‘Richness in Ends, Simpleness in Means!’ on Arne Naess’s Version of Deep Ecological Friluftsliv and Its Implications for Outdoor Activities

ABSTRACT

The increasing global warming and the loss of biodiversity should concern us all. Some feel that outdoor activities, which take place in natural surroundings, should have a special obligation to change. In this article I present an example of what an outdoor life practice that responds to the ecological crisis could look like. I use the simple Norwegian outdoor life called friluftsliv, and the deep ecological version suggested by philosopher and climber Arne Næss (1912–2009) as an example and case. Naessian friluftsliv is interesting and relevant in three ways. First, Naess gave a philosophical basis for friluftsliv, building on deep ecology and Spinozism. Second, he presented content, norms and guidelines for a deep ecological friluftsliv. And third, he gave examples of such friluftsliv through his own practice of simple life in nature. Naess thus presents a radical alternative to present-day resource-consuming and specialized outdoor activities and nature sports. Finally, Naess’s version of deep ecological friluftsliv is discussed in relation to alternative theoretical approaches and to critical questions concerning friluftsliv as practice.

KEYWORDS:

• Outdoor activities
• friluftsliv
• Arne Naess
• deep ecology
• climate crisis

1. Introduction

The increasing global warming and the loss of biodiversity should concern us all. The ecological problems that surfaced in the 1960 s, which included resource depletion, pollution and increase in world population, have now reached a more serious turning point. Some feel that outdoor activities which take place in natural surroundings have a special obligation to change (Beery 2013). My goal in this article is to present an example of a type of outdoor activity that not only satisfies criteria for ecological awareness but is joyful and inspiring. In addition to philosophical justifications and arguments of virtue ethical, deontological or utilitarian types, we need models and illustrations which more concretely show what deep ecological activities can look like. I will use Arne Næss (1912–2009), Norwegian philosopher, climber, founder of deep ecology, and a lifelong practitioner of the Norwegian version of outdoor life called friluftsliv, as an example and case. Naess is of special interest because first, he was one of the founders of deep ecology, second, he developed guidelines for deep ecological practice in various areas of life, and third, he tried to develop an ecologically sound practice in his own friluftsliv. It is therefore the link between theory, guidelines and concrete¹ practice which makes the Naess example especially interesting and illuminating.

The article by Breivik (2019) gave a presentation and discussion of what a Naessian deep ecological sport could look like, including guidelines and examples from his own sports practices. In the present article the focus is on friluftsliv and outdoor activities that are different from most sports and which are of special interest from a deep ecological ethical perspective since they take part in natural environments. My aim in the present article is not to take up a discussion with Naess, based on critical analysis and arguments, but rather give a descriptive presentation of Naess’s own views as well as some counterviews from some of his critics. My own philosophical boxing match with Naess will have to take place later on another occasion.

Naess developed his deep ecological leisure practice inside the Norwegian friluftsliv tradition. I will, therefore, first briefly sketch out the friluftsliv tradition, before I present some of Naess’s central deep ecological views. This is followed by a presentation of Naessian deep ecological friluftsliv, with examples from his own life. In the last part of the article I present some examples of the impact Naessian friluftsliv has had and how some critics have responded to his theory as well as his practice.

2. The Friluftsliv Tradition

The word ‘friluftsliv’ means literally ‘free air life’ and was first used by the playwright Henrik Ibsen in the poetic drama Paa Vidderne (On the heights) (Ibsen 1991/1859). The term can also be translated as ‘open air life’ or ‘nature life’ (Gurholt 2008; Reed and Rothenberg 1993). The practice of friluftsliv is older than the term and comes historically in two versions (see Breivik 1978). One version is connected to the countryside and activities such as hunting, fishing and the collecting of berries, eggs and mushrooms. The other tradition is connected with the cities and involves activities like hiking, climbing, canoeing and skiing. The city tradition goes back to early and middle 19^th century when poets, painters, as well as natural scientists, inspired by new romantic and nationalistic ideas, started to explore the ‘wild nature’, especially the mountains (Breivik 1978).

In contrast to sports, the friluftsliv ideology avoided organized competitions, used relatively simple equipment and did not accept motorized vehicles in nature.² The goal was to experience the silence, greatness and beauty in nature. Friluftsliv is thus more than ‘recreation’, a term which almost exclusively refers to specific activities and does not imply a broader and deeper relationship to nature (Beery 2013). Authors thus typically describe friluftsliv as ‘a philosophical lifestyle based on experiences of the freedom in nature and spiritual connectedness with the landscape’ (Gelter 2000, 78). Or, ‘friluftsliv, first and foremost, is about feeling the joy of being out in nature, alone or with others, feeling pleasure and experiencing harmony with the surroundings’ (DAHLE 2003, 248). In the following presentation I will try to show what the deep ecological philosophy of Arne Næss added to the theory, as well as the practice, of friluftsliv.

