Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse

Abstract

Through a critical rhetorical analysis of US elite and popular press coverage of global warming, this essay explores the structuring presence and implications of apocalyptic framing. We found that the hallmarks of apocalyptic rhetoric-a linear temporality emphasizing a catastrophic end-point that is more or less outside the purview of human agency-permeate selected discourse. Two variants of the apocalyptic frame impact human agency: tragic apocalypse constitutes global warming as a matter of cosmic Fate; and comic apocalypse suggests that mistaken humans have a capacity to influence (within limits) the global warming narrative's end. We conclude with suggestions for structuring climate change communication in ways that enable more members of the public to become active advocates for, and participants in, mitigating global warming.

Keywords:

• Global Warming
• Climate Change
• Apocalyptic Rhetoric
• Frame Analysis
• Agency

If the patterns of argument typical of religious prophecy are also observable in any public discourse that anticipates or predicts catastrophe, then we should be skeptical of the public's ability to reasonably evaluate any appeal to urgency in the face of disaster. At the same time, we also run the risk of dismissing valid threats because they are couched in the form, if not the language, of traditional prophetic warnings. (O'Leary, 1997, p. 310)

Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004).

Keller (1999) identifies a tendency to "read [climate change] data apocalyptically" (p. 42). The apocalyptic tone of climate change rhetoric may not only encourage a feeling of despair in the face of impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics' ability to discredit climate scientists as alarmists (Leiserowitz, 2007). Yet, environmental advocates like Rachel Carson have successfully relied upon dire predictions of the world's end to provoke necessary action (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1996). Although apocalyptic discourse often reads as divisive, this rhetorical strategy ultimately may invite widespread attention to environmental issues.

While scholars have begun drawing connections, no sustained analysis has been undertaken concerning the structuring effect and possible implications of an apocalyptic frame for global warming. Heeding Moser and Dilling's (2007) call for "greater multi- and interdisciplinary research on communication and social change" (p. 508), we conducted a critical rhetorical analysis of US elite and popular press coverage of global warming. Our analysis suggests that the hallmarks of apocalyptic rhetoric-a linear temporality emphasizing a catastrophic end-point that is more or less outside the purview of human agency (Brummett, 1991)-permeate selected discourse. We identify two variants of the apocalyptic frame, following O'Leary (1993): a tragic apocalypse, which constitutes global warming as a matter of cosmic Fate; and a comic apocalypse, which suggests that mistaken humans have a capacity to influence (within limits) the end of the global warming narrative. We conclude with specific suggestions for structuring climate change communication to avoid the tragic apocalyptic outcome of moving the public, in Al Gore's words from An Inconvenient Truth, "straight from denial to despair." By interrogating the apocalyptic frame, we hope to inspire approaches to communication about global warming that empower the public to overcome barriers to individual and collective agency, enabling them to become advocates for and participants in, global warming mitigation.

Media Framing, Global Warming, and Apocalyptic Rhetoric

Interrogating the press coverage of climate change is important, for a substantial portion of the general public's knowledge-and their perceptions of the issue's risk-come from the media (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). As Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) argue, the "coverage of global warming is not just a collection of news articles; it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by [the] news" (p. 126). Unfortunately, as a growing literature suggests, the press's power to constitute public interest, and serve the greater good, may be failing in the case of climate change. Scholars have critiqued the misinformation spread through the press due to media-corporate ties (Mazur, 1998), and journalistic practices such as using "balanced" reporting which disputes the scientific consensus that human-induced climate change is a real, urgent problem (Boykoff, 2007a; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).

Along with identifying the ways that powerful interests and professional practices influence the media coverage of climate change, scholars have attended to the press's shaping of global warming as a political issue and scientific discourse (Russill, 2008). The tool of frame analysis has proven quite useful to these efforts (Antilla, 2005; Boykoff, 2007b; Jones, 2006). Frame analysis not only permits critics to identify constitutive structures in a discourse, but also to consider the structures' possible impacts in terms of agency, public opinion, policy, and democracy (Ott & Aoki, 2002). The force of hegemonic ideologies, the values of a profit-driven media, and the professional practices and codes of journalism impact the way the press frames important public issues (Iyengar, 1991). Frames are "familiar and highly ritualized symbolic structures" which "organize the content and serve to close off specific pathways of meaning while promoting others" (Tucker, 1998, p. 143). Frame analysis assumes that the press not only sets an agenda in terms of what issues are salient or important for the public, but also shapes how readers may define problems, attribute causes, and evaluate solutions (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 2006).

