Player quotas in elite club football

Abstract

FIFA President Sepp Blatter’s recent attempt to resurrect the 6 + 5 quota for club football which limits the number of home-grown players to six is a protectionist measure at odds with global trends in free trade and freedom of movement. We remain unconvinced that his goals—to arrest the decline in the competitive quality and balance of international football, ensure greater investment in developing native talent and safeguarding national identity—are a problem or served well by such a regulation. We show that the impact of foreign players on national teams is mixed and restrictions are as likely to undermine the quality of national teams as much as they will improve them. Our moral case will show he is wrong to assert that elite club football’s prime agenda ought to be a nationalist one. We conclude that the primary threat to the integrity, competitive balance and cultural significance of football is not labour migration but misplaced financial imperatives that have an overriding impact on shaping football’s mode of production. The root cause for perverse labour practices, which may have a knock-on effect on the quality of some international teams, is due to the scale and uneven distribution of money. It is here, particularly with respect to the power of European ‘super-clubs’ that reform is needed most.

El reciente intento del presidente de la FIFA, Sepp Blatter, por revivir la cuota 6+5 para los clubs de fútbol, que limita el número de jugadores locales a seis, es una medida proteccionista contradictoria con las tendencias globales relativas al comercio libre y la libertad de movimiento. Seguimos sin estar convencidos de que sus objetivos —frenar el descenso de la calidad competitiva y el equilibrio en el fútbol internacional, asegurar una mayor inversión en el desarrollo de talentos autóctono y proteger la identidad nacional — son un problema o sean logrados por dicho reglamento. Mostramos que el impacto de los jugadores extranjeros en las selecciones nacionales es mixto y que las restricciones son muy tan propensas a reducir la su calidad como a aumentarla. Nuestro argumento moral muestra que él está equivocado en afirmar que la principal agenda de los clubes de fútbol debería ser nacionalista. Concluimos que la principal amenaza para la integridad, equilibrio competitivo, y relevancia cultural del fútbol no es la migración laboral, sino los imperativos económicos fuera de lugar que tienen un efecto predominante en la configuración de los modos de producción del futbol. La causa principal de prácticas laborales perversas, que puede tener un efecto en cadena sobre la calidad de algunos equipos internacionales, se debe al nivel y distribución desiguales de dinero. Es aquí, particularmente, en relación con el poder de los “super-equipos” europeos donde más se necesita esa reforma.

FIFA-Präsident Sepp Blatters jüngster Versuch, die ‚6+5’-Regel für den Clubfußball wiedereinzuführen, welche die Zahl der heimischen Spieler auf sechs begrenzt, ist eine protektionistische Maßnahme, die im Widerspruch zu globalen Entwicklungen bzgl. des Freihandels sowie der Bewegungsfreiheit steht. Wir bleiben dabei nicht überzeugt davon, dass seine Ziele – die Verhinderung der Abnahme der Qualität und der Ausgewogenheit im Wettbewerb des internationalen Fußballs, die Versicherung einer größeren Investition in die Entwicklung heimischer Talente und der Schutz nationaler Identität – überhaupt ein Problem darstellen bzw. von dieser Regel gelöst würden. Wir zeigen, dass der Effekt, den ausländische Spieler auf nationale Mannschaften ausüben, gemischt ist und dass Restriktionen genauso wahrscheinlich die Qualität einer nationalen Mannschaft mindern wie sie verbessern könnten. Unser moralische Fall wird zeigen, dass er falsch in der Behauptung liegt, das Hauptagenda des elitären Clubfußballs solle ein nationales sein. Wir schlussfolgern, dass die Hauptbedrohung für die Integrität, das kompetitive Gleichgewicht und die kulturelle Wichtigkeit des Fußballs nicht in Arbeitsmigration, sondern in deplatzierten finanziellen Imperativen liegt, die einen weitreichenden Einfluss auf den Produktionsmodus im Fußball haben. Die Quelle perverser Arbeitspraktiken, die womöglich die Qualität mancher nationaler Mannschaften als Nebenwirkung beeinflussen, ist die Reichweite und ungleiche Verteilung des Geldes. Es ist hier, insbesondere bzgl. der Macht der europäischen ‚Superclubs‘, wo Reformierung am ehesten benötigt wird.

