A view of a bureaucratic developmental state: local governance and agricultural extension in rural Ethiopia

Abstract

This article discusses the hybridism of the Ethiopian developmental state through an analysis of the local interface between the state and the peasantry. The aim is to explore to what extent bureaucratic rationality both conditions and perverts the procedures employed in the implementation of public rural development policies, in this case agricultural extension. And to what extent development policies can operate as an instrument of power that reinforces the local disempowerment of the most vulnerable peasants. The article makes a detailed analysis of the machinery of agricultural extension, the local conditions of distribution and reception of fertiliser and improved seeds in rural Ethiopia.

Keywords:

• local peasant-state interface
• technical package
• public policies
• rural governance
• Ethiopia

Notes

1. Weber, Economie et Société, 294.

2. De Waal, “The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi”; Lefort, “A Response to Alex De Waal.”

3. Hagmann and Péclard, Negotiating Statehood.

4. Hagmann and Péclard, Negotiating Statehood; Oliver de Sardan, Anthropologie et développement.

5. Weber, Economy and Society.

6. Bayart, « Le politique par le bas ».

7. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, p. 26.

8. Swyngedouw, “Authoritarian Governance.”

9. Emmenegger et al, “Decentralization to the Household.”

10. Segers et al., “Be like Bees.”

11. Lefort, “Free Market, ‘Developmental State’ and Party-state Hegemony.”

12. For details see Davis et al., In-depth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System; Shahidur et al., Fertilizer in Ethiopia; Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, In Search of a Strategy, Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”

13. See Chinigo, “Agrarian Transformation” or Dessalegn Rahmato, Peasant and the State on land titling; Lavers, “Food Security” or Fekadu Nigussa and Mberengwa, Challenges of PSNP on SafetyNet; Emmenegger, Sibilo Keno, and Hagmann, “Decentralization to the Household” or Abbink, “Ethnic-based Federalism on Decentralization”; and Teferi Abate Adem, “Green Revolution” or Kassa Belay, “Constraints to Agricultural Extension on Agricultural Extension Itself.”

14. See Scott, Seeing like a State, on the administrative ordering of society as a State simplification.

15. See Foucault, on the disciplinary power in Il faut défendre la société.

16. Markakis, The Last Two Frontiers, Clapham, “Controlling Spaces.”

17. For a non-exhaustive overview on rural imbalance of powers, see: Lefort, “Powers-mengist and Peasants,” or, on the connection between mengist and gabare; Woldeab Teshome, “Irrigation Practices,” Vaughan and Tronvoll, “The Culture of Power on the Mechanisms of Domination”; Segers et al., “Developers and Farmers,” or Teferi Abate Adem on conflations of powers; Poluha, “Learning Political Behaviour,” or Segers et al., “Be like Bees for Vehicles of Peasant's Mobilisation.”

18. Clapham, “Controlling Space”; Pausewang, “No Environmental Protection without Local Democracy.”

19. See Vaughan, “Revolutionary Democratic State-building”; Lefort, “Free Market for Model Farmers,” or Chinigo, in “Agrarian Transformation,” for ‘1 to 5’ groups.

20. Sikor and Lund, “Access and Property.”

21. Dessalegn Rahmato, The Peasant and the State; Aspen, “Models of Democracy.”

22. Lefort, “Free Market, or, Powers-mengist and Peasants.”

23. Segers et al., “Farmers and Developers.”

24. A similar approach has been developed on Rwanda, see Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret, “Agricultural Innovation.”

25. Woldeab Teshome, “Irrigation Practices,” State intervention and Farmer's Life-worlds.

26. The MoARD represents a “superministry” (Vaughan, 2011), because it coordinates all rural development initiatives but also because its close ties to local kebele government (Pausewang, 2002).

27. See Olivier de Sardan “A la recherche des normes pratiques.”

28. Chibber, “Bureaucratic Rationality.”

29. See Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine.

30. Mainly vis-à-vis PNSP, Productive SafetyNet Program, and their food distribution. For details see Lavers, “Food Security,” or Fekadu Nigussa and Mberengwa, Challenges of PSNP.

31. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 289.

32. The surveys were carried out as part of a Ph.D. (from 1999 to 2001) then a research programme conducted in collaboration with Institute of Research for Development/French Centre for Ethiopian Studies/Addis-Ababa University (from 2010 to 2012).

33. The use of fertiliser was introduced in Ethiopia by the Food and Agriculture Organisation in the late 1960s, but only really developed in the mid-1990s. For a more detailed history of agricultural policies, see Kassa Belay, “Constraints to Agricultural Extension Work”; Davis et al., In-depth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System; Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”

34. Shahidur Rashid et al., Fertilizer in Ethiopia; Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, In Search of a Strategy: Rethinking Agriculture-led Growth in Ethiopia; Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”

35. Shahidur Rashid, Fertilizer in Ethiopia.

36. Growth and Transformation Plan.

37. Only a DA can approve these arrangements and guarantee their agronomic suitability.

38. On the large scale, there are very sharp variations between weredas, kebeles and, of course, between farms. In Eastern Tigray, the proportion of fertiliser beneficiaries thus varies between 73% of all householders in Ganta Afeshum wereda and only 36% in the neighbouring Kulo Mukheda wereda. In Wolaita (Damot Sore wereda), where the average proportion of farmers using fertiliser is 58%, percentages vary from 38% to 91% between one kebele and another (surveys, April 2011).

