https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4996-4746
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ABSTRACT
Peacebuilding necessitates a re-evaluation of the Western/liberal, non-Western/illiberal dichotomy. After numerous failures in liberal peacebuilding and the lack of innovative intervention approaches, scholars sought potential alternatives in emerging powers’ involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. However, the debate often oversimplifies the issue, categorizing Western peacebuilding as inherently liberal and non-Western peacebuilding as illiberal. This dichotomic understanding is problematic and hinders progress in the analysis of the subject. We contend that peacebuilding has become institutionalized as a foreign policy tool driven by national interests, with similar strategies employed by different governmental actors irrespective of their stated objectives.
Acknowledgement:
We thank Emanuele Castelli and Fabrizio Coticchia for their comments on our first draft. We also thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 A/RES/47/120B, para 5.
2 The most quoted attempt made by the UN to provide a comprehensive definition of peacebuilding is a reflection of its hypertrophy, whereby ‘there is considerable overlap of goals and activities along the spectrum from conflict to peace […], various peacebuilding activities may take place in each phase of the spectrum’ (UN Citation2010, 6).
3 Quoted from Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16.
4 The word repertoire identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice (Tilly Citation1993, 26).
5 A notable exception is a number of individual case studies painting a more nuanced picture of non-Western peacebuilding. These studies, however, avoid generalizations, thus limiting the scope of their findings to the respective cases (Akpınar Citation2013; Abdenur and Call Citation2017; Cannon and Donelli Citation2022).
6 Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington Citation1968, 12).
7 Following a strategic review of the Mission in 2016, it was renamed EUCAP SOMALIA.
8 Security and Defence Strategy for the Mediterranean; Rome, 2022. Available at: https://www.difesa.it/Il_Ministro/Documents/Strategia%20Mediterraneo%202022.pdf.
9 Following the battle of Mogadishu in 1993, the multinational forces gradually withdrew, and the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) came to an end being one of the UN's most disastrous peace operations to date. Italian Armed Forces participated in the operation 'Restore Hope’ (Unified Task Force-UNITAF, 1992-1994), aimed at creating a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of the country.. See https://www.esercito.difesa.it/operazioni/operazioni_oltremare/Pagine/Somalia-UNOSOM-Ibis.aspx.
10 Italian Chamber of Deputies records, 14th Legislature (2001-2006). See: http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/022bis/001ter/pdf019.pdf
12 On 1 April, AMISOM has been replaced by the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).
14 Somalia is among the beneficiary countries. See Frontex, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-build/other-partners-and-projects/non-eu-countries/.
15 The New Deal is a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, development partners, and civil society to improve the current development policy and practice. See: https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/about-new-deal/.
16 Grand Bargain: Agenda for Humanity (Istanbul, 2016), is an agreement to reform the delivery of humanitarian aid. See: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain.
17 9th National Development Plan, 9.
18 In 2005 Ankara established the Year of Africa, an investment agenda to open up to sub-Saharan African countries (SSA).
19 The AKP government welcomes being labelled as an ‘emerging donor country’ because being ‘emerging’ means increasingly influential. Such discourse helps foster Turkey’s identity as a self-confident global actor domestically and internationally.
20 The concept has been placed at the centre of international agenda at the World Humanitarian Summit, held in Istanbul in 2016, and later reaffirmed by the 5th Istanbul Conference on Mediation in 2018.
21 Although the base is legally a military facility for the training of the Somali National Army, in practice it is a full-edged Turkish military outpost in the region (Sıradağ Citation2013).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Giulio Levorato
Giulio Levorato is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Sciences at the University of Genoa, Italy. He has been an adjunct Professor of Geopolitical Context at the Universidad Ean of Bogotá, Colombia. His research focuses on the impact of international bureaucracies in peacebuilding change, the role of rising powers in conflict management, and diplomacy from below.
Federico Donelli
Federico Donelli, Ph.D. is a tenure-track Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Trieste. His research areas include international politics and security studies of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on the foreign policy of various regional and extra-regional actors. He is currently working on the militarization of the Red Sea and the increasing global competition in sub-Saharan Africa. He is the author of several articles that have appeared in International Affairs, Third World Quarterly, Small Wars & Insurgencies. He is also the author of Turkey in Africa. Turkey's Strategic Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, published by Bloomsbury in 2021.