While earlier studies have looked at the deep ecological consequences for sports (Breivik 2019; Loland 1996), the following presentation will focus on friluftsliv. This will expand on earlier contributions by Faarlund (1993), Dahle (2003), Gurholt (2008, 2014), Eichberg (2009), and Beery (2013). The article will also be relevant for and throw some light on the discussions of nature sports. What is called ‘nature sports’ bear many resemblances to friluftsliv. Several contributions look at how nature sports ‘can help us to better comprehend our relationships with natural environments’ (Krein 2008, 285) or how ‘remote sports’ can place us in a wider, non-human, world (Howe 2008, 1). Another topic is whether nature sports can produce intensity and realize the sublime as a substitute or parallel to competition in ordinary sport Howe (2019a); Krein 2015. The interplay between technical skills and aesthetic experiences is discussed by, Howe 2012 who also criticizes the instrumental conception of sport and the pursuit of excellence. Instead of a focus on ‘anthropomaximising efficiency’ the author sees Norwegian friluftsliv ‘as a counterpoint to both conventional and nature sport’ (Howe 2019b, 437). I will in the following try to show what a Naessian deep ecological friluftsliv can contribute.

3. Naessian Deep Ecology—Some Key Concepts and Ideas

3.1. The Concept of Nature

The concept of nature is central in Norwegian friluftsliv and in Naess’s ecophilosophy (Naess 1990). Naess went beyond the pure objective descriptions of nature in mathematical physics to argue that nature should phenomenologically be understood in a Gestalt-like manner as a web of dynamic relations where individual entities, living as well as non-living, can be understood as knots in a web. He argued, furthermore, that not only primary (size) but secondary (colour) and even tertiary sense qualities (Gestalt-impression of a forest) exist as parts of the apprehended nature. All living entities and even ecosystems have value in themselves and are not only of instrumental value.

In addition to the theoretical conception of nature, there is also a more practical conception of ‘nature’ used by Naess and in the friluftsliv discourse. Here ‘nature’ means areas that are little influenced, manipulated or impacted by humans. It is what Naess sometimes called ‘free nature’ and others call the ‘wilderness’. While some think nature is a concept spoiled by the Cartesian enlightenment or romanticism and their influences, I think the concept is necessary in practical discourse to describe where friluftsliv takes place. Other concepts like ‘milieu’ or ‘environments’ are even more anthropocentric.

3.2. Egalitarianism in the Biospheric Web

As mentioned above, Naess argued that human beings are connected with other living and non-living beings in a huge web or network. Living beings are knots in the biospheric web. Furthermore Naess advocated egalitarianism in the biosphere. This means that all knots in the web have the same right to live and blossom—at least in principle. There may be practical, and other reasons, why some beings, such as humans, are privileged. But in principle all living beings are equal in value and status (Naess 1990). This means a sharp turn from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism (Brennan and Lo 2016; Sessions 1995). Human beings are not superior in value and status. Animals and other living beings have rights. Naess even defended larger entities, such as ecosystems, and their right to live and blossom.

An example and consequence of Naess’s position means that killing animals for sport becomes problematic and should be abandoned. Similarly, hunting is unacceptable, except when absolutely necessary for getting food. Instead Naess advocated a living-together with animals, for instance by letting them be, letting them live, and living with them. When he was a professor at the University of Oslo he always had a couple of rats, either in his pocket or on his shoulder, to exemplify to students and colleagues the living-together with animals. And instead of killing snow mice at his cottage at Tvergastein he let the mice enter at least half of the cottage, but they were prohibited, for practical reason and conflict of interests, from entering the kitchen and the food reservoir. Instead the mice could be studied when they played in the snow, sliding down small hills of snow outside the window of his living room.

The right to live and blossom does not stop with animals. One should tread lightly on earth. One’s footprints should be ecologically sound. Naess practiced this in his own concrete way. At his cottage at Tvergastein, 1506 meters above sea level, the vegetation is sparse. To remind himself of respect and identification with living things he had what he called a ‘kitchen garden’ in front of the cottage, consisting of small flowers, grass, moss and other high-altitude specimens. Nobody was allowed to tread on the minute flowers. Respect!

3.3. Self-realization and Identification

Naess was inspired by Spinoza.³ Every living being, even the smallest, has a self-interest in expanding its power and realizing its interests (Naess 1995). But self-realization should not interfere negatively with other beings’ self-realization. In this expansion process the self has to identify with the other living beings and respect their interests. For many, identification is easiest when something is aesthetically or axiologically pleasing. Naess had a different view. Suffering was, for Naess, the most potent source of identification. He wrote:

My standard example involves a nonhuman being I met forty years ago. I was looking through an old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different chemicals. At that moment, a flea jumped from a lemming which was strolling along the table and landed in the middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea to die. Its movements were dreadfully expressive. Naturally, what I felt was a painful sense of compassion and empathy. But empathy was not basic, rather it was a process of identification: that ‘I saw myself in the flea’: If I had been alienated from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me feeling indifferent. So there must be identification in order for there to be compassion and, among humans, solidarity. (Naess 1995, 227)

Self-realization thus means expansion of the self, from the ego towards an inclusion and identification with wider circles of beings. Warwick Fox (1990) distinguished between three selves based on three ‘varieties of identification’: personal, ontological and cosmological. Fox favored the ontological and the cosmological, because they are more encompassing and impartial. Naess argued, however, that personal identification is also of great value. For Naess personal identification was not restricted to human beings, but included emphatic togetherness with all living beings, such as the example of the dying flea. Personal identification need not be partial and favor one’s own interests. Ecofeminists, such as Plumwood (1991), sided with Naess here in arguing that personal identification facilitates increased sensibility and gives weight to emphatic actions.

