No Harm, No Foul? Justifying Bans On Safe Performance-Enhancing Drugs

Abstract

Scholars such as Simon (2007; 2004) and Loland (2002) as well as the authors of the World Anti-Doping Code (2001) argue that using performance-enhancing substances is unhealthy and unfairly coercive for other athletes. Critics of the anti-doping position such as Hoberman (1995), Miah et al. (2005) and Tamburrini (2007) are quick to argue that such prohibitions, even though well-intended, constitute an unjustifiable form of paternalism. However, advocates for both of these positions assume that preserving good health and, conversely, avoiding health-related harms, lie at the centre of the debate. Given the apparent stalemate in the debate over the validity of health concerns on performance-enhancing drugs, in this essay, I investigate ethical issues of ‘harm-free’ pharmaceutical performance enhancement. Beginning with the hypothesis that a harm-free performance-enhancing drug may be produced in the future, I ask if there would still be compelling reasons for prohibiting such a drug. I address this question by providing two arguments against allowing athletes to use pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs – the damage to the testing and contesting of sport and the loss of internal goods that are intrinsically satisfying. These two arguments taken together, I argue, are sufficient to sustain the prohibition of pharmaceutical performance-enhancing drugs without citing their harmful side effects.

Resumen

Académicos como Simon (2007;2004) y Loland (2002) así como los autores del Código Anti-Dopaje Mundial (2001)[World Anti-doping Code] argumentan que el uso de sustancias que mejoran el rendimiento deportivo es nocivo para la salud y coacciona injustamente a otros atletas. Críticos de la posición anti-dopaje tales como Hoberman (1995), Miah (2005) y Tamburrini (2007) no pierden el tiempo a la hora de argumentar que tales prohibiciones, a pesar de ser bien intencionadas, constituyen una forma injustificable de paternalismo. Sin embargo, los partidarios de ambas posiciones asumen que el cuidar la salud y, a la inversa, el evitar daños a la salud, son el meollo de la cuestión. Dadas las aparentes tablas en el debate sobre la validez de las inquietudes sobre la salud en cuanto a las drogas que aumental el rendimiento deportivo, en este ensayo investigo los temas éticos involucrados en la mejora farmacéutica del rendimiento deportivo “sin daños”. Empezando con la hipótesis de que una droga sin daños que mejora el rendimiento deportivo puede ser producida en el futuro, pregunto si podría haber todavía razones convincentes para prohíbir tal droga. Encaro esta cuestión mediante dos argumentos que rechazan permitir que los atletas utilicen drogas farmacéuticas que mejoran el rendimiento deportivo – el daño que se causa a la prueba y al concurso en el deporte [distinción basada en el artículo de S. Kretchmar “From Test to Contest”] y la pérdida de bienes internos que son intrínsecamente gratificantes. Estos dos argumentos tomados conjuntamente, adujo, son suficientes para mantener la prohibición sobre drogas farmacéuticas que mejoran el rendimiento deportivo sin tener en cuenta las secuelas perniciosas.

Zusammenfassung

Wissenschaftler wie Simon (2007; 2004) und Loland (2002) sowie die Autoren des Welt-Anti-Doping-Codes (2001) argumentieren, die Verwendung leistungssteigernder Substanzen sei ungesund und stelle einen ungerechtfertigten Zwang für andere Sportler dar. Kritiker der Anti-Doping-Position wie Hoberman (1995), Miah (2005) und Tamburrini (2007) argumentieren kurzerhand, dass solche Verbote, obwohl gut gemeint, eine nicht zu rechtfertigende Form von Paternalismus bilden. Allerdings sind sich Fürsprecher beider Positionen einig, dass die Erhaltung der Gesundheit und umgekehrt die Vermeidung gesundheitlicher Schäden ein Kernpunkt der Debatte sind. Angesichts der scheinbar festgefahrenen Debatte über die Bedeutung der Gesundheit in Bezug auf leistungssteigernde Mittel, werde ich in diesem Aufsatz die ethischen Fragen von „schadloser“ pharmazeutischer Leistungssteigerung untersuchen. Ausgehend von der Hypothese, dass ein schadloses leistungssteigerndes Medikament in Zukunft erzeugt werden könne, frage ich, ob es auch dann noch zwingende Gründe für das Verbot eines solchen Medikaments geben würde. Ich bearbeite diese Frage, indem ich zwei Argumente gegen den Gebrauch pharmazeutisch leistungssteigernder Mittel durch Athleten anführe – die Beeinträchtigung des Austestens und Wettkämpfens im Sport und der Verlust von inneren Gütern, die intrinsisch befriedigend sind. Diese beiden Argumente zusammen, so behaupte ich, sind ausreichend, um das Verbot von pharmazeutischen leistungssteigernden Mitteln aufrechtzuerhalten, ohne auf ihre schädlichen Nebenwirkungen einzugehen zu müssen.

