What Is Sport? A Response to Jim Parry

ABSTRACT

One of the most pressing points in the philosophy of sport is the question of a definition of sport. Approaches towards sport vary based on a paradigm and position of a particular author. This article attempts to analyse and critically evaluates a recent definition of sport presented by Jim Parry in the context of argument that e-sports are not sports. Despite some innovations, his conclusions are in many ways traditional and build on the previous positions. His research, rooted in the conceptual analysis, starts with a stipulation that sport is paradigmatically Olympic sport. He defines it then as an ‘institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill’ i.e., identifies six necessary elements of sport: human (not animals), physical (not chess), skill (not jogging), contest (not mountaineering), rule-governed (not ‘field sports’), institutionalized (not hula-hooping). Our claim is that this definition, despite its methodological clarity, is not accurate and does not sufficiently represent sport outside the Olympic context. First, to say for something to be a sport it is necessary to be a contest leads to a narrow concept of sport. Secondly, Parry’s account lacks the emphasis on game and play-like structures that are inherently present in sport (even in the Olympic sport), namely non-necessity, non-ordinariness, arbitrariness and gratuitousness. We try to direct the attention precisely on these structures and offer an alternative account of sport understood as a modern ‘hard core’ sport that nevertheless reaches important congruences with Parry’s definition. The originality of this contribution lies in presenting the essential qualities of modern ‘hard core’ sports, which, although sometimes hidden in the modern emphasis on high level performances, competition, and results, play an important role in the question how sport ought to be played and approached.

KEYWORDS:

• Philosophy of sport
• definition of sport
• Parry
• play
• game

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the reviewers and editor for their comments on the previous drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 9^th Czech Philosophy of Sport Conference (October 2020) hosted by the Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, Czech Republic. We are grateful to the participants of this conference for a discussion, specifically to Jim Parry for his critical comments.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. We are aware of the limits of analytical thinking (see Kretchmar 2007a, or Meeuwsen 2021). Here we simply use it to bring systematic clarity into some already existing analytic approaches. This does not mean that we do not value more continentally based conceptions of sport.

2. In order to be sufficiently broad, Parry (2019, 14) has to claim that ‘Olympic Sport means Olympic-type Sport’, which suggests that for example kick-boxing meets the criteria of his definition, but has never appeared on the Olympic Programme.

3. These thoughts are inspired by J. Pike and his essentialist and naturalist approach to sport. He claims that sport cannot be constructed out of anything, but natural actions generate the rules of a particular sport. Moreover, there are essential and difficult actions (doables) in any sport and the primary value of sport is succeeding in performing those difficult actions.

4. For a comprehensive analysis of the theories of sport see Simon, Torres, and Hager (2018, 21–57) and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (search ‘philosophy of sport’). A good example of a particular theory of sport is a recent contribution of Meeuwsen (2021).

5. This approach is criticised, among others, by Howe (2019, 443), who states: ‘Given the glorious messiness of both the history and practice of the many kinds of physical activity that can and have been called sport, the pursuit of essentialist definitions of sport is, quite possibly, a mare’s-nest not worth untangling.’ This statement, however, does not exclude the possibility to find relatively stable concepts that shed some light on what sport essentially is. Other authors who are critical towards essentialism are Breivik (1998) and McNamee (2008).

6. However, in some cases, the additional title serves to narrow the scope of reference, not signal something problematic. For the sport context, consider ‘water sports’ or ‘women’s sports’. Neither of these additional titles serve to signal a borderline case, only a narrowing. We would like to thank one of the reviewers for raising this point.

7. Wertz (1995, 99) states that long before Wittgenstein, R. G. Collingwood developed the doctrine of the overlap of classes and foresaw the need for the definition of a concept in philosophy to be coextensive with its entire exposition. Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances with respect to defining sport is presented by McNamee (2008, 9–14).

8. Some activities have more in common than other activities (such as playing chess with playing ice hockey in contrast with being an accountant with playing ice hockey), but what matters is whether we use the most adequate terms to describe the reality. In this sense, some activities will be rather games (such as board games), or consumptions (such as speed eating), or fighting (such as battles in wars) than sports.

9. For more insights into the relevance of specific actions in sport see Pike (2019).

10. This technique involves the search for ‘logically necessary conditions’ for the use of a word. In particular, Parry uses an ‘exhibition analysis’ which clarifies the concept of sport by offering ‘construals’ of the six first-level terms. Here Parry accepts Körner’s account (1990, 130): ‘Exhibition-analysis consists in making indicative or normative propositions which are more or less implicitly accepted by a person or a group of persons fully explicit.’

11. Closer reading of Papineau (2017) reveals that Parry’s account critically reacts to some of the claims about sport raised in this particular book.

12. For a discussion on the status of training and its relation to game, play, and work see Faulkner (2019).

13. Suits here mentions that diving and gymnastic competitions are examples of a non-game sports.

14. Suits’s definition of games was criticised and revised by Kretchmar (2019b). Critical evaluation of Kretchmar’s position is offered by A. Wolf-Root (2020). Suits’ views on games have since (1967) evolved.

15. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sport/#Form. Accessed 13 September 2021.

16. However, Parry states that this feature of sport is an outcome of criteria 5 and 6 rather than another and separate criterion.

17. In Czech language, the term ‘encounter’ is the translation of ‘střetávání’. It is the constitutive term for ancient Greek athletic festivals and local games, but also for gymnastic exercises (gymnastiké) practiced in gymnasia. It represents the essence of the agonal character of ancient Greek culture.

18. Kretchmar (2014, 2019), Simon, Torres, and Hager (2018) and others have argued that competing with self is problematic and misleading. However, Howe (2008) argues that certain self-competition is possible. She calls such a competition self-reflexive competition and demonstrates that it is not so much with one’s self (which is philosophically absurd), but within one’s self, between conflicting motivations and desires. This kind of self-competition is compatible with our general idea of facing our own limits.

19. The idea that not all sports have to involve competition and contest (understood as plurality and comparison) is supported for example by Howe (2019) who analyses nature sports, and Kretchmar (2019a) who speaks about four kinds of sport projects that are all ‘gratuitously challenging physical activity projects’, but only two of them are competitive, yet two of them are not.

20. Breivik uses the term encounter to signify an action and reaction to an opponent. We prefer a broader usage of the term that involves all four existential dimensions of the relations suggested by Breivik.

21. This does not, however, mean that we cannot be engaged in sport playfully. See for example Mareš and Ryall (2021).

22. Kretchmar (2019b) uses this particular term in his critique of B. Suits‘ definition of games. He defines game playing as an attempt to solve a gratuitous problem.

23. Perhaps we may see the ‘non-necessary/non-ordinary’ element of sport in the constitutive term ‘rule-governed’. Sport’s (constitutive) rules, as Suits (1973, 12) suggests, prohibit use of the most efficient means for reaching the pre-lusory goal. Sports are, however, non-necessary and non-ordinary not just in terms of rules, but more generally as a type of activity that is more complex and cannot therefore be defined solely by referring to its rules.

24. Huizinga (2014, 10) asserts that in this respect, there is no formal difference between play and ritual.

25. We would like to thank one of the reviewers for raising this point.