While frames "cannot guarantee how a reader will interpret or comprehend" an issue or text, they "play a fundamental role in structuring the range of likely decodings" (Greenberg & Knight, 2004, p. 157), often in ways that support dominant ideologies. For instance, Antilla (2005) found that US press coverage framed climate change in terms of controversy, skepticism, and uncertainty. Such framing upholds prevailing ideologies of "free-market capitalism and neo-liberalism" (Carvalho, 2005, p. 21). It has impacts beyond individual readers' interpretations, as Boykoff (2007b) argues, opening "spaces for US federal policy actors to defray responsibility and delay action regarding climate change" (p. 486). Given its power to shape interpretations, policy, and action, close attention to how the press frames the issue is crucial to building a political will to mitigate climate change.

Apocalyptic rhetoric, we argue, represents a mediating frame in global warming discourse. Certain versions of this frame may stifle individual and collective agency, due to their persistent placement of "natural" events as catastrophic, inevitable, and outside of "human" control. Analyzing them could help explain why some individuals take a fatalistic attitude toward, or consider their agency very small in comparison to, the challenge of climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). Moreover, apocalyptic framing helps us understand two vocal minorities who might well stand in the way of building a collective will-the alarmists, who believe global warming's "catastrophic consequences" are veritably unstoppable, and the naysayers, who view global warming as a conspiracy created by environmentalists and the media (Leiserowitz, 2005, p. 1440).

In the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, the apocalypse refers to prophesying, revealing, or visioning the imminent destruction of the world (Zamora, 1982). Common connotations of apocalypse are influenced by pre-millennial theology, which foregrounds the world-ending moment that precedes the second coming of Jesus Christ. Brummett (1991) and O'Leary (1993) argue that apocalypse is so prevalent in secular as well as sacred discourse that it constitutes its own unique genre of rhetoric.

Apocalyptic rhetoric typically takes shape in narrative form, emphasizing a catastrophic telos (end-point) somewhere in the future (Brummett, 1991). A cosmic or natural force drives the linear temporality in apocalyptic rhetoric, such that "certain events and experiences are inevitable, unalterable, and determined by external forces beyond human control" (Wojcik, 1996, p. 298). The narrative in apocalyptic discourse typically posits a tragic ending-"a date or temporal horizon beyond which human choice is superfluous, a final Judgment that forecloses all individual judgments" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 409).

Apocalyptic rhetoric prophesies (directly or implicitly) a new world order, often accompanied by spectacular, (melo)dramatic, or fantastical images of the destruction of the current order (Brummett, 1984). Common apocalyptic discourses suggest that the social order is beyond repair. Given the "unrecuperably evil world" and "bankrupt society on the verge of imminent" collapse-as well as the cosmic force driving apocalyptic events-there is seemingly no reason to attempt social change once an issue is framed apocalyptically (Wojcik, 1996, p. 312). Like God's wrath or nuclear war, the apocalyptic scenario is so much greater than humanity (let alone individual human efforts), that there seems little hope for intervention.

However, some scholars argue that apocalyptic discourse is inherently ambivalent, offering the possibility to inspire human agency even within a ruinous scenario (O'Leary, 1993). Fatalistic and optimistic views co-exist in some environmentalists' conceptions of apocalypse:

Disaster ... represents a desecration of a sacred world, and it is to be resisted with all of one's passion. It is simultaneously, almost certainly, the only conceivable path back to a paradise where humans live in harmony within the sacred, natural order, and thus, in the final moment, it may need to be embraced. (Taylor, 1999, p. 382)

We believe that the variations in apocalyptic discourses are not only "in the eye of the beholder," but are also identifiable as rhetorical differences in texts themselves.

Thus, following O'Leary (1993), we identify two main variations of the apocalyptic frame: a tragic apocalypse, characterized by "resignation" (Burke, 1984, p. 37) to a foretold ending; and a comic apocalypse, discernible through its more forgiving outlook on humanity "not as vicious, but mistaken" (Burke, 1984, p. 41). The two frames are distinguishable through their construction of agency, temporality, and telos. Comic variations posit that "time is open-ended, allowing for the possibility of change, while the tragic conception of Fate promotes a view of time and human action as closed" (O'Leary, 1993, p. 392). Viewing apocalypse tragically suggests that human agency is limited to "following the divine will and behaving in ways decreed by God" (Wojcik, 1996, p. 314), toward a catastrophic telos which is clear and unstoppable. Taking a comic perspective, humans are responsible for a course of actions, giving them some play in influencing their fate (while not totally changing the disastrous outcome foretold, an outcome which is more ambiguous than the tragic telos).

