Television documentary film in Hong Kong: the case of Hong Kong's two terrestrial television broadcasters

Abstract

Hong Kong's two terrestrial broadcasters, Asia Television (ATV) and Television Broadcasts Ltd. (TVB), are uncharacteristic of other broadcasters in a number of respects, and this influences the documentary films that they produce. This unusual aspect is largely due to Hong Kong's almost unique situation as a Western non-democratic British colony in the East which went on under duress to become a component entity of an Eastern totalitarian communist State. Though this colonial and post-colonial totalitarian context rarely affected documentary film-makers at ATV and TVB in a blatant manner, and broadcasting staff within the organisations also resisted political encroachment when it arrived, that context nevertheless ensured that restrictions were placed upon the ability of the film-makers to produce critical, impactful films. This article will first explore how these two broadcasters can be associated with models of relations between the media and the state. The relationship to mainland China will then be referred to. Following this, an outline of the television documentary films of these broadcasters will be given, before a more in-depth account of particular films is provided. The article will conclude via reference to Habermas’ notion of the public sphere, and by offering proposals for change and improvement to this broadcasting output.

Introduction

Hong Kong's two terrestrial broadcasters, Asia Television (ATV) and Television Broadcasts Ltd. (TVB), are uncharacteristic of other broadcasters in a number of respects and this influences the documentary films that they produce. This unusual aspect is largely due to Hong Kong's almost unique situation as a Western non-democratic British colony in the East which went on under duress to become a component entity of an Eastern totalitarian communist State. The shift from colonial to communist authoritarianism ensured that what persisted was authoritarianism. However, this colonial and post-colonial totalitarian context rarely affected documentary film-makers at ATV and TVB in a blatant manner and broadcasting staff within the organisations also resisted such encroachment whenever it appeared. During the colonial era, though, and covering the period from the late 1950s, when television appeared in Hong Kong, to the early 1980s, when negotiations on the future of Hong Kong commenced between the United Kingdom (UK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), there was little need for such resistance, as the cultural–racial chasm which existed between government and local population persuaded the colonial authorities to allow the two terrestrial broadcasters and their affiliated film-makers to operate relatively freely. This arrangement, based on understandings that the broadcasters’ output would be entertainment-driven, and that what little current-affairs programming there was would not challenge the authorities, suited both parties, as a parsimonious government did not want to tie up resources through over-engagement with local broadcasting, and the broadcasters were aware that a local population cut out of the system of governance for so long was not overly preoccupied with political issues anyway.

However, from the mid-1980s onwards this tactical concord began to fragment as ATV and TVB management forged closer links with corporate and political entities in the PRC. This was also encouraged by PRC officials, because, in a communist State, and, in this case, one which would, it was by then clear, take control of Hong Kong, official purview of terrestrial television was a sine qua non. After the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997 liaison between the Hong Kong broadcasters and the PRC increased, though it was also challenged by staff in news and current-affairs departments who had been educated in Western principles of professional public service broadcasting (PSB), and who feared the eventual loss of editorial autonomy. It was this context of cross-border institutional convergence and journalistic resistance to it, in tandem with the background contexts of colonial and post-colonial authoritarianism, that provided terrestrial television broadcasting and television documentary film-making within TVB and ATV with its atypical profile, and this article will now seek to delineate that profile more explicitly by relating it to models of the relationship between television and the state.

Television and the state, a working synopsis

National states superintend television in diverse ways, and theorists attempt to develop models of such superintendence. Commonly, and for the purposes of this article, these models are of televisual systems deemed to be either (1) State owned and/or controlled, (2) professional, subsidised public service or (3) commercial, market dominated.¹ These broad definitions embrace a range of internal differences: some state-controlled systems accommodate varying degrees of commercial management and autonomous professionalism, some commercial systems receive varying degrees of public subsidy and government intervention, and professional broadcasting systems also differ in the degree of autonomy from government and market forces they bear. Nevertheless, these definitions will provide a foundation for the present section of this article.

In all three systems referred to there are also different arrangements for PSB, a central concern of this article, and what is meant by that phrase here is current-affairs broadcasting which aims to provide autonomous, or substantially autonomous, social, political and culturally important information, interpretation and analysis for the public. According to UNESCO, PSB should ‘serve the informational needs and interests of the public’ (Mendel 2011, 7) and should be characterised by ‘independence from both the State and commercial interests [and an] impartiality of programmes’ (6). In a state-controlled system such broadcasting is closely overseen by the state, is neither independent nor impartial, and, by definition, not PSB in the above sense. On the other hand, in public service/professional and commercial systems, it ought to be, though questions remain concerning that. For example, in the UK, terrestrial PSB is broadcast by a public broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and a number of commercial broadcasters which have sizable responsibilities under license for PSB (Ward 2008). However, commercial terrestrial broadcasters within the UK have been accused of diluting PSB output in order to increase ratings and revenue (Gorman and McLean 2009, 144), whilst the autonomy of BBC PSB has been called into question because of the institutional and social relationships which hold between the broadcaster and establishment. Although the BBC is overseen by a Board of Governors whose role is to ensure independence from government (Ward 2008, 246), the public corporation status of the institution means that the extent to which that is so remains unclear (Gorman and McLean 2009, 142). Outside of the UK, the opacity involved in this arrangement has also led to the emergence of alternative types of PSB system, the two most important of which might be the ‘parliamentary’/‘proportional representation’, and the ‘civic’. In the former, oversight of PSB is divided among political parties through proportional representation, whilst, in the latter, oversight is extended beyond such parties to encompass socially important affiliations. These ‘pluralist’ PSB models can be differentiated from the UK approach, in which PSB tries to achieve journalistic ‘balance’ (143).

Taking these three PSB models together, it can be argued that the professional model is based on notions of balanced journalism and the autonomy of PSB from the political structures of the state, whilst the parliamentary and civic models are based on an acceptance of partisan broadcasting and an association of broadcasting to those structures (Hallin and Mancini 2004). These systems of PSB may be public, commercial or – commonly – a combination of both. In some cases the systems may operate in a context in which the public broadcaster is dominant, and, in others, where commercial broadcasters are. An example of the latter case would be the USA (Ward 2008, 53). Here, PSB may suffer from influence by commercial interests, but less so by government. In contrast to these systems, though, in the PRC, PSB is controlled by state agencies. Hong Kong is not the PRC. However, given the associations which now exist between PRC and Hong Kong television systems it will be helpful to outline the PRC television system before considering PSB within TVB and ATV.

