Making Sense of the Philosophy of Sport

Abstract

Beginning from an earlier claim of mine that there was really no such area of study as the philosophy of sport, Part One of the paper reconsiders the place previously given to David Best’s distinction between purposive sports and aesthetic sports. In light of a famous cricketing event in the 1977 contest between England and Australia (‘The Ashes’), in which Derek Randall turned a cartwheel after taking the winning catch, the paper clarifies that not all aesthetically-pleasing events taking place in sporting competitions can be understood as the aesthetic in sport. Then, in Part Two, the force of the claim that philosophy is one subject is explored. The conclusion is that a focus just on the philosophy of sport is necessarily inappropriate, since it will present the student with only cases from sport to then apply to sport. Rather, one’s understanding must be informed by (much of) the breadth of philosophy. Charles Travis’s view of occasion-sensitivity provides a clear example of appropriately contextual appeal. Part Three of the paper returns to the need for an institutional account of sport, one recognizing that there is no one occasion on which a particular sport is played; and hence no single set of conditions which can uniquely identify that sport. Thus, soccer played with one’s children typically differs from elite soccer: but both are (genuinely) soccer. When one turns to the appreciation of sport (in the light of Stephen Mumford’s excellent Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a]), one recognizes that, in order to genuinely appreciate sport, one cannot detach oneself from the outcome as completely as Mumford’s extreme purist seems to. But reflection on that case may also return us to contextualism by moving us away from attachments to the complete or the exceptionless in our accounts of spectating as of sport: maybe there is no one thing that occurs in all the relevant cases.

Comenzando por una afirmación mía anterior de que no existe realmente un área de estudio como la filosofía del deporte, la parte uno de este artículo reconsidera la posición otorgada con anterioridad a la distinción establecida por David Best entre deportes de finalidad y deportes estéticos. Siguiendo el famoso evento de cricket del enfrentamiento entre Inglaterra y Australia de 1977 (“The Ashes”), en el que Derek Randall dio una voltereta lateral tras realizar la recepción que les dio la victoria, el artículo aclara que no todos los hechos estéticamente agradables que tienen lugar en la competición deportiva pueden entenderse como la estética del deporte. Luego, en la parte dos, se analiza la fuerza de la afirmación de que la filosofía es una disciplina. La conclusión es que centrarse sólo en la filosofía del deporte es necesariamente inapropiado, pues ello presentará al estudiante sólo casos del deporte que luego se aplican al deporte. Sin embargo, la habilidad de comprender debe ser formada por una mirada filosófica (mucho más) amplia. La posición de Charles Travis respecto a la percepción ambiental (“occasion-sensivity”) proporciona un ejemplo claro de apelación contextual. La parte tres de este artículo retorna a la necesidad de una propuesta institucionalizada del deporte, una que reconozca que no hay ni una sola ocasión en que un deporte concreto es practicado; y por lo tanto ningún conjunto único de condiciones puede identificar ese deporte de modo único. Así, el fútbol jugado con nuestros hijos es de un tipo diferente al fútbol de élite: pero ambos son (propiamente) fútbol. Cuando se presta atención a la apreciación del deporte (a la luz del excelente Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a] de Stephen Mumford), se reconoce que, para apreciar de forma adecuada el deporte, no podemos desarraigarnos del resultado de forma tan completa como parece que lo hace el purista extremo de Mumford. Pero la capacidad de reflexionar en ese caso puede devolvernos al contextualismo al liberarnos de los lazos con lo completo o lo que no tiene excepciones tanto en nuestras concepciones del hecho de ser espectadores, como del deporte: quizás no hay ninguna cosa que se mantenga en todos los casos dados.

Dieses Papier geht von einem früheren Text von mir aus, in dem ich erklärte, dass es das Forschungsgebiet einer Philosophie des Sports nicht wirklich gibt. Im ersten Teil dieses Papiers wird der Stellenwert erörtert, der zuvor David Bests Unterscheidung von zweckmäßigen und ästhetischen Sportarten eingeräumt worden war. Angesichts des berühmten Ereignisses, als während eines Cricket-Spiels 1977 zwischen England und Australien, Derek Radall nach dem zum Sieg führenden Fang ein Rad geschlagen hatte, zeigt der Text, dass nicht alle ästhetisch anregenden Ereignisse in sportlichen Wettkämpfen als Ästhetik des Sports gefasst werden können. Im zweiten Teil des Papiers wird die Tragweite einer philosophischen Untersuchung des Themas hinterfragt. Die Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass der Fokus einer Sportphilosophie auf das Thema unzureichend ist, da sie nur Beispiele präsentiert, die dann als charakteristisch für den Sport gelten sollen. Vielmehr muss Sport informiert durch die ganze Breite der Philosophie verstanden werden. Die Vorstellung der Kontext-Sensibilität von Charles Travis bietet ein Vorbild für eine geeignete kontext-gebundene Betrachtung. Der dritte Teil des Papiers kehrt zu der These zurück, dass es zwar eine institutionalisierten Analyseweise von Sport bedarf; jedoch einer, die darauf beruht, dass es nicht ein eindeutiges Set von Bedingungen gibt, die definieren, was Sport ist. Der Fußball, den Kinder spielen, unterscheidet sich in der Regel deutlich vom Elitefußball – trotzdem ist beides (genuin) Fußball. Wenn man also die Aufmerksamkeit im Lichte der exzellenten Studie von Stephen Mumford “Sport: Ästhetik, Ethik, Emotion” (2012a) richtet, so zeigt sich, dass man sich, um Sport wirklich einschätzen zu können, dem Ereignis nicht, wie Mumford in einer extremen puristischen Weise, entziehen kann. Aber auch die Reflexion auf diesen Fall führt uns zurück zu der Frage nach der Bedeutung von Kontexten, während sie uns wegbringt von der Idee, bei der Betrachtung des Sports ein Ganzes, ausnahmelos in den Blick bekommen zu können. Vielleicht gibt es hier nichts, was all die relevanten Fälle vereint.

