Pragmatic Peacekeeping in a Multipolar Era: Liberal Norms, Practices, and the Future of UN Peace Operations

ABSTRACT

As UN peacekeeping continues to move through a period of change and rupture, we conceptualise this turn as ‘pragmatic’ and take interest in its normative dimensions. In this introduction to a Special Issue, we take stock of scholarship on this pragmatic turn, arguing that it can be enriched through deeper engagement with theories of norms and practices, drawing especially on pragmatist approaches in the field of International Relations. We also argue that, while pragmatic peacekeeping may be less ideologically ambitious than earlier iterations of the practice, it still has a strong normative dimension.

KEYWORDS:

• Peacekeeping
• united nations
• multipolarity
• liberal internationalism
• norms
• pragmatism

Introduction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is – yet again – experiencing a period of dramatic change. While peacekeeping has never been static, either conceptually or in practice, moments of rupture and transformation have been interspersed with periods of relative continuity. Peacekeeping has gone through many phases before, from its more modest origins in the 1956 Suez Crisis, to the inter-positional approach favoured during the Cold War, to the post-Cold War expansion of the 1990s. More recently, it has been shaped by adaptations to the post-9/11 security landscape and a global focus on violent extremism and counter-terrorism (Williams and Bellamy 2021; Osland and Peter 2021; Karlsrud 2018). Peacekeeping has also experienced periods of crisis, and some argue that we are again in one of those periods (Autesserre 2019; Kenkel and Foley 2021; Osland and Peter 2021).

The current changes have already garnered significant scholarly attention. They have fuelled debates about the future of UN peacekeeping, both over the short term and over the long term. Geopolitical drivers of change are central to these debates, with many experts arguing that shifting power dynamics and the advent of a multipolar world order have profound financial, political, ideological, and operational implications for UN peacekeeping (Paris 2014; de Coning 2021; Kenkel and Foley 2021; Hellmüller 2022; see also Paris 2023; Karlsrud 2023).

The alterations wrought by geopolitical change are not hypothetical, nor are they surprising. Peacekeeping is always ‘a product of its time’, susceptible to shifting global power configurations (Andersen 2018, 1). At present, UN peace operations are ‘challenged both from within – by diminished western support – and from without, by increased contestation from non-western actors’ (Coleman and Job 2021, 1451). A period of relative consensus has given way to heated disagreements about the form and purpose of UN peace operations (Gowan 2020; Laurence 2019). In this Special Issue, we take stock of geopolitical challenges and we analyse their implications for the normative underpinnings of UN peacekeeping. We do this by leveraging insights from International Relations (IR) theory and conceptualising peacekeeping as an evolving practice that, like most international practices, can simultaneously embody, reinforce, and transform a variety of global governance norms. We expect the analysis will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike, especially those interested in links between normative and practical considerations in international politics. Our contributors offer a host of novel insights about the concrete, operational dimensions of UN peace operations, while also reflecting on the interplay between political trends at the macro level and the day-to-day practice of peacekeeping.

However, before analysing normative change and rupture, it is important to discuss elements of continuity. Peacekeeping has been historically embedded in liberalism, and liberal internationalism more specifically. Even more, it has always been a political tool of the UN. Peacekeeping was originally aimed at preventing imperial power conflict in the Suez Canal, and it quickly became one of the UN’s flagship activities. In the decade following the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, six more missions were deployed to Lebanon, the Congo, West Papua, Yemen, Cyprus, and the India-Pakistan border (von Billerbeck 2016, 163). Some became long-term missions lasting decades while others were short-term responses to acute crises. Yet they all served as an implicitly liberal symbol of what could be achieved through global institutions and international cooperation. Peacekeeping’s liberal ideological orientation became more explicit as it grew into the liberal consensus of the post-Cold War era. In this period, UN peacekeeping became more globalised and even more ‘aligned with liberal democratic norms and principles, asserting an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security’ (Coleman and Job 2021, 1453). Peacekeeping is also a well-established tool in the broader project of liberal international world-making, linked to ideas of state-building and so-called ‘failed’ states. These elements of continuity now co-exist alongside striking changes in peacekeeping practice.

We build on recent work by conceptualising the changes examined in this Special Issue as a turn toward ‘pragmatic’ peacekeeping (Peter 2019, 9). Pragmatic peacekeeping refers to ‘lowest common denominator’ policies and a more limited peacekeeping agenda that prioritises conflict containment as opposed to resolution (Osland and Peter 2021, 10). Borne of heightened geopolitical tensions, pragmatic peacekeeping reflects the fact that normative consensus is harder to come by than it was in the late 1990s or 2000s: it is less intrusive and more likely to involve ‘trimmed down’ mandates that emphasise protection, politics, and stability (de Coning 2019, 312; Peter 2019, 19). While it is less ideologically ambitious (i.e. less focused on promoting liberal democratic norms), it still has normative dimensions in which we take particular interest.

