A Soft Gynocentric Critique of the Practice of Modern Sport

Abstract

In this article we propose a philosophical critique of two general, but not exhaustive, approaches to gender studies in sport, namely gynocentric feminism and humanist feminism. We argue that both approaches are problematic because they fail clearly to distinguish or articulate their epistemological and ideological commitments. In particular, humanist feminists articulate the human condition using the sex/gender dichotomy, which fails to account adequately for gendered subjectivity. For them gender difference is a contingent feature of humanity developed through socialisation. As a result, it seems that what humanist feminists regard as women in their natural ‘state’ is in itself ideological. The generic ‘human’ condition is by no means a neutral condition but rather an idea tarnished by gender history characterised by the masculine. Consequently, humanist feminists uncritically argue for inclusion in sport, with access to an equal share of the human goods available, without carefully problematising the ideological nature of the practice. Gynocentric feminists also subscribe to the sex/gender dichotomy, suggesting however, that gender subjectivity is the result of a biological imperative. For gynocentric feminists, sexual difference provides authority for adjudicating between a separate and different male and female epistemology. Accordingly, gynocentric feminists commit the genetic fallacy by condemning sport to a masculine activity and therefore incompatible with feminine value in light of its male ancestry. ‘Soft’ gynocentrism does not fully sanction a conception of sport which allows only traditionally female values to flourish, or at least the reason for celebrating such sports would focus upon the goods and values therein. In other words, the value of the practice for either men or women is to be found, following MacIntyre (1985), in the internal goods that characterise the particular practice. Such internal goods are, as MacIntyre argues, goods of the practice and do not belong to any particular gender or group.

Resumen

En este artículo proponemos una crítica filosófica de dos enfoques generales, pero no exhaustivos, de los estudios del género en el deporte, en concreto el feminismo ginocéntrico y el feminismo humanista. Argumentamos que ambos enfoques son problemáticos porque claramente fallan a la hora de distinguir o articular sus compromisos epistemológicos e ideológicos. En particular, las feministas humanistas articulan la condición humana utilizando la dicotomía del sexo/género, la cual no puede explicar adecuadamente una subjetividad con género. Para ellas la diferencia del género es un rasgo contingente de la humanidad que se desarrolló por medio de la socialización. Como resultado, parece que lo que las feministas humanistas consideran como mujeres en su “estado” natural es ideológico en sí mismo. La condición “humana” genérica no es en ningún caso una condición neutra, sino más bien una idea deslustrada por la historia del género caracterizada por lo masculino. Consecuentemente, las humanistas feministas argumentan de manera no crítica por la inclusion del deporte, con acceso a una porción igual de los bienes humanos dispobibles, sin problematizar cuidadosamente la naturaleza ideológica de la práctica. Las feministas ginocéntricas también se apuntan a la dicotomía del sexo/género, sugiriendo sin embargo, que la subjetividad del género es el resultado de un imperativo biológico. Para las feministas ginocéntricas la diferencia sexual proporciona autoridad para adjudicar entre las separadas y diferentes epistemologías masculina y femenina. De esta manera, las feministas ginocéntricas cometen la falacia genética al condenar al deporte como actividad masculina y por ende incompatible con el valor femenino en vista de su ascendencia masculina. El ginocentrismo “suave” no aprueba totalmente de una concepción del deporte, que permite prosperar sólamente valores tradicionalmente femeninos, o al menos la razón para celebrar tales deportes enfocaría los bienes y valores ahí incluidos. En otras palabras, el valor de la práctica bien para los hombres o para las mujeres se encuentra, siguiendo a Macinyre (1985), en los bienes internos que caracterizan la práctica particular en cuestión. Tales bienes internos son, como MacIntyre (1985) argumenta, bienes de la práctica misma y no pertenecen a ningún género o grupo particular.