The television system in China, a synopsis

The television system in China is controlled by the state, state-sanctioned corporate bureaucratic and commercial forces, and elites connected to the political establishment. Early television in China followed the approach adopted in the Soviet Union, where the primary purpose of television news and current-affairs programming was to ‘explain and celebrate the triumph of communism’ (Smith and Patterson 1998, 42). Television was first introduced in China in 1958 as an ideological addendum to the Great Leap Forward, a disastrous policy initiated by paramount leader Mao Zedong which resulted in mass starvation. At that time current-affairs television was considered to be no more than ‘propaganda for the Party's policies and ideologies’ (91). However, television did not have great reach in China during the 1950s, and it was, in fact, not until economic reform took place in the mid-1980s, that it began to develop into a mass media, to the point where, by 2003, the total numbers of television stations had reached 363, with almost 3000 channels reaching close to 95% of the population (90). Despite such proliferation, though, television in China remains dominated by the PRC state broadcaster, China Central Television (CCTV). This is the only broadcaster with a national monopoly status, and, as a consequence of this, CCTV enjoys considerable influence. All television stations in China are obliged to show CCTV channels and programmes, including at peak times, and this, together with other factors, guarantees the continued dominance of CCTV (248). Beneath the level of the state broadcaster, broadcasting institutions are also established by Communist Party administrations at country-wide, district and city level. No organisations or parties other than State-sanctioned are allowed to establish broadcasting stations. Foreign enterprises are prohibited from setting up such stations, and all broadcasting is subject to Orwellian levels of censorship (248).

Nevertheless, despite this totalitarian structure, television in China has evolved alongside reform of the Chinese economy, to the extent that corporate commercial forces are now strongly active within the China television system, although such forces remain linked to the political establishment. Consequently, the present television system has been described as ‘a peculiar mix’ of ‘a state controlled propaganda system’ which ‘bears the imprint of the market and a thorough process of commercialization’ (250); and as ‘a contradiction in itself, unable to fit with any of the standard existing modes, public services, commercial, or state control’ (250). One way of understanding the mainland China television system is as a state-controlled one in which as many opportunities to make a profit as possible are allowed so long as those are linked to PRC elites, interests and policies. Such a system is inevitably subject to corruption and manipulation because of the nepotism and lack of transparency involved, and CCTV attempts to disguise both that, and the authoritarian character of broadcasting in China, through producing programmes for internal and external consumption which present a positive image of the PRC, or which attempt to appear impartial (though they are not).

The television system in Hong Kong

Terrestrial television broadcasting in Hong Kong is dominated by a duopoly of commercial broadcasters (ATV and TVB) which is now closely connected to the political establishment in both the city and Beijing. In 1957, the Hong Kong branch of the British television company Rediffusion established the first television station in the colony, initially operating a few cable subscription channels in English. As English was a minority language the station had a small audience consisting of expatriates and English-educated members of the local elite. However, in 1963 Rediffusion introduced a Chinese cable channel, and then, in 1973, the company was granted a free-to-air terrestrial broadcasting license, adopting the new title of Rediffusion Television Limited (RTV). In 1982, RTV renamed itself again, this time as ATV, offering, as today, the free Chinese ‘Home’ and English ‘World’ channels. Rediffusion exercised monopoly control over the television industry in the colony for a decade until the appearance in 1967 of TVB as the first free-to-air terrestrial broadcaster. TVB offered, as today, two free-to-air channels: the Chinese ‘Jade’ and English ‘Pearl’; with Jade quickly coming to dominate the local television market, sometimes securing up to 90% of prime-time ratings (Ma 1999). In September 1975, a third commercial television channel, Commercial Television (CTV) was established. However, and for a variety of reasons, CTV failed in 1978. TVB and ATV remain the only two free-to-air terrestrial broadcasters in Hong Kong at the time of writing (though two new licenses were issued in late 2013).² Both are pro-Beijing institutions at the level of management, with ATV the more so, but with TVB nevertheless also earning the sarcastic nickname of ‘CCTVB’. In addition to these two commercial broadcasters there is also a ‘public broadcaster’: Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). However, RTHK is not a public corporation along the lines of the BBC but a government department which, in addition, does not have its own dedicated channels, but makes a few programmes shown under obligation on ATV and TVB.

The television system that emerged in Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s cannot easily be categorised as either commercial, government–controlled or professional. In terms of the first of these categories, the colonial government controlled the television market by granting licenses to a limited number of broadcasters whom it had a close relationship with. For example, when the first competitive bid for a TV license was launched in 1965 the winning application was from TVB. No reason was given for this, but the Board of Directors of the company at the time reveals that the chairman was also the chairman of the leading property development company in Hong Kong, and land sales to property developers were one of the colonial government's main sources of income. What happened here is an example of what was termed the policy of ‘positive non-intervention’, in which the colonial government remained in ultimate control, whilst day-to-day management of large sectors of the economy and society was placed in the hands of trusted local corporate elites (Carroll 2011). Beyond that, such an arrangement could also be defined in terms of the sort of state monopoly capitalist liaison which will be discussed later in this article when ATV and TVB will be related to the notion of the ‘public sphere’.³ It was this approach that determined how the television system in Hong Kong developed as it did. The market was never open but dominated from the outset by a commercial corporate duopoly loosely regulated by and close to government. Although, given the nature of terrestrial broadcasting vis-à-vis both airwave availability and fiscal cost, most states are forced to place restrictions upon the number of commercial broadcasters licensed, those broadcasters are not always so close to the political establishment – and also, importantly, the political establishment of another country – as was/is the case with Hong Kong. One further point that can also be made here is that the formation of duopolies was characteristic of the Hong Kong colonial capitalist system. Monopolies might generate public discontent on account of their domineering hold, whereas duopoly at least provides a veneer, and pretence, of competition. The existence of such duopolies also made it easier for the state to manage the economic system.

