William J. Morgan’s ‘conventionalist internalism’ approach. Furthering internalism? A critical hermeneutical response

Abstract

Several authors, such as William J. Morgan, John S. Russell and R. Scott Kretchmar, have claimed that the limits between the diverse normative theories of sport need to be revisited. Most of these works are philosophically grounded in Anglo-American philosophical approaches. For instance, William J. Morgan’s proposal is mainly based on Richard Rorty’s philosophy. But he also discusses with some European philosophers like Jürgen Habermas. However, Habermas’ central ideas are rejected by Morgan. The purpose of this paper is to analyse Morgan’s rejection of Habermas’ thought and show that a more appropriate normative of sport that explains better our current sporting world can be achieved by drawing on the German philosopher’s ideas. The plan of this paper is the following. It shall analyse the limits of the distinction between broad internalism and externalism by taking Morgan’s work as its starting point. To do so, firstly, the conventionalist way in which Morgan criticises the limits of interpretivism shall be explained (§2). Secondly, the relationship between Morgan’s proposals and the hermeneutical theories which are at the roots of his proposal shall be brought to light. Thirdly, since Morgan takes Habermas’ hermeneutical ethics to be an example of externalism, the relationship between his theory and Habermas’ ethical account shall be clearly defined. Moreover, Morgan’s proposal shall be criticised in the light of Habermas’ discourse ethics (§3). To conclude, a Habermasian approach in sport ethics shall be described (§4).

Ciertos autores, como William J. Morgan, John S. Russell y R. Scott Kretchmar, han defendido que los límites que existen entre las diversas teorías normativas del deporte deben ser revisados. Muchos de estos trabajos se basan en propuestas filosóficas anglo-americanas. Por ejemplo, la propuesta de William J. Morgan se fundamenta principalmente en la filosofía del Richard Rorty, pero también discute con algunos autores europeos como Jürgen Habermas. Sin embargo, Morgan rechaza las ideas básicas de Habermas. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar este rechazo y mostrar que basándose en el alemán se puede construir una concepción normativa más adecuada del deporte que explique mejor el mundo deportivo actual. El discurrir del artículo será el siguiente. Analizará los límites de la distinción entre internalismo amplio y externalismo tomando la obra de Morgan como punto de partida. Para ello, primero, se explicara el modo convencionalista en que Morgan critica los límites del interpretacionismo (§2). Segundo, se traerá a colación la relación entre la propuesta de Morgan y las teorías hermenéuticas que la sustentan. Tercero, como Morgan concibe la filosofía de Habermas como un ejemplo de externalismo, se definirá claramente la relación entre su teoría y la ética del discurso de Habermas (§3). Para concluir, se ofrecerá una propuesta de ética deportiva habermasiana (§4).

Viele Autoren wie William J. Morgan, John S. Russell und R. Scott Kretchmar haben gefordert, dass die Grenzen zwischen verschiedenen normativen Theorien des Sports überdacht werden müssten. Die meisten dieser Arbeiten haben eine philosophische Grundlage, die von anglo-amerikanischen philosophischen Ansätzen stammt. Zum Beispiel basiert William J. Morgans Ansatz zum größten Teil auf der Philosophie Richard Rortys, aber er nimmt auch Bezug auf manche europäische Philosophen wie Jürgen Habermas. Habermas’ zentrale Ideen werden jedoch von Morgan mit Ablehnung begegnet. Das Ziel dieses Textes ist es, Morgans Ablehnung von Habermas’ Denken zu analysieren und zu zeigen, dass eine angebrachtere Normativität des Sports, die die heutige Welt des Sports besser erklärt, durch die Hinzunahme von Konzepten des deutschen Philosophen erreicht werden kann. Der Aufbau des Textes ist wie folgt: Er wird die Grenzen der Unterscheidung zwischen einem breiten Internalismus sowie Externalismus analysieren, indem Morgans Arbeiten als Ausgangspunkt genommen werden. Um dies zu tun, wird zunächst die konventionalistische Art und Weise beleuchtet, wie Morgan den interpretativen Ansatz kritisiert (§2). Zweitens wird die Beziehung zwischen Morgans Ansätzen und den hermeneutischen Theorien dargestellt, die ihnen zugrunde liegen. Drittens, da Morgan Habermas’ hermeneutische Ethik als einen Fall von Externalismus versteht, wird die Beziehung zwischen seiner Theorie und Habermas’ ethischer Darstellung klar gemacht. Darüber hinaus wird Morgans Ansatz vor dem Hintergrund der Diskursethik von Habermas kritisiert (§3). Zum Schluss wird ein Habermas’scher Ansatz bzgl. Sportethik beschrieben

Plusieurs auteurs , tels que William J. Morgan , John S. Russell et R. Scott Kretchmar , ont affirmé que les limites entre les diverses théories normatives du sport doivent être revues. La plupart de ces œuvres sont philosophiquement ancrées dans les approches philosophiques anglo-américaines. Par exemple, la proposition de William J. Morgan est principalement basée sur la philosophie de Richard Rorty. Mais il argumente aussi avec certains philosophes européens comme Jurgen Habermas. Toutefois, les idées centrales de Habermas sont rejetées par Morgan. Le but de cet article est d'analyser le rejet de Morgan de la pensée d'Habermas et montrer qu’une approche normative plus appropriée du sport qui explique mieux notre monde sportif actuel peut y parvenir en s'appuyant sur ​​les idées du philosophe allemand. Le plan de cet article est le suivant. Il doit analyser les limites de la distinction entre les grands internalisme et externalisme en prenant le travail de Morgan comme point de départ. Pour ce faire, d'une part, la façon conventionnaliste par laquelle Morgan critique les limites de l’interprétativisme sera expliquée (§ 2). Deuxièmement, la relation entre les propositions de Morgan et les théories herméneutiques qui sont à l'origine de sa proposition doit être mise en lumière. En troisième lieu, étant donné que Morgan prend l’éthique herméneutique d’Habermas comme exemple d’externalisme, la relation entre sa théorie et l’éthique d’Habermas doit être clairement définie. En outre, la proposition de Morgan doit être critiquée à la lumière de l'éthique du discours de Habermas (§ 3). Pour conclure, une approche de Habermas à l'éthique sportive sera décrite (§ 4).

好些学者，如威廉·摩根（William J. Morgan）、约翰·罗素（John S. Russell）和司各特·克瑞契玛（R. Scott Kretchmar）都认为体育中多样化的规范理论的局限需要予以重新审视。大多数著作都取道于英美哲学路径，如摩根的观点主要以理查德·罗蒂哲学为基础。尽管他也和欧洲哲学家如哈贝马斯进行过讨论，但是他拒绝接受哈贝马斯的核心思想。本文的目的是分析摩根对哈贝马斯思想的拒受和阐明用以更好解释当前体育世界的更合适的体育规范可以从德国哲学家的观念中获得。文章以摩根的著作为起点分析广义内在主义和外在主义区别的局限。①解析摩根批评解释主义的因袭主义方法；②揭示摩根的观点与作为其观点根源的解释学理论之间的关系；③摩根把哈贝马斯的解释主义伦理看成外在主义的范例，他的理论和哈贝马斯的伦理解释应当进行清晰的界定；并且，摩根的观点应使用哈贝马斯的话语伦理学进行批判。结论：体育伦理中哈贝马斯的方法值得重视。

Keywords:

• sport ethics
• interpretivism
• externalism
• William J. Morgan
• Jürgen Habermas

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Robert Scott Kretchmar for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. The concept ‘social practice’ was taken by sports ethics from Alasdair MacIntyre’s work After Virtue, whereas the concept of interpretation comes from Ronald Dworkin’s work Taking Rights Seriously.

2. However, it was Ronald Dworkin’s thought which inspired John Russell’s paper ‘Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With?’ (1999), which is considered the first interpretivist proposal in philosophy of sport.

3. In fact, Morgan thinks that this objection has ‘certain plausibility’. However, he doubts whether ‘there are any forms of inquiry that transcends all local, social conventions’ (Morgan 2002, 297).

4. Simon’s interpretation of discourse ethics can be seen as a complement of the one offered in this paper. Simon focuses his analysis on the question of the theory of truth (the conventionalism/realism discussion) in order to make an argument for moral realism in philosophy of sport. Rather, this paper focuses less on Habermas’ theory of truth and more on his ethical theory in itself in order to clarify the nature of practical reason and how its different employments relate among themselves.

5. Pawlenka (2005) shows that there is not a clear-cut distinction between the general conception of fairness and fairness in sport. She makes the point that many political philosophers, like John Rawls, have used sports to analyse the role that fairness should play in the social realm. If this is the case, how can we claim that there is a clear distinction between general fairness and fairness in sport?

6. Despite acknowledging that contemporary sporting communities, as Rorty and Morgan rightly pointed out, require solidarity and the acceptance of a common view of the good, this paper has claimed that there are circumstances in which ‘external’ moral principles need to be taken into account. Then internalism needs to be complemented by the use of moral elements so the gap between internalism and externalism in sport ethics is bridged. To me, against Morgan, such external principles provide ‘the rational inferential path that leads from ancient sport, to traditional sport, to modern sport’ (Morgan 2012, 76). It is worth mentioning that this is not an original contribution to sports ethics. Other authors have already argued that some external principles should be utilised to complement the intrinsic ones. For instance, John Russell claims that there should be a different source for moral evaluation of sport, that is, the consent principle. Such a principle, ‘of consent expresses the “external principle of games”’. (Russell 2007, 147) Such a principle of consent is not an exclusive principle in sports ethics, but a generally used moral principle which determines who is allowed to take part of the game and who is not. According to Russell’s claim, ‘this shows that games are not separate from our regular moral institutions’ (Russell 2007, 148). Moreover, he defends that such type of external principles are linked to the Kantian conception of the respect for the person. This paper agrees with Russell. However, my proposal is even stronger than his. In line with Kretchmar’s works, I hold that the internal–external distinction needs to be replaced with a more holistic ethical account. The classical distinction between internalism and externalism defended by internalist authors is, I believe, outdated and leads philosophy of sport, once again, to ‘dead ends’ (Kretchmar 2013, 275).

7. Habermas’ presuppositions of speech acts are not actual conventions. They do not have a social origin; they are not created by people’s action. However, they play the same very role as Morgan’s and Marmor’s deep conventions, they provide the rational context in which argumentation is possible. So, by following Habermas’ philosophy, it is possible to find some elements that are at the backdrop to every linguistic context.

8. It is also worth mentioning that such a Habermasian account would increase the number of those people who are considered part of the sporting community. For example, supporters and fans are also affected by the consequence of normative decision-making in sport in relevant ways: should not they take part of the debates on normative issues in sport? (Lopez Frias 2012).