To date, pragmatic peacekeeping includes three sub-trends. The first is a scaling down of operations. The UN has not created a new peace operation since 2014 (Coleman and Williams 2021, 242) and missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, and Darfur (replaced with a smaller mission) have recently been closed. The scaling down of operations has also been more obvious on the civilian and bureaucratic side, rather than the uniformed side (Coleman 2020, 705, 706). In addition, the total budget for UN peacekeeping is down from $8.5 to $6.6 billion, a cut of 23% since 2015 (see Karlsrud 2023). The second component of pragmatic peacekeeping is bureaucratic reform and the integration of different categories of ‘peace’ operations, combining different types of activities – including peace enforcement, protection of civilians, stabilisation, collaboration with other military forces and counter-terrorism efforts – under one conceptual umbrella. This collapsing of categories has also seen increased overlap with institution-building and state-building efforts, making it hard to discern where the practice of peacekeeping begins and ends, especially given the ‘confusing and confused’ terminology that is often used to describe multilateral intervention (Peter 2019, 9). Third, disagreement on the nature, role, and form of peacekeeping missions has increased between member states, especially ‘great powers,’ in the context of domination by the P3 (France, the UK, and the USA) in the Security Council (Coleman and Job 2021, 1453). This is a form of norm contestation. Some member states, along with the Secretariat staff, have responded to the perceived militarisation of peace operations by emphasising the ‘primacy of politics,’ stressing the limits of UN peacekeeping, and arguing that peacekeeping will not always be the ‘right tool’ for managing violent conflicts (High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations 2015; Andersen 2018, 14). As a consequence of this contestation, we see differing interpretations of peacekeeping mandates as member states look to operationalise the main guiding principles of peacekeeping – consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate – in different ways (Paddon Rhoads 2016; Laurence 2019; Karlsrud 2023; Principles of Peackeeping – United Nations Peacekeeping). Despite these three shifts, liberalism remains dominant as an underlying ideology, adapting to the circumstances much as it has in earlier phases of UN peacekeeping.

The turn towards pragmatic peacekeeping, and the uncertainty and tensions that defines it, carries two tensions from which our argument develops. The first tension juxtaposes the continuity of liberalism with clear signs of normative change and rupture. The second tension results from the expansion of peacekeeping’s conceptual umbrella (i.e. what ‘counts’ as a peace operation), combined with a scaling down of operations. It is both growing in concept but shrinking in footprint.

This Special Issue analyses these tensions by examining different aspects of pragmatic peacekeeping, paying particular attention to its normative dimensions. In this introduction, we focus less on how tensions may be resolved in practice, and more on how scholarly analysis should shift in light of them. We argue, first of all, that scholarly analysis of pragmatic peacekeeping can be enriched through deeper engagement with theories of norm and practice change, especially pragmatist approaches in the field of IR. We also argue that studying the shift towards ‘lowest common denominator’ peacekeeping can improve our understanding of broader trends in global security governance. In other words, pragmatic peacekeeping is currently a ‘hot topic’ among those who study UN peace operations, but it should also be of interest to anyone studying the multipolarity, the rise of a post-liberal world order, and their implications for international organisations. In making this argument, we argue for the importance of continuing analysis of the pragmatic turn in peacekeeping and we discuss the possibilities it presents for rethinking concepts, engaging different types of analysis, and critiquing peacekeeping institutions.

With this introduction, we contribute to conversations about the future of UN peacekeeping, both conceptually and operationally. We begin by reviewing the concept of pragmatic peacekeeping in depth and some of the scholarly literature that maps its origins. We then present three questions that emerge out of our assessment of existing tensions in peacekeeping and the direction that pragmatic peacekeeping appears to be taking:

1. What does it mean to be normative in the context of UN peacekeeping?

2. What does the waning of liberal internationalism mean for UN peacekeeping?

3. What norms underpin the turn to pragmatic peacekeeping, and what impact do they have on peacekeeping practice?

These three questions frame the Special Issue as a whole and our contributors reflect on them in a variety of ways. In the final part of the introduction, we look to IR theory to discuss the relationship between pragmatic peacekeeping and theories of norm and practice change in global governance.

The contributors to this Special Issue build on the high-level discussions of the introduction, looking to different aspects of pragmatic peacekeeping and providing key examples of the conceptual rethinking we propose in this introduction. Roland Paris (2023) provides a historical view, arguing that peacekeeping is a form of Collective Conflict Management – a practice that evolves alongside shared international beliefs about what constitutes a security threat and what constitutes a normatively appropriate response to such threats. John Karlsrud (2023) analyses the ‘end of the liberal moment in peacekeeping,’ arguing that it will put pressure on traditional peacekeeping norms and may drive the normalisation of a new type of peace operation: UN Support Missions, which provide bureaucratic and logistical support for regional counter-terrorism operations. Tom Buitelaar (2023) examines the promotion of human rights norms in UN missions, a quintessentially liberal aspect of peacekeeping practice. He analyses the impact of mission leaders’ individual characteristics on how those norms get interpreted, demonstrating their agency and discretion in the face of structural pressures – a finding that highlights the complexities of norm implementation in International Organisations (IOs) and the pitfalls of assuming a straightforward relationship between geopolitical change and changes in peacekeeping practice. Cassin and Zyla (2023) similarly examine the possibilities attached to post-liberal peace operations. Their focus is on implications for members states – especially changes to state bureaucracies, training programmes and public framing of participation in UN peacekeeping operations – that are required for states to meet the post-liberal moment in UN peacekeeping. Finally, Zahar and Deschamps-Laporte (2023) examine problems that have arisen from moves towards the inclusion of gender considerations in peacekeeping. While an illiberal anti-gender backlash does exist globally, they argue that middle powers such as Canada – long stalwart advocates of liberal internationalism – have actually done a great deal to inadvertently hinder progress on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda (Resolution 1325). What each of these articles demonstrates is the diversity of changes in peacekeeping, from the macro- to the micro-level that require a pragmatic analysis.

What is pragmatic peacekeeping?

We understand pragmatic peacekeeping as a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach in specific policy areas. While this is a micro-level view, we can also ‘zoom out’ to facilitate an understanding of trends in contemporary peacekeeping. Both the narrow and the wide lens allow us to understand how scholarly analysis of peacekeeping is already changing and how it continually adapts to the empirical reality of peacekeeping operations. Pragmatism is an umbrella that brings together many views – theoretical, empirical, political – of contemporary peacekeeping (Chandler 2017, 21-42; Moe and Stepputat 2018). Moreover, we label this umbrella as a ‘turn’ in scholarship. It is possible to use the theoretical, empirical, and political ideas under this umbrella to better make sense of the trends seen in contemporary peacekeeping. In this section we first discuss existing literature and critiques across empirical, political, and theoretical categories, before returning to a discussion of key tensions within the turn to pragmatic peacekeeping.