If the Hong Kong television system cannot be classed as commercial free-market neither can it be classed as state-controlled, as, unlike the television system in China, the state was not directly involved in day-to-day programming activity. State control was exercised through proxy here by trusted operators who enjoyed virtually complete autonomy of action. And neither can this television system be classed as public service/professional either. ATV and TVB have PSB obligations to produce balanced current-affairs programming written into their constitutions. However, in practice neither the colonial government nor the broadcasters wanted potentially troublesome current-affairs programming to appear, and so this did not begin until as late as the late 1980s, and against the context of Sino–British discussions over the future of Hong Kong. In addition, such programming was also deliberately kept at a low level of output within the stipulations of the television licenses involved so that when it did appear it could have little impact. Finally, in both the endgame colonial (early-1980s to 1997) and post-colonial periods both broadcasters have been accused of manipulating their PSB output for institutional–political ends, and, if true, that would be against the ethos of PSB. Although it has been argued that a public service broadcaster such as the BBC sometimes favours the ‘establishment’ (Gorman and McLean 2009), the manipulation carried out by ATV and TVB is regular, rather than merely occasional.⁴

From the late 1970s onwards Chinese corporate institutions in Hong Kong, including, as mentioned, ATV and TVB, formed strategic alliances with the economic and political establishment in China. Amongst other outcomes this led the colonial government to postpone the issuing of a third television license which had been pending since the failure of CTV in 1978. The government was concerned that any new broadcaster would go the same pro-Beijing direction. This concern also intensified after it was determined in the mid-1980s that Hong Kong would indeed be handed back to China in 1997; and in fact no further television license was awarded over the remainder of the colonial period. The colonial government did seek tentatively to counter pro-Beijing tendencies within Hong Kong television through the ‘corporatisation’ of RTHK in the early 1990s but was ultimately forced to retreat from this under intense pressure from Beijing (Hong Kong Journalists’ Association 2006, 7). And, since ATV and TVB remained staunchly pro-Beijing after 1997, post-colonial pro-Beijing Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) governments felt no need to alter the broadcasting arena either. When further licenses were eventually issued, as late as December 2013, the government ensured that they were granted to trusted pro-establishment corporations and kept out of the hands of liberal voices. This caused controversy at the time but the government forced the legislation through regardless.⁵

Media and the state in Hong Kong after the handover

Between 1982, when discussions over the future of Hong Kong began, and the 1997 handover, the Hong Kong media enjoyed an unprecedented degree of freedom of expression and took advantage of that in order to engage energetically with the evolving historical situation. This was also encouraged by Britain and the colonial government as a means of countering the influence of Beijing. Following 1997, however, the situation changed fundamentally, and the Hong Kong media had to adapt to an uncertain new status quo. The Hong Kong Basic Law, the legal constitutional framework arrived at as an eventual consequence of the Sino–British Joint Declaration of 1984, seemingly acknowledged the need to maintain freedom of expression and the press. However, such acknowledgement did not provide unequivocal protection for media freedom. One controversial article, Article 23, which Beijing inserted into the Basic Law following massive reaction in Hong Kong to the Tiananmen massacre,⁶ also appeared to provide a basis for direct government interference in the media on grounds of ‘national security’. In addition, PRC officials also stressed that three subjects should be off-limits to the Hong Kong media: advocacy of independence for Tibet and Taiwan; advocacy of greater autonomy for Hong Kong than was established by the Basic Law; and criticism of mainland leaders and the Central Government. The Hong Kong media was expected to steer clear of these ‘national’ issues and cover international and local Hong Kong matters instead (Choi and Yeung 1985).

In addition to these intimidations and restrictions, mainland officials also sought to influence the media in Hong Kong by effecting ownership of media companies, criticising pro-democracy media outlets and spokespersons, and engaging in forms of strategic ambiguity when questioned by the media over the extent of Beijing's activities within the SAR. Of these three strategies, the most imperative was increased control at the level of media ownership, and, through this means, pro-Beijing business tycoons within Hong Kong were expected to advance an escalating Beijing-sympathetic concentration of media ownership. In addition to such direct intervention, though, which was well reported by an edgy Hong Kong media, organisational concentration also took place more indirectly and covertly, as control of media organisations not obviously connected became increasingly vested in the hands of an elite cadre of pro-china tycoons (Fung 2008). This also gave rise to the notion of the ‘black hand’: the idea that, through covert forces based in Hong Kong, the PRC was exerting more and more influence over the city.⁷

This level of pro-establishment intervention in its affairs forced the Hong Kong media to amend working methods and one manifestation of this was that immediately following 1997 increased emphasis was placed upon ‘objective’ and factual, rather than ‘editorial’ journalism (Lee 2007, 5). Whilst the former is certainly a necessary component of professional practice, its over-defensive deployment in post-handover Hong Kong resulted in a reduction in risk-taking journalism, a predisposition to be over-respectful to and less questioning of establishment figures, and an increased level of self-censorship. In addition, it has also been argued that increased contact with pro-Beijing establishment figures following the handover led the Hong Kong media to undergo a process of cultural re-orientation (Lee 2007, 7). After 1997, for example, Hong Kong journalists had to rely on contacts with mainland officials more frequently than had been the case before, and one consequence of this was the adoption of a more considerate attitude towards the PRC, so that what may have been thought independent judgement shifted ineluctably closer to PRC positions. This did not amount to being ‘bought of’, but rather to a subliminal process of re-orientation which took place in relation to the realities of power and the realistic – though also compromised – requirements of professional practice. It has, however, also been argued that since an upsurge of pro-democracy activism took place in Hong Kong from 2003 onwards this situation of half-mindful consensual drift and reliance on defensive strategies has alternated with a more strident and critical approach, in which news analysis searched more tenaciously for the sorts of bottom line the Chinese government would allow. Such an approach assumed that the PRC and not SAR government was the decision-maker, but it also allowed pro-democracy media to both (cautiously) address the issue of PRC interference in Hong Kong, and (more stridently) step up criticism of the SAR government (Lee 2007, 10).

The documentary films of TVB and ATV

The documentary film current-affairs broadcasting output of TVB consists of two weekly series, one of which runs on the Cantonese-language Jade Channel, the other on the English-language Pearl channel. On the Jade channel, Tuesday Report was launched in 1987. As the programme was often aired on different days of the week, though, it was variably titled as Monday/Wednesday or Sunday Report, depending on the day of appearance. Because of this, the production team gave the series the informal name of X Report, and that title will be used here. The English-language Pearl Report was launched in 1988 on the Pearl Channel. Each programme in both series lasts for around 25 minutes, and is shown before peak viewing time, at either 7 pm or 7.30 pm. This means that the audience for both series is small (the Pearl Report, which has a smaller audience than the X Report, is also sometimes screened at 8 pm). Both series are produced from within the News and information Services Division of TVB, and have separate teams to deliver the Cantonese Jade and English Pearl programmes. Both programmes also have long-serving Senior Executive Producers: Yuan Siu-ching, for the X Report and Diana Lin, for the Pearl Report.

