Digging into the past: critical reflections on Rwanda's pursuit for a domestic mineral economy

Abstract

Since 2009, mineral development and trade strategies in the Great Lakes region of central Africa have been tied more closely to security rather than to economic development agendas. This shift has resulted largely from the emergence in 2009 of a ‘conflict minerals’ label coined by Western advocacy organizations, aimed at limiting armed groups access to mineral resources. The ‘conflict minerals’ debate perpetuates a dual single-story narrative to do with mining, namely: firstly, the single story of the region – one in which minerals, particularly those from artisanal and small-scale mining, are a source of capital for armed conflict and outside state building; and secondly, the single story of Rwanda – one in which the country compensates for its lack of significant mineral wealth by sourcing from neighbouring countries. This paper looks at Rwandan mining history prior to the genocide, and reforms since 2000, challenging the dual single-story narrative, and showing how a focus on the security imperative to delink mining from conflict poses severe limitations to the long-term growth of the these economies.

Keywords:

• Rwanda
• artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)
• ‘conflict minerals’
• Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
• peace-building
• greed
• informality

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr Miles Larmer and Dr Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt for their comments made on the initial draft of this paper. The author also wishes to thank Professor Gavin Hilson for several rounds of useful comments and edits; and the two anonymous peer reviewers and editorial team for their invaluable insights and patience in seeing this paper through to publication. The author thanks Dr Michael Biryabarema for permitting full access to the Rwandan Geology and Mining Department's archival records. Lastly, the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining (IOM3), which provided financial support for this research, is acknowledged.

Notes

1. Adichie, Danger of a Single Story.

2. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patriomonialism,” 2.

3. For a history of, for instance, the pivotal role played by l'Institut de Recherche Scientifique de l'Afrique Central (IRSAC), with one of its research stations in Rwanda, in fostering research in Rwanda, and linked to interdisciplinary research in the Great Lakes region, see Vansina, Living with Africa.

4. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patriomonialism,” 2.

5. There are exceptions such as Bidega, “Réorganisation de l'artisanat minier”; Uwizeyimana, “L'Activité Minière au Rwanda”; and van Teeffelen, EU Raw Materials Policy.

6. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patriomonialism,” 2.

7. Prunier, Africa's World War.

8. De Sa et al., “Beyond Illegality,” 8.

9. Lahiri-Dutt, “May God Give Us Chaos,” 16.

10. Concerning the DRC, see Vlassenroot and Raeymakers, “Politics of Rebellion and Intervention”; Perks, “Can I Go?”; and MacGaffey, Real Economy of Zaire.

11. Over 100 archival documents were studied in the context of writing this paper, ranging from consulting reports on the mineral economy; monthly, quarterly and annual reports of the ministries concerned with mining from 1970 to 1993, internal memos and travel reports within the ministry, parastatal and cooperative institutions linked at that time to the government; inter-ministerial correspondence between Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Trade and Industry, and Mining; two academic works by Rwandans; and geological maps and other types of geological data. In certain instances, the author was provided confidential data sources and thus these are referred to but not referenced.

12. The author resided at each mine site for a period of a week and combined morning life-history sessions with afternoon field observations at mine sites. Photographs and videos are archived with permission from the mine owners and participants.

13. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld following the University of Reading's confidentiality policies.

14. United Nations, Final Report of the UN Panel 2001.

15. Severine Autesserre provides an extremely useful summary of the lead up to the UN Panel report and the types of research and advocacy efforts that have ensured as a result. Given the scope of this paper, for those who wish to understand this history further, and the power of the ‘conflict minerals’ narrative, see Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales of the Congo,” 210–212.

16. Le Billon, “Natural Resource Types,” 21.

17. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil Conflict”; Keen, Economic Functions of Violence; Reno, Corruption and State Politics; and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States.