As an example and consequence of his views on personal identification Naess argued that we need close contact with natural surroundings. These can be of different kinds, more or less influenced by human interventions. Naess thought that friluftsliv, especially when lasting several days, offered good possibilities for identification and solidarity with a variety of animals, birds, insects and whole living ecosystems. Thus, for Naess friluftsliv was not so much about recreational, aesthetic or health benefits for the practitioners, as about a possibility of being together in joy as well as suffering, with a diversity of living beings, in a variety of ecological webs. It was about experiencing an unfolding of possibilities for the action of each knot, of each of the living beings in the ecological web.

3.4. Human Nature, Human Action and Joy

Naess was influenced by Spinoza but used Spinoza freely to develop his own views, for instance on human nature. While Descartes distinguished between res cogitans and res extensa as two different substances, Spinoza argued that there is but one substance, Deus sive Natura, revealing itself in two attributes: thought and extension. The parallelism of the attributes means that movements of the body are linked to parallel movements of the mind. Naess used this philosophical conception when arguing that under practical circumstances one needs to be active in body as well as mind, such as when he took philosophy books with him on climbing expeditions.⁴

Following some central views of Spinoza, Naess furthermore held that human beings as well as non-human-beings seek to increase their power to reach what they want (Naess 1994). Whereas being passively constrained leads to negative affects, being active increases the positive affects. In addition many-sided involvement can increase positive affects. Spinoza derived many of his theorems from the proposition that ‘our body has many parts’. According to Naess’s interpretation this meant that our body has a variety of kinds of capacities, including capacities of different kinds of movement (Naess 1994). Hilaritas, the all-embracing joy, is experienced when all parts of body and mind are active, none of them hampered by excesses of the other parts. Titillatio, the smaller or partial joy, is experienced when only some parts are active. As we will see, since friluftsliv has the possibility of involving the whole person, body and mind, and includes many-sided activeness, it is connected with joy and well-being.

As an example and consequence of this view Naess argued that a central goal in education should be to offer possibilities for hilaritas early in childhood. Naess pointed to the hundreds of simple bodily activities of children in physically rich and diversified environments. Later, for some, this has been turned into specialized sport activities with standardized rules, complicated equipment and resource-consuming practices. This may happen in sports, but friluftsliv can also become specialized and resource-consuming, which according to Naess, has negative consequences. It means less possibilities for hilaritas.

4. Naessian Deep Ecological Friluftsliv

4.1. Some Characteristics

In the following I will present some of the characteristics of Naessian friluftsliv, in theory as well as practice. Naess distinguished between shallow ecology, where the focus is on superficial measures to reduce our negative impact on the environment, and deep ecology, where the goal is a thorough overhaul of our ways of living in and with our natural surroundings (Naess 1973). His own deep ecological version was called ecosophy_T, with T referring to his ‘expedition cottage’ at Tvergastein, in the Hallingskarvet mountain ridge.⁵ Naess’s ambition was to develop a form of friluftsliv which was in accordance with his deep ecological views. In the following I will use the term ‘deep ecological friluftsliv’ since Naess’s guidelines focus on general deep ecology and not only on his personal version, the ecosophy_T.

Naess was active in several disciplines of friluftsliv. When he was young he was a leading European climber, and he continued with climbing, as well as skiing, hiking and various friluftsliv activities, into old age (Gjefsen 2011; Rothenberg 1992). He spent in total 13 years at his cottage at Tvergastein where daily friluftsliv pursuits were part of the lifestyle. Naess addressed friluftsliv in several of his papers. At the end of an unpublished paper called ‘Notes on the philosophy of sport’ Naess stated that, in so far as sports are enjoyed in nature, the ideal is to respect the norms of friluftsliv. These norms are, or should be, in harmony with ecosophy_T and other philosophies of life which are inspired by ecology and respect for our planet. In his book Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, a chapter is devoted to friluftsliv with the title ‘Exuberance in nature’ (Naess 1990, 177–181). Here, among other things, is a discussion on friluftsliv as practiced and expressed by his friend and opponent, Nils Faarlund. Naess argued that friluftsliv is not only outdoor recreation, but a deeper form of life in free nature, which respects nature and seeks ‘to touch the Earth lightly’ (Naess 1990, 177).

For Naess friluftsliv, thus, represented a critique of modern technical and complicated lifestyles. Friluftsliv enthusiasts should advocate a paradigm shift toward simpler lifestyles in closer contact with nature. The friluftsliv enthusiast and Polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen looked at friluftsliv as a return to earlier and simpler ways of living, in closer contact with nature (Nansen 1927). Naess agreed with Nansen and thought that H. G. Wells and others who spoke enthusiastically about life in technological civilization were wrong, and that our long tradition as hunter-gatherers means that we are adapted to, and equipped for, a simple life in close contact with our natural surroundings. Like Faarlund, Naess looked at friluftsliv as a form of play in natural environments, where we mimic playful physical activities of hunter-gatherers:

• on water—swimming, diving, rowing, paddling, sailing, fishing

• in fields and forests—hiking, camping, skiing, riding, hunting

• in mountain terrain—glacial walks, climbing, cross-country skiing, backcountry skiing, fishing, hunting.