Many of the ideas of the pragmatic turn emerged following disillusionment around peacekeeping operations, especially critiques targeting the liberal aspects of peacekeeping. The pragmatic turn thus includes the critique that ‘the key to successful post-conflict transition lies in local – non-western, non-universalist – epistemologies’ (Finkenbusch 2016, 247). Indeed, scholars have pointed out that one of the several reasons peacekeeping operations struggle is the neglect of the local context and the neglect of the views of those ‘receiving’ interventions.

Empirically and politically, pragmatic peacekeeping allows us to think about what is possible in the future of peacekeeping, especially in a post-liberal order. Cedric de Coning (2021) argues that in a new multipolar order, peacekeeping will need to adapt in ways that stay true to its core principles and will do so after a period of contraction and moderation. Osland and Peter (2021) argue that liberal peacebuilding and stabilisation approaches should be ‘cast aside’ and transformed into bottom-up peace work. This is connected to the idea that the expansion of and blurring of peacekeeping into broader categories of peacebuilding is a top-down approach that comes from larger structures of liberal international order. Moe and Stepputat (2018, 295) employ the pragmatic turn in peacekeeping as a shortcut to designate four broad moves in studies of peacekeeping, noting that the future of peacekeeping is linked to ‘the “local turn” in peacebuilding, the related rise of complexity, hybridity and resilience thinking, as well as in the (re)turn to prevention, stabilisation and pacification approaches’ (Moe and Stepputat 2018, 293; see also Cassin and Zyla 2023).

The pragmatic turn hinges on questions about the future of UN peace operations and whether there is such a thing as post-liberal peacekeeping. While some see the turn as ‘contested and confused’ (Andersen 2018, 343), a core feature of pragmatic peacekeeping analysis seems to be attention to the practices and norms of peacekeeping while being cognizant of the changes happening both globally and at the micro level. Rather than focusing only on the abstract problems associated with liberal approaches, the pragmatic turn foregrounds workability under conditions of normative disagreement. It highlights what the UN can practically do while taking into account key critiques of liberal peacebuilding. In this vein, Stepputat (2018, 405) suggests that ‘pragmatic peace looks for what is possible in the shorter term and takes a step back from the high ambitions of the liberal peace.’ For Chandler (2017, 26), the pragmatic critique of peacebuilding targets the projection of western liberal ideals in contexts unsuited for such ideals.

Further, the pragmatic turn in the peacekeeping literature has developed useful links with the longer-running trends in philosophical pragmatism and its links to International Relations (Bargués 2020, 241). As such, it is useful to draw from some of this philosophical and theoretical pragmatism in discussions of post-liberal pragmatic peacekeeping. Building on pragmatist thinkers in philosophy, Bargués (2020, 241) advances that pragmatism, as a school of thought, ‘draws on a continued process of inquiry: a process that relies on previous experience, but copes creatively with new problems as they emerge; a process that accounts for continuity and change at the same time’. He shows that pragmatic approaches in the context of peacekeeping are concerned with the practices of peacebuilders. In doing so ‘pragmatist approaches account for social reality without either resorting to absolute foundations as positivist theories do or falling into the relativist “anything goes” approach of some post-positive thinkers’ (Bargués 2020, 241). Their writings are concerned with the local, the complex context, and what peacekeepers are doing in practice. This is highly complementary to both the ‘practice turn’ in IR (and in peacekeeping scholarship, specifically) as well as normative theories in IR, something that we discuss in the third section of this paper.

Many scholars of pragmatic peacekeeping do not necessarily label their approaches as philosophically pragmatist, but they usually ‘share a concern with the specificity of context, complexity and provisionality that resonates with tenets of philosophical pragmatism’ (Stepputat 2018, 405). For example, De Coning (2021, 213) builds on complexity theory to develop a ‘principled adaptive approach’ to peacebuilding as part of the pragmatic turn. His adaptive peacebuilding can account for continuity and change at the same time and bears a resemblance to pragmatism as a school of thought. For de Coning, adaptive peacebuilding will enable UN missions to ‘adapt and transform to the realities of the moment whilst remaining resilient and staying true to [their] core form and identity’ (De Coning 2021, 213). In Osland and Peter’s (2021) definition of pragmatic peacekeeping, they build on current critiques of peacekeeping to argue that peacekeeping operations should now focus on the rule of law and should be structured from the bottom-up. This suggests a focus both on a normative dimension and a localisation of peacekeeping. Finkenbusch (2016) similarly responds to several critiques of liberal peacebuilding by pushing for a focus on local settings and epistemologies that impact peacekeepers capacity to ignite change at specific times and places (see also Bargués 2020). While these are not necessarily suggestions that we make, nor do the other contributors, they highlight links between pragmatic peacekeeping, pragmatism as a philosophy, and different practices and norms within a post-liberal peacekeeping agenda. This focus on peacekeeping practices in different contexts is captured strongly by John Karlsrud (2023) and Tom Buitelaar (2023) in their respective contributions to this issue.

The pragmatic turn is influenced by the rise of a multipolar world order and that order’s effects on twenty-first century individual peacekeeping missions. Some argue that multipolarity’s impact on peacekeeping can be understood as shaping the move toward pragmatism – toward peace operations that are less ideologically ambitious and less intrusive (Osland and Peter 2021; de Coning 2019). As with previous phases and changes in peacekeeping, scholars see links between the form and function of UN operations and wider geopolitical trends. In the current multipolar order, the pragmatic turn has two notable characteristics.

