7—Riding The Wind—Consummate Performance, Phenomenology, and Skillful Fluency

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Zhuangzi and Watson (1968, 32).

2. Larsen (2010, 30).

3. Scott Kelso’s groundbreaking work in dynamic systems theory advocates different levels of description, i.e. from neuronal activity to biomechanical angles and higher. He stresses the point that ‘no single level of analysis has priority over any other’ (ibid., 2). The underlying pragmatic criterion is that these adjust best to the phenomenon to be described, which is quite consistent with the thick holism here defended and the idea of different descriptive levels just argued for. Kelso develops a theory of coordinated human behavior—from neuronal level to mind—that is governed by generic processes of self-organization. This results in the spontaneous formation of dynamic patterns that are independent of the stuff that realizes them and the level at which they are observed (ibid., xi–xiii). With this, we can explain any phenomenon, from molecular behavior (ibid., 6–8) to coordination dynamics of limbs, say someone doing a biceps curl (ibid., 80), and from social coordination and coupling of limb synchronies (ibid., 93–99) to neural and mental processes (Ibid., 260ff). As he sees it, ‘Instead of trying to reduce biology and psychology to chemistry and physics, the task now is to extend our physical understanding of the organization of living things.’ (ibid., 287) Given the complexity of his views as well as space limitations, drawing a fuller connection between both programs is beyond the scope of this project. Related work on developmental research by Thelen and Smith is considered later.

4. Not taking into account that describing subatomic particles in motion is subject to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: in particle physics, we cannot possibly locate and determine a particle’s trajectory concurrently. An ‘ultimate’ extensional description at its most fundamental level is thereby impossible in principle.

5. This landmark collection of essays brings sport under the gaze of phenomenology and some of the best sport philosophers, with analyses that engage Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, Sartre, and others as well as topics such as performance enhancement, risk sports, movement, the sweet tension in sport, and feints in football. Some of these are incorporated when directly pertinent, but the present analysis attempts to bring to the table an alternative and complementary perspective.

6. See Ilundáin-Agurruza (2000) for an elucidation of interpretation in the context of the arts but with ready and obvious application to other practices and phenomena. It argues that ontology depends on the creative hermeneutic process and that artworks (or other created phenomena) are the result of a collaborative enterprise that integrates artwork, artist, audience, and historical context anchored by a caring disposition he calls attendance. The notion of attendance is incorporated in essay 10.

7. Breivik (2008) criticizes O’Saughnessy’s view of proprioception, which takes proprioceptive dynamics for kinesthetic ones in ways that misconstrue how we actually feel said processes. Citing Todes, Breivik amends the account and aligns it with a holistic approach concerning how we move during sporting activity (348–349).

8. Best’s Wittgensteinian leanings, with which I largely sympathize, point out how concepts cannot be true or false themselves since they are the standards of meaning, and as such cannot be criticized externally but only internally in terms of contextual consistency (1979, 135). The soundness of the point standing, it is instructive to complement his point by pointing how some of our concepts originate from movement, as Sheets-Johnstone notes in several instances appealing to the fact that for Husserl, the ‘I move’ precedes the ‘I can do’ (1990, 29, 2011, 116). Moreover, in The Roots of Thinking (1990), she shows how many of our central concepts originate in our bodymind. She sums this up elsewhere when she writes that, ‘corporeal powers give rise to corporeal concepts, fundamental human concepts such as grinding, sharpness, hardness, and so on’ (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 116). Let us also remember Ortega’s insight concerning how our bodily perceptions inform our concepts.

9. Space limitations prevent a discussion of agency and ownership regarding our actions, body schema, and body image. For a fuller account, see Gallagher (2005b).

10. For further exposition on these qualities, rhytmicities, and kinetic melodies, see Sheets-Johnstone (2009, 233, 273–274, and 317).

11. There is a rich sense of ‘forgetting,’ rooted in Zhuangzi’s ideas, is more fully developed in essay 10 and its appendix. It necessitates further preparatory work, undertaken in essay 9, before it can be fruitfully discussed.

12. Gerunds are verbals that end in ‘-ing’ but work as nouns. As such they express action or a state of being. But because gerunds function as nouns they take the position that nouns ordinarily take, e.g. as direct object or subject. Presently, the idea is that a gerund emphasizes the dynamic and fluid nature of bodymind schematizings and imaginings and deemphasizes or discourages thinking of them, however surreptitiously, as static entities or objects. In essay 10, Minamoto’s idea of kata is discussed as a patterning as well, enriching the idea of animated and dynamic patternings.