18. Ross, “What Do We Know?,” 338.

19. Ross, “What Do We Know?,” 338.; Le Billon, “Natural Resource Types,” 12.

20. Ross, “What Do We Know?,” 338

21. Kaplan, “Carats and Sticks,” 561.

22. For a range of instruments and mechanisms tried, see Le Billon, “Natural Resource Types.”

23. De Sa et al., “Beyond Illegality,” 6.

24. Perks, “Securitisation of the Mineral Development Agenda,” 8.

25. Muscarella Gooch, “Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds,” 195.

26. Muscarella Gooch, “Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds,” 190.

27. For instance, the challenge of implementation in largely informal mine settings with tightly controlled trade networks is explored in detail for Sierra Leone by Kaplan, “Carats and Sticks,” 599–604.

28. Perks, “Securitisation of the Mineral Development Agenda,” 10.

29. The Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision (Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act) requires companies to declare whether ‘conflict minerals’ (defined as cassiterite, columbite–tantalite, wolframite, gold or their derivatives originating from the DRC or an adjoining country) are found in their products, or if they are an integral part of the product's function. If so a company will be obliged to report on due diligence measures undertaken on the chain of custody. For a full version of the text, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf/. Accessed May 9, 2013.

30. Johnson, No Kivu, No Conflict, 6.

31. Dizolele, “Unintended Consequences of Dodd–Frank,” 2.

32. Aronson, “Unintended Consequences of Dodd–Frank,” n.p.

33. Reyntjens, “Privatization and Criminalization of Public Space,” 587.

34. Reyntjens unpacks the ‘complex, shifting and unpredictable geopolitical landscape’ of the Great Lakes region, showing how earlier grievances would unleash a tangle web of cross-border interventions in the region, and that ultimately the weakness of the Congolese state would make criminalization of trade networks possible. Thus one can argue that economic predation becomes a proxy but not a cause in and of itself of on-going civil instability; Reyntjens, “Privatization and Criminalization of Public Space.”

35. For a full report, see Channel Research, Amani Labda, Peace Maybe.

36. Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales of the Congo,” 205.

37. Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales of the Congo,” 211.

38. For an extensive overview of initiatives, see Perks, “How Can Public–Private Partnerships?” A further synopsis is found in Perks and Vlassenroot, “From Discourse to Practice.”

39. These two are the jointly funded World Bank and Department for International Development (DFID) Growth with Governance (PROMINES) programme in the DRC, and the capacity-building support provided under the Africa Governance Initiative to the mineral sector in Rwanda. Several partners are exploring new engagement in Burundi, but none is underway at the time of writing.

40. iTSCi is a mineral traceability and due diligence programme intended for tungsten, cassiterite and wolframite in Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda. At present it is operational in Rwanda and in select parts of the DRC. See: International Tin Research Institute “Towards a Responsible Cassiterite.”

41. See the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, signed by the member states at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), that does contain an ASM development component; and both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and the World Gold Council's Conflict-Free Gold Standard highlight the necessity to engage with ASM formalization.

42. Dizolele, “Unintended Consequences of Dodd–Frank,” 2.

43. The oldest preserved African iron furnace dates back to 689 BCE. It is said to originate from Gasiza in modern-day Muyunzwe District of Rwanda.

44. Uwizeyimana, “L'Activité Minière au Rwanda,” 152.

45. For full details of the three EICV surveys, see http://www.statistics.gov.rw/survey/integrated-household-living-conditions-survey-eicv. Accessed July 1, 2013. The first EICV completed in 2000 developed six categories of ‘poor’, defined using participatory methodology. For a full discussion of the survey results, see Howe and McKay, “Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods.” The two least poor categories included indicators such as the ability to send children to school, investment of extra income into other revenue-generating activities, possession of livestock, tiled-roof housing, and land. Outcomes of the life miners interviewed by this author resonate with these indicators, suggesting that, in fact, over time, mining may provide a stable pathway out of extreme poverty for rural populations in Rwanda.

