The long road to institutionalization: the Kenyan Parliament and the 2013 elections

Abstract

What explains the emergence of a relatively strong legislature in Kenya in a region characterized by “rubber stamp” parliaments? And how do the results of the 2013 election affect the chances of continued strengthening and institutionalization of the Kenyan legislature? This paper addresses these questions by situating the evolution of parliamentary strength and institutionalization in Kenya in the context of the country's political history since independence. The argument advanced is that although the codification of the gains in parliamentary strength and independence only began to take place in the late 1990s, the process that led to the realization of these gains goes back to the first parliament after independence. The paper also analyzes the impact of the constitutional requirement of 50% plus one in the presidential race on party structures in different parts of the country. The findings suggest that while the 2013 elections were marked by a heightened sense of inter-regional alliance-building for the presidential race, at the sub-national level the effective number of parties increased in all regions relative to the 2007 election, with the exception of the Central Region.

Keywords:

• institutions
• parliament
• elections
• Kenya

Notes

1. Phrase from Tordoff and Molteno, “Government and Administration,” p. 254.

2. Business Daily, “Independent Body Should Vet Nominees.”

3. For discussions on the importance of legislatures as institutions of limited government, see North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment”; and Acemoglu et al. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause.”

4. Barkan and Matiangi, “Kenya's Tortuous Path,” p. 240.

5. Barkan, “African Legislatures,” p. 22.

6. The World Bank, Country Data: Kenya.

7. Barkan, “Legislatures on the Rise?,” p. 129.

8. Opalo, “Africa Elections,” p. 84.

9. Daily Nation, “House No Longer a Toothless Bulldog.”

10. Barkan, “African Legislatures”; see also the discussions in Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya.

11. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 15.

12. Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, 16.

13. Pitcher et al., “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism,” p. 127.

14. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p. 162.

15. Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?,” p. 342; Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship, pp. 97–9.

16. Wright and Escriba-Folch, “Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival,” p. 302; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival,” p. 1292.

17. Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, p. 10.

18. Slovik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, p. 4.

19. Roessler, “Enemy Within,” p. 302.

20. For discussions on the relative power of administrators vis-à-vis rulers, see Greif, “Impact of Administrative Power,” pp. 17–55.

21. Onoma, Politics of Property Rights Institutions, p. 6; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship, pp. 151–3.

22. Greif and Laitin, “Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” pp. 636–9.

23. Special Correspondent, “Realignment in Kenyan Politics,” pp. 14–15.

24. Bratton, “Formal Versus Informal Institutions.”

25. Posner and Young, “Institutionalization of Political Power,” p. 130; Opalo, “African Elections,” pp. 85–6; Bratton, “Formal Versus Informal Institutions,” pp. 108–9.

26. For an exploration of the importance of African legislatures in the democratization process, see Opalo, “African Elections.”

27. Polsby, “Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives.”

28. Cain et al., Personal Vote, p. 111.

29. For a discussion of the rise of incumbency advantage in the United States Congress, see Cox and Katz, “Why Did the Incumbency Advantage.”

30. The National Assembly of Kenya, Standing Orders.

31. Nakamura and Johnson, “Rising Legislative Assertiveness,” p. 18.

32. The phrase “agency in tight corners” is borrowed from Lonsdale, “Agency.”

33. Kirui and Murkomen, “Legislature,” p. 6.

34. Bienen, Kenya, p. 66.

35. Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, p. 247.

36. An often-ignored fact is that the appointment of Josephat Murumbi to replace Odinga was an attempt by Kenyatta, who realized the strength of the radical wing of KANU, to appease the radicals. Murumbi was a Pan-Africanist and a loose ally of Odinga who also sat on the board of the Lumumba Institute.

37. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, p. 40.

38. The Rice index is a measure of cohesion within an organization and takes values between 0 (impasse) and 100 (consensus); Stultz, “Parliament in a Tutelary Democracy,” pp. 106–7.

39. Branch and Cheeseman, “Politics of Control in Kenya,” p. 14.

40. Branch and Cheeseman, “Politics of Control in Kenya,”, pp. 23–4.

41. See the discussion in Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, pp. 125–43.

42. Gertzel, Government and Politics in Kenya, p. 10.

43. Gertzel, Politics of Independent Kenya, p. 138.

44. Widener, Rise of a Party-State in Kenya, pp. 143–5.

45. Throup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy,” p. 381.

46. Gertzel, Government and Politics in Kenya, p. 10.

47. This is according to the contents of various issues of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly.

48. These figures only include the elected Members of the 10th Parliament from the 210 constituencies.

49. Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette.

50. Besides five independent candidates, the other parties included Ford Kenya (ten candidates), KANU (6), Alliance Party of Kenya (5), New Ford Kenya (4), Federal Party of Kenya (3), Ford People (3), National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (3), Chama Cha Uzalendo (2), Kenya National Congress (2), Narc-Kenya (1), Maendeleo Party (1), People's Democratic Party (1), Muungano Party (1), and KADU Asili (1).

51. This is the number of registered parties in 2013 according to the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (IEBC).

52. Laakso and Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties,” pp. 4–9.

53. Proctor, “Role of the Senate,” p. 411.

54. The Standard, “Senate is Not Retirement Home of Sorts.”

55. Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth, pp. 99–129.