Governing ethnicity after genocide: ethnic amnesia in Rwanda versus ethnic power-sharing in Burundi

Abstract

A remarkable process of ethnic engineering has been taking place in neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda. After a failed democratization attempt in the early 1990s, both countries experienced an extremely violent transition process. Despite the many similarities between the two countries, they have adopted radically different approaches to address long-standing ethnic divisions. While Rwanda has opted for a policy based on ethnic amnesia and an integrationist policy centred around civic identity, Burundi has institutionalized its societal segmentation through ethnic power-sharing along the lines of Lijphart's consociational model. This comparative analysis explains the differences from two perspectives. On the one hand, in line with historical antecedents, ethnicity is engineered in a way that serves political elite interests. On the other hand, path dependency, in particular the modality of political transition in both countries, explains the notably divergent policies on ethnicity.

Keywords:

• ethnicity
• political transition
• consociationalism
• Burundi
• Rwanda

Notes

1. For example, Chrétien, L'invention de l'Afrique; Goyvaerts, Conflict and Ethnicity.

2. For example, Newbury, Cohesion of Oppression; Hiernaux, Caractères physiques.

3. For example, Mamdani, When Natives Becomes Killers.

4. This is the approach adopted by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and by other intergovernmental human rights bodies.

5. Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda.” See also various contributions in Guichaoua, Crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda.

6. For example, CIA, World Factbook. Accessed December 18, 2013.

7. UN General Assembly Resolution 1743 (XVI) of February 23, 1962. Five months later, the UN GA noted that ‘efforts to maintain the unity of Ruanda-Urundi did not succeed’; Resolution 1746 (XVI) of June 27, 1962.

8. For example, Harroy, Rwanda.

9. For example, Sebasoni, Origines du Rwanda.

10. For example, Nsanze, Burundi contemporain, pp. 115–49; Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, pp. 343–60.

11. Lemarchand and Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi.

12. République du Burundi, Livre blanc.

13. Huntington, Third Wave, pp. 124–5.

14. For example, the report of the International Commission of Inquiry, established in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1012 of August 28, 1995.

15. Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve.”

16. For excellent overviews, see Basedau, Managing Ethnic Conflict; and the chapters by Wolff, Reilly and Roeder in Wolff and Yakinthou, Conflict Management in Divided societies.

17. In more detail, see, for example, McGarry et al., “Integration or Accommodation?” The division into two schools obviously oversimplifies the rich and more nuanced literature.

18. For example, Berry, Culture and Equality.

19. Roeder, “Power-Dividing as an Alternative.”

20. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy.

21. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Also Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies.

22. International Crisis Group (ICG), Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse.

23. Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality.

24. This is the conclusion of a Wikileaked cable of the US Embassy in Kigali dated August 2008; “Ethnicity in Rwanda – Who Governs the Country?” http://rwandinfo.com/eng/ethnicity-in-rwanda-who-governs-the-country/. Accessed December 18, 2013.

25. Buckley-Zistel, “Remembering to Forget.”

26. Proportional representation systems are most often used in ‘new democracies’, whereas plurality systems (such as the first-past-the-post system) are, relatively speaking, more frequently used in ‘established democracies’; Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Electoral System Design, p. 30.

27. Stroh, “Electoral Rules of the Authoritarian Game.”

28. Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa, p. 101.

29. United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC), Summary Record, p. 3.

30. Republic of Rwanda, The Senate, Political Pluralism and Power Sharing.

31. In more detail, see Niesen, “Political Party Bans in Rwanda.”

32. United Nations General Assembly (UN GA), Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, p. 1.

33. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 53–103.

34. On Rwanda, see Vandeginste and Huyse, “Consociational Democracy for Rwanda,” pp. 108–13.

35. ICG, Burundi: Bye-Bye Arusha?

36. For example, Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History.”

37. Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence,” p. 699.

38. Lemarchand, Burundi, p. 108.

39. Allocution de Son Excellence le Docteur Grégoire Kayibanda, Président de la République Rwandaise prononcée à l'occasion du nouvel an 1973 (document on file with the author) (author's translation).

40. Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes, pp. 51–74.

41. See http://www.tutsi.org/aboutus/. Accessed December 18, 2013 (author's translation).

42. Vandeginste, “Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition.”

43. Bentley and Southall, African Peace Process, p. 75.

44. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, p. 73.

45. McCrudden and O'Leary, Courts and Consociations, p. 131. Also Kiwuwa, Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transition, pp. 116–58.

46. Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing.”

47. For an overview, see Hintjens, “Reconstructing Political Identities,” pp. 95–6.

48. Interview in Jeune Afrique, no. 2112 (July 3–9, 2001) (author's translation).

49. McLean Hilker, “Everyday Ethnicities.”