46. Service des Mines, Repertoire des Exploitants Miniers, 7.

47. Service des Mines, Repertoire des Exploitants Miniers, 7.

48. See http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/rwanda-expects-to-double-revenue-from-mining-industry-on-new-tax#rshare=email_article. Accessed June 28, 2013.

49. A typical French expression used by Rwandan miners when referring to the first foreign mining operators.

50. Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda, 18, 21; Newbury, “Lake Kivu Trade,” 12.

51. Life History #5, Session 1, April 26, 2012.

52. Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 84.

53. Hilson, “Once a Miner, Always a Miner”; Banchirigah, “How Have Reforms Fuelled”; Maconachie and Binns, “‘Farming Miners’ or ‘Mining Farmers.’”

54. Life History #9, Session 3, May 3, 2012.

55. Fisher, “Occupying the Margins.”

56. Siegel and Veiga, “Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.”

57. Luning, “Liberalisation of the Gold Mining Sector.”

58. Siegel and Veiga, “Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.”

59. Siegel and Veiga, “Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining.”

60. Fisher, “Occupying the Margins.” 740.

61. Mahungiro, Discussion des Programmes Complementaires, n.p.

62. Whilst national participation in mining (through cooperatives and associations) had been legislated as early as 1964, by 1974 most small operations had either faded out or had been absorbed into the subcontracting model put in place by SOMIRWA.

63. Union National des Coopératives Artisanales Minières et Rwandaises (COPIMAR), 1990 Rapport Annuel des Activités, 18.

64. Campbell states that the objective of mineral reforms since the 1980s has been to ‘avoid state ownership and attract private investors’; Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process,” 201.

65. Van der Veen, Aide Memoire, n.p.

66. Interview with a stakeholder, Kigali, June 13, 2012.

67. Uwizeyimana, “L'Activité Minière au Rwanda,” 113.

68. COPIMAR, 1990 Rapport Annuel des Activités, 8.

69. Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, Le Plan Minéral du Rwanda, 445.

70. Service des Mines, Rwanda, Répertoire des Exploitants Miniers, 10.

71. Van der Veen, Aide Memoire, n.p.

72. These strategies differed from liberalization strategies that typically hinged on granting third-party traders buying licences, independent of any formal concession titles, as was the practice by this time in Zaire following its 1983 mining trade liberalization policies. For a review of the Zaire case study, see Perks, “Can I Go?”

73. Bicamumpaka, Rapport Trimestriel de REDEMI: avril–juin 1989; Bicamumpaka, Rapport Trimestriel de REDEMI: juillet–septembre 1989.

74. Bicamumpaka, Memorandum, 1.

75. Bicamumpaka, Memorandum, 3.

76. Bicamumpaka, Memorandum, 2.

77. Bicamumpaka, Memorandum, 2.

78. Mahungiro et al., Recherche de Cassiterite, n.p.

79. Mahungiro et al., Recherche de Cassiterite, 4.

80. Kangura, a monthly opinion magazine, makes this argument in its edition numbers 12 and 13, March and April 1991, respectively.

81. As expressed by Thomas Malthus, the idea that any country subsisting upon ‘a source of revenue furnished by other countries is infinitely more exposed to accidents of time and chance than one which produces its own’; Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population.

82. United Nations, Final Report of the UN Panel 2002, 32.

83. Van der Veen, Aide Memoire, n.p.

84. Confidential database.

85. Ministry of Natural Resources of Rwanda (MINIRENA), Revised Rwandan Mining Policy, 6–7.

86. The government has targeted 20% of its national gross domestic product (GDP) to derive from mining, through US$400 million-worth of export earnings per annum by 2017. This represents more than a doubling of 2011 results.

87. Luning, “Liberalisation of the Gold Mining Sector.”

88. Fédération des Coopératives Minières au Rwanda (FECOMIRWA), Statistiques de Production 2012, single Excel sheet.

89. Fédération des Coopératives Minières au Rwanda (FECOMIRWA), Statistiques de Production 2012, single Excel sheet.