(Naess 1990, 178)

For Faarlund (1993), and also Naess (1990), friluftsliv was a way to experience a simple lifestyle, and to develop a society built on closeness to, and respect for nature. In this sense friluftsliv is not only a goal in itself, and thus inherently valuable, but also extrinsically valuable. It may lead to a better society.

Friluftsliv is similar to sport since it focuses on what is joyful and valuable in itself, but it differs from sports that represent, and to some extent celebrate, a capitalistic, expansive society. Faarlund (1993) is very critical of ordinary competitive sport where losers are separated from the winners. This leads to elitism and consequently to a denial of the self-realization of others. The practice of friluftsliv is not, however, effortless. Naess maintains that without effort there is no quality and without quality there is no enjoyment. But, rather, this leads to a perfectionism that does not presuppose egoistic competition and celebration of victory over others.

With this as a first background for understanding friluftsliv versus sport, let me turn to the deeper philosophical principles and presuppositions for Naessian friluftsliv.

4.2. Simplicity and Many-sidedness

Friluftsliv is a form of human action. Naess argues that friluftsliv is well suited to engage the whole person and thus to lead to hilaritas. Specialized sports, with a focus on specific bodily performances, are more susceptible to titillatio and to being partial and constrained. A high degree of hilaritas becomes more difficult to realize, as (1) more externalities are needed in relation to the time enjoyed in sport, and as (2) more limited and standardized kinds of movements are implied (a loss of many-sidedness).

Naess’s views are a response and antidote to the increasing use of resource-consuming and complicated equipment in many specialized outdoor pursuits. Naess used surfing as an example of the value of simplicity of means. Body surfing has greater simplicity than big wave surfing with high-tech boards, wetsuits, foot-leash ropes and other surf gear. Modern surfing necessitates more time spent on externalities and therefore limits the freedom. Many-sidedness, freedom and joy are easier to realize with simpler means.

The idea of many-sidedness includes physical as well as mental capacities. Naess preferred the term ‘activeness’ rather than ‘activity’ to describe hilaritas in sport and friluftsliv. Whereas ‘activity’ readily associates with the physical, the term ‘activeness’ is meant to refer to a disposition or stance to be active with body and mind. It thus puts emphasis on the holistic character of friluftsliv where all parts are active. If too much weight is placed on specialized physical capacities the joy becomes a titillatio, which is joy corresponding to activeness of some, but not all, parts. It is in part passivity because some part of us is left ‘untouched or at least not wholly alive’ (Naess 1994, 2). Friluftsliv encourages a many-sidedness. Since friluftsliv takes place in natural environments it demands a wider range of cognitive and emotional capacities than many sports. One must be able to plan a route, handle surprises, confront dangers, change strategy, help others, observe changes in the weather, and so on. Friluftsliv is thus open to many-sidedness as well as diversity and complexity.

4.3. Diversity and Complexity

Diversity and complexity are two key concepts in Naess’s deep ecology. Naess argued for diversity in ecosystems and also in lifestyles and cultures. In relation to friluftsliv this could mean two things: firstly, one should encourage a diversity of types and forms of friluftsliv and welcome experimentation and development of new activities; and secondly, one should encourage friluftsliv in a variety of environments. This could be taken to mean that we should welcome many of the new activities in nature which have been developed since the 1970 s, such as paragliding, windsurfing, white water kayaking, base-jumping and kiting (Breivik 2007). These activities include experimentation and exploration of the air, the mountains, the sea and the rivers. They take place in natural environments but can be practiced with a sport-like mindset or a friluftsliv-like mindset. Some of the practitioners of the new lifestyle sports are aware of the distinction between traditional friluftsliv (Tellnes 1992), with longer time periods spent in nature, and what they call modern friluftsliv, which is more action-oriented and takes place in shorter time-intervals (Green, Thurston, and Vaage 2015).⁶ From a Naessian viewpoint only some versions of the new lifestyle sports will be accepted as genuine friluftsliv They must have a friluftsliv mindset rather than a sport mindset and they must adhere to the guidelines of deep ecological friluftsliv.

4.4. Improvisation and Creativity

Some of Naess’s guidelines for sound ecological practice are relevant for sports (see Breivik 2019) as well as for friluftsliv. They include:

• perfectibility rather than competition

• many-sidedness rather than specialization

• playfulness rather than achievement

• if achievement, achievement related to personal and group resources, making it essentially non- quantifiable.

(Naess 1994, 2)

The idea of perfection, or perfectibility, has a long tradition in Western philosophy (Hurka 1993) as well as sport (Breivik 2010). Naess’s version of perfectionism builds on Spinoza and involves not only the individual self, the ego, but the ecological self. Thus, the scope of perfection widens and leads to perfecting oneself together with other beings as part of a larger ecological entity. It is like a member of a climbing team developing and perfecting relevant skills in order to climb a specific route. From a Naessian view, even non-human ‘players’ are involved in the perfection game. Climbers can therefore feel that they perfect their skills not in opposition to the rock but as ‘partners’ with the rock, and as participants in a perfection game where skills are developed relative to the affordances of the rock. Perfection was for Naess a deeper norm than competition. Competition can lead to a narrow focus on results, rather than on the process of developing and integrating personal, social and ecological resources as a central part in one’s life.