Both X and Pearl Reports are modest operations with a production team of eight in X and only five in Pearl. However, under the terms of the broadcasting license TVB are obliged to produce current-affairs television broadcasting every week and this means that both X and Pearl have to have programmes available for airing each week. As is evident, this is both a limited obligation for the broadcaster and a grinding schedule for the film-makers. In general, it takes six–seven weeks for an X Report film to be completed, and five weeks for the smaller-budget Pearl films.⁸ This short time frame places considerable limitations on what can be achieved and this constraint is also reinforced by the fact that the teams in both series see their primary role as that of portraying the social, political and economic condition of Hong Kong from a local rather than macro-political perspective. Although such macro-political issues are tackled, the films often focus on their localised consequence. This approach is in addition also influenced by the fact that the production teams in both series see themselves as working within a commercial environment and so have to keep ratings healthy, and one consequence of this is that a certain ‘feel-good’ factor enters into the films.⁹

The production teams of both Pearl and X have also become habituated towards their employer environment in the sense that they seem unaffected by the controversial character of TVB as a pro-Beijing institution. For example, although the executive producer of X was aware that TVB was referred to as ‘CCTVB’, she believed this was aimed at TVB news, rather than X or Pearl.¹⁰ Both producers also felt that they were working in a ‘comfortable’ environment and that management did not intervene directly in their decision-making and film-making activities. Each week both production teams take part in briefings at which management representatives are present. At these meetings both executive producers (Lin and Yuan) present reports and senior TVB executives have their say. The producers claim that management only ‘comments’ here, and does not ‘give orders’.¹¹ Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether these ‘comments’ are ever disregarded, or how such interventions affect the films produced. These two executive producers could be regarded as gatekeepers and stakeholders who operate within sometimes overriding organisational routines and policies which establish an a priori understanding of what is likely to be approved by management. Whilst remaining professional journalists, they are also stakeholders in the need to help their employers avoid political and economic problems, and this may influence their thinking and actions.

It could also be argued that the limited significance of X and Pearl relative to TVB news output is one reason why these producers experience their environment as relatively benign, and, in addition, an interesting distinction also emerges here in relation to such limited significance which places the executive producers’ claims for editorial autonomy under some question. It transpires that the X Report comes under greater scrutiny than the Pearl Report at the weekly meetings just referred to because the X Report is in Cantonese and reaches a far larger audience than the English-language Pearl Report. So Pearl has more editorial autonomy than X on account of its lesser importance. Pearl also has arguably a more liberal voice than X and it may be that pro-Beijing management at TVB believes the impact of the series to be such that there is little need for them to intervene, even if that management does not like some of the Pearl films. On the other hand, it may also be that management sees such liberalism as serving to vest the pro-Beijing organisation with the appearance of even-handedness.

The two executive producers of X and Pearl also believed that over the years no significant changes in policy or editorial direction have taken place within the two series. However, and as will be shown in the next section of this article, that is not the case. Both producers did offer that, over time, more human-interest and ‘lifestyle’ films had appeared and the number of films made on political matters had declined.¹² This had partly been the result of the commercial imperative referred to earlier. However, for Pearl, it had also been influenced by the fact that since the handover it had become more difficult to find political figures willing to be interviewed in English, even though those figures were able to speak English well. The problem with English has, in addition, also influenced staffing at Pearl, with the producer arguing that since the handover journalism schools in Hong Kong had been unable to supply her with enough local staff sufficiently proficient in English.¹³ This also reflects the change of ‘medium of instruction’ policy which was introduced by the first post-handover SAR government in 2005, in which many schools were instructed to use Chinese rather than English as the principal medium of instruction.

The author of this article is grateful that the executive producers of X and Pearl were willing to be interviewed. However, such gratefulness does not extend to TVB management, which refused access to those older documentary films held on TVB premises and unavailable elsewhere, on the grounds that TVB felt under no obligation to take part in the furtherance of academic research. TVB also made it clear that should future such requests for viewing films be made by other academics those requests would also be rejected.¹⁴ It would also have been useful to learn more about the film-making environment at ATV. Unfortunately, however, no figure approached at ATV even returned communication. It is difficult to believe that this unwillingness to co-operate is unconnected to the fact that both these organisations are wary of co-operating with a Western academic intent on scrutinising them. This wariness also extended to one of the two executive producers who agreed to be interviewed. This producer objected to a suggestion that the interview with her might be placed (after her review) on the author's project website (http://www.documentary-film.af.hkbu.edu.hk). Despite these difficulties, though, a considerable number of films made by TVB and ATV are held in university libraries in Hong Kong and these were viewed for the project related to this article. In addition, it has also been possible to identify films which were made, but are not available for viewing, for one reason or another. The next two sections of this article will now attempt, first, a summary schedule and list of those films, and then a more detailed account of particular groups of films.

The documentary films of TVB and ATV, a summary of production

The documentary films of TVB both cover a wide range of issues but also cluster around particular subjects. The largest two clusters relate to the Tiananmen massacre of 4 June 1989 (31 films) and China (31–40 films).¹⁵ However, the films on China vary considerably in subject matter, and, given that, it could be concluded that the most prominent single subject present is Tiananmen. However, whilst literally true such a conclusion is also misleading because the great majority of these films were made immediately before and just after the event itself. TVB made six film ‘specials’ in Cantonese prior to the massacre, and a further six in June, shortly after the massacre. In addition, the X Report made three films in Cantonese prior to the massacre, and a further three afterword, also in June; whilst the Pearl Report made 10 films in English, three prior to the massacre and six further over the period up to June 1990. This is a considerable number of films: approximately 27. However, after June 1990 it appears that TVB made only four more films on Tiananmen, one in 1994 (X Report), another in 2004 (X Report) and two in 2009 (X and Pearl). These were also ‘anniversary’ films (5 years, 10 years, 15 years on), and, in a sense, had to be made because the anniversary of this traumatic event simply could not be ignored in Hong Kong. So, in fact, the subject dropped off the agenda of TVB rapidly, reflecting its controversial nature and Beijing's desire to expunge the event from history. The question arises here as to whether the fact that 27 films were made in the 13-month period from May 1989 to June 1990, but only a further four in the following 276 months, amounts to self-censorship, or even policy at management level? The anniversary of Tiananmen is observed every year in Hong Kong through a mass rally which seeks vindication for the fallen protestors and criticises the stance taken by the PRC government. Clearly, TVB has distanced itself from this.