Résumé

Des chercheurs comme Simon (2007; 2004) et Loland (2002) aussi bien que les auteurs du Code anti-dopage mondial (2001) soutiennent que l'utilisation de substances améliorant la performance est malsaine et injustement coercitive pour d'autres athlètes. Les critiques de la position anti-dopage comme Hoberman (1995), Miah (2005) et Tamburrini (2007) répondent immédiatement que de telles interdictions, bien que bien intentionnées, constituent une forme injustifiable de paternalisme. Cependant, les défenseurs de ces deux positions estiment que la préservation de la santé et, au contraire, le rejet des atteintes à la santé, sont au centre du débat. Étant donné l'impasse apparente du débat sur la validité de la question sanitaire en ce qui concerne les produits dopants, j'examine dans cet essai les questions éthiques posées par l'amélioration pharmaceutique de la performance sans effet négatif. Je développe cette question en fournissant deux arguments contre l'autorisation donnée aux athlètes d'utiliser des produits dopants : l'altération de la rencontre sportive et la perte des productions internes donnant intrinsèquement satisfaction. Je démontre que ces deux arguments pris ensemble sont suffisants pour pouvoir lever l'interdiction des produits dopants pharmaceutiques sans avoir àévoquer leurs effets secondaires nuisibles.

Keywords:

• Performance-enhancing drugs
• doping
• anti-doping bans

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Scott Kretchmar for his help on numerous revisions and input, the journal's editor Mike McNamee for his patience in helping revise this article, and also the anonymous reviewers for their valuable input.

Notes

1. Central to this paper is the distinction between doping and performance enhancement. While often conflated, this paper is not addressing the issue regarding doping in sport, which is the practice of using specific prohibited substances and methods for improved performance. Rather, this paper explores the ethical issues of allowing the use of pharmaceutical performance enhancers by athletes. While many pharmaceutical performance enhancers such as steroids and EPO (erythropoietin) are currently considered doping by many sporting governing bodies, the term doping as it is currently used refers to a practice embedded within a large social context. Furthermore, since doping is, by definition, against the rules, sport philosophers struggle to untangle the inherent ethical problems of performance enhancement from the problems that arise from doping, which include cheating, deception and accepted social values. Rather than exploring the issue of doping, this paper explores only the ethical arguments regarding the use of pharmaceutical substances to enhance an athlete's performance in sport.

2. Although inconclusive, scientific evidence indicates both steroids and erythropoietin can be harmful to athletes if used at certain levels.

3. I define pharmaceutical enhancement as the use of any controlled substance whose use enhances performance and is not needed to address an athlete's medical condition.

4. While both genetic enhancement and non-pharmaceutical performance-enhancing methods are important issues under the topic of performance enhancement, I am limiting my subject only to the use of harm-free pharmaceutical interventions. However, as I will argue later, my conclusions could be used to address both new technological advances in performance enhancement such as genetic and harm-free pharmaceutical enhancement.

5. While an argument for preserving the test sounds at first a resurrection of formalism, this is not the route I am suggesting. In the tradition of broad internalism provided by Simon (2004) and Russell (1999), I rely on a broader understanding of sport where the tests can change while the excellences deemed central to the test are preserved. I hold that tests can be altered, but the alterations should not corrupt the excellences the sport intends to test.

6. I will admit that this belief is a bias on my part and that I have found no empirical data to either confirm or deny this position. It does however seem the most believable given the various factors in surrounding their use.

7. This references the previous belief that the majority of athletes would not take performance-enhancing drugs or would not have access to them.

8. There is some debate as to the specificity of internal goods (see McNamee 1995). Some internal goods may be specific to a single sport, like the feeling of hitting a home run in a World Series, but some internal goods may apply to the practice of sport as a whole, such as triumph over an opponent in a shared contest. MacIntyre indicates that football has its own internal goods, but as McNamee points out, many of these goods are not specific just to football (MacIntyre 2007, 187; McNamee 1995, 79). Rather they are part of sports in general. I agree that both exist. When important, I will make clear when I am referring to sport-specific internal goods or to goods internal to sport in general. Otherwise, I will use the term internal goods inclusively to indicate both kinds.

9. I do concede that some elite athletes place less emphasis on the intrinsic value of sport than do athletes at other levels. However, this level of sport is only a small percentage of all sport. It is also likely the case that many athletes even at the elite level still place a high degree of emphasis on the intrinsically valuable aspects of sport.

10. Some examples of the characteristics of WADA's ‘spirit of sport’ are ethics, fair play, honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and education, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rules and laws, respect for self and other participants, courage, community and solidarity (2008).