Futhermore, Naess argued for many-sidedness rather than specialization. As mentioned above many-sidedness means that one should flourish and develop one’s bodily and mental capacities in a variety of activities and in many different ways. Specialization is often associated with a narrow focus on achievements and results. It may be important for a climber to reach the top, to climb a new route, to climb it faster than before, to climb with less protection, or even to climb solo. Naess suggested that we should focus less on achievements and more on playful and holistic attitudes where not individual but group resources are focused. If one wants to look at objective results and use standard comparisons, such as gradations of climbing routes, one should look behind the superficial end result. Achievements should be evaluated according to the resources at hand. One may therefore enjoy a performance that objectively is of medium quality if the talent, training input, and equipment are sub-optimal. One must evaluate according to more refined and complex parameters than the objective result protocols do.

Instead of achievement and objective results Naess advocated an increase in perception, sensitivity and experiential qualities. An increase in perceptual qualities is in many cases preferable to an increase in objective performance. This is also ecologically important, since an increase in achievement very often implies more advanced equipment and resource-consuming travels. Less advanced equipment can be compensated for by increased sensitivity and more nuanced evaluations. One should thus encourage attitudes that are in accordance with Naess’s slogan ‘Richness in ends, simpleness in means!’

4.5. Some Examples from Naess’s Practice of Climbing

Naess started climbing when he was 14 years old and continued until he was more than 90 years old. He climbed everywhere; in trees, on facades, up rain gutters, on the outside of moving trains, on brick walls, on crags and big stones, in huge mountains. Naess thought playful climbing was part of being alive—at least for him. As a young student he hiked and climbed continuously for months in the Pyrenees and Alps, sleeping in a tent and with little equipment. He soon found out that the process of climbing was much more interesting than reaching summits, which often led to him to abandon the last hundred meters to the top. Later he came to the conclusion that mountains cannot be conquered. Conquest of mountains is a contradiction in terms (Naess 1970). There are no ‘victories’ or conquests. One has to adapt to and respect the mountain. It is climbing as a process and experience that is interesting (Naess 1970).⁷ In many ways climbing is a communion with mountains. Conquest of mountains is a sacrilege, showing them little or no respect. Hallingskarvet, the mountain where Naess had his cottage, became in particular a ‘big father and even a sort of God’. Mountains are elevated and immutable and deserve respect (Naess 1970, 1994). This had some practical consequences. The climbing route should be left without marks. When using bolts they should not be hammered deep into the cracks. One should be able to remove them easily. Naess considered the placing of bolts an art form.

Similarly, Naess valued creativity. Before starting a climb he would look into his rucksack to see what he happened to have there. If he had only a few carabiners, he and his climbing companion had to adjust the climbing to this fact and have joy and perfection in relation to what was possible. The creativity was not only related to use of climbing gear, but to the choice of climbing style. Climbing was not necessarily vertical climbing but could even be horizontal climbing along the bottom of the Hallingskarvet mountain ridge. The rules were: ‘Feet a maximum of two meters above the ground. Do not step on the ground. Imagine instead that there is a two hundred meter abyss below your feet’. Horizontal climbing could thus be playful, but with a twitch of seriousness.

From his many climbs Naess knew that climbing and other friluftsliv pursuits included taking risks. Naess admired Fridtjof Nansen’s idea of our common roots being in simpler lifestyles, closer to nature and, therefore, the importance of attitudes like courage, independence and ‘the spirit of adventure’ (Nansen 1927; Repp 2004). Yet, Naess maintained that a Spinozist outlook was also compatible with adventure and ‘controlled risk’ and would not be contrary to the intensely emotional experiences in climbing (Naess 1994). According to Spinoza an increase in freedom, or degrees of freedom, can only be attained through challenges, through exposure to the unknown and the physically and mentally risky. Recklessness must, however, be banned because the wide Self in its Self-realization has the norm ‘live and let live’. Nothing should be done merely to please, amuse and impress the public at large. Here Naess obviously thought of the highly publicized adventures of some modern ‘risk-takers’. In contrast to some of the modern risk-takers who use risk and risk-taking to flag their own personality image, Naess believed that one should always focus on control and security. The riskier the arenas, the more one needs to focus on protection and control. It is not by chance that some base-jumpers call themselves ‘control freaks’, which is in accordance with Naessian views.

5. Guidelines for Friluftsliv: Simplicity in Means and Respect for Nature

I have presented some of Naess’s key deep ecological ideas and have given some examples of his friluftsliv practice. Naess summed up his own position with the following guidelines for ‘ethically and ecologically responsible friluftsliv’:

1. Respect for all life. Respect for landscapes. Traceless passage through the wilderness.

2. Outdoor education in the signs of identification. Instead of goal-direction and competition, deep, rich and varied interaction with nature.

3. Minimal strain upon the natural combined with maximal self-reliance.

4. Natural lifestyle. All-sided togetherness with the greatest possible elimination of technique and apparatus.

5. Time for adjustment when one comes from urban life to the stillness of nature. It takes time for the new milieu to work in depth. Several weeks must pass before the sensitivity for nature is so developed that it fills the mind.

(Naess 1990, 179)

These guidelines stand in contrast to the capitalistic growth economy. A goal is to make friluftsliv independent of mechanized, competitive and environmentally destructive intrusions into nature. The goal for Naess, and some of his co-developers of deep ecology, was to develop a form of friluftsliv that can contribute to overcoming the ecological crisis. But can Naessian deep ecology be put into practice?