Though apocalyptic rhetoric is associated with religious fundamentalism, scientists, environmentalists, and journalists structure their discourse on climate change through tragic and comic variants. At times, their framing embraces a limited spirit of optimism concerning humanity's potential to influence the crisis; and at other times, their framing accepts climate catastrophe as Fated. Comic and tragic apocalyptic framing has important consequences for amassing a political will to mitigate global warming. While pre-millennial prophets empower audiences by encouraging them to see their worldviews as correct (Brummett, 1991), they offer no recourse for audiences to act upon the changes occurring around them (save for personal actions, such as repentance or agreeing with the prophet's forecast). Comic features may be better suited to building the broad coalition necessary to curb global warming.

Tragic and Comic Variations of the Apocalyptic Frame in Global Warming Discourse

Our analysis concentrates on the coverage of climate change in the US elite and popular press. We chose four publications that have a wide readership in the USA: the New York Times and the Washington Post (elite press), Time magazine (or its subsidiaries), and USA Today (popular press). We searched the Lexis-Nexis database for articles appearing from 1997 to 2007, a decade of coverage beginning with the Kyoto Protocol. To locate relevant and qualitatively rich pieces, we searched for "global warming" or "climate change" in the headline or lead paragraphs. We initially intended for the terms to be used interchangeably (as they often are in discourse); however, as commonly used in the USA, the terms may relate to various frames. "Climate change" suggests non-human (natural) agency as the driver for warming, while "global warming" positions human activities as the main cause (and comic "cure") of rising surface temperatures and their effects (Bolstad, 2007).

We added the search term "catastrophe" (appearing anywhere in the article text) after our cursory examination of articles yielded a common recurrence of the term in pieces which offered sustained coverage of climate change or global warming. Our search parameters resulted in 55 articles in the New York Times, 32 in the Washington Post, 10 in Time magazine, and eight in USA Today. The term "catastrophe" steered us away from articles that only briefly mentioned global warming (e.g., as a metaphor or quick event story), and led us to articles which afforded the potential to more deeply explore apocalyptic framing. The term may have garnered articles which do not represent a centrist view of human-induced warming. However, the articles appear in prolific news outlets, and demonstrate how comic and tragic apocalypse may impact the ability to address climate change politically. Other researchers may wish to consider the prevalence of apocalyptic framing in more "everyday" reporting on global warming.

Brummett (1991) suggests that apocalyptic discourse often accompanies great changes in human communities-changes which imply a failure of "old" systems of meaning. Our reading of global warming discourse confirms Brummett's assertions. For instance, insurers worry that standard models of risk assessment cannot account for the dangers of global warming: "Now they think that when it comes to the weather, the world is moving. Wind and flood seem to be playing by new rules" (Garreau, 2006, p. C1). Scientists echo this sentiment, claiming that the current climate defies prior modeling and "conventional wisdom" (Clynes, 2007, p. 52). There is a sense in which climate change is happening so quickly and intensely that we cannot keep pace with understanding it; nor can our current form of politics give guidance or promote action to halt or slow it.

Indeed, much of the discourse reflects the root meaning of apocalypse, as the ability to interpret signs and make predictions. Scientists (and occasionally, journalists, politicians, and business leaders) are cast as prophets who interpret ambiguous signs and complex data which foretell a grim future. The average person does not appreciate the "early effects of global climate change," such as "new habitats for butterflies," or "thinner ice in the Arctic" (Ignatius, 2006, p. A17). While some scientists have "long foreseen a clash between humans and their planet" (Revkin, 2006a, p. F2), Ignatius (2006) continues, laypeople "can't see these changes in our personal lives, and in that sense, they are abstractions ... even though they may be harbingers of a catastrophe that could, quite literally, alter the fundamentals of life on the planet" (p. A17).