After Tiananmen a further 31–40 films can be identified relating to China. However, and as mentioned, these vary in subject. Some, for example, concern the Cultural Revolution, whilst others address issues of economic reform. In addition to this focus on China, approximately 16 films concern the handover and or Joint Declaration, 20 concern elections in Hong Kong, 14 are about the Chief Executive, 19 are on Asia, 25 on the rest of the World, and 19 on Taiwan. Few, if any, of the films on China critique the Central Government, whilst only one of the films on Taiwan debates the pros and cons of Taiwan independence to any degree. So, it can be argued that TVB has held to the Beijing mantra on avoiding the issue of Taiwan (and Tibetan) independence, and on not criticising the Central Government. However, discussion on democratic reform in Hong Kong could not be avoided, given the need to cover political debate within the city, and this issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this article.

ATV is a smaller operator than TVB and this is reflected in the documentary film output of the broadcaster. ATV tends to make, or, more commonly, commission, inexpensive documentary films in extensive series. Often the level of analysis in these films and series is low, and many of the films also function as public-relations exercises on behalf of the PRC, and ‘China’. China is, therefore, the major focus of ATV documentary films, as, for example, in The Modern World and Chinese History (January–October 1991, 39 episodes), China in the Past 100 Years (2005, 28 episodes) and One Hundred Years of the Republic (2011–2012, 20 episodes). The great majority of documentary films actually produced by ATV are in Cantonese, with the English-language team in the Inside Story unit being small in number and incapable of major output as a consequence. ATV went overboard in churning out large numbers of inexpensive films during the handover, making three series of films (all in Cantonese) between January and July 1997, consisting of 15, 40 and 13 episodes respectively: a total of 68 within seven months! It is debatable, however, whether these could be classed as documentary films as many are running-segments of direct reportage. The station's Cantonese programme, News Magazine, also produced a four-episode series on the handover in 1997, a three-episode series in 2007, and a further two-episode film in 2012. Inside Story produced one English film on the handover. In addition, a few special series of films were produced using a combination of outside sourcing and ATV staff. These were China Report (1993, four episodes), and Deng Xiaoping (2004, five episodes), both in Cantonese (and pro-Beijing). Two such specials were also produced in English and these will be considered in the next section of this paper. As with TVB, ATV is obliged to broadcast current-affairs documentary films each week, and its Inside Story and News Magazine series follow the pattern of the TVB Jade and Pearl series in mainly covering small-scale stories affecting Hong Kong.

The documentary films of ATV and TVB, an analysis of some noteworthy films

From 1977 onwards TVB made individual documentary films at the rate of two per year. Films winning international awards included China Reforms (1985), a film which also provides an insight into the partisan alignment of TVB at this time. China Reforms tackles the issue of political reform in China in a marginal way and is mainly concerned with the impact of economic reforms instituted in the early 1980s. The picture that emerges here is a positive one of China liberalising its economy under the leadership of new (relatively) autonomous managers. Various problems arising from this are discussed including old-guard communist resistance to reform. However, the film does not criticise the PRC authorities and neither does it address pressing issues of corruption and nepotism.

TVB documentary film-makers made a number of films on the China student protest movement just before and shortly after the massacre of 4 June, and the most noteworthy of these is Spring of Discontent, which appeared in May 1989. Spring of Discontent is a work of direct cinema in which the film-makers interact and identify with the student demonstrators. Unusually for TVB the film contains little commentary, and, instead, allows the protestors to speak for themselves. The passion and resolve of the demonstrators is captured here, as they demand ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. However, things changed quickly. The Long March (July 1989), made only one month after the massacre, provides a history of the demonstrations, but hardly mentions the massacre; whilst the overarching message of June 4th: One Year On (June 1990) is of the PRC seeking ‘stability’ and social ‘improvement’. Shortly after this a pronounced pro-Beijing bias appears more frequently. For example, Patten v China (1992) covers the debate over the reforms instituted by the Governor, Sir Christopher Patten, in 1992. This studio discussion involving three guests and a presenter is, overall, critical of the reforms. At one point the presenter, who should be neutral, opines that the reforms ‘do not honour the spirit of the 1984 Accord’; whilst one of the guests, an expatriate representing an elite financial corporation, reinforces this by claiming that the Patten reforms had ‘fundamentally moved away from the 1984 agreement’ and were ‘tantamount to full democracy’. Another example of apparent bias is Human Rights in China (1993), which gives the impression and one which contradicted evidence at the time that human rights abuse was decreasing in China.

A change to this did however occur in 1994 when Diana Lin began to play a greater role in the Pearl Report. In 1994, Lin was the presenter in a Pearl Report film featuring interviews with Patten and Lu Ping, then Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Liaison Office. The contrast with the 1992 Pearl Report film Patten v China is stark, as Lin aims questions at a discomforted Ping, who eventually walks out of the room. In contrast to Ping, Patten – then vilified by the pro-Beijing establishment – is relaxed in his interview. However, in a later 1996 Pearl Report film Patten looks far from at ease and is defensive in denying that his ‘remaining 500 days [of British sovereignty] will be only ceremonial’.

By 1996 Lin had become both presenter and executive producer of the Pearl Report and her impact comes through in both the 1996 interview with Patten and a 1997 film made just months before the handover, entitled RTHK's Future. This 60-minute long Pearl Report ‘special’ examines the prospects for RTHK following retrocession and remains commendably balanced, regardless of the criticism then being levelled at RTHK by pro-Beijing figures. In a 2004 film entitled Doomed Democracy, which deals with Beijing's refusal to grant Hong Kong universal franchise to elect the Chief Executive and Legislative Council in 2007–2008, Lin is not very even-handed, though, and takes a clear pro-democracy stance in asserting that the PRC edict has rung ‘the death knell to Hong Kong's hopes for democracy’. Lin led the Pearl Report from 1996 to the present.