The first is a scaling down, both physically and financially, of peace operations. For instance, MONUSCO, the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is scaling down and planning an exit strategy; UNAMID, the mission in Darfur, has closed and the UN has established a Special Political Mission (UNITAMS) with a lighter footprint and civilian personnel. Several other peacekeeping missions have phased out and transitioned to a lighter footprint as well (eg. Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia). Moreover, the UN has not established a new multidimensional peace operation since 2014 (Coleman and Williams 2021, 242). Further, ‘between 2015 and 2021, no large UN missions were created and several major ones were shuttered, resulting in a decline of no more than 20% in both the total number of deployed personnel and the combined budget for peacekeeping’ (see Paris 2023, 3). Coleman (2020, 705) also notes that the scaling down of operations affects different sectors of peacekeeping operations differently because ‘civilian posts have declined more steeply and for longer than mission budgets or uniformed personnel deployments’. This should be taken into account when analysing peacekeeping amid complex conflicts because it creates ‘challenges for efficient mandate implementation in many contemporary UN peace operations’ (Coleman 2020, 706). It is interesting to consider this observation in the context of Buitelaar’s (2023) contribution to this issue, as he argues that individual civilian leadership and the socialising of such leadership can explain significant variation in the bureaucracies and pathologies of UN peacekeeping.

Still, while the UN scales down operations, there is a growing participation of African states and regional organisations in peace operations. In the past couple of years, there has been a sequential deployment of African Union operations that have been transformed into UN missions, such as MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. This growing regional participation has led to more complementarity between the AU and the UN, what de Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud (2016, 1) call ‘a pattern of complex hybridity’ between both organisations (see also Duursma 2017; Kim and Sandler 2022). The AU also cooperated with the UN in the case of the hybrid AU–UN mission in Darfur (2007–2020), and even AMISOM in Somalia. As more regional organisations, especially the AU, participate in peacekeeping missions, it creates new points of inter-organisational friction and may further curtail the range of practices that are politically feasible in peace operations (see Wiuff Moe and Geis 2020).

In general, under the pragmatic turn, both theoretically and empirically, there is a move away from the expansive, ambitious liberalism of post-Cold War missions in favour of an approach that is narrower, more ideologically modest, and which welcomes leadership from African states and emerging powers. This helps to circumvent ideological disagreements and attract broader adhesion from member states (Osland and Peter 2021) whereas unabashedly liberal approaches have become less viable in a multipolar context. This supports the claim advanced by some scholars that peace operations will evolve, not die, as the global security landscape changes (Coleman and Williams 2021; De Coning 2021). For de Coning (2021, 215), in the medium term, ‘the most likely adaptation is a shift away from the large peacekeeping and stabilisation operations of the 2000s towards a variety of smaller more specialised peace operations’. In this issue, Cassin and Zyla (2023) along with Karlsrud (2023) suggest that as UN peacekeeping engages in reform through multipolar contestation, some traditional principles may be left behind.

The normative dimension

In many ways this is a significant shift. Still, liberal norms and values remain ‘baked in’ to many parts of the UN system, and path dependence exerts a strong pull. For instance, Security Council resolutions codifying the protection of civilians norm have given rise to a wide array of protection of civilians policies, guidance, training materials, and practices that are thoroughly embedded in the UN’s peacekeeping infrastructure (Bode and Karlsrud 2018, 5). Norms related to children and armed conflict and women, peace, and security (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 16; see also Zahar and Deschamps-Laporte 2023) are similarly embedded and unlikely to disappear overnight. These norms may be articulated and promoted using technocratic concepts, like training standards, administrative requirements, or ‘best practices’ that downplay their normative content and obscure the broader normative context in which they operate (Bernstein and van der Ven 2017, 2). However, they still embody shared beliefs about what constitutes appropriate behaviour for blue helmets (Katzenstein 1996, 5).

At the same time, rising powers like China are contesting some parts of the normative framework for UN peace operations. According to Abdenur (2019, 53-54), non-P5 states that have traditionally been excluded from decision making for UN peace operations are now pushing three distinct normative priorities. They are arguing that peacekeeping should only take place with the permission of – or in partnership with – the UN; they are focused on upholding the principle of respect for national sovereignty; and they are opposed to the ‘premature’ mobilisation of peacekeepers when conflict breaks out (Abdenur 2019, 53-55).

Despite the resilience to date of norms like protection of civilians, the normative trajectory of UN peace operations is uncertain. Core peacekeeping norms like impartiality are being interpreted, operationalised, and practiced in new ways, even while they remain ‘rhetorically powerful’ (Laurence 2019, 257; see also Karlsrud 2023).

The idea of a pragmatic, ‘lowest common denominator’ peacekeeping policy and practice is linked to normative contestation. Contestation is visible when it comes to mandates for UN peacekeeping operations, especially over questions about what types of activities to include, or how to justify controversial activities. Such contestation extends to emerging actors such as China and the African Union (AU), as Africa is the UN’s largest troop-contributing region (Coleman and Job 2021, 1456). African states and China aim to ‘further target the most liberal democratic aspects of peacekeeping and seek to replace western dominance with increased regional influence over UN peacekeeping decisions in Africa and greater Chinese influence in and beyond the Security Council’ (1451). China disputes the liberal model of peace operations, which it considers ‘overly focused on institution building, on liberal values such as freedom and democracy, and on the imposition of a particular notion of good governance through the attachment of political considerations before assistance is offered’ (Coleman and Job 2021, 1460). In fact, due to this liberal approach, China has traditionally objected to UN peace operations because it perceived them as interference in domestic affairs (ICG 2009) and it has seen ‘immediate democratic reforms, such as holding elections, as a “luxury” (Kuo 2020, 16)’. Although China is currently more involved in peacekeeping activities – for reasons such as the changing Chinese state identity (Yin He 2019), or the reputational gain as a responsible power (Fung 2019; Yin He 2007) – China has a distinctive approach to peacekeeping (Kuo 2020) and might not necessarily ‘directly challenge the existing liberal norm[s]’ (Kuo 2020, 15). Rather, China approaches its security involvement in Africa through a ‘developmental peace’ model (Zhao 2011) which focuses on ‘economic reconstruction and sees poverty and unemployment as the source of unrest’ (Kuo 2020, 16). This developmental peace approach could be complementary to the liberal model (Li Dongyan 2012). At the same time, China is also trying to move peacekeeping away from the liberal language of human rights (see Karlsrud 2023). Analysis should centre thse normative moves in peacekeeping going forward.

