Conventionalism Revisited

Abstract

Conventionalism in sport philosophy has been rejected as unable to provide a theory of normativity and as collapsing in ethical relativism, but this criticism is rather imprecise about its target, which invites doubt about the legitimacy of the concept of conventionalism described by its critics. Instead, a more charitable and legitimate account of conventionalism is proposed, one that draws inspiration from conventionalism in axiomatic geometry and is able to avoid the counterarguments directed against conventionalism. This new model allows for a number of non-conventional elements of sport, namely the definition of sport and certain central moral norms, while at the same time arguing that normativity in sport is not exhausted by them, which leaves athletic communities with authority over a broad range of norms.

El convencionalismo en el deporte has sido rechazado por no ser capaz de proporcionar una teoría de la normatividad así como por decaer en un relativismo ético. Pero esta crítica es bastante imprecisa en cuanto al objetivo que busca, lo cual invita a dudar sobre la legitimidad del concepto del convencionalismo tal y como es descrito por sus críticos. Alternativamente, se propone una versión del convencionalismo más caritativa y legítima; una inspirada en el convencionalismo de la geometría axiomática, y que es capaz de evitar las réplicas dirigidas contral el mismo. Este modelo permite incorporar un número de elementos del deporte no convencionales, específicamente la definición del deporte y ciertas normas morales centrales a la par que permite argüir que la normatividad en el deporte no se ve agotada por ellos, lo cual confiere a las comunidades atléticas autoridad sobre un amplio ámbito de normas.

Der Konventionalismus ist in der Sportphilosophie abgelehnt worden, weil er als normative Theorie unbrauchbar zu sein scheint und weil er in einen ethischen Relativismus mündet. Aber diese Kritik bleibt bezogen auf die Zielsetzung eher ungenau, wodurch Zweifel an der Rechtmäßigkeit der Kritik am Konventionalismusbegriff aufkommen. Stattdessen wird ein nützlicheres und legitimeres Verständnis von Konventionalismus vorgeschlagen, eines, das angelehnt ist am Konventionalismus der axiomatischen Geometrie und das die Gegenargumente, die gegen den Konventionalismus ins Feld geführt werden, vermeidet. Dieses neue Modell lässt eine Reihe von unkonventionellen Elementen, bezogen auf die Definition von Sport und bestimmten zentralen moralischen Normen, zu, wobei man gleichzeitig sagen kann, dass Normativität im Sport nicht nur aus moralischen Normen besteht. Somit bleibt die Entscheidungsgewalt über eine Vielzahl von Normen in der Hand der Sportverbände.

Dans la philosophie du sport, le conventionnalisme a été rejeté comme étant incapable de fournir une théorie de la normativité et en raison de sa dissolution dans le relativisme éthique, mais cette critique est relativement imprécise quant à sa cible et jette un doute sur la légitimité de la notion de conventionnalisme décrite par ses détracteurs. A l’opposé, un bilan plus positif et légitime du conventionnalisme est proposé ici, qui s'inspire du conventionnalisme de la géométrie axiomatique et est en mesure d'éviter les contre-arguments dirigés contre lui. Ce nouveau modèle rend possible un certain nombre d'éléments non conventionnels du sport, à savoir la définition du sport et de certaines normes morales centrales, tout en faisant valoir qu’ils n’épuisent pas la normativité du sport, ce qui laisse les communautés sportives en situation de s’imposer sur un large spectre de normes.

KEYWORDS:

• conventionalism
• communities of principle
• Dworkin
• conventions

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank William Morgan, Lucie Thibault and Mike McNamee, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their feedback. Any error in this paper is the sole responsibility of the author.

Notes

Gaylord Perry, a former pitcher in Major League Baseball, is believed to have used on a consistent basis spitballs, which are illegal types of pitches. As Lehman (1979) points out, even if Perry indeed violated the rules very frequently, it would be difficult to argue that Gaylord Perry never actually played the game of baseball because of this reason.

‘Cultural context’ refers here to the context of the values around which athletic communities are built. To follow D'Agostino's (1981) example, North American professional basketball is built in a cultural context that considers competitiveness and aggression as valuable, superseding the original non-violent nature of the game.

This claim might be considered as incompatible with the historically contingent nature of sport, but this incompatibility is only apparent. Any human being is subject to a set of fundamental moral norms protecting life, well-being, dignity and so on, regardless of whether she is engaged in such a historical contingent practice or not. If that were not the case, then engaging in such a practice would legitimise breaking these norms. Of course, it is possible to claim that while those practising sport are subject to these norms, the moral norms themselves do not have to be considered part of sport. However, there is something unpalatable about the statement that sport is inherently amoral and that only an outside influence can make it conform to morality. That being said, it makes more sense to accept the fundamental moral norms as sport norms.

The fact that this account allows for universal moral norms makes it compatible with moral realism. As a result, this version of sport conventionalism is able to maintain Dixon's distinction between ethical principles and conventional norms.

‘Rationality’ here refers to the basic ability of human beings to act according to goals, instead of causes. Seen as creations of rational beings, conventions have a purpose, which is to reflect a communal axiological view about sport and the world, and are not just pointless occurrences.

It is important to point out that this statement does not require participants to wholeheartedly embrace all the values of the community organising the game. Instead, it should be understood as claiming that players have to commit only to those values that make the game possible. Turning again to D'Agostino's (1981) example, if the professional North American community builds this game around aggression and competitiveness, then players have an obligation to accept these values. Furthermore, this commitment needs to be manifested through their actions during the game, allowing for cases of participants superficially committing to these values without any deeper form of attachment to them. As it is defined here, this obligation allows for cases of conscientious objectors, i.e. participants who do not agree with the values around which the game is played and who decide to undermine them through their in-game actions. When all things are considered, the moral superiority of the values they are espousing might override the immorality of their status as free-riders, but this does not undermine the fact that they are taking advantage of the game in order to subvert it, which is morally problematic.