In addition to one-off programmes the Pearl Report and its Cantonese counterpart has, as mentioned, clustered films to form mini-series on subjects such as Tiananmen, the handover, SARS, Taiwan and reform in China. These subjects are though often tackled from a local/human-interest point of view, and a good example of this is a film which purports to mark the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen. Rather than targeting the political issues involved, Passing the Baton (2004) focuses on a nonconforming President of the Hong Kong University Students Union and the attempt by the student body to impeach him on account of his revisionist views on Tiananmen. This stance contrasts with the approach taken in Doomed Democracy, and the reason for this, perhaps, is that Tiananmen remained, and remains, a particularly sensitive issue.

Turning to ATV, News Magazine has been produced since 1988. An English-language equivalent of News Magazine entitled Vision Today also appeared in 1989 and lasted until 1992, when that series was replaced by Monday Monitor; which then ran until 1993. Monday Monitor was then replaced by Inside Story, which runs to the present day. As the title indicates, Inside Story films generally covered matters inside Hong Kong. Many of these films have been lost but what survives appears to show a pro-establishment orientation. In the early period this is less obvious though, with a 1992 film on the Patten reforms entitled Constitutional Changes of the Governor managing to achieve balance. Constitutional Changes of the Governor was part of the Monday Monitor series. It also seems that both this series, and its predecessor, Vision Today, were prepared to tackle subjects which later programmes would shy away from. For example, a Monday Monitor film from 1992: June 4th…Three Years On, is anything but pro-Beijing. June 4th…Three Years On contains interviews with a number of people affected by the Tiananmen massacre, and makes no attempt to be other than sympathetic towards the student protestors. One interviewee recounts receiving a phone call from her sister in which the latter claimed to have seen ‘tanks rolling over students’ in Tiananmen Square. However, from 1994, and after the demise of Monday Monitor, ATV's Cantonese News Magazine and English Inside Story gradually moved away from such a critical approach to China. Having said this, though, ATV film-makers also resisted intercession by management when that became overly intrusive. One instance of this occurred in 1994 when management intervention to cut footage of the Tiananmen massacre from a programme marking the fifth anniversary of the atrocity led to the resignation of several senior staff. By the time we arrive at the late 2000s, though, this ceases to happen, and a pro-establishment/Beijing bias also appears more evident. A 2012 Inside Story film on the introduction of national education, entitled National Education and Liberal Studies, weighs in favour of national education; whilst another Inside Story film from 2012, entitled Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying, is set solidly within the pro-establishment camp, with the pan-democrats granted only token coverage.¹⁶

Although the documentary films of ATV were regularly made or outsourced in extensive series, the company also made or commissioned smaller series of films, and even a few stand-alone films, and it is in these that the pro-Beijing orientation is most evident. These include Deng Xiaoping and Hong Kong (2004, five episodes) and the one-off Donald Tsang: A Man and His Mission (2006) and Wen Jiabao's Work Report (2010). Donald Tsang: A Man and His Mission is little more than an affirmative public relations exercise on behalf of both the Second Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and Beijing. Here, Tsang states that nobody can become the leader of Hong Kong ‘without Beijing's blessing’, and that he is happy to work with an ‘enlightened and supportive Central Government’. Tsang's close connections with the pro-Beijing tycoon class eventually led to his departure from office in ignominy in 2012, and the contrast between the blasé 2006 Tsang of Donald Tsang: A Man and his Mission, and the 2012 Tsang seen weeping before an animated Legislative Council, is cogent. Wen Jiabao's Work Report (2010) is in many ways more interesting than the Tsang film because it is so peculiar. The film's presenters first set out an affirmative account of Wen's report to the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and show NPC members giving the report their enthusiastic endorsement. However, back in Hong Kong an invited commentator, a ‘noted Sinologist’ from Sweden, proceeds to systematically demolish every clause of the great report to the evident embarrassment of the presenter. The contrast between the stage-managed and ATV/mainland-lauded ‘Report’ and this unexpected exposé is unintentionally amusing.

The current-affairs television output of TVB and ATV and the notion of the ‘public sphere’

One reason why the current-affairs television documentary films of ATV and TVB fall below an ideal public-service standard is that ATV and TVB constitute an institutional duopoly complicit with the political authority. This constitution and complicity leads to a situation in which these organisations make or commission films which endorse that authority or fail to hold it to sufficient account. However, another reason for this less than ideal state of affairs is related to the constitution of the public sphere in Hong Kong, and, in order to both understand that province better, and make recommendations as to how documentary film output at ATV and TVB might be improved, this article will explore the notion of the public sphere in relation to TVB/ATV. Jürgen Habermas’ seminal The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Enquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society charts the historical development of the public sphere and its ‘structural transformation’ and consequent diminution at the hands of monopoly capitalism (Habermas 1993, 160). However, in addition to this examination of deterioration and descent Habermas also defines what an ideal public sphere might consist of. The ideal public sphere is defined as an arena of free ‘rational-critical debate’ on matters of general public interest (Habermas 1993, 160). This public sphere would mediate between society and the state, hold the state to account, and, on occasion, even challenge the state (Fraser 1992, 110). In this sense, the public sphere is extrinsic to the machinery of state, although in an ideal scenario the state should facilitate its reproduction and vitality because it is an expression of citizenship. For Habermas, the public sphere should exercise a ‘principle of control’ and ‘supervision’ over the state and the state should acquiesce to that (Habermas 1993, 28). Here, political control exercised by the state is subordinate to the ‘democratic demand for information’ (Mills and Barlow 2012, 302). This also means that the principle of public sphere supervision transcends the category of the authority of the ‘existing power’: a category most fully realised in totalitarian states such as the PRC and its Hong Kong SAR adjunct (Habermas, cited in Mills and Barlow 2012, 308). Habermas also defines the ideal public sphere as a domain in which ‘the rationalization of power [takes place] through the medium of public discussion amongst private individuals’ (my emphasis) (Habermas, cited in Mills and Barlow 2012, 318). These individuals are ‘private’ in the sense that they are not connected to power groupings in society: they are not ‘organised private individuals’ (Habermas 1993, 247–248). Free discussion taking place outside of relations of organised puissance results in rational outcomes, and this sort of ‘rationalisation of power’ within the public sphere is advantageous to society as a whole.

