Inhibiting doping in sports: deterrence is necessary, but not sufficient

Abstract

The use of performance-enhancing drugs is a significant problem in sport. It cheats clean athletes of their hard-earned rewards from perfecting their skills though dedication and hard work. It defrauds fans by substituting a distorted playing field for a true competition. Anti-doping agencies have been charged with enforcing drug policies, primarily through the use of drug testing programs. We propose that drug testing, while important, is not sufficient to achieve deterrence. Engaging the principles of perceptual deterrence and development of a moral community of athletes can greatly enhance compliance with rules.

Keywords:

• Deterrence
• perceptual deterrence
• anti-doping
• drug testing

Notes

1. In the prisoner’s dilemma game two members of a gang have been arrested for a criminal offense and are separated without the ability to communicate. There is insufficient evidence from the crime scene to convict them of the principal charge but enough to convict of a lesser offense. Prosecutors offer each gang member a bargain. They can each betray the other by testifying that the other was the one who committed the principal crime (in which case they will each serve a two year prison term), they can remain silent but if one betrays but the other does not the betrayer will go free and the other will serve a three-year prison term, they both can cooperate with each other, refuse to betray in which case they each get convicted of the lesser offense with the penalty of a one-year prison term. It is in the best interest of each not to betray the other, but since they are separated without communication they cannot be sure that the other did not betray them (i.e. they distrust one another) – each gang member therefore has a strong reason to betray the other, even though the best outcome is to cooperate and each remain silent.

2. When any anti-doping agency announces that 2% of the tests it conducted were positive for banned substances, it means only that 2% of the total tests were positive and says nothing about the percent of those who cheated who were caught. For example, let’s say that an anti-doping agency conducted 1000 blood and urine tests and 2% or 20 different people tested positive, the objective certainty of getting caught doping would not be .02 because there is no way of knowing how many athletes were actually cheating. What any anti-doping regime really wants to know is what proportion of its athletes cheat, then it can determine the true denominator for the calculation of the objective certainty of punishment . Anti-doping agencies generally have no valid estimate of either the proportion or number of athletes under their jurisdiction that are currently using banned substances.

3. To be clear here, we are talking about being ambiguity-averse with respect to losses not being risk-averse. Research in behavioral economics and psychology has shown repeatedly that people are risk averse with respect to gains but risk seeking with respect to losses. So, for example, if people are asked, ‘would you rather choose $900 for sure or a 90% chance to win $1000,’ they are overwhelmingly more likely to take the sure $900, they are risk averse with respect to gains. If, however, they are asked, ‘would you rather lose $900 for sure or a 90% chance to lose $1000’, they overwhelming choose the latter; they are risk seeking when it comes to losses. The reason behind the switch is that people are loss averse, losing a certain amount hurts much more than winning the same amount.

4. In 2013, for example, WADA doubled its suspension for first major offense doping from two years to four years adding the penalty of a loss of at least one Olympic competition, and a lifetime ban for a second major violation. At the same time it increased the severity of the penalty, WADA may have inadvertently decreased the certainty of punishment by passing a rule giving athletes immunity from punishment if they provide ‘substantial’ information about other doping athletes.

5. In order to maintain the credibility of the sanctioning regime as well as to strengthen moral condemnation of cheating, formal sanctions will always have to be imposed on cheating athletes.

6. Pubic punishment that consists of shaming the offender have been a common feature throughout American history (Friedman 1993) and is still in common use today (Garvey 1998).

7. A good reputation is not only intrinsically valuable, it has long-term instrumental benefits as well. A good reputation is formed not merely by one’s own words, ‘I am an honest person,’ but by having a record of not engaging in forbidden actions (other more minor things too like gift giving, acts of decency etc.). An established record of not doing wrong things is a strong signal that one is of good character, that one can be trusted, and from this opportunities will be presented that will not be available to one with a blemished character.

8. Some examples of inappropriate shaming from our point of view are people who are forced to wear a sign or t-shirt outside a store they shoplifted from that says, ‘I was convicted of shoplifting,’ or convicted sex offenders who have to post on the doors of their home or on their car that ‘I am a dangerous sex offender – no children allowed.’ For other examples, see Garvey (1998). These are not constructive uses of shaming (see Stryker 2013).

9. There are times, however, when excommunication from sport (either a life time ban as in the case of Lance Armstrong) or the banning of a country’s entire sport’s delegation (as was proposed in the case of the Russian Federation doping scandal by WADA) would convey a powerful deterrent message.

10. A standard is not simply the statement of a rule, but has a strong affective component.

11. This example of the creation of trust is taken from Hollis (1987).