Missing states? Somali trade networks and the Eastleigh transformation

Abstract

Since the collapse of the Somali state, Nairobi's Eastleigh estate has played host to thousands of Somali refugees and developed from a quiet residential suburb to a major East African commercial hub. This article examines this transformation, arguing that it builds on pre-existing cross border trade networks, as well as diaspora and Kenyan sources of capital, and regional and global processes that intensified in the early 1990s. The Eastleigh story provides a lens through which we trace economic changes associated with Somalia's extended statelessness, in particular how connective fabric has been generated and sustained in this stateless period. However, the Eastleigh story is not just one of Somali statelessness, but also of interaction with other states. In particular, this article focuses on the ambiguous relationship of Eastleigh to the Kenyan state, suggesting that Somali business in Eastleigh, although born of a collapsed state and informality, is integrated in various ways into the formal state-regulated sector. Furthermore, Eastleigh businesspeople hope for more Kenyan state involvement in the estate to provide better security and infrastructure, while Somali businesspeople in general long for a viable Somali state that will allow them to invest their capital at home.

Keywords:

• Statelessness
• migration
• diaspora
• transnational trade
• urban transformation

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the Leverhulme Trust and the Oxford Fell Fund for supporting the ‘Diaspora, Trade and Trust: Eastleigh, Nairobi's Little Mogadishu’ project within the Oxford Diasporas Programme. This research would not have been the same without the assistance of Hassan Kochore, Hannah Elliott, and David Anderson, as well as the many businesspeople who took the time to talk to us. We also thank Robin Cohen, the British Institute in Eastern Africa, Burhan Iman, Kaamil Warsame, Mohamed Ali, Elias Issack, Tari Doti, and Basma Sharrif.

Notes

1. Lochery, “Rendering Difference Visible.”

2. This paper is based on research by Carrier and Lochery conducted from 2010 to 2012. Carrier is the project lead of the project ‘Diaspora, Trade and Trust: Eastleigh, Nairobi's Little Mogadishu’, part of the Oxford Diasporas Programme funded by the Leverhulme Trust. He has conducted archival research in Nairobi, as well as eight months of fieldwork, interviewing Eastleigh traders, residents and visitors, conducting surveys of traders and shop/mall owners, and participant observation. Along with Hannah Elliott, Hassan Kochore and Badr Shariff, Lochery carried out life history interviews with businesspeople in Isiolo, Marsabit and Moyale from April to September 2010 as part of the British Institute in East Africa project ‘Trade and Trust in Northern Kenya’, coordinated by David Anderson. She is now carrying out her doctoral fieldwork looking at the redevelopment of the private sector in Somaliland; this paper draws on interviews she carried out with businesspeople in Hargeisa, Somaliland, between July and November 2012.

3. Hake, African Metropolis, 38.

4. Kenya National Archives (KNA) file BAA/1/17 (Eastleigh Township – Municipality), letter from Governor Edward Northey to Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 29 January 1921.

5. Goldsmith, “Somali Impact on Kenya,” 470.

6. That is, routes that avoid encounters with officialdom – ‘panya’ means ‘rat’ in Kiswahili.

7. Elliott and Lochery, “Shifting Markets in the Northern Kenyan Borderlands.”

8. For a brief history of why it was principally Arabs and Indians who ran shops in northern Kenya, see Manger's description of changing patterns of trade from the late 19th century onwards; Manger, Hadrami Diaspora, 88–95. Until the Shifta War of 1963–1967, Isaaq and Harti Somalis from the northern Somali regions had played a role as shop owners in northern Kenya, but their commercial position was damaged by the war.

9. Marchal, Final Report on the Post Civil War Business Class, 102.

10. Marchal, Survey of Mogadishu's Economy, 74.

11. Martin, L’émergence d'un marché.

12. Martin, L’émergence d'un marché, 43.

13. Somalian referring to a Somali national.

14. See the statement by Mwai Kibaki on 27 April 1965 in a parliamentary debate recorded in Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), pp. 1545–1546.

15. Horst, Transnational Nomads.

16. Lindley, Early Morning Phonecall, 105–107.

17. Abdulsamed, Somali Investment in Kenya.

18. The hidden nature of power relations in economies nominally based on trust is discussed in the informal economy literature – see Meagher's summary in Meagher, “Culture, Agency and Power,” 15–18.

19. While hard to verify, Eastleigh traders report that demand for shops is dwindling, pointing to empty shops in some of the newer malls, and the fact that mall designs now include bigger businesses, being less reliant on small shops.

20. Menkhaus, “Kenya–Somalia Border Conflict Analysis”; Little, Somalia: Economy Without State.

21. Interview with Moyale, 26 July 2010.

22. Campbell, “Formalizing the Informal Economy”; Reinikka, “How to Identify Trade Liberalization Episodes.”

23. Menkhaus, “Kenya–Somalia Border Conflict Analysis,” 32, 35.

24. Lindley, “Leaving Mogadishu.”

25. Famine Early Warning Systems Network, Dobley Cross-Border Market Profile Report.

26. Davidson, Dubai, 67–69.

27. Jamal, “Somalia,” 212.

28. Marchal, Final Report on the Post Civil War Business Class, 87.

29. Marchal, Final Report on the Post Civil War Business Class, 84–87; Marchal, “Dubai,” 94.

30. Marchal, Final Report on the Post Civil War Business Class, 90.

31. Mathews, Ghetto at the Centre of the World, 187–189.

32. Pliez, “Following the New Silk Road,” 28, 32.

33. Interview with Hargeisa, 16 July 2012.

34. Interview with Moyale, 26 July 2010.

35. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, 38–39.

36. Jamal, “Somalia.”

37. Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow.”

38. Interviews with Hargeisa, July 2012.

39. Africa Watch, Somalia, 35–36.

40. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland.

41. Reno, “Somalia and Survival in the Shadow.”

42. For a description of the state's quest for control over resources in the South, see Cassanelli, “Explaining the Somali Crisis.”

43. Ghalib, Cost of Dictatorship; Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?

44. Ahmad, “Agenda for Peace or Budget for War?”

45. Menkhaus, “Somalia,” 28–31.

46. Menkhaus, “Somalia,”, 51.

47. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State.

48. Interviews with power companies in Hargeisa, July and November 2012; see “Power is as Valuable as Peace.” Economist Online, August 14, 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/08/somalia (accessed October 18, 2012).

49. Bakonyi and Abdullahi, “Somalia – No Central Government,” 38.

50. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, 85.

51. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, 152–153.

52. Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics”; Menkhaus, “Somalia.”

53. Ahmad, “Economic Explanation of State Failure and State Formation.”

54. Menkhaus, “Somalia,” 61.

55. Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics.”

56. Barise, “Money Rules in Mogadishu,” 22–23.

57. Ahmad, “Business of Islamism.”

58. The lines between informality and formality are blurred, however, as Islamic ‘formal’ companies still rely on personalized networks of trust in the marketplace. In Eastleigh, for example, the insurance company Takaful has been active only for a year, and to promote their products they first sell them to Islamic scholars, elders and other trusted members of the community who then spread the word more widely; interview with Abass Mohamed, Takaful Insurance, Nairobi, 2 August 2011.

59. Tiilikainen, “Somali Women and Daily Islam.”

60. The report was shown on KTN and is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoQuEAXS4WA (accessed September 2012).

61. Sunday Nation, July 13, 2009. http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/af9241a1-7086-11de-aa2f-77980ee7d563.1 (accessed September 2012).

62. See the remarks by the then Assistant Minister for Commerce and Industry in a parliamentary debate of 12 July 1995; Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) for this date. See also Campbell, “Formalizing the Informal Economy,” 22, who writes about the interception by KRA of several vehicles transporting smuggled goods to Eastleigh.

63. Abdikarim, “City Council of Nairobi.”

64. See the article by Stephene Sangira in the Star newspaper, January 4, 2012. http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/56342-eastleigh-dual-carriage-tender-finally-advertised (accessed September 2012).

65. See http://somalijournalist.wordpress.com/2013/01/01/somali-refugees-fear-repatriation (accessed January 2013).

66. On the reported ‘exodus’ from Eastleigh to Mogadishu, see: http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/showthread.php/69194-Mass-exodus-from-Eastleigh-to-Xamar (accessed January 2013).

67. See the article in the Star newspaper by Kassim Mohamed, January 3, 2012. http://www.the-star.co.ke/lifestyle/128-lifestyle/56228-how-notorious-criminal-gangs-rule-eastleigh (accessed September 2012).

68. Although uniformed security guards protect many of the businesses and banks.

69. Hart, “Informal Economy.”

70. ‘Jua kali’ means ‘hot sun’ in Kiswahili, and is the general term for the informal sector where many workers operate with little shade and shelter; King, Jua Kali Kenya.

71. Marchal makes this point about African trading networks plugged into Dubai more generally; Marchal, “Dubai,” 104.

72. Qassim, “Collapse of the Somali Banking System,” 185–186.

73. Nurhussein, “Global Networks.”