La récente tentative du président de la FIFA Sepp Blatter de ressusciter le quota des 6 + 5 pour le football de club qui limite le nombre de joueurs formés localement à six est une mesure protectionniste à l'encontre des tendances mondiales en matière de libre-échange et de la liberté de mouvement. Nous ne sommes pas convaincus que ses objectifs (arrêter le déclin de la qualité et de l'équilibre concurrentiel du football international, assurent un plus grand investissement dans le développement des talents locaux et la sauvegarde de l’identité nationale) sont un problème ou bien servis par un tel règlement. Nous montrons que l'impact de joueurs étrangers dans les équipes nationales est mixte et les restrictions sont autant susceptibles de porter atteinte à la qualité des équipes nationales que de les améliorer. Notre cas moral va montrer qu'il a tort d'affirmer que l'ordre du jour principal de l'élite du football de club doit être nationaliste. Nous concluons que la principale menace pour l'intégrité, l'équilibre concurrentiel et l'importance culturelle du football n'est pas la migration de la main-d'œuvre, mais les impératifs financiers mal-placés qui ont un impact majeur sur l'élaboration du mode de production de football. La cause profonde des pratiques de travail perverses, qui peuvent avoir un effet secondaire sur ​​la qualité de certaines équipes internationales, est due à l'ampleur et la répartition inégale de l'argent. C'est ici, en particulier en ce qui concerne le pouvoir de « super-clubs » européens que la réforme est le plus nécessaire.

国际足联主席塞普·巴拉特（Sepp Blatter）最近试图恢复俱乐部足球“6＋5模式”将本国球员数量限制为不少于6名的做法是种保护主义措施，它与自由贸易和自由运动的全球趋势相悖。我们不相信他遏制比赛质量的下滑和维护国际足球的平衡，确保为培养本国球员获得更多投资和保护国家认同的目的在这一规则的调控下能得以实现。我们认为，外籍球员对本国球队的影响是多向性的，对它数量的限制既可能提高本国球队的质量，也一样可以降低本国球队的质量。道德分析表明他精英俱乐部足球的首要目的是本国性的断言是错误的。我们觉得对足球的完善、竞争平衡和文化意义的主要威胁不是劳工移民而是对建构足球发展模式有着颠覆性作用的错位的资助规则。对国际球队质量有着连锁反应的不正当的劳工实践的根本原因是规模和资金分配的不均衡，尤其与急需改革的欧洲超级俱乐部王国有关。

Keywords:

• player quotas
• club football
• FIFA
• Sepp Blatter

Notes

1. 69% of Premier league players are ineligible for England, and up to 50% of this group are ineligible for the national team of any European country. See Transfermarket.co.uk online. Available at http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/en/default/gastarbeiterstartseite/basics.html (accessed 12 May 2014).

2. EU footballers are subject to Article 48 of the EC Treaty which allows freedom of movement for workers and entails the non-discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment (European Community, 2002). Clubs affiliated to national associations (including those within the EU) may be subject to further regulation at the national level. For example, the English Football Association (FA) requires all non-EU players over the age of 16 to apply for a work permit to play for a British club. The criteria applied restrict eligibility to elite-level players whose talent is considered to make a significant contribution to improvement of the domestic game (i.e. that nationals cannot, at least in sufficient number). Other Leagues operate similar policies such as non-EU quotas, salary caps and squad size limits.

3. Portugal have qualified in 6 of 14 UEFA Championships (finishing 4th on three occasions and a runner-up place in 2004) and 6/20 qualifications for the World Cup (with a 4th place in 2006 and 3rd place in 1966). Portugal’s current FiFA ranking is 3.

4. Netherlands are currently ranked 15, but have 10/20 World Cup appearances (including 3 as finalist and a 4th position) and 9/14 visits to the UEFA Championships (winning in 1988, coming third on three occasions and 4th once).

5. Ten of the 12 players representing Chelsea’s under-18 side were born in England, with all but one eligible to play for England, which many of them already had at various age group levels. The average age of their initial involvement with the club was just over 11 yrs. Available at http://www.chelseafc.com/ (accessed 12 May 2014).

6. Barcelona offered to pay Messi's medical bills to assist his growth on the condition that he moved to Spain. Messi, with relatives in Catalonia enrolled in the club's youth academy.

7. All member clubs of national federations affiliated with UEFA are subject to regulations that limit the size of their UEFA competition eligible players to a squad of 25 players of which 8 must be ‘locally-trained players’. These players must have been registered with the club (or with another club affiliated to the same national association) for three full seasons, or 36 months, between the age of 15 and 21.

List A players are made up of the following: (1) Slots 1–17: Any player. (2) Slots 18–21: Locally-trained players (association-trained or club-trained). (3) Slots 22–25: Club-trained players. (4)A club-trained player is a player who has spent a total of at least three full seasons with the club between the ages of 15 and 21. An association-trained player is a player who has spent a total of at least three full seasons with clubs affiliated with the same association as his current club between the ages of 15 and 21.

List B is for young players and there is no limit to the number of players that can be submitted on that list. See UEFA.com. Available at http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Regulations/competitions/Regulations/01/94/62/34/1946234_DOWNLOAD.pdf (accessed 12 May 2014).