Dualisms, Dichotomies and Dead Ends: Limitations of Analytic Thinking about Sport

Abstract

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines.

To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ‘broad internalism’ engaged in by Russell (1999, 2004), Dixon (2003), Simon (2000, 2004) and Morgan (2004). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ‘mind from nowhere’. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities.

Resumen

En este ensayo intento demostrar las limitaciones del pensamiento analítico en la filosofía del deporte y los callejones sin salida a los que tales análisis pueden llevarnos. Como alternativa, abogo por una filosofía de la complementaridad y compatibilidad en cuanto a lo que parecen ser alternativas excluyentes. Esta es una posición escéptica en cuanto a la utilidad de la bifurcación y otras concepciones de la realidad simplificadas que no se deshace de ellas completamente. Una filosofía de la complementaridad se mueve en el mundo de las ambigüedades, paradojas, diferencias de grado, tendencias, mezclas, polaridades, tensiones, complejos, transiciones, y toda otra manera de desorden. Recalco que esta posición ha sido generada, en parte, por el trabajo desarrollado en las ciencias empíricas y que la complementaridad provee un paradigma que es útil a lo ancho y largo de las disciplinas académicas, incluyendo la filosofía del deporte.

Para mostar las maneras en las que el pensamiento analítico conduce a callejones sin salida en la literatura sobre el deporte analizo el debate epistemológico sobre “internalismo extenso” con el que trabajan Russell, Dixon, Simon, y Morgan. La evidencia para la alegación de que ellos han llegado a unas tablas mayormente inútiles se basa en el hecho de que no proporcionan ninguna tercera opción, y además en que las herramientas analíticas y las reglas básicas que emplean impiden su descubrimiento. Sugiero que los cuatro autores acomodan la tendencia analítica de bifurcar la realidad y requerir posibilidades entre altenativas excluyentes. También alego que ellos tratan a la razón como si esta fuese generada por medio de una “mente de ningún lugar.” La filosofía antropológica, sugiero, nos da una muy necesitada base somática que controlaría puntos de vista sobre la razón demasiado optimistas (Dixon, Simon, Russell) o interpretaciones de la mente excesivamente plásticas (Morgan). También puede proveer un testimonio que podría ayudarnos a entender porqué los homínidos (incluso los modernos) se sienten tan atraídos por las dicotomías, y porqué tenemos tantos problemas reconciliando incompatibilidades aparentes cuando intentamos comprender la naturaleza del deporte y su valor.

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Essay versuche ich die Grenzen der analytischen Denkrichtung für deren Gebrauch in der Sportphilosophie aufzuzeigen, sowie die Sackgassen zu denen ihre Analysen führen können. Alternativ hierzu befürworte ich eine Philosophie der Komplementarität, d.h. einen Standpunkt der gegenüber Zweiteilungen der Welt und anderen vereinfachenden Darstellungen der Welt skeptisch ist und somit die Ganzheit nicht aus dem Blick verliert. Eine Philosophie der Komplementarität bewegt sich stets im Bereich von Ambivalenzen, Paradoxien, graduellen Unterschieden, Tendenzen, Mixturen, Polaritäten, Spannungen, Komplexitäten, Übergängen und allen anderen Formen der Unordnung. Es bleibt anzumerken, dass dieser Standpunkt z. T. aus Arbeiten der empirischen Wissenschaften entstanden ist. Komplementarität liefert daher ein Paradigma, dass quer durch alle Disziplinen von Nutzen sein kann, also auch für die Sportphilosophie.