Reflecting on the pragmatic turn, the two tensions identified above are relevant in a discussion of the normative trajectory of peace operations. From a normative perspective, it is significant that there is the appearance of meaningful change while other features of peacekeeping – notably liberalism - remain constant. An example of this tension is the turn to stabilisation missions and ‘robust’ peacekeeping mandates which have been ‘unable to bring an end to the conflicts where they are deployed because the more successfully these operations stabilise, the less incentive ruling elites have for seeking a political settlement’ (De Coning 2021, 217; see also Russo 2021; Karlsrud 2019). These diminishing incentives for political settlement have been seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, which have both hosted stabilisation missions. Even the social cohesion activities in peacekeeping, when paired with stabilisation and focused on the local, have not really helped address the deep causes of conflict that could produce political change (Brown and Zahar 2015; Piccolino 2019).

In fact, when it comes to stabilisation mandates, ‘western states progressively de-emphasised liberal democratic peacebuilding in favour of more robust’ protection of civilian missions and stabilisation and counterterrorist operations’ (Coleman and Job 2021, 1454). De Heredia (2019, 624) advances that stabilisation and its militarised approach develop a relationship with colonialism and militarism because of the ‘the use of force; their racialisation of subjects; their aim to constitute, reform or bypass state authority, including economic reforms; and their aim to eliminate armed resistance’. While not necessarily liberal or democratic, stabilisation and the features De Heredia describes are still heavily rooted in liberalism. In tandem with western states, African actors have also been following the shift towards robust mandates and military-based approaches, though slightly differently. Abrahamsen (2018) has demonstrated that it is mostly development actors who are at the forefront of military-based approaches on the African continent and not military officers. This suggests that stabilisation and robust mandates are multidimensional and their effects on peace must be continually reassessed and the critiques of stabilisation are important. Giving more credit to stabilisation, De Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud (2016, 10) write that ‘the AU has used its peace operations to contain violent conflicts, to protect governments and their citizens against aggressors and to help stabilise the security situation in the affected countries. Simultaneously, the AU has used its special envoys and good-offices mechanisms to seek lasting political solutions’. Still, stabilisation often co-exists awkwardly with goals like the protection of civilians, even if UN and AU officials do not acknowledge the tensions between them. For example, in countries like Mali – another state that hosts a UN stabilisation mission – state security forces are frequent perpetrators of attacks on civilians (Di Razza 2018, 2). What remains for the UN is a challenge in balancing the desire for both change and stasis from competing actors in conflict.

The second tension is the expansion of a definitional umbrella of peacekeeping alongside a scaling down of operations. These ongoing tensions play out in several areas of peacekeeping operations, including the collapse of different categories of ‘peace’ operations and bureaucratic reform that combines different types of activities under a larger umbrella (i.e. the shifting of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2019 into the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs & Department of Peace Operations). This can also involve integrating different areas of policy or a combining of mandates, such as bringing together protection of civilians mandates and state-building mandates without matching those mandates with the necessary resources. In short, UN peacekeepers are being asked to juggle a wide range of normative priorities that may or may not fit together.

Finally, in thinking about the pragmatic turn and these tensions, it is important to highlight key decolonial critiques of the large umbrella of peacekeeping operations. They are also relevant to how scholars should conceptualise and critique theoretical interventions and research. For instance, Sabaratnam (2017) argues that even critiques of liberalism and peace operations are trapped in a ‘paradox of liberalism’, ‘in which intervention and its critics find themselves enclosed, with interventions themselves apparently softening their edges and filling the space through emphases on “local ownership”, “participatory governance”, multidimensional approaches to poverty reduction and political “partnership” with aid-recipient countries’ (2013, 270). In her view, the concept of liberal peace only makes sense when the philosophical frames of Eurocentrism – understood as Western distinctiveness – have already been accepted. In relation to our argument, even pragmatic peacekeeping, or that which strives to be less political, is always trapped in this same paradox of liberalism. Although this type of critique remains marginal to the main policy making circles, it deserves attention when thinking about the flaws of liberalism and whether peacekeeping could become ‘post-liberal’(i.e. Coleman and Job 2021). Indeed, the pragmatic turn’s focus on the practical and the normative together might open space to consider these critiques more fully. Future work could look at the extent to which ‘challenger’ states in the new multipolar order can harness these types of critiques or adapt them to their purposes.

Ultimately, this Special Issue contributes to debates about the future of UN peacekeeping, but also to wider conversations about multipolarity, the rise of a post-liberal world order, and their implications for global security governance. Our primary focus is on the normative trajectory of UN peace operations. Still, this trajectory cannot be understood without reference to cross-cutting changes in the global security landscape. Institutions like the UN – and the norms and practices that constitute peacekeeping – are resilient, but they are also malleable. Shifting geopolitical dynamics have political, financial and ideological effects on the practices of global security governance, including the practice of peacekeeping. For IR scholars, peacekeeping can serve as a useful case study, helping us trace those effects within a complex organisational setting. It can also help us understand points of disconnect and rupture between broad geopolitical trends and specific governance practices. In the next section we lay out a framework for doing so – for analysing the normative implications of multipolarity and the rise of pragmatic peacekeeping.