À partir d'une de mes affirmations antérieures qu'il n'y avait vraiment pas de domaine d'étude que la philosophie du sport , la première partie de cet article revient sur la place donnée précédemment à la distinction de David Best entre les sports raisonnés et des sports esthétiques. À la lumière d'un célèbre événement de cricket dans le concours de 1977 entre l'Angleterre et l'Australie (« The Ashes » ), dans lequel Derek Randall a fait la roue après avoir reçu la balle gagnante, l’article précise que pas tous les événements esthétiquement satisfaisant qui ont lieu dans les compétitions sportives peuvent être compris comme l'esthétique du sport. Puis, dans la deuxième partie, la force de l’affirmation que la philosophie est un sujet est questionnée. La conclusion est que de se concentrer seulement sur la philosophie du sport est nécessairement inapproprié, car il sera présenté à l'étudiant seulement des cas de sport à appliquer ensuite au sport. Au contraire, sa compréhension doit être informée par (largement) l'ampleur de la philosophie. L'avis de Charles Travis de l'occasion-sensibilité fournit un exemple clair de recours contextuellement approprié. La troisième partie de l’article renvoie à la nécessité d'un compte-rendu institutionnel du sport, un qui reconnaît qu'il n'y a pas qu’une seule occasion à laquelle un sport en particulier est joué, et donc pas un ensemble unique de conditions qui peuvent identifier de manière unique le sport. Ainsi, le football joué avec les enfants de l'un diffère généralement de football d'élite : mais les deux sont (authentiquement) le football. Quand on se tourne vers l'appréciation du sport (à la lumière de l'excellent Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a]), de Stephen Mumford) , on reconnaît que, afin d'apprécier véritablement le sport, on ne peut pas se détacher du résultat aussi complètement que le puriste extrême de Mumford semble pouvoir le faire. Mais la réflexion sur ce cas peut aussi nous ramener à la contextualisation en nous éloignant des attachements au complet ou au sans-exception dans nos comptes-rendus de spectateurs du sport : peut-être n'y a-t-il pas une seule chose qui se produit dans tous les cas pertinents.

從我過去提出，運動哲學研究領域並不存在的這項論點引入，本文第一部分再論David Best所提出，目的性運動與美學式運動間的區辨。 首先，從1977年英國與澳洲對戰的著名板球賽事中，Derek Randall在勝利的接殺後所表演的側翻而論，本研究闡明並非所有發生在運動競賽中賞心悅目的美感事件，都可被理解為運動中的美學。第二部分則探討哲學是個主體的主張。總結來說，只專注於運動哲學無疑是不適當的，因呈現給學生的僅有運動的實例以及如何應用於運動。更應該做的是，必須以哲學的深度來增進對於此學科的理解。Charles Travis提出的情境感知概念，明確的說明適切的脈絡吸引力為何。本文第三部分則回顧為何需要對運動提出制度性解釋；首先要認知到沒有一個場合是只進行某項特定運動，也因此沒有任何單一條件可以充分定義那項運動。因此，與兒童踢足球雖然通常不同於競技足球，但兩者的確都是足球。當論及運動鑑賞，依據Stephen Muford的精心之作《運動觀賞:美學、倫理與情感》(2012)一書中所提出的想法：為能真正欣賞運動，在觀看運動時不應該如他所描述的純粹主義者一般，全然抽離於賽事的結果；然而反思這個例子也可能使我們落入脈絡主義中。在說明運動鑑賞的理由時，它將我們由涉入轉往追求純粹或無例外規則；事實上，也許沒有一項事物是發生在所有的相關事件裡。

KEYWORDS:

• philosophy of sport
• institutional
• spectatorship
• discipline

Notes

1. This paper began life as a Keynote presentation to the Conference of the International Association of the Philosophy of Sport, in Fullerton California, September 2013. This partly explains both its presentational style and its personal references: to have changed these would have transformed the piece.