39. Kassa Belay, “Constraints to Agricultural Extension Work.”

40. Scott, Weapons of the Weak.

41. Interview, Western Tigray, 2012.

42. See the confusion between Party's supporter and volunteer in the Program, in Teferi Abate Adem, “The Local Politics of Ethiopia's Green Revolution.”

43. See onions cultivators observed by Lefort, “In Free Market, ‘Developmental State’ and Party-state Hegemony” or Khat producers in our enquiry.

44. Migdal, State in Society.

45. The MoARD physical encadrement is presented in Planel, “Usage de l'engrais en politique.”

46. Weber, Economy and Society.

47. Teferi Abate Adem notes in “The Local Politics of Ethiopia's Green Revolution,” that “they were concerned more with the political consequences of not fulfilling the required quota than with its economic outcome.”

48. Dom and Carter, “The Role of the ‘Government Go-betweens.’”

49. Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and Training College.

50. Interview, Abela Gefata, Humbo, Wolaita, April 2011.

51. Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, In Search of a Strategy: Rethinking Agricultural-led Growth in Ethiopia, 3: “Fertilizer use has moved more than 40% of land area cultivated with cereals, but selected seeds only cover less than 5%.”

52. Interview, North Shewa, Amhara, February 2011.

53. Interview, Shasge kebele, Metema wereda, North Gondar, 2011.

54. Overcrossing of traditional institutions and states administration are frequent. See Vaughan for Tigray in “Revolutionary-democratic State Building.”

55. Interview Kalakel Tatokoraro, East Tigray, July 2012.

56. Chinigo, “Decentralization and Agrarian Transformation.”

57. Interview, Amara Biyo kebele, Shashura wereda, West Amhara, 2011.

58. Arriola, “Ethnicity and Opposition Support.”

59. Markakis, Ethiopia, the Last Two Frontiers.

60. Interview, Oumaïdota, Afambo, Afar, February 2012.

61. See also, Fasil and Habtemariam, “Assessment of the Current Extension System”; Kassay Belay, “Constraints to Agricultural Extension Work”; Spielman, Kelemework, and Alemu, “Seed, Fertilizer and Agricultural Extension.”

62. Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”

63. Interview, Wolaita, SNNPR, 2011.

64. Interview, Gununo, Damot Sore, Wolaita, December 2011.

65. Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, Rethinking Agriculture-led Growth; Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”

66. Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, Rethinking Agriculture-led Growth; Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification.”.

67. Woldeab Teshome, “Irrigation Practices.”

68. Interview, D., Leinsha kebele, Metema wereda, North Gondar, Amhara, 2011.

69. According to our surveys, criticisms at the collective meetings are confined to the productivity outcomes associated with the Package, and there is no mention of the debt that it sometimes causes, an issue that is not aired publicly. The responses by MoARD officials are therefore restricted to the way the farmers use the Package, in particular their failure to use sufficient quantities of fertiliser.

70. Interview, A., Genta Afeshum kebele, Bete Hawariat-Sassun wereda, Eastern Tigray 2012.

71. Agere selam tabia, tataruba kushet, Kulo Mukheda wereda.

72. Spielman et al., “Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification,” and Spielman, Kelemework, and Alemu, “Seed, Fertilizer and Agricultural Extension.”

73. For details see Shahidur Rashid et al., Fertilizer in Ethiopia; Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, In Search of a Strategy: Rethinking Agriculture-led Growth in Ethiopia.

74. For details see Shahidur Rashid et al., Fertilizer in Ethiopia; Dercon, Vargas Hill, and Zeitin, In Search of a Strategy: Rethinking Agriculture-led Growth in Ethiopia.

75. Scott, Seeing like a State, 6.

76. Planel, La chute d'un Eden éthiopien.

77. Scott, Weapons of the Weak.

78. Some of the poorest peasants or those most reluctant to buy fertiliser from the MoARD, buy their neighbours’ surplus fertiliser on the market.

79. In reality, on old improved barley varieties.

80. Various interviews, 2011 and 2012.

81. Interview, Washa kebele, Shasura wereda, West Amhara, 2011.

82. Planel, La chute d'un Eden éthiopien.

83. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance on the “hidden transcripts.”

84. Interview, A., Genta Afeshum, Bete Hawariat-Sassun, Eastern Tigray 2012.

85. Interview, N., Alaye, Kalalel, East Tigray, 2012.