Along with reflecting the basic traits of apocalyptic discourse, the US press frames global warming as a narrative which provides the foundation for both tragic and comic variations. The linear plot begins with increased greenhouse gas concentrations, which result in warming that leads to numerous catastrophic effects. Rising surface temperatures result in melting of the polar ice caps and heat-induced expansion of water molecules: "The vast majority of climate scientists agree that if we continue pumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere the world's temperature will climb significantly, and new computer models project a grim scenario of droughts and rising sea levels" (Zimmer, 2006, p. 8). Rising sea levels have numerous effects, including greater coastal flooding (Rogers, 2007), which means the loss of coastal areas (Ain, 1998); the loss of favorite tourist locations (Tidwell, 2001); increased cost to, and potential collapse of, the insurance industry (Garreau, 2006); and the inability of homeowners to sell their homes or recover from losses (Morrison & Sink, 2007), among other outcomes.

Changes in the ocean's circulation will mean the destruction of marine ecosystems and biodiversity, and, potentially, the onset of another Ice Age. Changing weather patterns create more instances of, and more severe, hurricanes (O'Driscoll, 2007), floods, and drought (Achenbach, 2004; Gertner, 2007). The increase in severe weather events means more heat and flood-related deaths and a strain on the fresh water supply and agriculture (Herbert, 2002), which will result in famine, resource wars (Homer-Dixon, 2007a), refugee crises, and genocide (Perry & Iriba, 2007; Struck, 2007). The discourse also suggests that changing weather patterns will result in unprecedented animal migrations and extinctions (Eilperin, 2007; Ignatius, 2006), and the spread of insect-borne diseases, such as malaria (Tidwell, 2001).

Qualitatively, global climate change thus appears as a story which emphasizes a catastrophic ending, on a scale that would affect humanity in dire ways:

Evidence is fast accumulating that, within our children's lifetimes, severe droughts, storms and heat waves caused by climate change could rip apart societies from one side of the planet to the other. Climate stress may well represent a challenge to international security just as dangerous-and more intractable-than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war or the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rogue states today. (Homer-Dixon, 2007a, p. A25)

Although the apocalyptic climate change narrative follows the same basic plot throughout various texts, the treatment of time, telos, and agency in the discourse is quite variable. The experience of time may be fast-paced, moderate, or gradual in its unfolding. There are marked differences in the certainty of endpoints, with some fragments implying that "the end" is happening now, and others suggesting that it could or will happen at some point in the (known or hypothetical) future. The complicated and inconsistent narrative lends itself to both tragic and comic interpretations-sometimes within the same fragment. Yet, our reading suggests that there are discernible differences in comic and tragic variations, primarily centered on human agency (the capacity for adaptation to, or mitigation of climate change).

Framing Global Warming as a Tragic Apocalypse

A number of discursive features constitute global warming tragically: verbs which express the certainty of catastrophic effects, a lack of perspective or shortening of time from beginning to telos, and analogies which equate global warming with foretold apocalyptic outcomes. Each feature forecloses human agency or frames climate change as a matter of Fate. Within the tragic variation of apocalypse, global warming (not other "natural" or divinely ordained events or processes, such as a steady decline to extinction which inevitably befalls all earthly species) is viewed as the demise of humanity.

A close reading of the discourse reveals important differences in the verbs, "is," "will," and "could," which call attention to variations in human agency. Predicting global warming through the word could frees space for human action, including adaptation and mitigation. Asserting that the catastrophic telos of climate change is happening or will occur, however, may reduce the potential for human intervention. As Revkin (2006a) quotes British chemist James E. Lovelock, a 14-degree temperature rise "means roughly that most of life on the planet will have to move up to the Arctic basin, to the few islands that are still habitable and to oases on the continent. It will be a much-diminished world" (p. F2). Declaring with certainty that these negative impacts of global warming will happen suggests that a cosmic, extra-human force determines the outcome of events.

Tragic discourse may even describe predicted events through present-tense verbs, heightening the deterministic effect: "As the Arctic ice melts and ice shelves collapse in the Southern Ocean, vast areas of open water are exposed. The water absorbs heat from the sun that until now was reflected by the ice" (Struck, 2007, p. A10). Struck (2007) qualifies that a warmer ocean "is expected" to reduce ocean circulation; but he concludes with a tragic analogy: "The previous time" the oceanic conveyor-belt current stopped "15,000 years ago, the Northern Hemisphere was plunged into a brief but brutal ice age, apparently within decades" (p. A10).