6. Putting Naessian Deep Ecological Friluftsliv into Practice; Some Examples and Problems

Naess’s deep ecological friluftsliv inspired several practice areas and led to new philosophical and normative discussions. Let me just give a few examples. Naessian deep ecological friluftsliv was important as inspiration for Nils Faarlund when developing his Norwegian Mountain School in the 1970 s. At the same time the Norwegian School of Sport Sciences set up friluftsliv programs at university level, building on Naessian deep ecology. Naessian friluftsliv has also been an inspiration for Scandinavian adventure guiding (Andersen and Rolland 2018). A study by Beery (2013) found that participation in friluftsliv led to a stronger attachment to nature and, thus, a possibility for lifestyle changes.

Another impact is found in tourism. Ecotourism started in the 1970 s, had a second wave in the 1990 s and then again since 2015. A diversity of themes and programs have been developed, most recently focusing on climate change (Aikens, McKenzie, and Vaughter 2016). Ecotourism comes in many versions and not all of them are environmentally friendly. It can ‘be used as a marketing term to sell products that verge on mass tourism or cause environmental and cultural degradation’ (Acott, Trobe, and Howard 1998, 238). Following Naess’s distinction between shallow and deep ecology, Acott, Trobe, and Howard (1998) distinguished between shallow and deep ecotourism. While shallow ecotourism has a focus on anthropocentric values, deep ecotourism ‘encapsulates a range of ideas which include the importance of intrinsic value in nature, emphasis on small-scale and community identity, the importance of community participation, a lack of faith in modern large scale technology and an underlying assumption that materialism for its own sake is wrong’ (Acott, Trobe, and Howard 1998, 245). Ecotourism is therefore not only an ambiguous phenomenon in theory, but even more so in practice.

Even deep ecologists may exemplify behaviors that are problematic. Høyer and Naess (2001) pointed out the problem of energy costs for delegates travelling from all over the world to ecological conferences. A study by Becken (2002) then examined the estimated costs of the Ecotourism Summit in 2002, which was considered a huge success, but which also accumulated huge negative greenhouse effects. Intentions and consequences may not always be in harmony. Naess was aware of this paradox, as when he went on ecologically unfriendly expeditions in younger days and later in life when travelling to meetings and conferences.

Naess therefore did not necessarily encourage people to seek wilderness but asked people to cross the border between nature and culture and look at the flowers in cities, at the sky and the clouds, at the small patches of nature that are observable anywhere. Instead of merely focusing on facts and science, Naess argued for the importance of openness, activeness and sensitivity.

A similar holistic and ecocentric view is presented by Le Grange (2018) who wants to shift the focus of education from chiefly promoting the interest of human beings to an interest in enhancing all of life. He seems, like Naess, to favor ‘experimentation with the real, whereby educational encounters (pedagogical episodes) are moments in a life-long affair of experimentation’ (Le grange 2018, 884). Like Naess he builds on Spinozism, but of a different kind. Inspired by Deleuze and the new materialism he flattens ontology so that human beings hold no privileged place in the cosmos (see Le Grange 885.) Nevertheless, Le Grange maintains that we should hold on to the ethico-normative distinctiveness of the human animal and the cultivation of (post)human sensibilities. This is close to Naess’s views about egalitarianism and the responsibility of humans.⁸

With these few examples we see that Naessian deep ecological theories and practices are in various ways intertwined, problematized and connected with many of the new developments in ecotourism, guiding and environmental education.

7. Naess and His Critics, Some Central Discussion Points

For a long time friluftsliv was first and foremost a practice. Since the 1970 s it has become part of the academic world and a scholarly and professional subject. Naess was one of the pioneers in giving friluftsliv a philosophical foundation. He argued: ‘Friluftsliv is a rather concrete theme, but it cannot be separated from metaphysics. So the jump back to philosophy is not unduly long. Understanding of anything in nature begins with direct experience, but this soon stimulates reflection’ (Naess 1990, 181). Naess was here reflecting in the tradition of Thoreau, Leopold and others.

Naess gave a lasting contribution to friluftsliv in three ways. First, by his deep ecological and Spinozistic underpinnings of friluftsliv. Second, by his norms and guidelines for deep ecological friluftsliv. Third, by his own examples of friluftsliv practice.

Naess’s philosophical foundation of friluftsliv is special in several ways. Firstly, it is argued from an ecocentric and egalitarian position where humans and all living and non-living beings are on a par and are supposed to interact fruitfully. Secondly, Naess’s conception of values as objective parts of a world of concrete contents invites relevant action. Animals and ecosystems demand to be taken care of. Thirdly, Naess’s pluralism invites a coordination of actions, based on a platform of common principles. Alongside Naessian Spinozism or ecosophy_T, different philosophical and religious views are welcome to enter the platform from their different basic positions. Conversely, Naess’s deep ecological approach and his version of friluftsliv have been criticized on several points. Let me start with some theoretical points.