Guiding questions for the special issue

We have asked contributors to the Special Issue to address three core questions about geopolitical change, pragmatic peacekeeping, and the normative trajectory of UN peace operations. These questions are intended to focus discussion and facilitate dialogue among authors, but they also speak to broader debates about peacekeeping, global security governance, and debates in IR theory about the relationship between norms and practices.

What does it mean to be normative in UN peacekeeping?

We define norms as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Katzenstein 1996, 5; Jurkovich 2020). Like many others we distinguish regulative norms, which ‘order and constrain behaviour,’ from constitutive norms, which ‘create new actors, interests, or categories of action’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). The impact of both types of norms has long been visible in UN peace operations. Traditionally, for example, those charged with staffing UN missions were constrained by an expectation that blue helmets would come from countries that did not have a direct stake in the conflict. Peacekeepers came disproportionately from non-neighbouring countries in the Global South and so-called ‘middle powers’, which were perceived as more disinterested than superpowers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, or former colonial powers (Paddon Rhoads 2016, 31–32, 61). Constitutive norms also give UN peace operations a distinct character. Core principles like impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force are more than just regulative norms – they have a definitional quality insofar as they distinguish peacekeeping missions from other types of military deployments (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 174). In short, peacekeeping is both constituted and regulated by its own distinct set of norms.

Like the UN more broadly, peace operations can also be conceptualised as agents of normative transformation in their own right – as promoters of particular norms (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). After the end of the Cold War, the UN – and the blue helmets it deployed – became overt proponents of liberal norms and values, working to advance liberal democracy and market-based economic reforms in conflict-affected societies (Barnett 1997; Paris 2004; Paddon Rhoads 2016). This commitment to liberalism persists in contemporary missions. It is particularly obvious in these missions’ efforts to promote and uphold universal human rights. At the field level, this includes programmes aimed at protecting civilians from attack, advancing the rights of women and children, mentoring and improving accountability for host state security forces, and helping to organise elections, to name just a few examples (United Nations Department of Peace Operations n.d.). Taking a broader view, the UN’s peacekeeping bureaucracy also promotes liberal ideals by integrating human rights norms into training standards and educational materials for blue helmets; by carrying out human rights vetting for UN and non-UN troops; and through campaigns like the Secretary-General’s Human Rights Up Front initiative (United Nations 2015; Paddon Rhoads 2019, 284–286). In an era of pragmatic peacekeeping, these activities have become contentious with countries like China, which are working to scale back peacekeepers’ human right work (Coleman and Job 2021, 1460; see also Karlsrud 2023).

It is important to recognise, however, that UN peace operations always had a normative dimension, even before the UN’s turn toward liberal peacebuilding in the 1990s and early 2000s. Peacekeeping is a practice that embodies shared expectations about the UN’s role in global security governance, about the duties of host states and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs), and about which actions are appropriate for blue helmets on the ground. In a broad sense, the peaceful resolution of disputes among member states has always been a core part of peacekeeping’s raison d’être. Yet cold war missions were largely geared towards upholding norms related to state sovereignty, like non-interference in the domestic affairs of host states. These normative commitments persist, but they are sometimes in tension with overtly liberal goals like advancing human rights – a tension that helps explain disagreements about standards of appropriate behaviour for peacekeepers on the ground.

In short, peace operations are both constituted and regulated by norms, in addition to being normative agents in their own right. From an analytical perspective, this means that studying the normative trajectory of peacekeeping should encompass questions about the goals and values that animate the work of blue helmets, but also wider questions about the form and function of UN missions themselves. Both are susceptible to change over time and are likely to evolve alongside shifting geopolitical dynamics (Andersen 2018). Given that some practitioners take peacekeeping’s liberal orientation for granted – a tendency reinforced by the UN’s penchant for technocratic language – and that this orientation is increasingly contested, analysis of peacekeeping’s normative trajectory should include questions about the degree to which alternative ideologies are considered and the extent to which normative action is openly acknowledged as such. International Relations scholarship more broadly has also been susceptible to an unspoken liberal worldview. In order to develop a richer critique of key issues, including peacekeeping, a critique of liberalism itself is also necessary.

What does the waning of liberal internationalism mean for UN peacekeeping?

UN peace operations do not exist in a vacuum. They are shaped by broader trends in the prevailing Zeitgeist of global governance (Andersen 2018; Paris 2014). These trends include the global rise of populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and growing protectionism (Abrahamsen, Andersen, and Sending 2019). Many of the challenges facing UN peacekeeping are symptoms of a wider disenchantment – a disenchantment with multilateralism, liberal internationalism, and what is often referred to as the ‘liberal international order’ or the ‘rules-based international order’ (Ikenberry 2018; 2022–23 Departmental Plan - Global Affairs Canada 2022). Across the UN system – and in bodies such as the Security Council – states like China and Russia are challenging the liberal underpinnings of multilateral practices like peacekeeping.

This raises questions about the impact of those challenges on peace operations. While they may seem like ‘game changers’ – especially when they emanate from permanent members of the Security Council – global security governance is sufficiently complex that we should avoid snap judgments about Russian or Chinese influence on peacekeeping. Other research suggests that challenges to liberalism may not have the effects that Western observers expect. For example, normative change at the macro level may not give rise to immediate changes in peacekeeping practice (Glas and Laurence 2022). We also know that international organisations are prone to path dependence, making them harder to change, a pattern that has long been on display in UN peace operations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The UN’s peacekeeping bureaucracy is extensive and liberal norms are thoroughly entrenched within it. This means that scholars should be asking questions about whether, or to what degree, ‘liberal’ bureaucracy is resisting the pressure to make peacekeeping ‘less liberal’. When normative change does beget changes in practice, scholars should pose questions about the pace and process by which such change occurs.