Importantly, many fragments exhibit a sense of uncertainty about whether the telos is fated comically or tragically, through the mix of is, will, and could. One of the more complex constructions we discovered is an "if-will/would," which pairs the hope for human agency (if) with the preordained tragic outcome (will/would):

Several climatologists believe that it is likely that the ice sheet will begin melting uncontrollably if global temperatures climb more than 3.6 [degrees Fahrenheit]. A rapid meltdown in Greenland would quickly raise sea levels around the world and flood coastal cities and farms. As well as sending large icebergs down the coast, the infusion of cold, fresh water could disrupt ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream, which help to keep weather in the Northern Hemisphere regulated. "If that feedback kicks in," says [climatologist Konrad] Steffen, "then the average person will worry." (Clynes, 2007, p. 52)

The end-points of human-animal displacements and migrations "could" set in, following an ice sheet melt that "will begin" "if" a 3.6-degree rise in temperatures occurs. The "if/would" and "if/could" constructions imply hope for human intervention. However, this hope is quickly diminished, as tragic texts conclude that humans are unlikely to, or are incapable of, acting. The climatologist above suggests that the average person does not begin to worry until after a self-reinforcing feedback loop kicks in, suggesting that human involvement in a potentially comic narrative will not come until it is too late-rendering the narrative tragic.

The shorter the time frame is from beginning to telos, the less likely humans are to have agency over the effects of global warming. Tragic apocalyptic discourse posits a quickened pace for global warming: "Global warming has the feel of breaking news these days. Polar bears are drowning; an American city is underwater; ice sheets are crumbling" (Revkin, 2006b, p. 1). To promote a feeling of immediacy for global warming may not, by itself, hinder human agency. Warning readers that we currently feel some effects of global warming may promote a sense of urgency while retaining the potential for human action. To suggest that "the fastest warming in the history of civilization [is] already under way" (Herbert, 2000, p. A23), however, may thoroughly discourage readers from active participation by minimizing human agency. Moreover, it is possible to read signs of climate change as a catastrophic telos which is already in process: "the oceans are rising, mountain glaciers are shrinking, low-lying coastal areas are eroding, and the very timing of the seasons is changing" (Herbert, 2000, p. A23). Global warming thus appears impervious to human intervention in the current moment.

The tragic acceleration of time may also occur when reporters or scientists give no perspective for readers concerning temporality. Following early estimates that "if no action is taken, the average surface temperature of the globe will rise by two to six degrees Fahrenheit by [2100]," Stevens (1997) concludes, "It would mean more warming, coming more rapidly, than the planet has experienced in the last 10,000 years" (p. F1). With no sense of time scale, readers are left to experience the global warming narrative as though happening overnight or over a season, in the same way they may have witnessed floods or droughts. The accelerated time places the catastrophic telos outside human influence: "Since the warming would be unusually rapid, many natural ecosystems might be unable to adjust, and whole forest types could disappear" (p. F1).

The combination of tragic telos, deterministic linear temporality, and an extra-human force guiding history appear most dramatically in discussions of feedback loops, self-perpetuating cycles that exacerbate warming and its effects. Homer-Dixon (2007b) describes feedback loops as "a vicious circle ... in our global climate [that] could determine humankind's future prosperity and even survival" (p. A29). Here, the end-point of global climate change is cast completely outside of human agency, for "nature takes over." Though Herbert (2002) mixes a variety of caveats and verbs (for example, in the above excerpt he uses "could," rather than "would" or "will") in his discussion of feedback loops, the tragic implication is clear: It is likely that surface temperature will rise "between 3 and 10.5 degrees Fahrenheit. That is a level of warming that could initiate the disintegration of the ice sheet. And stopping that disintegration, once the planet gets that warm, may be impossible" (p. A25). With the loss of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, "Tremendous amounts of housing, wetlands and farming areas around the world would vanish. Large portions of a country like Bangladesh ... would disappear" (p. A25). Once a feedback loop becomes instantiated, there is little (if anything) humans can do but witness the (apparently rapid) disappearance of entire nations.

The argumentative force of the tragic apocalypse also appears through analogies, especially those between current climate change and ancient climate catastrophes, or fictional weather apocalypses, as in The Day After Tomorrow (Bowles, 2004; Scott, 2004). For instance, Gugliotta (2005) lures readers with the headline, "Extinction Tied to Global Warming; Greenhouse Effect Cited in Mass Decline 250 Million Years Ago" (p. A3). Volcanoes releasing "Huge amounts of carbon dioxide ... trigger[ed] a greenhouse effect that warmed the earth and depleted oxygen from the atmosphere, causing environmental deterioration and finally collapse" (p. A3). Stories about analogous events function as enthymemes where global warming's worst effects are fated, outside of human capacity to mitigate or adapt to them. Through the harrowing images of fictitious or ancient catastrophes, audiences may draw their own conclusions concerning the fate of humanity, and life itself.