Habermas posits the emergence of an authentic public sphere in the growth of early European bourgeois society and goes on to argue that the later expansion of the state and monopoly capitalism effected a negative ‘structural transformation’ and ‘refeudalisation’ of this sphere (Habermas 1993, 195). The growth of mass society caused the state to expand and one consequence of this was that the latter began to exercise greater informational control over the public sphere (Dahlgren 1991). This is the origin of government public relations activity, and Habermas makes a distinction between this ‘public presentation of power’ and disinterested debate taking place within the public sphere (Mills and Barlow 2012, 305). As this intrusion of the public authority into the public sphere took place so also did a related incursion by the expanding capitalist system, which sought to advance its own vested interests, and even turn public information itself into a profitable commodity. One example of this, according to Habermas, occurred in the European press during the 1830s when the development of a mass commercial press replaced the early political bourgeois press, causing the press to ‘abandon its polemical stance and concentrate on … profit opportunities’ (Habermas 1993, 184). Under the evolving system of state monopoly capitalism, capitalist organisations attempted to broker deals with the state, and both sought to control the public sphere in order to sanction and advance such activity. As this ‘refeudalisation’ of the public sphere continued, oppositional bodies were also excluded. The result was the eventual formation of a ‘phony’ public sphere in which the state and corporate entities sought to persuade the public through a fake display of transparency set in motion whenever ‘there is a need to win public approval’ (Mills and Barlow 2012, 319). As an inheritor of the Frankfurt School's critique of mass society Habermas is also concerned about the role of the mass media within this process and he argues that, ‘whereas formerly the … [media] … limited itself to the transmission … of rational critical debate … now, conversely, this debate gets shaped by [a] mass media’ increasingly under control of the political-economic establishment (Habermas 1993, 188). And this is even truer of the new mass media of radio, film and television, whose ‘publicist power’ is overwhelming (187).

Most of this account can be related to the television system in Hong Kong and documentary films output of ATV and TVB, but that system and output also suggest inflections to that account. In terms of the films, it could be argued that the ‘rationalization of power through the medium of public discussion amongst private individuals’, where those private individuals were film-makers, never existed as an initial province within ATV/TVB. Rather, there were occasions when such a constituency emerged temporarily, around the Sino–British discussions over Hong Kong in the mid-1980s, Tiananmen in 1989–1990, the Patten reforms in 1992–1994, the 2003 attempt to introduce national security legislation, the failure to introduce universal suffrage in 2006–2008, and political conflict related to the Chief Executive in 2012. Beyond that, though, it could also be argued that during the majority of even those occasions the balance which accrued between that film output as ‘private’ and ‘organised’ remains indeterminate; and it may in fact only have been around Tiananmen that the films of ATV and TVB achieved true privatory status in the Habermasian sense.

Apart from these occasional manifestations of an animated public sphere, Habermas’ account of the structural transformation of the public sphere appears to fit the ATV/TVB situation. In Hong Kong the television market is organised through close arrangement between the state and complicit corporate entities. The principle of supervision is subordinated to the principle of the existing power, both in general, and in terms of the films, within which such relegation takes the form of an avoidance of scrutiny of the existing power through a focus on local/human-interest/lifestyle. The principle of public information is circumscribed here, and the public presentation of power prevalent. Misleading displays of transparency occur in the form of corporate/governmental public-relations campaigns, though these are mainly broadcast by the stations, rather than appearing in the films.

Against this authoritarian context elements of the media outside of television, including the press and radio, remain independent and active, though they are adversely affected by the economic cost of remaining in the public sphere and market, and by punitive criticism from the establishment. For example, cut-throat commercial competition has led to physical attacks upon media workers recently, whilst criticism of the establishment is met by concerted pro-establishment campaigns of denunciation.¹⁷ However, even though, despite these obstacles, elements of the Hong Kong press and radio remain defiantly sovereign, Habermas’ notion of the existence of a ‘phony’ public sphere appears to apply to terrestrial commercial television broadcasting; and what might have been a powerful voice in the Hong Kong public sphere has been transmuted and diluted. Given this, it can be argued that these television documentary films now play two principal roles. First, along with the films of RTHK, these films help keep the public service remit in existence within the television system. However, and second, these films also help sustain the state monopoly-capitalist system, because, as in any hegemonic system, the dominant power must tolerate the existence of intermittent oppositional voices and debate in order that the system be deemed tolerable. As is implied by the concept of hegemony, though, these films are circumscribed, acting more as pressure-release valves than incisive exposés. In this respect it is also worth referring to Habermas’ critique of the increasing preponderance of lifestyle/human-interest material within the public sphere. It will be recalled that the executive producers of the X and Pearl Reports felt that, over the years, lifestyle/human-interest films had come to predominate. Habermas is critical of the prevalence of such material, arguing that it combined ‘journalistic format with the literary forms of the psychological novel into a combination of entertainment and ‘advice’ … which … could have been invented for the purpose of public relations serving the cause of the status quo’ (Habermas 1993, 175). Seen through this optic ‘serving the cause of the status quo’ takes the form of a placatory diverting address, and, although the current-affairs documentary films of ATV and TVB may keep the torch of public service alight they are also assuaging and diversionary, and typical of what Habermas referred to as the structural transformation which took place ‘from the journalism of private men of letters to the public consumer services of the mass media’ (Habermas 1993, 181). Here, hegemony is indistinguishable from distraction.