What norms underpin pragmatic peacekeeping?

Disagreements about the form and purpose of contemporary peace operations spring in part from interest-based calculations among Security Council members, TCCs and PCCS, and other key stakeholders. Some states may press for the scaling-back of peace operations as a result of financial and budgetary concerns, while others push back against robust mandates because they believe assertive military action puts their personnel at risk (Boutellis 2017; Hunt 2017, 116–117). Yet disagreements about peace operations also hinge on divergent beliefs about the relative weight of different peacekeeping norms (e.g. the importance of protecting civilians vs. minimising the use of military force). Disagreements often turn on underlying assumptions – sometimes made explicit, but sometimes not – about what constitutes appropriate action for those who mandate, fund, staff, and carry out peace operations. Pragmatic peacekeeping may be less ideologically ambitious than earlier iterations of the practice, but it still has a strong normative dimension. A less intrusive approach to peacekeeping privileges the norm of non-interference over norms that might infringe on the sovereignty of host states. At the same time, so long as blue helmets are deployed to address the causes of intra-state conflict, not just conflicts between states, peace operations will embody some normative assumptions about which modes of social, political, and economic organisation are conducive to peace.

These assumptions are nested within cross-cutting sets of norms related to state sovereignty, human rights, and the UN’s role in global security governance. These broader normative structures, and the interplay between them, can be theorised in terms of norm ‘complexes’ (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zürn 2020) in which distinct, non-hierarchical, and partially overlapping sets of rules interact. The ambiguity that arises from competing norms tends to fuel contestation. In this respect, UN peacekeeping is an interesting case study that can shed light on related debates about threats to the rules-based international order and the normative trajectory of international organisations.

Acknowledging that peace operations always have a normative dimension – and that their normative assumptions are bound up with collective expectations about the UN’s approach to over-arching issues like state sovereignty and human rights – underlines the linkages between pragmatic peacekeeping and the wider field of global security governance. To analyse these linkages the scholars who study pragmatic peacekeeping should make a point of critically examining normative assumptions that often remain unarticulated. In doing so, the contributors to this special issue suggest further reflection on the normative dimensions of peacekeeping in a multipolar world in which liberal norms are contested. In their contributions to this Special Issue, the authors unpack many of these assumptions, explore points of conceptual overlap, and analyse their concrete implications for field personnel and for the form and function of UN missions.

Pragmatic peacekeeping, security governance, and international relations theory

In advancing the discussion on pragmatic peacekeeping, this Special Issue – and this introduction specifically – addresses several major themes including the future of liberalism, the future of peacekeeping as a practice, and the role of norms within peacekeeping. Practices, norms, and the broader future of liberalism are also central points of debate within International Relations today. We argue that given the major shifts and transitions in peacekeeping, there is much to be gained from deeper exchanges between peacekeeping scholarship, theories of norm contestation, and pragmatist approaches in the field of IR. In support of that, we argue that ‘pragmatic peacekeeping’ is a useful empirical entry point for addressing wider questions about norms, practices, liberalism, and international order, thereby contributing to knowledge and theoretical advancement in IR.

While scholarship on norms and the growth of practice theory in IR are often conceived as being in tension with each other (eg. Bueger and Gadinger 2014, 2015), they are most productively understood in complementary ways. Insights about practices, routines, and habits are valuable but limited if considered in a vacuum away from questions of how practices shape politics and norms. The reverse also holds true – questions of norms and the politicisation of international actors should not be considered separate from questions of what those actors do. Practices and norms are indeed distinct (Adler and Pouliot 2011), but there is value in considering them together and in conversation, as many have done recently (Bernstein and Laurence 2022; Glas and Laurence 2022). Some of this conversation has been taking place around questions of UN peacekeeping and other UN business and operations (eg. Bode and Karlsrud 2018; Laurence 2019). It is therefore important not just to consider norms and practices in terms of abstract theoretical conversations, but to view pragmatic peacekeeping and the pragmatic turn as empirical phenomena that can make these conversations richer. As such, we argue that analyses of change in peacekeeping should integrate insights from theories of both norms and practices, not just one or the other, for maximum theoretical leverage.

Disagreement between UN member states on the role, goals, and tactics of peacekeeping is a form of norm contestation. Similarly, calls for a scaled back, less ideologically ambitious approach to peacekeeping is a form of norm contestation. The impact of this contestation will depend on how the multipolar order evolves. Norms may become more entrenched, they may be reimagined, or they may gradually fade away. If one had to speculate building on current trends, it seems likely that sovereignty norms, like non-interference, will experience a period of renewal with more limited peacekeeping mandates being a likely result. A norm like the protection of civilians is unlikely to disappear, but it may be reimagined in ways that further emphasise host states’ role in providing protection. Meanwhile, quintessentially liberal norms, like those related to post-conflict democratisation, will probably carry less weight and figure less prominently in peacekeepers’ mandated tasks.

A strict causal line between changing norms and changing practices does not exist. In fact, drawing on pragmatist theory, some scholars argue that thinking in terms of norm contestation does not capture rapid changes in rules, values, institutions and practices (Pratt 2020, 59–60). Nevertheless, we believe it does capture the dynamic interplay between normative debates about peacekeeping and changes in practice. These changes will occur among member states and across bureaucratic, civilian, and military spaces of the UN. As scholars study these changes in the context of the pragmatic turn, we encourage questions such as: why do certain actors contest some peacekeeping norms and not others? How are peacekeeping norms contested in different UN bodies? How, or to what extent, do different types of states contest established peacekeeping norms? These types of questions should illuminate recent trends in peacekeeping while providing theoretical insights that are relevant for practice theory, theories of norm change and contestation, and larger debates about global security governance.