Framing Global Warming as a Comic Apocalypse

A comic apocalyptic frame suggests that human beings have agency at different points within the global warming narrative. Comically framed discourse posits that humans may mitigate the worst effects of climate change, or that they may adapt to the unchangeable telos. For instance, Kristof (2005) identifies relatively inexpensive "initial steps we can take to reduce carbon emissions ... like encouraging mass transit, hybrid vehicles, better insulation and energy-efficient light bulbs," which "could reduce global emissions by one-third" (p. A25). At the same time it leaves open the possibility that humans may influence the future, apocalyptic rhetoric from a comic frame casts global warming as a material reality, (more or less) ordained and thus constraining human choices. Empowerment within the comic variation of apocalypse is not a trivial matter, however. It requires humans to make the right decisions from a limited set of choices: "Nature commands humans to adapt or die. The natural world keeps erupting, shifting, storming, collapsing, whirling. It refuses, despite our entreaties, to become something dependable and constrained and rational" (Achenbach, 2004, p. C1). In other words, a comic apocalypse does not suggest that events are controllable through any or all human actions.

Using the comic frame permits humans to miss the fully tragic telos (which would, presumably, end all time and humanity):

In [climatologist Roger Pulwaty's] view, a crisis is a point in a story, a moment in a narrative that presents an opportunity for characters to think their way through a problem. A catastrophe ... is one of several possible outcomes that follows from a crisis. "We're at the point of crisis ... " Pulwaty concluded. (Gertner, 2007, p. 68)

By distinguishing between "crisis" and "catastrophe," the comic variation suggests that the tragic telos is only one potential ending to the climate change narrative, contingent upon whether humans alter their behavior in an appropriate manner.

Human beings can assume responsibility within a comically constructed apocalypse, even if the narrative begins tragically. Eilperin (2007) reports that "the warming of the climate system is unequivocal ... even in the best-case scenario, temperatures are on track to cross a threshold to an unsustainable level" which "could" produce effects "irreversible within a human lifetime" (p. A1). What begins as a tragically ordained story takes a comedic turn, as humans have an opportunity to realize that they are mistaken. Eilperin interviews climate scientist Gerald Meehl, who concludes "that a sharp cut in greenhouse gas emissions could still keep catastrophic consequences from occurring: 'The message is, it does make a difference what we do'" (p. A1). Comically, the telos does not overshadow the significance of human choice, which may stave off total catastrophe.

While mitigation is one potential source for human agency, another is adaptation. As Revkin (2007) quotes Dr. Mike Hulme: "Climate change is not a problem waiting for a solution ... but a powerful idea that will transform the way we develop" (p. A16). The emphasis on transformation suggests that humans can adapt to the apocalyptic telos of global warming, even though the telos is, implicitly, foretold. The comic telos thus requires humans to rethink their choices, sometimes after the worst effects of global warming have taken place. Such effects may be forecast as though they will (most likely) occur, maintaining the apocalyptic structure (even in the comic variation):

If the scientists are right about an apocalyptic future of floods, droughts, dead coral reefs, rising sea levels and advancing deserts, global warming is an existential threat that should affect our approach to just about every issue. To take it seriously, we would have to change the way we think about transportation, agriculture, development, water resources, natural disasters, foreign relations, and more. (Grunwald, 2006, p. B1)

Though the ending of global warming is foretold, climate change provides a comic challenge from which people may learn, grow, and adapt. While the tragic variation would end the narrative with humans and all other species as victims of the catastrophic effects of global warming, the comic version is more open-ended.

Furthermore, comic variations often present the apocalyptic telos in a non-totalizing way, again with the effect of amplifying human agency. Comic versions of the global warming narrative posit localized effects, as Clynes (2007) suggests: "A one-meter rise in sea levels over the next 93 years would have enormous consequences, flooding low-lying coastal areas and megadeltas, such as the Nile and Brahmaputra in Bangladesh, where millions of people live" (p. 52). Though Northern industrialized nations could adapt to flooding, developing coastal countries likely could not: "the dramatic effects of climate change could push the number of displaced people globally to at least one billion" (Clynes, 2007, p. 52). Discourse such as this takes seriously global warming's threat, while emphasizing a non-total telos. As exemplary of the comic variation, it reinforces responsibility for making ethical choices, rather than resigning oneself to the foretold, total catastrophe.