2. Reference to McFee:

McFee 1985—LS

McFee 2004a—SRV

McFee 2011a—AJ

McFee 2011b—PAD

McFee 2011c—FER

McFee 2013—OAS

3. In a parallel way, Suits (1995, 17) contrasted officiated sports with judged sports, where the first (like one of Best’s aesthetic sports) ‘… is a performance and so requires judges. The other [officiated sport] is not a performance but a rule-governed interplay of participants, and so requires not judges but law enforcement officers’. (see OAS note 2.)

4. Suits’ are less so! (see OAS note 2).

5. Ideally, one would also remove the shirts, which would prevent what (below) I call ‘rooting’.

6. See also Whiting and Kenna (2013, 124) where it is reported that Randall ‘… used to practice catching sky-ers behind his back’.

7. As ‘… a spontaneous demonstration of a very genuine delight’ (Randall 1984, 67).

8. As Dummett (2010, 5) continues, ‘… mathematics shares with philosophy a difficulty in saying what it is about. Mathematicians do not concern themselves to find any general answer to this question; it is for philosophers to say not only what, in general, philosophy is about, but also what, in general, mathematics is about.’

9. Indeed, the Oxford chair in what, elsewhere, would be physics is still called the chair of Natural Philosophy (the last time I looked).

10. Of course, our discussions should reflect our best empirical understanding—our best account of the relevant science, for example. But that need not count against John Searle’s tendencies to imagine a computer made from (his example) old beer cans. We should give the best account we presently can; but the philosophy should go through on different accounts of the science since, as Popper taught us, claims about science are, by their nature, open to refutation/falsification by events: it is of the nature of science to be refutable. So we cannot build our philosophy on a particular moment of scientific ‘knowledge’, as later events might refute that knowledge-claim. Thus, it makes sense to adopt framework science (say, in evolution or the atomic theory of matter) while not building in, say, Steven Jay Gould’s version of evolutionary theory, in contrast to Richard Dawkins’—or vice versa.

11. Russell Mysticism and Logic (1917)—but see also his sub-title to Our Knowledge of The External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (1926).

12. Similar points might be made for business ethics.

13. When thinking of attempts to define ‘sport’ (and ‘game’), many of us rightly first turn our attention to the works of Bernard Suits (1978, 1995: compare SRV, 17–31). Here, it is interesting that one attempt to augment Suits’s work, from within his formalist tradition, came from Klaus Meier’s view that there were more rules to sport than Suits had initially granted, to include those that specify and regulate ‘… eligibility, admission, training and other pre-contest requirements’ (Meier 1995, 28). With different starting assumptions (in particular, the rejection of the hunt for a definition), the recognition of such ‘auxiliary rules’ (Meier 1995, 28) might have been the beginning of a kind of institutionalism about sport. Equally, one might find the beginnings of such institutionalism in recognizing sport as a practice—had that term not been appropriated by followers of MacIntyre (for discussion, see McFee 2004b).

14. Contrast Frege’s mistaken account of concepts as like fields, needing to be completely bounded (Frege 1960, 159; SRV, 67).

15. Of course, this is a technical usage Mumford invents for this purpose, to draw our attention to what he takes to be a fundamental difference here. Further, Mumford presents his case in terms of team games, for reasons not relevant here: so we can follow him in that respect.

Moreover, as Mumford (2012a, 9) grants, ‘[m]ild partisanship may consist in identifying with a team and following their progress in the media, watching the occasional game that gets televised … There are cases of extreme partisanship with supporters who follow their team home and away, never missing a fixture, adorning their home with memorabilia, thinking and talking of nothing but their team, writing about them and keeping detailed records.’

Mumford is ‘… keen to isolate the traits of purism and partisanship in the abstract even if they appear in mixtures in concrete cases’ (quoted Mumford 2012b, 372). He is clear that the distinction, while drawn sharply in the abstract, may not be realised in practice. More recently, Mumford (2012b, 372) has urged the need for a theory oscillating between ‘[t]he fully-fledged purist [who] sees only the aesthetic aspects of sport and the fully-fledged partisan [who] sees only the competitive aspects …’. In the text, I dispute Mumford’s view of competitive perception as it applies here. But, chiefly, I wish to raise a question-mark over the usefulness of abstractions of this kind from the concrete—while echoing the thought from Austin (1970, 252) that, while ‘… over-simplification is the occupational disease of philosophers’, perhaps such abstraction is actually philosophers’ occupation.

16. Mumford (2012a, 10) is arguing against Dixon 2001 who presented the purist as ‘… someone whose allegiance shifts according to which is currently the best team’ (Dixon is quoted Mumford 2012a, 14 top).

17. Of course, winning and losing is also important in aesthetic sports—but, there, it must be characterised in terms of the manner of performance: for purposive sports, it must simply be within the rules.

18. See again note 17.

19. Episode of Hancock’s Half Hour, ‘Football Pools’, broadcast BBC TV, 27 November, 1959.