Um zu zeigen weshalb analytisches Denken in der Sport[wissenschafts]literatur zu Sackgassen führt, untersuche ich die epistemologische Debatte über den „weiten Internalismus”, wie sie unter Beteiligung von Russell, Dixon, Simon, und Morgan geführt wurde. Als Argument für die Behauptung, dass jene nur äußerst unfruchtbare Patt-Situationen erzeugen, dient die Tatsache, dass sie keine dritte Option anbieten; vielmehr verhindern ihre analytischen Werkzeuge und Grundregeln deren Offenlegung. Ich behaupte, dass jene vier Autoren sich mit der analytischen Tendenz abgefunden haben die Realität zu zweiteilen, und dass sie weiterer Wahlmöglichkeiten neben den begrenzten Alternativen bedürfen. Ich behaupte ferner, dass sie die Vernunft so darstellen, als ob sie von einen „Geist aus dem Nirgendwo” erzeugt worden sei. Die Philosophische Anthropologie, so meine Vermutung, liefert die dringend benötigte somatische Fundierung, die zu einer Begrenzung der überschwänglich optimistischen Sicht auf die Vernunft (Dixon, Simon, Russell) oder der allzu plastischen Interpretation des Verstandes (Morgan) führt. Dies könnte auch Hinweise zu einem Verständnis liefern warum Hominiden (auch moderner Prägung) sich von Dichotomien so angezogen fühlen und warum wir solche Probleme haben, die im Hinblick auf das Wesen und die Werte des Sports offensichtlichen Unverträglichkeiten in Einklang zu bringen.

KEYWORDS:

• Analytic Philosophy
• paradigms
• ambiguity
• dualism

Notes

1. Most philosophers, as McNamee has noted (McNamee 2007, 3), look for distinctions or differences. Analytic philosophy takes this as one of its prime missions. It looks for foundational differences, logical alternatives, basic options, a priori possibilities. Whether one is entirely comfortable with the way such procedures are carried out or with the conclusions that are reached is another matter. But even those who do not want to end their research with analytic conclusions may admit that some analytic-tending ‘clearing of the brush’ may still be a good way to begin.

2. The relationship works both ways. Analytic philosophers also borrow methodologies from other schools of thought. Kelly noted that ‘some evidence for the value of a phenomenological approach to philosophy can be found in the fact that even traditional analytic philosophers, the sworn enemies of all things continental, sometimes endorse a descriptive – which is to say, broadly speaking, a phenomenological – methodology’ (Kelly 2000, 3).

3. Some of the work of Roberts (e.g. 1998) and Burke (e.g. 2006) would likely represent this point of view. In following the lead of Rorty, they discount all forms of foundational, dichotomous thinking. The Nietzsche-inspired analysis of ‘infinite games’ by Carse (1986) might also qualify in this regard.

4. The incompatibility thesis, as is commonly known, specifies that one cannot win (or lose) a game unless one plays it, and one cannot play it unless one follows its rules. Thus cheating (or otherwise failing to play by the rules) and winning are incompatible.

5. Roberts's 1998 critique of Morgan is a case in point.

6. Mealeau-Ponty, Maurice. 1942/1963. The Structure of Behaviour. Translated by Alden L. Fisher. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

7. I say this, not so much because people have stopped writing about epistemological options (See e.g. Burke 2006.), but because it is difficult to see how the issue will ever be adjudicated, given the exclusive options favoured by analytic-tending analyses.

8. Dixon (2003) literally recruits Simon to his realist position, and Simon (2004) does not resist. Russell (2004) is more difficult to pin down. While he identifies realism as a ‘respectable position’, he also argues in favour of a brand of moral naturalism that is ‘constituted by more basic natural social, psychological, and biological properties’ (144). These sorts of contingent factors would tend to support Morgan's scepticism, though in Russell's case they are related to human nature, something that is fairly stable. For Morgan, contingency is grounded in history, politics and other social factors.

9. As far as I can tell, all four authors are comfortable with this either-or resolution proposed by Morgan. While conciliatory in tone, the arguments of each author ultimately defend either realism or antirealism to the exclusion of the other option. This shows among other things that, for all the serious differences among and between these authors, they are all comfortable with analytic ways of conceptualising the world. In this sense, they are more like one another than different.

10. The term ‘somatic’ comes from the Greek soma, meaning ‘body’. The adjectives somatic and asomatic or non-somatic have been adopted by some philosophers (See e.g. Boisvert 1998) to describe philosophers or philosophic procedures that seem oblivious to the human condition as ‘embodied’.

11. I am least comfortable with this sweeping claim when I look at Russell's work. Of the four, he is the only one who seems to acknowledge our rootedness in biology. By way of contrast, Morgan writes as if we are clay shaped almost entirely by the vicissitudes and hegemonies of culture. Dixon and Simon simply do not address biological or anthropological concerns, thereby implying they are uninteresting, irrelevant or both.

12. For an interesting analysis of other potentially harmful vestigial structures, see Booth et al. (2002).