In addition, comic discourse indicates a time frame (93 years in the previous example) over which global warming will occur, rendering the temporality comic. While a tragic temporality might predict an exact date after which human agency is impossible; or, leave time to be experienced as rapid through its portrayal of catastrophic events; a comic framing allows readers to experience a more manageable time period across which effects may occur. In comic temporality, the effects of global warming do not happen all at once: "while widespread permanent inundation ... is possible, it isn't likely to occur in [New York City] in our grandchildren's lifetimes, or even their grandchildren's. And an extra 5 to 10 inches of water over the next few decades," Rogers (2007) concludes, is manageable for residents (p. 1). While such temporality may make the issue of climate change appear less pressing to crass readers unconcerned with their families' or communities' futures, it permits human action on climate change, rather than limiting possible expressions of human agency to total resignation.

Conclusions: Understanding and Reframing Apocalyptic Despair

Framing global warming as an apocalyptic event has several implications. Tragic apocalyptic framing in particular posits the issue of global warming as extra-human, driven by cosmic forces, and, as such, Fated. Oddly, this makes it difficult to hold humans accountable for pumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. We are dismayed by tragic discourse that attributes global warming to a simple "rise in temperatures" (Bacon & Watson, 1998, p. 3A), which alleviates humans of responsibility for creating, or at least contributing to, climate change; and decreases the sense of human responsibility for combating global warming.

Furthermore, apocalyptic framing diminishes the range of human agency possible in influencing the inevitable march of global warming. As Brummett (1991) explains, believers who have "lost control over events" are "reassured, not by regaining control, but by knowing that history is nevertheless controlled by an underlying order" (p. 37). Apocalyptic framing limits believers' agency to acting in accordance with prophetic directives, which typically involves intrapersonal activity (e.g., repentance) in the face of cosmic forces beyond individual control. Rather than encouraging material action or behavioral change, being a true believer resigns the community to inaction.

A second implication of the tragic apocalyptic frame is that it invites naysayers to discredit scientists as false prophets and label environmentalists as alarmists. As Gleiberman (2006) notes: "The right-wing strategy, which has been to paint global warming as a lofty hypothetical-an alarmist scenario pushed by pesky Chicken Littles-is a way of relegating it back to the era of '60s paranoia" (p. 65). Apocalyptic framing serves as fodder for naysayers to continue portraying global warming as "overblown" or arguing "that it may not exist" (Stevens, 1997, p. F1). Ultimately, such a discourse polarizes readers, who are forced to choose sides because they were not given more nuanced options for addressing the issue.

But if not through a tragic apocalypse, how might the narrative of global warming be framed to promote political action? Participants in a recent Environmental Communication forum speak to this question, in light of Schwarze's discussion of melodrama (Kinsella, 2008). As Schwarze (2006) argues, the polarizing structure of melodrama may inspire action: "Promoting division and drawing sharp moral distinctions can be a fitting response to situations in which identification and consensus have obscured recognition of damaging material conditions and social injustices" (p. 242). Though melodrama and apocalyptic tragedy differ, they share a tendency to divide audiences, for instance, into heroes against villains (Schwarze, 2006) or believers against non-believers (Brummett, 1991).

Perhaps the polarizing rhetoric of melodrama may shift the ground of the climate change debate away from economic costs and benefits, to the moral stakes of decimating the earth, as Peterson suggests (Kinsella, 2008). Drawing clear distinctions between heroes and villains could motivate identifications to mitigate emissions. As Check counters, the complex issue of climate change may not lend itself to divisive, melodramatic structure, for it does not have a single clear "rhetorical devil that is powerful, ubiquitous, deceitful, and identifiable" (Kinsella, 2008, p. 98). We, too, worry that divisive rhetoric, particularly in the form of tragic apocalypse, has precluded and will continue to suffocate opportunities for a widespread collective will to form. If we accept the view advocated by a number of experts-that global warming represents a challenge to every aspect of modern development-it is imperative for as many different sectors of society as possible to contribute to positive change. Polarizing the community while denying the potential for action, as in apocalyptic tragedy, seems an untenable rhetorical strategy for encouraging the public to become active participants in climate change mitigation.

As a frame, apocalyptic comedy may promote agency on the issue of global warming more than tragic polarization. The comic frame promotes humanity as mistaken, rather than evil. As such, comic discourse allows some space for bringing ideologically disparate communities together. To the extent that humanity is mistaken, it has agency for making different choices which may lead to different outcomes. Time is open-ended, with human intervention possible. Humanity is less likely to be resigned to its fate, and, as such, may be inspired to take steps to change.