13. Gallagher is aware of this research, much of which post-dates his analyses on the matter (personal conversation). His phenomenological analysis can be easily adapted to cover these cases.

14. In fact, even reading needs saccades. We do not need to see every letter to make sense of the text. And in fact we do not. A smiple epxirmnt sufgices: we nrsd olty the ferdt and ledt lertre to unftrstknd a tmxt. Knudson and Kukla explain, ‘When there is slow relative movement between an observer and an object, the eyes can smoothly move together following the object until visual angular velocities reach 40 to 70 degrees per second,’ that is the speed of a person walking at 3 mph six feet away (1997). These are the kinds of speeds at which we can smoothly follow objects. But in sport most movements require saccades such that we only observe actions partially. In volleyball, angular velocities exceed 500 degrees, and although we can handle 700 degrees, ‘the eyes basically turn off so they saccade to the next fixation’ (Knudson and Kukla 1997).

15. As Gallagher points out, Shusterman mistakes Merleau-Ponty’s view, taking it ‘as a negative description of ‘representations of body parts and processes’’ when ‘Merleau-Ponty simply wants to say that he can move without knowing anything about or being aware of the subpersonal processes of motor control’ (2011, 310, fn. 1). Nonetheless, this does not affect the ulterior point that both, subpersonal an reflective, representational processes supplement each other.

16. Shusterman cites James, ‘spontaneous action is always best’ (2012, 62).

17. Polanyi writes, ‘Skilful knowing and doing is performed by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether practical or theoretical. We may then be said to become subsidiarily aware of these particulars within our focal awareness of the coherent entity that we achieve’ (Polanyi 2005 [1958], 2). But this tacit dimension, important as it is, remains too opaque. This project strives to bring some light.

18. Upon being asked by the deficient reader how he was able to uncover the secrets of the text, the latter may reply that ‘reading while sunbathing has made him well red,’ to the puzzlement of the former.

19. Serrasoles descended Keyhole Falls, after more than a year of preparation, in January of 2015 (Rogers 2015). First he had to rappel 300 feet of disintegrating volcanic rock. See the video at http://www.redbull.com/en/adventure/stories/1,331,696,054,636/the-scariest-waterfall-drop-you-ve-ever-seen

20. The author was tested at the age of 16, while he was a swimmer and produced a value of 75 mL (kg-min). Subsequently in his early 40s, he still had a value of 76–77 mL (kg-min) when trained. Given his solid but non-stellar competitive results, such factors are far from good predictors for athletic excellence in competition.

21. We may question whether the reflexivity requisite to become aware of the quality of one’s movement affects said movement (in terms of skill) and its felt experience. Conversely, we can also wonder whether the level of skill influences the experience and gnostic possibilities of movement in kinetically intensive practices such as sports or performances. Is it changed, like some sort of motile Schrödinger’s cat, when one looks into it? These are questions best left for another occasion, but worth noting.

22. The first part of this article (2007a) discounts various empirical, sociological, and anthropological misinterpretations of the encierro to then, conceptually and phenomenologically, describe its meaning.

23. Breivik conducts a Heideggerian analysis of skydiving (2010), Ilundáin-Agurruza (2007b) examines Skydiving and risk sports in terms of the Kantian sublime.

24. This is not the time to address this complex topic as fully as it deserves. For a rigorous and thoughtful assessment of Morgan’s pivotal article (2013) and Russell’s work that engages the ideas of Habermas and Gadamer see López Frías (2014a, 2014b). In the latter, he states the need for and his agreement with a more holistic account for ethics (2014b, 54–55).

25. Institutionalization is both problem and solution; we are too aware of current challenges that threaten to subvert sports’ potential to flourish, to wit cheating, doping, or the inordinate influence of commercial interests. For a critical and balanced assessment of MacIntyre’s uncompromisingly negative view of institutions see McNamee (2008); for a discussion of this issue and an in-depth application of virtue ethics to a concrete case, Turkish soccer, see Ilundáin-Agurruza and Kuleli (2013).

26. Jeannerod and colleagues show how hand-related parietal neurons play a specific role in visuomotor processes of grasping (1997, 46), and further that different neurons are encoded for either precision grip, finger prehension, or hand prehension, which in turn are used for grabbing different shaped-objects, that is, different neurons are used to grab a sphere, which requires all fingers, than a cylinder, which requires palm opposition (ibid., 48). Hence, grasping a tennis racket or the tsuka (handle) of a katana engage different neurons and for the agent feel dissimilar at the pragmatic level at which the object is engaged (Jeannerod 1997). Interestingly, the hands pre-reflectively shape differently as the object is approached, based less on vision than on previous experiences of grasping and their tactile qualities. Moreover, even when the same muscles contract, different neurons fire for different grips, for example, precision versus power grabbing (Jeannerod 1997, 41). Extrapolating from this, we can hypothesize how the same muscles contracting can result in different kinematics, dynamics, and feelings (sensations and perceptions) when used with different tools and with different rules of engagement that change the position of the grip, as in fencing (thereby allowing to explain both the physiological level and the pragmatic one of why the fencer prefers the sabre).

27. To reframe this with Gallagher, ‘the body actively organizes its sense experience and its movement in relation to pragmatic concerns’ such this is not reducible to neural and physiological operations even if these operations are necessary (2005a, 142).

28. Essays 9 and 10 explore the socio-historical aspect of our ways of moving in relation to Marcel Mauss.

29. For a discussion of kalon in the broader context of the Ancient Olympics see Ilundáin-Agurruza 2012.

30. See entries for , and in the The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (2009).

31. Monti still showed superior kalon, for he actually forsook an Olympic medal. Fernández Anaya states that he believes he would have passed him to win a World or European championship (Arribas 2014).

32. Warren Fraleigh (1982) argues against such fouls in a widely cited piece. Addressing this issue as it merits lies beyond the feasible scope of this project, unfortunately.

33. Oda and Kondo (2014) discuss the unique case of Kendo, which seeks a purposive result, to eliminate the opponent, yet how this is to be achieved aesthetically (see essay 9).

34. For a critical analysis of skillful coping, flow, and mushin within an East-West comparative framework see Krein and Ilundáin-Agurruza (2014).

35. In Reflections on a Katana we will read more in depth about Musashi and expand on these ideas.

36. McNamee reminds me that Polanyi (2002 [1958]) also analyzed this under the notion of connoisseurship.

37. For an insightful reading of water in the context of surfing and paddling alongside Bergson and James, see (Anderson 2007).

38. Sheets-Johnstone (2009, 2011) and Thompson (2007) profitably incorporate Luria’s framework.

39. For a holistic pedagogy of sport that discusses the ideas of Dewey, Ortega, Naess, Savater, and Spinoza among others, see Ilundáin-Agurruza (2014).

40. Nishida Kitarō (1990) founder of the Kyoto school comes to a similar conclusion independently; see essay 9.

41. The views summarized here reflect the content of Parts III and IV for the emotions, and Part V for freedom. For a lucid exposition of these ideas, see Garrett Thomson (2012).

42. Thelen and Smith ‘approach the mystery of human development with the conviction that the acquisition of mental life is continuous with all biological growth of form and function’ (1994, xiii). They rely on principles of nonlinear dynamic systems, whose premise is to understand the central question of ‘how complex systems, including developing humans, produce patterns that evolve over time’ (ibid., 51). Another key element is that dynamic principles are based on thermodynamic realities that describe the way the universe works, and which are independent of the level of observation or the particular material instantiation (ibid., 52ff. 71). This makes it very powerful, as it can account for any phenomenon without getting caught up in a reductionist trap. And being dynamical, it also avoids any reifying boxes. For instance, when considering the dynamic principles of development in the context of leaning to walk (something robotics is still struggling with) instead of ascribing locomotor development to a logically inevitable process, this is seen as the ‘confluence of available states within particular contextual opportunities’: normal human infants learn to walk upright because of anatomical and neural elements tied to the species’ history, contingencies of humans’ own developmental history, a strong urge to move efficiently, support surfaces, gravity, things to hold on to, parental guidance, etc. (Ibid., 72). The result is that, ‘Walking self-organizes under these constraints because non-linear, complex dynamic systems occupy preferred behavioral states’ (Ibid.). Further, their research shows that ‘the central nervous system (CNS) is not a computer controlling an electronic output device [one of the dominant views, unsurprisingly congruent with cognitivism]. Rather, the CNS must translate intentions and plans into moving limbs and body segments. The body constitutes a complex linked system, with mass, elastic, energetic, and inertial properties, which has multiple sensory linkages within it and between the organism and the outside world.’ (Ibid., 75) The pervasiveness of continuities and multiple but related levels bespeak of thick, dense holism.

43. See Ilundáin-Agurruza (2011, 2014, forthcoming) for a consideration of this issue from various angles.

44. Redolent of Luria’s explanation of a kinetic melody (1973, 32), this was developed before I was aware of his work.