Conclusions

There is in all likelihood little that the films and film-makers of ATV and TVB can do to improve this less than ideal situation within the Hong Kong PSB television system, even if they wished to do so (though there is little evidence for the latter). What is really required is effective transformation of that system into a liberal and open public sphere through both fundamental reorganisation of the institutions and remodelling of the mindsets of those within the institutions. In order to achieve what Habermas referred to as the ‘rationalisation of power through the medium of discussion’ in the television documentary film those within the institutions would therefore have to commit to a ‘rational reorganisation of social and political power’, and become ‘committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the State and each other’ (Habermas 1993, 210). This also means vesting more power and authority in the films and film-makers. However, given the pro-establishment nature of ATV and TVB and the authoritarian system in Hong Kong and PRC this will never occur outside of a revolutionary change or shock to the political system. All that can be done for now is to keep making demands for the expansion of the public sphere within the arena of the television documentary film in Hong Kong as a matter of policy, and hope that film-makers participate in such demands. Specific proposals can also be made here concerning the further entrenchment of public service commitments, increased editorial freedom, placement of films at peak viewing time, increased public funding and resources, enhanced staffing and changes to official regulations. For example, and in terms of the latter, the 2010 Amended License for TVB in the Broadcasting Ordinance unfortunately retained the obligation to produce a ‘minimum of two 30 minute current-affairs programmes per week’ per language service, with a minimum of only 30 minutes per week produced in Hong Kong.¹⁸ This is a grinding schedule and stipulation which ensures only modest and inadequate outcomes. Instead, more in-depth ‘seasons’ of longer films which also have more time to carry investigations through, and are better resourced, could be proposed. Before any of that occurs, though, film-makers may also adopt a strategy typical of that taken by the British documentary film movement of the 1930s: whilst making routine, and, in Habermas’ terms, diversionary films, make others which ingeniously stretch the boundaries of official and institutional expectation (see Aitken 1990, 1992, 1998, 2013).

Of course, it could be argued that the ATV/TVB situation is no different from that affecting many commercial terrestrial broadcasters in the developed world. For example, the main UK commercial broadcaster, ITV, embodies Habermas’ formulation of a ‘structural transformation’ from public debate to consumerism well. ITV developed a reputation for the production of cutting-edge current-affairs series, such as, for example, World in Action. However, during the 1990s such series were replaced by populist programming including soap operas in order to attract audiences and revenue. This affected the status of ITV as a PSB broadcaster, and, today, ITV does not have statutory obligations to produce current-affairs documentary films.¹⁹ However, there is a difference here with the Hong Kong situation in that, whilst, in the UK, channels such as the public broadcaster (BBC) and the semi-public broadcaster Channel Four have strong PSB obligations, this is not the case in the Hong Kong television system.²⁰ Given that, it could be argued that there is even more need for the PSB current-affairs documentary films of TVB and ATV (and also RTHK) to act as a redoubt against the inroads of the ‘public presentation of power’ and the shift from public information to ‘public consumer services’. Writing today, however (April 2015) this is unlikely to happen within ATV in particular, as the broadcaster has reached such a low ebb that it's broadcasting license is about to be revoked.

Notes on contributor

Ian Aitken is a professor of film studies at the Academy of Film, Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests are in realist film theory and documentary film studies. He is the recipient of five Hong Kong government competitive grants awarded in order to carry out research into documentary film in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore over the 1945–1970 period. His most recent book publications include Hong Kong Documentary Film (EUP, 2014), Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of the Documentary Film (ed.) (Routledge, 2013), Lukácsian Film Theory and Cinema (MUP, 2012), and Documentary Film: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies (ed.) (4 vols.) (Routledge, 2012). His 1990 book Film and Reform: John Grierson and the Documentary Film Movement was re-published by Routledge in 2013. He is editor of the forthcoming The Major Realist Film Theorists (EUP) and co-editor of the forthcoming The Colonial Documentary Film in South and South-East Asia (EUP).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council [RGC GRF 240112] Hong Kong Baptist University Research Committee [HKBU Conference Grant RC-Conf/12-13/08], and the HKBU School of Communication GRF Incentive Grant Scheme.

Notes

1. This varies (see Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm [1963] below, citing four categories of media system), but see, amongst others, Curran (2002), Boyce, Curran, and Wingate (1978) and Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963).

2. This proved highly controversial as it appeared that the SAR government was taking the opportunity to reward pro-establishment institutions by only granting licenses to such institutions, and not more liberal voices.

3. See final section of this article: ‘The current-affairs television output of TVB and ATV, and the public sphere’.

4. Many examples could be given of TVB intrusion and manipulation here, but one might be the TVB decision to exclude a rival and more liberal news network from its events, because the network had criticised TVB for pro-Beijing bias (see Chan 2013).

5. Three licenses were available. Two went to the existing and pro-establishment telecommunications companies I Cable and PCCW. However, a third, which would have gone to a new and potentially pro-democracy company, was unexpectedly withheld. At the time of writing, this company is taking legal action over the matter.

6. See the section in this article on the films of ATV and TVB.

7. For example, South China Morning Post (15 January 2014), discussing the empty column in Ming Pao newspaper left by pro-democracy veteran Martin Lee, as a protest about the action taken by the owner of the newspaper in removing the Editor-in-Chief, and referring to the ‘black hand’.

8. Interview with Diana Lin, 15 October 2013, TVB TV City, Hong Kong.

9. Interview with Yuan Siu-ching, 28 October 2013, TVB TV City, Hong Kong.

10. Interview with Yuan Siu-ching, 28 October 2013, TVB TV City, Hong Kong.

11. Interview with Yuan Siu-ching, 28 October 2013, TVB TV City, Hong Kong.

12. Lin and Yuan interviews.

13. Lin interview.

14. Letter from TVB News and Information Services Department to Ian Aitken, May 2012.

15. Note: all figures given for numbers of films are the product of research. However, although largely accurate, they remain to a degree approximate.

16. In 2012, the Hong Kong SAR Government attempted to introduce a compulsory subject entitled ‘National Education’ into the school curriculum. This was widely believed to be an under-handed attempt to promote the PRC in Hong Kong. Widespread reaction and protest followed, leading the government to eventually suspend the introduction of the subject.

17. So far, in 2014, two armed attacks have taken place against journalists, for political or commercial reasons; and a campaign against mainland tourist visitor numbers was met with organised and rigorous response by the government.

18. HKSAR Broadcasting Ordinance (2010), CAP 562, Amended License TVB, First Schedule: General Provisions, ‘Current-Affairs Programmes’, Clause 6.1, p. 3.

19. ITV no longer promotes itself explicitly as a PSB broadcaster. However, the network does commit itself to ‘business integrity and high ethical values’, and operates detailed ‘Code of Conduct’ and ‘Whistleblower’ policies. http://www.itvplc.com/responsibility.

20. For example, Channel Four attempts to ‘strike a balance between public service and commercial content’, and ‘to promote social environmental and personal change’, Channel Four, ‘Corporate Responsibility’, http://www.channelfour.com/info/corporate-responsibility.