Philosophical pragmatism becomes relevant here, as it provides a space for IR theorists to draw on elements of practice theory and theories of norms, among others. A pragmatist view is helpful for thinking through the pragmatic turn in peacekeeping, since a pragmatist ontology sees actors as wrestling with ‘problem-situations’ and creatively reworking the practical, cultural, and normative world around them (Jackson and Nexon 2019). Practices are still foregrounded but power, processes, and norms are linked, providing another patch across the holes in the theoretical fabrics of both norm contestation and practice (Jackson and Nexon 2019; see also Pratt 2016). Pragmatism is one way of expanding the theoretical possibilities and shifting forms of analysis to keep up with the changing nature of UN peacekeeping.

Along with norm-based approaches and practice theory, historical approaches to understanding UN peacekeeping are useful. These historical views can either ‘zoom in’ on fine detail, providing a different temporal lens to examine practices, or as Dayal (2021) effectively demonstrates, one can zoom out and think about larger geopolitical and structural effects that come from the use of different peacekeeping tools. Paris (2023) takes this longer historical view as well, with an eye to how larger powers in a multipolar world do this. In addition, Carroll (2017), in his history of Lester B. Pearson and peacekeeping in the 1960s, views the historical trajectory of Pearson and peacekeeping at the time as ‘pragmatic’, using the term effectively in that context. Similarly, critical, decolonial approaches to IR are valuable for understanding political and ethical problems that arise out of current changes. A continued pragmatic turn should be a pluralist one that has room for each of these views – norm-driven, practice-driven, ontologically pragmatist, historical, and decolonial. This Special Issue does not fully realise all of these possibilities, but it lays a strong foundation for future research.

Conclusion

Pragmatic peacekeeping prioritises conflict containment as opposed to resolution, and it is less ideologically ambitious than other post-Cold War iterations of the practice (Peter 2019). Our goal with this Special Issue is to advance conversations within the pragmatic turn and provide new insights about the interplay between change and continuity in peace operations. We do this by focusing on two core tensions in UN peacekeeping: liberalism’s apparent decline as well as its ongoing influence, and the expansion of the definitional umbrella for peace operations alongside a sharp contraction in numbers of missions and personnel in the field. Making sense of these tensions requires a shift in scholarly analysis and a willingness to consider the dynamic relationship between peacekeeping norms and practice. As the UN continues its move toward ‘lowest common denominator’ peacekeeping, it raises questions about what norms will shape peacekeeping mandates and policy, and how they will interact with peacekeeping practice at the field level.

Larger questions also remain about the role of liberalism in UN peacekeeping and about liberal internationalism more generally. Liberalism, as a concept, is present both in the foundations of IR as a discipline and in the roots of international order, especially within IOs. Moreover, peacekeeping has historically been a quintessentially liberal activity – one that symbolised what could be achieved through global institutions and international cooperation.

In this respect, the Special Issue contributes to wider debates about multipolarity, the rise of a post-liberal world order, and their implications for global security governance. Authors in this issue look at what might come next as liberalism and peacekeeping shift together. For scholars studying global governance more generally, peacekeeping can serve as a useful case study. It helps us identify new patterns within a complex organisational setting and helps us understand the evolving relationship between broad geopolitical trends and specific governance practices. This type of analysis has the added value of demonstrating ‘proof of concept’ for an eclectic theoretical orientation that places norm-based approaches in conversation with practice theory (Glas and Laurence 2022; Bernstein and Laurence 2022).

Predicting the future is rarely straightforward. Still, scholars and practitioners agree that UN peacekeeping has entered a period of change, and potentially transformation. Multipolarity is reshaping the political and institutional environment in which peacekeeping mandates and policy are developed. While the result may be a more ‘scaled back’ version of peacekeeping, we have argued that the practice still has strong normative dimensions – it still rests on shared beliefs about what constitutes appropriate action for blue helmets and on assumptions about which modes of social, political, and economic organisation are conducive to peace. We have also argued that the normative dimensions of pragmatic peacekeeping merit further attention, and contributors to this Special Issue analyse their significance across a range of missions and policy areas. Their contributions should be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike, and we look forward to ongoing conversations about the future of UN peacekeeping and its place in an evolving global security landscape.

Acknowledgements

This Special Issue is based on a workshop, ‘Action for Peacekeeping? Middle Powers, Liberal Internationalism, and the Future of UN Peace Operations’ that was hosted virtually in May 2021 by the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa. We are grateful to all the workshop participants for the fruitful discussions that informed this introduction, and to our authors for their thoughtful contributions to the Special Issue. We would like to thank Dr. Rita Abrahamsen for her support throughout this project in her role as Director of CIPS, as well as the editors of JISB and the anonymous reviewers who provided valuable feedback during the publication process. We are also grateful to our research assistants Liam Richardson, Fernando Aguilar, Roya Shams, and Jiadi Wu.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Government of Canada through the Mobilising Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) programme under Targeted Engagement Grant number 19-2-21.

Notes on contributors

Caroline Dunton

Caroline Dunton has a PhD from the University of Ottawa and is a Research Associate at CIPS.

Marion Laurence

Marion Laurence is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. Her research examines norm and practice change in global security governance, with a primary focus on United Nations peace operations.

Gino Vlavonou

Gino Vlavonou has a PhD from the University of Ottawa. His research focuses on identity, discourses, armed conflict dynamics, and peacekeeping in Africa. His forthcoming book Belonging, Identity and Conflict in the Central African Republic will be published by the University of Wisconsin Press in the fall of 2023.