Zusammenfassung

In diesem Artikel liefern wir eine philosophische Kritik im Hinblick auf zwei allgemeine Ansätze, ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit, aus dem Themenbereich Gender Studies im Sport; genauer gesagt gynozentrischer -und humanistischer Feminismus. Wie behaupten, dass beide Ansätze problematisch sind, da sie nicht klar ihre epistemologischen und ideologischen Bindungen offenlegen. Insbesondere betonen humanistische Feministinnen, in Bezug auf die Sex/Gender Dichotomie, die conditio humana, dies verkennt jedoch die geschlechtsspezifische Subjektivität. Ihnen erscheinen die Gender-Unterschiede als kontingentes Merkmal, das sich im Zuge der Sozialisation entwickelt. Daher scheint das, was humanistische Feministinnen als Frau im natürlichen ‘Zustand’ betrachten, selbst als ideologisch. Die allgemeine Grundbedingung des „Menschlichen“ ist keineswegs nur eine neutrale Bedingung, sondern eher eine Idee, die durch maskulin geprägte Gender-Historie kompromittiert wurde. Folglich fordern humanistische Feministinnen unkritisch eine Partizipation am Sport um an den verfügbaren menschlichen Gütern gleichermaßen beteiligt zu werden, indes ohne die ideologische Natur dieser Praxis sorgfältig zu problematisieren. Gynozentrische Feministinnen beziehen sich auch auf die Sex/Gender Dichotomie, jedoch mit der Maßgabe, dass die genderspezifische Subjektivität das Resultat eines biologischen Imperativs ist. Gynozentrischen Feministinnen liefern die sexuellen Unterschiede ein Recht zur Unterscheidung zwischen einer männlichen und weiblichen Erkenntnistheorie. Dementsprechend begehen die gynozentrischen Feministinnen, mit der Verurteilung des Sports als maskuliner Aktivität und daher unvereinbar mit femininen Werten einen genetischen Fehlschluss. „Weicher“ Gynozentrismus ist uneins mit einem Sportverständnis, welches nur traditionelle weibliche Werte fördert, es sei denn die Anerkennung solcher Sportarten würde sich aus immanenten Gütern und Werten legitimieren lassen. Mit anderen Worten, der Wert der Praxis, sei es für Männer oder Frauen, ist nach MacIntyre (1985) in den internen Gütern zu finden, die diese spezielle Praxis ausmachen. Derartige interne Güter sind MacIntyre zufolge, Güter der Praxis und gehören nicht zu einem speziellen Geschlecht oder Gruppe.

KEYWORDS:

• sex
• gender
• masculinity
• femininity
• feminism
• value

Acknowledgements

We are particularly grateful to Paul Davis for his generous contribution to the ideas developed in this paper; to those present at the annual meeting of the British Philosophy of Sport Association's annual conference in Stanley, County Durham, May 2005; and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments.

Notes

1. We are grateful to Michael Burke for this idea.

2. We are not here buying into a false universalism about men as a homogenous category that share all the same values, however; rather we are in part reflecting the tradition of dichotomising and generalising that has shaped much, but not all, of gender based research. Later in the paper, we argue that clumsy generalisations and dichotomies have been singularly unhelpful.

3. For a review of the current condition of female equality, see Greer 1999.

4. We are indebted to Paul Davis for use of an unpublished paper in expressing the putative characteristics of male sport.

5. Essentialism refers to the attribution of a fixed essence seen as residing in female biology, nature or/and psychological characteristics.

6. Caudwell (2003, 384) in the sports context has argued that the examination of sexual desire and sexual orientation can serve to undermine and ‘problematise’ the sex/gender binary; certain behaviour, or features, ‘dislocates the compulsory woman-feminine-heterosexual order and destabilises the binary of sexed bodies’.

7. We refer here to Iris Marion Young's classification of feminism into humanist and gynocentric feminism.

8. Environmentalism is a term utilised by Gatens (1996) to refer to the use of re-education and re-learning of patriarchal codes in order to neutralise sex difference.

9. There is clearly a wide range of approaches within these discipline areas and it is not our intention to explore the various types of deconstructionalist feminism or their diverse and often contrasting characteristics. In particular, there are a number of feminist writers who have attempted to move beyond binary oppositions, for example Gatens (1996), Butler (2004), Prokhovnik (1999) and Caudwell (2003). Such writers make welcome inroads into the debate about the complexity of the relationships between nature and nurture and sex and gender, but we argue that the proscriptions that arise from these analyses tend to promote ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ approaches. In other words, at a theoretical level there are less binary oppositions, but the political prescriptions tend to be either/or.

10. We refer back to the illustration provided by Germaine Greer above.

11. Thanks to Paul Davis for this idea.

12. For an extensive catalogue of virtues, see Pincoffs (1986, 76 – 7).

13. Simon Barnes, The Times (London), 16 April 2005.

14. According to Fotheringham's biography of Simpson (2003), these words may not actually have been uttered by Simpson himself but subsequently attributed to him as evidence of his courageous character.

15. Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2005.