOs or even that civilian organizations are interested in working with the security forces can be seen as a significant change. However, the rise in workshop style trainings, many held at beachside hotels, are unlikely to override decades of systemic abuses by the forces. As Knowles and Matisek (2019, 18) note in their analysis of international humanitarian law training as part of SFA, these norms transfers programmes often treat a history of human rights abuses by security forces as a simple lack of knowledge about the laws. Courses on international law or human rights are then viewed as a fix to the problem. Yet, these courses often do little to address the highly politicized nature of armed forces or to undo the normalization of violence under repressive regimes or in the context of widescale conflict. As Boutton (2018) observed, an influx of professionalization efforts is rarely an adequate replacement for fundamental restructuring. In the case of The Gambia, there is reason to be wary that short-term norms transfer programmes, which regularly only involve a few dozen participants for short sessions, could overtake required long-term reform efforts.

Introducing short-term training, provided by a wide range of donors without a wider strategy, threatens to further fragment the forces, which are already deeply divided. This is especially problematic in combination with more cohesive and intensive training provided to troops responsible for presidential security. This prioritizes regime security and directs the most substantial training to this goal. The development of elite units within a fragmented security structure that may not serve the population as a whole is a common pattern seen within SFA programmes in many other contexts as well (Watts 2015; Knowles and Matisek 2019, 15). It is also part of a trend in international support that falls short of direct interventions such as humanitarian aid and financial assistance, which often results in further stabilizing regimes (Turner and Kühn 2019, 241). In cases where SFA led to the consolidation of power in the forces closest to the president, it also alienated other factions of the armed forces who felt increasingly marginalized (Boutton 2018). While it may be too early to tell if this will be the case in The Gambia, favouring elite units with limited focus on building the competencies of the wider forces is far from the reform efforts publicly promised by Barrow. Rather it repeats many of the same divisive strategies used under the previous era.

Conclusion

This article’s focus on The Gambia post-2017 allows for insight into a period of significant SFA expansion following a political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The security forces have become a central focus of the transition due to their history of past abuses. Despite acknowledging the need for significant security sector reform, the Barrow government has shown little interest in enacting widespread restructuring, resizing, or retraining. Instead, political and military leaders alike have preferred ad-hoc and shorter-term SFA programmes. This preference is political and delinked from the wider security and development needs of the country. The aversion to SSR fits a broader pattern in which leaders are often reluctant to make changes to the security sector due to the substantial impact it can have on power dynamics (Jackson 2018, 3), including the risk of a military intervention. Aside from potential discontent in the armed forces, Barrow is also contending with weak economic conditions, increasing crime rates, growing street protests, and a rise in opposition parties, which combined leave him in a fragile position. As Barrow is trying to ensure his presidency beyond one term, there is little incentive to initiate long-term reforms, which are likely to anger the forces and further jeopardize his shorter-term goals. Despite some pressure from donors to move forward with security reform, they have not reduced support in other areas, such as aid, as a result of the delay in reform.

In contrast to his reluctance towards SSR, Barrow has welcomed a wide range of new security partnerships, as evidenced by the dozen foreign security advisors and a wide array of small-scale SFA programmes provided by states, international organizations, and NGOs. These have allowed Barrow to further develop his wider political strategy to (re)build international partnerships in contrast to the previous regime’s more isolationist leanings. Furthermore, the bulk of the SFA programmes are seen as nonthreatening as they are short-term and unlikely to significantly strengthen the capacities of the regular armed forces, who Barrow views with suspicion due to their close ties to the previous regime. Importantly, the wide range of donors offering assistance creates flexibility in the SFA efforts to allow Barrow to prioritize presidential protection and intelligence, areas he views as personally beneficial. The preference for SFA over widescale reform is also seen in senior Gambian security officers. Publicly and in interviews for this research they have framed SSR, and the downsizing aspect in particular, as a threat to the force. Meanwhile, they have (over)sold the potential advantages of international security partnerships to the Gambian forces, as statements at the familiarization tours indicate. Even if the grander narratives of what SFA could result in for the forces are aspirational, there have been some immediate advantages such as new uniforms for some and technical skills training for others. The ad-hoc nature of many SFA programmes also means that seniors officers who facilitate the partnerships stand to develop personal relations with foreign military personnel and build prestige within their profession by leading such efforts (Wilén 2021).

Despite some shorter-term advantages in SFA programmes, there is a need to consider the unforeseen consequences in the longer term. In The Gambia, there is a threat that SFA will further many of the problems that are inherent in the armed forces. Ex-president Jammeh’s attempts to coup-proof the armed forces involved the creation of parallel structures, informal units, and blurred chains of command. As a result, the forces are highly fragmented. Some of the broader restructuring ideas in the SSR plan aim to address these through creating coordination structures and developing more clear chains of command, but as noted, these reform ideas have not been enacted. Meanwhile, introducing numerous uncoordinated SFA programmes, with different entry points and an unclear overarching strategy threatens to further the divisions and inequalities between units. The Gambia, still in the early phases of developing new SFA programmes, could learn from other cases in Africa which have welcomed multiple, poorly coordinated SFA programmes. In cases such as Mali and Somalia, further fragmentation of the security sector and the inability to operate as a cohesive force has been an unintended consequence of these programmes, which has severe consequences in their attempt to counter ongoing insurgencies (Marsh and Rolandsen 2021). In The Gambia the priority on developing units closest to the president alongside the wider uncoordinated efforts will make it difficult to create the uniform, cohesive, and apolitical force that has been imagined in the new democratic context. Rather, the short-term SFA programmes threaten to further the very divides that the wider reform plans aim to fix.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Jessica Piombo, the three anonymous peer reviewers, and the journal editor for their constructive and detailed feedback on this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Research funding for this article was supported by Research Council of Norway under the grant ‘The Impact of Security Force Assistance on State Fragility, Project No.: 274645’.

Notes on contributors

Maggie Dwyer

Maggie Dwyer is a lecturer in African Studies and International Development in the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, UK and a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Her research focuses on armed forces, politics, security, and development, primarily in West Africa.

Notes

1 Author interviews with members of the diplomatic community in The Gambia, November 2019.

2 Changes to the command and control of the armed forces has been assessed by legal advisors to be unconstitutional under the 1997 Constitution, thus requiring the development of legal framework.

3 Author interview with MP in The Gambia, 16 November 2019.

4 Author interview with Ambassador Lajos in The Gambia, 25 November 2019.

5 Author interview, General Drammeh in The Gambia, 13 November 2019 (at the time Drammeh was the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff, he has since been promoted to Chief of Defense Staff).

6 Common view across 17 interviews by the author with military and police personnel in The Gambia, between 13 and 21 November 2019.

7 According to the mission webpage, viewed in August 2021, the contingent included 750 troops from Senegal, 200 from Nigeria, and 50 from Ghana.

8 Author interviews with donors and Gambia security stakeholders, November 2019.

9 Author interviews in The Gambia, November 2019.

10 Author interview with donor representative in The Gambia, 14 November 2019.

11 The issue of too many advisors was brought up in multiple interviews conducted by the author. It is also highlighted in the UNDP evaluation.

12 Author interviews with donor representatives in The Gambia, November 2019.