7.1. Some Criticisms of Naess’s Deep Ecological Theory

Naess can be criticized for not being ecocentric enough. His terminology sometimes seems to cling to dualistic conceptions like nature/culture, body/mind, living/nonliving beings. More recent forms of ecocentrism go much further in eliminating old dualisms based on Cartesian presuppositions. I think Naess’s terminology may be vulnerable to such criticisms as he often used traditional Western anthropocentric terminology which implicitly places humans outside or over nature. On the other hand, he was quite clear in his notion of the ecological web where all living beings are just knots and have the same value and have, at least in principle, the same right to live. But Naess cannot follow those who want to eliminate the distinction between living and non-living beings. As parts of the ecological systems non-living beings have their place, but not in the Naessian value system, where the ability to suffer was central to Naess’s conception of the value of beings.

Another criticism of deep ecology comes from some ecofeminist viewpoints. Deep ecology is charged with overlooking gender divisions and power hierarchies. Yet deep ecologists are diverse. The ecofeminist Karen Warren defends Naess and argues that the work of Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists and states that ‘Naess’s deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism’ (Warren 1999, 255). But other ecofeminists are more critical because Naessian deep ecology does not focus enough on division, power and gender. The Naessian approach favors sameness in nature whereas some feminists follow Reed (1989) who argued for separateness. According to Reed humans are different from nature. We are in many ways strangers and the Naessian self-realization of solidarity with nature overlooks power divisions, gender differences and hierarchies. Plumwood argues here for a middle position from a feminist viewpoint: ‘Deep ecologists can learn much from feminist theory and anticolonial theory about how to undertake the theoretical task of rejecting hyperseparation and elaborating a concept and ground for solidarity with nature distinct from unity, one that at the same time allows us to affirm continuity and to respect nature’s difference’ (Plumwood 2000, 68). Plumwood thus wanted to develop a view that respects sameness as well as difference and is realistic about power and hierarchies.

The views of Plumwood and others have led some authors to suggest a more balanced view of the ‘notion of identification that would allow one to retain key features of Naess’ view—most notably his gestaltist understanding of the “self” or “subject” and his emphasis on “Self-realization” as an ultimate norm—while responding to the problems that Plumwood’s work exposes’ (Diem 2002, 25). I agree here with some of the criticism of Naess’s philosophy of sameness and unity in nature. Through a long history of division and difference we are not immediate parts of nature and cannot identify with nature without overcoming what separates us. The expansion from the personal self to the cosmic self may be quite complicated and problematic. The idea of unifying oneself with nature and natural things has thus, by some, been criticized for ‘being based on a taken-for-granted and rather naive understanding that a linear and predictable relationship between human and nature exists’ (Sandell and Öhman 2013, 243). On the other hand, one could defend Naess to some extent by pointing out the importance he placed on diversity and complexity in ecosystems, as well as in relations between humans and ecosystems.

Another problem with Naess’s position is how to argue for a total egalitarianism without giving humans a privileged position. Naess admitted that humans, as conscious and moral beings, have a special responsibility. But how can we avoid saying that we are unique, privileged and, as such, have higher value? According to some critics, ‘Naess admitted that in practical terms we would often favor humans above other living beings, but has acknowledged the difficulty in removing the primacy of an anthropocentric position given the practical considerations, but provided no way to mediate this practically (ethically or morally)’ (Jones 2017, 163). It is true that Naess gave no clear guidelines for how human interests in practical, ethical terms should be weighed against the interests of other beings. But some of Naess’s critics who argue from an embodied cognitive perspective (Jones 2017), or from a cultural-ecological approach (Ingold 2000), cannot avoid being anthropocentric, and thus face the same, or, at least, similar problems about how to weigh different interests.

Even if biospheric egalitarianism was an indeterminate principle in practical terms, it stayed important as an ideal for equal value among living beings.

7.2. Some Criticisms of Naess’s Friluftsliv

Some authors have raised questions concerning Naessian friluftsliv. Following up the ecofeminists’ criticism, Gurholt (2008) argues that Norwegian friluftsliv was originally developed as a Bourgeois male education. She also thinks the eco-philosophical perspective on friluftsliv has been dominated by male perspectives and has not recognized women’s (and children’s) perspectives and competences. Instead, she wants to use cultural-analytical and phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretations to comprehend nature and friluftsliv as gendered, historical, social and cultural categories (Gurholt 2008, 65).

I think Gurholt is right about the early friluftsliv history. But in principle the egalitarian aspect of deep ecology should stand in contrast to any male chauvinism. I think Naess would certainly have welcomed studies of friluftsliv by use of gendered, historical, social and cultural categories, as he was in favor of social and cultural diversity.

Gurholt (2014) further argues that Naess’s conception of friluftsliv as ‘exuberance in nature’ signals an ‘aesthetic approach to what in a Nordic—notably Norwegian—context is frequently called “the nature”, a notion that is used regularly to refer to vast areas of uncultivated, “untouched” mountainous and forested land’ (Gurholt 2014, 234). She goes on to argue that ‘the notion that humans can be reunited with nature by returning to an earlier, seemingly prehistorical or authentic state of being—which is reflected in friluftsliv pedagogy inspired by deep ecology—will at the extreme imply that humans cease being human’ (Gurholt 2014, 235). She here refers to authors who have criticized deep ecologists for maintaining a romantic distinction between nature and culture. They have even criticized this for leading into fundamentalist and antidemocratic positions and for not taking socio-cultural relations into account (Argyrou 2005; Milton 2002; Sutton 2004).