However, it is important that we recognize the comic frame as "charitable, but not gullible" (Peterson, 1997, p. 44) in forming a collective will, particularly in light of the tendency to valorize comedy. Though comedy unifies communities and promotes possibilities, it may do so by appealing to hegemonic values rather than, for instance, fundamentally challenging the neo-liberal logic which justifies exploitation of the earth (Kinsella, 2008). Comic fluidity must not be taken as an excuse to justify doing nothing about global warming, or to maintain the status quo.

As Moser and Dilling (2004) argue, one of the greatest challenges facing a movement to mitigate global warming is the communication of urgency. Rhetors must strike a balance between framing global warming as cataclysmic, or simply inconvenient-something which does not require immediate action. To strike this balance, we must avoid the tragic tendencies of apocalyptic discourse, while effectively promoting human agency. As a starting point to constituting audiences as active advocates and participants, we suggest three comic strategies.

First, to combat tragic divisiveness, rhetors may link the concerns of global warming to discourses already in existence and of importance to different stake-holders (Leiserowitz, 2007). For instance, articulating climate change to energy independence (from "foreign oil") may prove powerful in building identification between (American) "naysayers" and environmental advocates.

Second, we believe that careful attention to the various perspectives on time scale may combat tragic apocalyptic risk, which leads to resignation (or at least inaction). In particular, we advise rhetors to avoid framing their estimates in terms of ultimatums, which exacerbate a tragic denial of human agency. Rather than threatening that the public must "act in ten years or face an apocalypse," rhetors may rearticulate the current crisis as an opportunity to avoid potential disaster for our families and communities. Communication scholars and climate scientists must work together on the difficult task of providing appropriate perspectives toward time, such that readers may experience the urgent effects of global warming as something they have opportunities to manage.

Finally, rather than maintaining the tragic apocalyptic assumptions that global warming is fated by the cosmos, rhetors may frame narratives to promote human agency. Instead of beginning stories with mysterious rises in carbon dioxide concentrations, journalists should focus on global warming as it relates to human activities, such that human agency is at the heart of the narrative. A comic apocalyptic scenario casts humans as mistaken, in need of-and capable of-correction.

Reframing the tragic apocalypse cannot end with vaguely interpretive or individualized agency. While becoming educated and expressing one's support for the growing coalition are important, in order to reduce emissions, such agency must be joined by concrete changes in our daily routines. Furthermore, while small behavioral changes (such as installing compact fluorescent light bulbs) are important to prepare individuals for the major changes to come, they must be connected to collective efforts and structural changes. To positively influence the global warming narrative, rhetors should, for instance, stress human agency in a number of sites, from altering heating and cooling practices; advocating for and using mass transit, bicycling, walking, and tele-commuting; to public support for funding alternative energy infrastructure.

Along with supporting diverse sites of human agency, rhetors may want to avoid the inherent conservatism of apocalyptic discourse. Apocalyptic rhetoric suggests that received sense-making systems (i.e., common sense) cannot explain great changes, but that various prophets can (Brummett, 1991). In the case of climate change, apocalyptic framing endows an array of experts and elites (including scientists, actuaries, politicians, and journalists) with the power to understand, frame, and perhaps resolve the issue; helping fuel the common sentiment that ordinary people cannot do anything to reduce global warming (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), or that they will not need to because "'someone will invent the gizmo' that solves the problem" (Gregg Easterbrook, quoted in Nocera, 2007, p. C1). Perhaps by linking climate change solutions to common sense-especially Americans' notions of sacrifice, conservation, community, and family (Moser & Dilling, 2004)-we may free scientists from their role as controversial prophets, while expanding agency beyond Fate. As our analysis suggests, simply creating awareness of an issue is not enough to create an active public. Rather, that awareness needs to work toward arousing the public toward action (Hallahan, 2001).

In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, 2007). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, 2007b). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.

The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this manuscript was presented for the Environmental Communication Division of the National Communication Association convention, San Diego, California, November 2008. We thank Chelsea A.H. Stow for her assistance with the original paper, and the Communication and Climate Change seminar at the University of Denver, in which the original work was conceived. We also thank the editors and reviewers for their helpful comments.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christina R. Foust

Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver

William O'Shannon Murphy

William O'Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver