Understanding the 2011 Ugandan elections: the contribution of public opinion surveys

Abstract

In the run up to Uganda's 2011 election, five public opinion surveys carried out by three different research firms found that President Yoweri Museveni would win between 64% and 70% of the vote, which closely matched the eventual electoral outcome. By revealing opinions and attitudes of would-be voters, opinion surveys shed light on some key aspects of the electoral process and its result in Uganda. First, they highlight the wide gap between the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the opposition in terms of recognition, affection and capacity for grassroots mobilization. Second, they reveal a disconnect between the opposition's denunciatory campaign message and would-be voters’ more positive appreciation of their political and socio-economic situation. Finally, surveys highlight the importance of material benefits to voters, as well as their serious concerns about possible electoral violence, which both played in the NRM's favor as patronage and control of the security agenda have been cornerstones of its rule. While polls help understand how voter support was induced, they also raise questions about its durability, as pre-electoral optimism soured reflecting a deterioration in the post-electoral economic situation.

Keywords:

• Uganda
• elections
• opinion polls
• voter behavior

Acknowledgements

The author holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics. He was the Programme Manager of the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), a multi-donor (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) basket fund supporting democratic processes and practices in Uganda. The DDP financed three opinion surveys in the run-up to the 2011 elections: one in partnership with the Monitor Publications carried out by TNS/Research International in May 2010 and two carried out by Wilsken Agencies for Afrobarometer in November–December 2010 and January 2011, respectively. The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone: they cannot be attributed to the DDP or any of its sponsoring governments. The author wishes to thank Simon Osborn, Kristof Titeca and Florence Brisset-Foucault, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Notes

1. Three polls released findings publicly, while two others (Synovate for the Inter-party Cooperation and University of California – Davis) only provided results to their clients. The publicly available polls include: Afrobarometer 4.5 (December 2010) and 4.5.2. (January 2011) (http://www.afrobarometer.ug); and TNS/Research International for the Monitor Publications (January 2011); also Daily Monitor, “Museveni Leads, Ugandans Fear.”

2. Daily Monitor, “Museveni Leads, Ugandans Fear.”

3. Aside from claims that the polling company had been infiltrated, detractors pointed to the 60% who thought that it was the government that had sent the interviewers as evidence of manipulation. This figure is not unusual in countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, as people expect the government to be the leading political and social force. It was, however, used as an indictment of the polls: opposition politicians called them “biased” and “NRM propaganda”; Kiiza Besigye cited in Baraire, “Besigye Ends Western Tour.” Veteran journalist T. Kalyegira wrote that the “view among the public” was that “this publication of opinion polls is a way of getting the public to believe a sense of a Museveni victory as inevitable” as well as “speculation that it is cover for what is widely believed to be preparations for massive rigging”; Kalyegira, “How 2011 Opinion Polls Took On Own Life.”

4. “This has never happened [before],” Museveni wrote. “The people of West Nile and North Central Uganda are now politically together with the rest of the country”; Museveni, “Factors Behind NRM's Victory.”

5. Tripp, Museveni's Uganda, p. 13; Cheesman, “African Elections,” p. 140.

6. He was cleared of trumped-up rape charges in 2006, and then of treason in October 2010, just before the campaigns started.

7. Izama and Wilkerson, “Uganda: Museveni's Triumph and Weakness,” pp. 64–78.

8. Izama and Wilkerson, “Uganda: Museveni's Triumph and Weakness,” p. 66.

9. See http://www.afrobarometer.org/.

10. For a discussion of the accuracy and political impact of pre-electoral surveys in Kenya, see Wolf, “‘Poll Poison’?”; also: Bratton et al., “Voting Intentions in Africa.” Branch and Cheesman, “Briefing: Using Opinion Polls”, use poll data to show the gap between conventional political assessments and citizen opinions.

11. Cf. European Union Election Observation Mission in Uganda, General Elections 18 February 2011; African Union, “Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission”; Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group.

12. DEMGroup's parallel vote tabulation, based on 1000 random polling stations, found Museveni garnering 67.8% of the vote with Besigye on 25.3%, a difference of less than 1 percentage point from Electoral Commission results; DEMGroup, Despite Challenges. This finding also supports the view that there was no tampering in the transmission and tallying of results beyond the polling station level.

13. All opinion survey results are from the Afrobarometer pre-electoral surveys: Round 4.5, published in December 2010; and Round 4.5.2, published in February 2011. Unless otherwise indicated, the results cited in the text are from the latest poll: Round 4.5.2.

14. Perrot et al., “Revisiting the 2011 Multiparty Elections.”

15. A total of 53% felt that “the opposition has not shown that it has the plans to solve the country's problems,” in contrast to 41% who felt that “the opposition has presented a convincing alternative plan and vision for Uganda.”

16. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 14.

17. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 15.

18. Carbone, No-Party Democracy?

19. Kiwanuka, “Govt to Give Bikes to LC1 Chiefs.”

20. The number of NRM members is an estimate, as there is no authoritative total following the registration drive of 2010; interview with Professor Elijah Mushemeza, Deputy Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commission, March 16, 2012.

21. A total of 600 aspirants filed petitions contesting the results; Candia, “Museveni Disbands NRM Electoral Body.”

22. Interview with Professor E. Mushemeza, Deputy Chairperson, NRM Electoral Commission, March 15, 2012.

23. According to Memonet, Uganda Media Coverage, pp. 52, 53, 78, 79, 74.0% and 37.9% of news content on Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) radio and 10 private radio stations, respectively, were accorded to Museveni. In the print media, 60% of daily and 42% of weekly coverage, respectively, was allocated to Museveni, followed by Besigye at 21% in dailies and 16% in weeklies, respectively. The NRM dominated the daily print news at 58% of total space, with FDC at 23% and DP at 7%, respectively.

24. Wetaka, “Besigye Appeals to Electorate.”

25. Otunnu's UPC put the key priority of its 2011 campaign manifesto thus: “During 25 years of Museveni/NRM rule, the vast majority of Ugandans have descended into unbelievably humiliating poverty. For them everything has been wiped out. This is programmed poverty; Museveni has stated that poor people are easy to rule. The UPC cannot accept that vast majority of Ugandans to be condemned to such a deep and perpetual cycle of poverty”; http://www.upcparty.org/campaigns.php/.

26. For an overview of Besigye's message, see, for instance, Twinoburyo, “Besigye in South Africa Denounces Museveni's Patrimonial State.”

27. You Tube, “Kiiza Besigye to Challenge Museveni.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Iw4gdeqOkE/.

28. For instance, NTV, “Besigye Outline 2011 Campaign Strategy.” NTV September 2, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82tIcgHCTGU/.

29. Lule and Among, “Olara Otunnu, Besigye Clash Over Boycott.”

30. A review of key Afrobarometer indicators from 2000 to 2008 (Rounds 1–4) shows that support for democracy and appreciation of fundamental freedoms remains high, with an increase in support for multi-party political competition and a decrease in satisfaction with democracy and in the evaluation of election quality as most significant changes; Afrobarometer. “Popular Attitudes Toward Democracy.”

31. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 5.

32. The Observer, “Editorial: Revise or Discard Cultural Leaders Bill.”

33. Hickey, Beyond the Poverty Agenda.

34. Mwenda, “Why Museveni Won and Besigye Lost.”

35. In 2008, 55% and 67% rated the government's performance in improving health and education services as “fairly” or “very” well; Afrobarometer Round 4 (http://www.afrobarometer.org).

36. Habati, “Early Ghosts in Schools.”.

37. Tripp, Museveni's Uganda; Rubongoya, Regime Hegemony.

38. Lijphart, “It's Our Time to ‘Chop’.”

39. Personal communication with an Senior FDC leader, May 12, 2011.

40. Andrew Mwenda quoted in Wilkerson, “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose.” The NRM has, however, rubbished this figure as being unsubstantiated and far too high.

41. DEMGroup, Money in Politics Report, pp. 7, 24. An indicator of a possible injection of election-related funds is that currency in circulation increased rapidly from September 2010 onwards, peaking in December 2010/January 2011 with an annual percentage change of over 30%; Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC), EPRC Speaks on Economic Turbulence.

42. In reaching out to the youth, Museveni also recorded a “rap” song that received considerable airtime on radio and in clubs. Furthermore, robocalls allowed the president's voice to reach into the phones of millions of Ugandans and ask them personally for their vote. Based on anecdotal information, this novel campaigning method made a strong impression, particularly among less-educated voters in rural areas.

43. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 21.

44. Personal communications with the Hon. Ronald Reagan Okumu (FDC), Aswa County, Gulu; and the Hon. Henry Banyenzaki, (NRM) Rubanda West, Kabale. http://www.enteruganda.com/D/9/579/700743/.

45. Mugerwa, “State House Bills Hit Record Shs190b.” The initially approved budget for State House in FY2010/11 was 63.67 billion shillings; Republic of Uganda, Ministerial Policy Statement, p. 99.

46. Habati, “Bribery or Service?”

47. Joughin and Kjaer, “Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform,” p. 63.

48. Tumushabe, “Trends in Public Administration Expenditure.”

49. Joughin and Kjaer, “Politics of Agricultural Policy Reform,” p. 61.

50. Mwesigye, “Museveni Uses NAADS, Roads, to Woo Baganda.”

51. National Resistance Movement (NRM), “Museveni Promises Teso Ministry.”

52. Bjornestad, Political Economy of Decentralization.

53. For instance. see Kivabulaya, “Museveni Grants Kikumiro and Kagadi District Status.”

54. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 13.

55. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” p. 25.

56. Kramon, Vote-Buying and Political Behavior, p. 23.

57. Gans-Morse et al., Varieties of Clientelism.

58. At polling stations with a turnout between 60% and 69% (i.e. above the national average), Museveni got 70.9% of the vote; between 70% and 79%, he received 74.5% of the vote; and between 80% and 89%, he got 81.9% of the vote; National Democratic Institute, “Preliminary Analysis”; also Green, “Uganda Post-Election Report.”

59. Gans-Morse et al., Varieties of Clientelism.

60. Kramon, Vote-Buying and Political Behavior.

61. More positively, the percentage saying they do not fear “at all” of being a victim of violence increased from 33% to 45% from November to January as a reflection of generally violence-free campaigns.

62. The numbers decreased to 50% and 63%, respectively, in January.

63. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election, pp. 21–2.

64. During the campaigns, the UPDF did state that it would transfer its allegiances to another president if that were the outcome of the vote; Uganda Radio Network, “UPDF Re-assures Opposition of Non-Interference.” However, there were contradictory statements from army leaders and the UPDF has continued its allegiance to Museveni as its founder and historic leader of the NRA, from which it emerged.

65. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Preparing for the Polls.

66. Uganda Radio Network, “Museveni Ready to Hand Over Power.” In 2008, Museveni famously remarked: “I hunted and killed my animal, now they want me to go, where should I go?”; quoted in Katureebe, “Why Museveni Freed Rwaksisi.” Museveni has been quoted as saying that he cannot be removed “by a mere piece of paper (a ballot),” although the original citation cannot be readily found; Wilkerson, “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose.”

67. HURINET, Uganda Decides.

68. Malone, “Uganda Election War of Words.”

69. Conroy-Krutz and Logan, Museveni and the 2011 Election,” pp. 23–4.

70. Sserunjogi Mukiibi, Eriasa. “Afrobarometer Poll: A Possible Referendum on the Future of Opinion Polling in Uganda”, The Independent February 15, 2011. http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-story/3916-afrobarometer-poll.

71. Email communication with Norbert Mao, June 28, 2012; also Mwenda, “Need for Alternative Vision.”

72. In April–May 2011, “walk to work” protests led by the opposition to criticize the high cost of living and undermine the government resulted in hundreds of arrests, including key opposition leaders, and nine deaths as a result of the crackdown by police and army. They were followed by traders’ and teachers’ strikes as inflation hit over 30% in October, its highest level since January 1993.

73. Afrobarometer, Country Headed in the Wrong Direction.