I think that Naessian friluftsliv certainly includes aesthetic aspects, but as I have shown, his interest in cognitive, emotional and physical types of involvement was as strong or stronger. Similarly, the critique that the Naessian view upholds a distinction between humans and nature is not well supported. Naess’s deep ecology was actually pioneering the opposite project to show that humans are just knots in a vast ecological web of relations. More relevant is Gurholt’s critique of returning to earlier romanticized ways of living in nature, although Naess was aware that friluftsliv could never become a common and general way of living in modern society. The last point, which expresses mistrust that deep ecology may promote fundamentalist and anti-democratic tendencies may perhaps hit some versions of deep ecology, but probably not Naess. His general philosophical attitude was one of pluralism and possibilism, favoring diversity.⁹

8. Conclusion

In conclusion, I think Naess’s deep ecology, his guidelines for friluftsliv and his own practice are relevant and inspiring, now and for the future. Naessian friluftsliv has the potential to inspire all of us, especially people who are guides or instructors in outdoor activities, teachers in schools or those developing tourism in natural surroundings.¹⁰ Naessian friluftsliv stands in contrast to the modern consumption and leisure culture with focus on guided tours, exotic experiences and luxury (Varley and Semple 2015). For those who cling to more traditional and simple forms of outdoor life it is, on one hand, a challenge to resist the increase in consumption, and, on the other hand, to be motivated by good examples of sustainable and eco-friendly outdoor life. I think Naessian deep ecological friluftsliv is one such inspiring, yet radical, example of outdoor life for the future. It is a type of outdoor life following the maxim: ‘Richness in ends, simpleness in means!’

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Naess uses the term ‘concrete’ here and other places to point to the direct experience and the actual behavior in relation to the environing world. He similarly uses the term to denote the difference between abstract values and ideas and the world of concrete contents, i.e. the world we directly experience with our bodies and senses.

2. This is different in the most northern parts of Norway, where snow mobiles are used extensively, as in Iceland and Alaska. The harsh climate and the tradition of reindeer herding in the Sami population have generated a different ideology here.

3. Naess uses Spinoza to develop his deep ecological theory. Naess’s interpretation focuses on the mind, on the consciousness side, while some recent interpretations interpret Spinoza in more materialist terms (Le Grange 2018). Similarly Braidotti (2006) proposes instead to re-read Spinoza in accordance with French thinkers such as Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault.

4. This means that Naess, using the Spinozistic vocabulary, was a non-dualist, not far from the recent conception of David Chalmers (1996, 2010), who argues for panpsychism. This sets Naess’s ecophilosophy apart from the new materialist conceptions of nature philosophy (Braidotti 2006; Mcphie and Clarke 2018).

5. A central goal in Naessian deep ecology is to overcome the dualism between humans and nature. Several other new ‘ecologies’ (see Guattari 2000) have tried, like Naess, to overcome the dualism to reach more ecocentric positions. Clarke (2017) points, for instance, to Eva Perez de Vega (n.d.) who talks about different possibilities. While deep ecology subjectifies nature and shallow ecology objectifies nature, dark ecology rejects nature and flat ecology goes even further and intensifies it as a nonhierarchical complex material system (Clarke 2017). Some of these new ecologies may be inspiring and lead to new practices. Naess was open to different philosophical underpinnings of what he called ‘the common ecological platform.’ The goal was to change practice.

6. A similar distinction appears in modern tourism, where some, inspired by friluftsliv, argue for ‘Nordic slow adventure’ in contrast to ‘fast adventure’ (Varley and Semple 2015). Slow adventures ‘are in effect explorations of and reconnections with this ground: feeling, sensing and investing in place, community, belonging, sociality, and tradition over time and in nature’ (Varley and Semple 2015, 78).

7. It must be admitted that the young Arne Naess was a competitive climber, putting up a lot of new and difficult routes in Norway and Europe in the 1930 s. He also introduced new types of gear and new climbing styles to the Norwegian climbing milieu. In 1950 and 1964 he was the leader of two Norwegian expeditions to Tirich Mir in Hindukush, North Pakistan. But his attitudes to climbing then had started to change. Naess’s climbing and his general friluftsliv practice more and more came to embody many of his deep ecological principles, like simpleness in means, many-sidedness, creativity, playfulness, etc.

8. Another version of the new materialism argues that concepts like ‘nature’ play a vital role in shaping our world (Mcphie and Clarke 2018). They have what is called ‘performativity’ since matter itself is morphed through conceptual processes. The authors seem to argue that this process runs through concepts and, further, through percepts and thereby have physical effects. It is very unclear how this can happen without thorough processes of meaning, intentions and actions. It is difficult to see how brain currents of some sort via merely physical intermediators can operate on physical systems and shape the material world. Here, Naess may have argued that intentional human action and responsibility would be necessary and a sine qua non.

9. Naess actually published studies of what it meant to have a democracy (Naess 1956) and held skepticism and pluralism as two of his most favored positions (Naess 1969).

10. Clarke argues that much of the environmental education, at least in the UK, has followed in the footsteps of what Naess called ‘shallow ecology’ highlighting the distinction between nature and ‘us’ or nature and culture. While there have been attempts to build education on conceptual models from deep ecology there may still be ‘the romantic and perhaps limiting concept of “nature” that deep ecology relies on, celebrating green “nature” over the “culture” of humans’ (Clarke 2017, 310).